CURRENT
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Editors
Prof. Dr. Redzep Škrijelj
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Social Sciences and Humanities is a field that studies the human and social aspects of the world and life and includes many branches of science. Social and human sciences, which have developed by humanbeings from past to present in an effort to understand both themselves and physical and human environment in which they live, are the products of modern enlightenment thought. These sciences which emerged with the need to explain scientifically and control the changes in political, economic, cultural, etc. social structures which occured after the Industrial Revolution, have strengthened their place in the historical process by using new methodologies.

In this context, various disciplines emerging in the field of social sciences and humanities have been institutionalized to explain different aspects of reality based on experimental findings, analytical, critical or speculative methods and to produce objective knowledge. The usefulness of social sciences and humanities, which are becoming more and more important every day in the world, is only possible with the cooperation of different disciplines they embody. This book aims to contribute to both the society and the relevant literature with the cooperation at stake.

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PREFACE

Social Sciences and Humanities is a field that studies the human and social aspects of the world and life and includes many branches of science. Social and human sciences, which have developed by humanbeings from past to present in an effort to understand both themselves and physical and human environment in which they live, are the products of modern enlightenment thought. These sciences which emerged with the need to explain scientifically and control the changes in political, economic, cultural, etc. social structures which occured after the Industrial Revolution, have strengthened their place in the historical process by using new methodologies.

In this context, various disciplines emerging in the field of social sciences and humanities have been institutionalized to explain different aspects of reality based on experimental findings, analytical, critical or speculative methods and to produce objective knowledge. The usefulness of social sciences and humanities, which are becoming more and more important every day in the world, is only possible with the cooperation of different disciplines they embody. This book aims to contribute to both the society and the relevant literature with the cooperation at stake. This book titled "Academic Studies in Social and Human Sciences" prepared by Livre de Lyon publishing house includes descriptive and critical studies in the fields of sociology, art and communication science. We would like to thank the authors who contributed to the creation of the book with their valuable studies and who evaluated the works meticulously by acting as a referee, and we wish the book to be propitious.

Prof. Dr. Redzep Škrijelj & Asst. Prof. Dr. Rasim Berker Bank

Editors

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CHAPTER I

INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

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1. Introduction

Communication (Adler & Rodman, 2006; Anderson, 1996; Aydoğan, 2015; Alemdar & Erdoğan, 1994; Aziz, 1982; Chaiken, 1979; Chandler & Muday, 2011; Cohen, 1958; Çamdereli, 2008; Defleur & Rokeach, 1982; Fejes, 1984; Günther & Domahidi, 2017; Hall, 1983; Hardt, 1992; Köker, 2007; McLuhan, 1977; Mowlana, 1995; Rosengren, 2006; Schramm & Riley, 1951; Tokgöz, 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Zıllıoğlu, 1993; Ziller, 1958) is a conscious or unconscious, intentional or unintentional process in which feelings and ideas are expressed as verbal and/or nonverbal messages, which are sent, received, and comprehended. Communication is dynamic, continuous, irreversible, interactive, and contextual (Berlo, 1960: 18). A person can be aware of sending a message, for instance, when you sit down with your best friend to discuss a serious problem. Therefore, communication can be conscious and intentional. You plan what you want to say because you want to ensure that is no doubt of the consequences of the situation. Or you can react with an unintentional facial expression that you are unaware of as when your boss tells you that he would like you to work overtime, but you have a date and want to leave on time; communication can be unconscious and unintentional. We call communication dynamic since it is in a constant state of flux, modification, or change. The participant's attitudes, values, and skills change, the context changes, and so do the messages. Communication is continuous because it never stops. It is irreversible as you cannot take what you say back. Also, communication is interactive and contextual. Communicators adapt as both people continually interact with each other. The words and actions of one person affect the responses of the other, which in turn affect the first person, and so on (Berko et al. 2010). There are many kinds of communication. This chapter describes interpersonal communication with its types and essential elements, and addresses some research conducted in the field in the discussion.

2. Interpersonal Communication

Interpersonal communication (Barbour & Goldberg, 1974; Beebe et al., 2008; Cappela, 1987; Devito, 2013; Floyd, 2011; Gamble & Gamble, 2014; Gao, 2011; Gökdağ, 2016; Hill et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2007; Leary, 1957; Millar & Rogers, 1976; Mutlu, 2008; Myers et al., 1995; Özodaşık, 2009; Paulsel & Mottet, 2004; Roloff, 1981; Rubin et al., 1992; Sullivan, 1953; Trenholm & Jensen, 2000) is an ongoing process rather than an event or series of events. When you think of an event, you usually think of something very definite which has a definite start and a definite finish. It can be misleading to think of interpersonal communication in this way. There are a number of more academic arguments which emphasize the importance of understanding intercultural communication as a continuous unfolding process (Hartley, 1999: 26). "Interpersonal communication is what occurs in interpersonal communication systems. These systems are distinguished from other communication systems in terms of function, structure, and process, but primarily in terms of function. Function is the leading aspect because communication systems, like naturally occurring, are generally assumed to "work" in some way. The basic function of such a system thus becomes a starting point itself, requiring no explanation, which can be called upon to explain other futures of the system. In that sense, function explains structure and process, so interpersonal communication, first of all, gets defined by its unique function, which is to regulate consensus regarding individual self-concepts (Cushman & Cahn, 1985: 16)."

According to Solomon & Theisis (2013: 9), "interpersonal communication is a continuous process. Even when one partner is speaking, the other is communicating through body position, eye contact, and facial expressions. It is also a dynamic process because meanings change and unfold over time, and previous messages affect how subsequent messages are created and understood. Interpersonal communication is consequential. It has consequences-in other words, it produces outcomes. When people actively use interpersonal communication to accomplish a goal, those consequences are deliberate. For instance, you might use interpersonal communication to persuade a classmate to help you with a paper, to resolve a conflict with a sibling, or to cheer up a friend. At other times, consequences are unintentional. For example, without realizing it, you might put down a co-worker, insult a classmate, or hurt a romantic partner. The consequences of intercultural communication, intended or unintended, can take a variety of forms, such as learning, helping, influencing, relating, and playing."

Interpersonal communication, as Gürüz & Eğinli states (2019: 49), is within the study fields of disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, social psychology, and communication. While interpersonal

communication is social rules, norms, and roles from the sociology perspective, the psychological perspective focuses on the psychological characteristics, health and well-being, and cognitive and emotional structures of people. With the perspective of communication, it includes human communication, and human interacting with all its characteristics, it is considered in terms of developing-changing relationships over time and the results of these relationships.

3. Types of Interpersonal Communication

Interpersonal communication types can mainly be divided into two groups: verbal and non-verbal communication. According to Taşdemir (2017: 164), there are some social characteristics that affect the way people use verbal and non-verbal communication they establish with each other. Some of these features are congenital, and some are required later in social life. People build their communication on these perceived features. It is known that many different factors play a role in interpersonal communication in terms of their degree of effect. These effects of these factors are also different. It is the context that determines which of these factors will be more effective during the communication established. The context, which consists of two basic elements, that is, time and place, enables us to make sense of the communication that takes place. The meaning of a spoken word, a physical movement, or an object used is only possible by knowing the context. In other words, every event becomes meaningful in the time and place it happens. Whether it is verbal or non-verbal no event and communication can be evaluated independently of the time and place it occurs.

Verbal Communication

Verbal communication is a dimension of human communication (Frank, 2000; Taşer, 2004; Vural, 2005; Zıllıoğlu, 1993). Although Aristotle uttered the phrase "Man is a talking animal," the most important feature that distinguishes man from animals is his ability to communicate with symbols and the complex language system he has developed. People can transfer their feelings, thoughts, and knowledge thanks to language. There are many evaluations about the birth of the language; language is the ability of the social human being, which is defined to be social being, to live together, function in coordination, and most importantly to be understood in order to overcome the inability to be alone in the nature. We find a language system ready at our birth, make sense of the world in it, and we enrich, change, and transform the language ourselves. While language creates important resources for our social coexistence, it also sets limits that determine the way we understand and comprehend the world. Thus, we perceive the world in a certain hierarchy and order. This brings along the perception, and expression of the culture, ideology, and

the system we were born into. However, man does not only use language, he also changes, transforms, and enriches it. Each generation differentiates the language with new transformations and changes so as to express itself. (Eriş, 2012: 21).

In the interpersonal communication process, especially in face-to-face communication, verbal communication meets the principle of unity "at the same time and place," and with the development of communication technologies, people can communicate their verbal expressions with various tools regardless of place and time. Whether it is established with or without a tool, a language is constantly used when speaking and listening in verbal communication. This language usually allows people to get along with each other. Every society produces and uses the necessary words according to its specific conditions. In other words, the lexical resource of the language in a certain society and period is related to the cultural life of that society. Words are not what they are spoken of, they are the signs and sound that represent them, and they gain existence and value in their use (Uztuğ, 2003: 88).

Non-Verbal Communication

Communication between people can take place in two forms; verbally and non-verbally (Argyle, 1996; Berman, 1999; Çizgen, 1994; Gombrich, 1992; Knapp & Hall, 1997; Leathers, 1997). In other words, it is possible to use one or both of these two forms in social interaction (Öztekin, 2016: 53). Communication established by people both verbally and non-verbally also emerges as a social need. Communication that takes place via both speech and body gestures is achieved through learning and mediatic construction in the socialization process, and it develops and consolidates with the individual over time and remains dependant on the environment, time, and culture in which he grows up and develops. In this context, both words and movements must have common patterns for the source and target audience. As is known, words and movements affect each other. Gestures put together with the words and body movements, such as body posture and voice also increase or decrease the effect of the spoken word, make it better understood, or change the meaning of the word (Poyraz, 2018: 43). Facial and body expressions are made with or without intention. People transmit certain meanings to each other through intended expressions. Nodding, raising eyebrows in the sense of "no" or expressing indifference by shrugging shoulders are examples of intended non-verbal communication. Even though such expressions are not verbal, they are synonyms with the expressions used in verbal expression. Therefore, the intended expressions, like languages may differ from culture to culture. For instance, in Turkey, raising the head from front to back means no, whereas in western countries, those who want to say no shake their heads.

"A while ago, a neighbour of mine who lived in Germany for many years made me a "come" gesture from a distance. When I got to her, I realized that she hadn't called me over. It turned out that the sign she made only meant "hello." When we want to say hello, we open our hands, raise them at the shoulder level, and shake them slightly from side to side. That gesture conveys different meanings in two different cultures. That is why we must accept such movements made by the face and the body as non-verbal language (Dökmen, 2011: 46)."

The first thing that draws attention when we meet any human being is the other person's appearance, smile, and liveliness in their eyes. Then we begin to see the person's behaviour. Perceptual information, such as the speech, tone of voice, and movements enable us to have a thought about that person. When we communicate, we get 90% of their lasting impressions within the first 30 seconds. When we first meet, we make positive or negative judgements about the person we communicate. We can decide whether the person is friend or foe. The first positive or negative judgement determines the scope or perception direction of the other characteristics of the person (Aytaç, 2000: 122). Non-verbal communication is the presentation of the image of ourselves or by which we appear to others. The judgements reached by the receivers from the images we present build a good part of the impression. The success of non-verbal behaviours in the way we present ourselves depends on the degree of harmony and interactivity of all non-verbal messages. Non-verbal signs make the first impression of someone's role in the receiver. According to some research, non-verbal messages carry a heavy load of burden of the first impression. Non-verbal signs that are particularly responsible for the formation of the first impression are physical appearance and sound characteristics. People can even read our personality based on our body type. Our body shape is a sign in the communication process, which greatly affect the first impression of new acquaintances (Burgoon & Guerrero, 1994: 152).

4. Elements of Interpersonal Communication
Sender- Receiver

The source is the participant who enables interpersonal communication by initiating and continuing communication, and receiver is the one who interprets the sent messages. According to Işık & Biber (2006: 13), the main purpose of the source, being the first basic component of communication, is to influence the target audience. The source may want to change, transform, or reinforce the emotions, thoughts, attitudes, and behaviour of the target audience through the message transmission. For this reason, persons, institutions, or organizations at the resource position should be able to quickly comprehend the relationships between events to make accurate decisions,

and to express their feelings and thoughts in a fluent, rational, and effective manner. To Mısırlı (2004: 5), there is often expected attitude behaviour from the target in the content of the message sent by the source. In addition to fully perceiving and analyzing the messages sent, when the target shows the predicted behaviours, it is safe to say that a truly effective communication is achieved.

Coding-Encoding

Code is a system of meaning owned and shared by the members of a culture. Codes consist of rules and agreements that determine in what contexts and how indicators are to be used and how they can be put together to create more complex messages (Fiske, 2011: 94). Coding in interpersonal communication is the way messages are produced and made appropriate. Coding is the understanding of information, feelings, and thoughts through various symbols. Both coding and encoding are involved in communication. Encoding is messages becoming meaningful. It is the process when the messages sent by the source are deciphered and interpreted by the receiver.

Channel

Messages are carried through channels. The way a message is transmitted from the source to the receiver is called channel. Devito states, (2013: 13) communication rarely takes place over solely one channel. Generally, two, three, or four channels are used at once in communication behaviour. For example, in face-to-face communication, participants speak and listen (audio-auditory channel), at the same time they send information via non-verbal messages (moving-visual channels), and emit odour and smell others (chemical-odour audio channel). When communicating online, participants often post photos, audio, or video files.

Message

One element of communication is message. In its simplest form, any information, emotion, and thought that the source sends to the target audience through a channel is called a message. In the communication process, messages are created and coded by the source and sent to the target audience through a channel. In the message creation phase, socio-cultural characteristics, such as age, gender, and income-education status of the target audience should be taken into account (Işık, 2019: 13). "We negotiate the meaning we derive from interpersonal communication by sending and receiving verbal and non-verbal messages. Whom we speak to, what we choose to speak about, what we do as we interact, the words we use, the sound of our voices, our posture, our facial expressions, our touch, and even our smell constitute the message or the content of our

communication. Everything we do as a sender or a receiver has a potential message value for the person with whom we are interacting or for someone observing the interaction (Interpersonal Communication: A First Look, n.d: 8)."

Feedback

In the process of interpersonal communication, the reaction and messages given in the context of what the source says are called feedback. Here, there is a displacement of the source and the receiver. The source rearranges the message and generates a new message. While the receiver creates feedback, he becomes the source, and the source becomes the receiver. Feedback can be verbal and non-verbal, positive-negative, immediate, or delayed. Positive feedback implies approval, whereas negative feedback is a sign of ineffectiveness. A yes or no answer to a question is verbal feedback, while nodding is a non-verbal feedback.

Feedforward

Feedforward is when the source sends information about the message before sending the original message. With the feedforward, we have an idea about the future messages. The preface at the beginning of a book is an example to feedforward. This subject was firstly addressed by Malinowski (1923) in his wok "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" as the term phatic communication to express previously submitted information.

Noise

In interpersonal communication, any element that prevents understanding of the message can be called noise. Loud noise is an example of physical noise, and impaired vision is an example to physiological noise. Psychological noise includes prejudices and preconceptions, and information overload or underload is the intellectual noise. Last but not least, language and dialectical differences can be called as semantic noise.

Context

The setting in which the act of communicating takes place is context. According to Erdoğan (2011: 49), communication is the necessary condition for the realization of all ongoing human relationships; it happens in real time and place, and it can only be perceived correctly in the context in which it occurs. Context includes all the factors that determine the nature of communication. Therefore, the context of communication describes a unity that consists of many contexts. That is, contexts are not independent of each other; all of the contexts determine the nature of that communication and relationship. All

the current and past factors constitute the context of the communication and the nature of the relationship. Context is the historical, social, cultural, economical, and psychological content of the communication.

5. Discussion

It is seen in the literature that interpersonal communication is analyzed in various contexts and variables. Kukko et al. (2020) conducted a research using the quantitative descriptive research method. The data were collected from 149 health care students to describe the perceptions of these students' interpersonal communication competence. The results show that simulations used in the research affected participants' interpersonal communication competences positively.

Martin & MacDonald (2020) investigated the communication strategies applied by individual scientists and environmental and non-governmental organizations on Twitter and Instagram. The results demonstrate that the application of interpersonal communication strategies encourage non-conversational engagement in terms of the number of comments and unique individuals involved in conversations.

Li et al. (2020) probed negative deviation effect in interpersonal communication. They explored whether there is a negative deviation effect in the estimate of the impression people left on others in short interpersonal communication, and they investigated the potential psychological mechanisms on that effect. The results revealed that a negative deviation effect existed not just because people are too focused on their own-negative thoughts in conversational performance but rather because people had a psychological defence towards others in their first communication.

First et al. (2020) had a structural equation model tested the direct and indirect relationships of a variety of proximity variables including COVID-19 exposure, media use (traditional and social), and interpersonal communication on stress and depression with a U.S. sample of 1,545 adults. Results showed that COVID-19 exposure had a direct effect on stress and an indirect effect on stress and depression through media use (traditional and social) and interpersonal communication.

Dewi et al. (2020) analyzed the role of interpersonal communication in moderating the influence of work competence and work stress on employee performance. A closed questionnaire was used with 103 employees. According to the results of the study, competency variable had a significant effect on employee performance, and interpersonal communication variable did not moderate the influence of work competence on employee performance.

Brown et al. (2020) investigated whether interpersonal communication skills are predictive of occupational therapy students' resilience or not. The participants of the study were 135 undergraduate occupational therapy students, who completed Interpersonal Communication Competence Scale. As a result of the study, interpersonal communication was found to be a significant predictor of resilience in occupational therapy students.

Afriyanti et al. (2019) used a cross-sectional design with a purposive sampling technique for 126 participants in their research to find out correlations between drug use, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), and interpersonal communication on sexual risk behaviour. Data were collected by five-part questionnaire. The results showed that significant correlation between interpersonal communication behaviour patterns and sexual risk behaviour.

6. Conclusion

It is safe to say as Berger states, "interpersonal communication theory and research have shown explosive growth and along multiple dimensions since the field's inception during the post World War II period. The interpersonal communication domain's scope of interest has not only broadened immensely since these early days, researchers working in such seemingly unrelated areas of communication science as mass communication, organizational communication, and communication technology have drawn heavily on conceptual frameworks and research advanced by interpersonal communication scholars. Moreover, interpersonal communication processes have become significant research foci in several applied areas (Berger, 2014: 4)." Interpersonal communication research is based on the assumption that the nature of interaction between social actors derives from their mutual perceptions of words and actions. Interpersonal communication, thus, entails all behaviour-verbal and non-verbal-that takes place during interaction. The key element in interpersonal communication is interpersonal relationship and the central focus of study in interpersonal relationship is the nature and quality of interaction between participants. Interaction is a process that develops over time and entails practices, such as turn-taking, interruptions, topic shifts, disclosures, and confirmations. The quality of interaction in a given situation may be enhanced or hampered by variables, such as complementarity (a reciprocal interaction in which the actions and words of one interactant suit or help to complete those of the other) divergence (whereby interaction orientates toward separate directions), convergence (whereby interaction orientates toward coming together), and compensation (whereby interaction involves interactants filling in gaps or making up for the failings of the others) (Oyeleye, 2005: 385). Interpersonal relationship is the exchange of information, emotions,

meanings, thoughts, and ideas. It consists of verbal and non-verbal communication. Sender-receiver, coding-encoding, channel, message, feedback, feedforward, noise, and context are the elements of interpersonal communication. As it can be seen in the literature, it has been a popular and multidisciplinary study area, which includes psychology, sociology, medicine, anthropology, social psychology, and psychiatry.

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CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF POPULISM THROUGH THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

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1. Introduction

The concept of populism is historically traced back to the Narodnik movement in the Tsarist Russia and the People's Party in the USA. Populist movements in the 19th century emerged as a result of peasant revolts against rapid modernization and changes in the social structure (Müller, 2019: 34). Unlike the 19th century versions, populism became a concept used to describe the political leaders and movements that came to power especially in Latin America in the 20th century. In the 21st century, populism has ceased to be a style of politics peculiar to a specific region and turned into a "global phenomenon" (Moffitt, 2020: 18). In recent years, especially with the rise of the far-right in the form of a single leader, party or movement in different countries or with the increasing popular support it has gained, populism has risen globally and occupied the center of political debate again. Many theorists who study populism discuss this rise of populism in the context of the concepts of "populist Zeitgeist", "populism age", "populist wave", "populist resurgence" and "populist moment". Of course, behind the global rise of populism is the fact that the styles of populist figures, who are influential in different geographies of the globe from Europe to Asia, from Africa to Latin America, in shaping contemporary politics display a variety of common points. Although populists have a different course in terms of their strategies, ideologies, discourse and political logic, they have some common historical conditions that cause their rise. The most important historical condition for the transformation of populism into a global phenomenon is that populism and crises coincide with the same historical period, or in other words, crises have an effect that facilitates populists' coming to power. Approaches that associate populism with crises point to the crisis of political representation, rapid social transformations, and the opportunities created by crises, and emphasize the ground that crises lay for populist rise. Although crises correspond to an external phenomenon

that causes populism to become a common phenomenon or to accelerate, it would be a more correct approach to see crises as an internal feature of populism rather than as an external phenomenon (Moffitt, 2020: 176-177). In other words, it can be said that populism can be seen as a result of certain types of crises, as well as a phenomenon that causes the crisis itself to deepen and be reproduced. There are three crises with economic, political and cultural dimensions underlying the global rise of populism in recent years. The first is the crisis of liberal democracy, the second is the crisis of neoliberalism, and the third is the crisis of increasing globalization. Two important phenomena cause liberal democracies to go into a crisis. The first is that the balance of security and freedom in liberal democracies is broken on behalf of security policies, the rule of law and human rights are suspended, and the state of emergency regimes undermine democracy by transforming into a rule rather than an exception. The other is that liberal institutions and values are brought up for discussion by populist leaders, parties or movements. These two tendencies have deepened the crisis of liberal democracy. It is possible to see the rise of populism as a phenomenon that causes the crisis of liberal democracy to deepen, but it is also possible to see it as the revival of a non-liberal democracy based on the principle of popular sovereignty and political structures and institutions that have lost their legitimacy. For this reason, populism has been on the rise as a style of politics that lives on the crisis of liberal democratic values that have already entered into crisis and at the same time causes the growth of this crisis. The second important point in the rise of populism is the destruction caused by neoliberal economic policies in the public sphere. Neoliberal effects such as income distribution injustice at a global scale, insecurity, privatization of public resources, and disintegration of social networks have brought about the crisis of governance of society. Behind the reason why populist politics coming to power, there are policies that will make the social destruction created by neoliberalism manageable. At the basis of the emphasis and social support of populist politics aimed at the local and the people, there is a kind of liberation story embodied in the leader's political personality. Another factor in the rise of populist politics is the crisis of increasing globalization. As the basic discourses of populist politics include such discourses as increasing globalization destroying the differences between the local and the universal, global migration movements bringing along multinational states, the presence of immigrants weakening the national identity, the tensions created by the multi-ethnic working life, the sense of loneliness caused by individualization, and the nationalist reactions to the erosion of national identities, they are directly related to the phenomenon of globalization. This study argues that the main driving factors behind the rise of populist politics on a global scale, albeit with different motives and different

names, are the crisis of liberal democracy, the crisis of neoliberal policies and the crisis of globalization, and that populism is not an accidental response to the "crisis in the governance apparatus" resulting from these crises above, but that it is a style of politics that causes these crises to deepen.

2. Populism as the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

The relationship between liberalism and democracy harbours various tensions from the very beginning. Liberalism claims that society consists of atomized and rational individuals, that any authority over the individual must be rejected, that the free market economy is based on a spontaneous order, and therefore the state that has the monopoly of power over the individual must be limited. Therefore, for a long time, the liberal tradition has acted with an approach aimed at protecting the public (individual) against the external interventions of the rulers that disrupt the property of the individual and the functioning of the free market rather than establishing a government based on popular sovereignty (Berktay, 2008: 67). Democracy, on the other hand, is the rule of demos by its classical definition. Only a people can rule. So, how will atomized and self-interested individuals become a people? It is precisely this inner tension that underlies the tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberals claim that the sovereignty of the people should be limited, as they give priority to individual autonomy, based on the principle of human rights and the rule of law. This is because, for the liberal theory, the rule of the people has the potential to eventually transform into the tyranny of the majority. Early liberals defined democracy and suffrage in terms of limited property owners, white and male subjects, and argued that the people as a whole would not be part of the democracy. Utilitarian thinkers that emerged in the 19th century liberal tradition, on the other hand, took the universal suffrage as the principle that would allow everyone to determine what is "best" for him/her. Democracy was formulated as "providing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people" (Berktay, 2008: 69). Of course, throughout the 19th century, democracy and parliamentarism were constructed as synonymous to one another. In this respect, democracy assumed a representational character, in which decision makers do not directly decide. The parliament was seen as an area where the nation's sovereignty (popular sovereignty) was concretized. Elections, on the other hand, were seen as a form of competition for the seat in the parliament. While liberal representative democracy was seen as the true realization of popular sovereignty and the rule of the demos in different country experiences, in the case of many countries' experiences it led to a political composition in which a limited political elite seized power. This formal aspect of democracy has taken the form of a dominant paradigm since the second

half of the 20th century, and the parliament, elections, political institutions, rule of law, freedom of organization and thought, and multi-party life that allows different political views to compete, have been seen as indicators of democracy (Köker, 2008: 11). In this respect, liberal democracy has put forward a formula that will keep individuals with different interests together in a competitive political order under a pluralistic parliamentary structure. The parliament has been seen as the domain of pluralism. In this respect, democracy has been designed as a political regime that recognizes pluralism and preserves differences among individuals, rather than being a mechanism to unite different social subjects under a homogeneous form like the people. Carl Schmitt, in his work titled The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, claims that this parliamentary order, which is based on pluralism, undermines the people and breaks the social unity, and argues that democracy cannot necessarily be based on a parliamentary structure based on pluralism (Schmitt, 1988: 32). This stressed area that Schmitt put forward between the parliament and democracy has gained a new dimension with the emergence of institutional structures that would limit the parliament in liberal democratic countries after the Second World War. Liberal democracies have aimed to reconcile the two strained areas by putting forward a formula that would consider democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, majority rule on the one hand, and constitutional principles such as individual rights and restriction of the state on the other. While liberal democracy acknowledges popular sovereignty based on the rule of the majority, it emphasizes the need for a series of institutional mechanisms that would enable pluralism, and protect freedom of expression and the rights of minorities. For this reason, in liberal democracies, the need for the existence of the constitutional court or supreme courts that will legally control the parliament and institutions and will protect fundamental rights against the "tyranny of the majority" has been seen by populists as the control of popular sovereignty by the appointed ones (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 101). Therefore, the attempt to reconcile liberal values with democratic values points to a crisis of liberal democracies from the very beginning.

Populist politics on the rise have mainly been fed by this internal tension of liberal democracy. For this reason, many theorists regard populism as a kind of deviation from liberalism's constitutional understanding of the state and representative democracy, or as a phenomenon that threatens democracy as a pathological case or return of the repressed (Taggart, 2002; Arditi, 2007: 74). Of course, such an attitude based on the assumption that there is a smoothly functioning liberal democracy does not see the crisis that liberal democracy has entered into with its different dimensions for a long time. The economic and political changes in the 21st century, the state of emergency practices

introduced due to war and terrorism, security-oriented political and legal regulations, new authoritarian practices emerging on social identities and differences have interrupted the functioning of liberal democratic institutions and caused liberal democracies to enter a crisis. With the rise of new social movements emerging on a global scale, mass and social criticism of representative politics, traditional political parties and non-democratic practices have also deepened the crisis of governance of liberal democracies. The crisis experienced by liberal democracies has gained a new dimension with the emergence of populist parties, movements and leaders on a global scale. Populism, in the context of the thesis that the unfulfilled promises of liberal democracy are possible with the real representation of the people, is not an enemy of democracy, but an attempt to revive the principle of popular sovereignty that liberal values have difficulty in achieving. In this respect, populists imagine a democracy in which separation of powers, party pluralism and minority rights are not recognized by using the institutions and concepts of liberal democracy and changing their internal structures (Urbinati, 2013: 137). In other words, they emerge as a critique of the idea that democracy will rely only on liberal values and institutions. At the basis of the conflict between populism and liberal democracy is the criticism of institutional structures aimed at controlling popular sovereignty against the elected, as well as a kind of criticism of the elitist understanding that leads to the exclusion of a certain segment of society. By formulating precisely the crisis of liberal democracies in the form of the failures of their ideals, populism sees the solution to the failure in the construction of an illiberal popular sovereignty.

What should be the starting point of a democracy in the form of popular sovereignty or general will? Populism has become a part of different political projects as "a thin-centered ideology in which society is divided into a dichotomy as pure people and elites" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 31). By dividing society into two main camps, populism feeds on a dual structure, one side being a pure and integrated people and the other being the elite who are seen as the enemy of the people. Since populists promise the true representation of the people, they aspire to see or build the people as a homogeneous group without differences. For this reason, a cleavage occurs between the pluralism of liberal democracy and the integrated pure public understanding of populism (Rummens, 2017: 644). Populists claim that it is possible to draw the boundaries of the people, that the people can demonstrate a common and consistent will, and that they can rule through representatives who can directly represent themselves (Müller, 2019: 96). Populists are therefore socially considered as a kind of criticism of liberal democratic regimes' belief in the existence of institutions that restrict or limit democracy. This is because any institutional mechanism that would

impede popular sovereignty and limit the will of the people is what populism opposes. Since liberal democracies' understanding of difference and pluralism undermines the principle of popular sovereignty and majority rule, and it is seen as a fundamental obstacle to a true democracy, populism should be seen not only as the division of society into two main camps as pure people and corrupt elites, but also as an anti-pluralism (Müller, 2019: 15). The criticism of populist leaders and movements - especially right-wing leaders and movements - about the functioning of liberal democracy has led them to exhibit more authoritarian practices or to spread the opinion that they are so through the liberal understanding of democracy. This is because populists focus on the practices that enable excluded groups to participate in political and social life rather than the institutional or normative dimensions of democracy (Moffitt, 2020: 208). It is possible to say that such an attitude is also effective on the tendency of populists to use the powers or opportunities accumulated in the hands of a small minority elite as a requirement of the principle of popular sovereignty on behalf of themselves, which they see as the real representatives of the people, and their attitude towards the judiciary and the media (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 102). In this respect, populism is a form of politics that deepens the crisis of liberal democracy and aspires to take it on an irreversible course, as well as a response to the crisis of governance of liberal democracy. In this respect, although populism aims to undermine the pluralism of liberal democracy, according to populists, democracy is seen as a defensible form of government to the extent that it makes it possible to protect the rights of the majority. What populists understand from democracy is to give the power of the elites to the people, to increase the capacity of the people to make decisions about the issues that affect them, and by this way to ensure the people's power. As can be seen in the examples of different countries, populists claim that they will provide the real representation of the people and they will bring the people back to power. Populism contends the pluralism of liberal democracy and the thesis that the rule of the people should be limited, but it claims that the people can rule only through representation. In this respect, populism gains meaning within the boundaries of representative democracy (Müller, 2019: 97). So much so that the people are often seen as a figure represented in the personality of the leader. In this regard, populism, rather than a critique of representation, claims that an absolute representation is not possible within the boundaries of liberal democratic values, and that only a party, leader or movement that truly represents the general will of the people will make true democracy possible. In this respect, populism should be seen as the pharmakon of democracy as a form of politics based on the re-glorification of the people with a formulation that will reestablish the principle of popular sovereignty wounded by liberal democracy. With

this aspect, while populism, as a way of overcoming the ruling crisis that liberal democracies have entered into, is a rising politics style, it has a dynamic that deepens the very crisis it is trying to solve. Populism, as it claims to be the most effective response to the crisis of liberal democracies, turns into a necessity that enables the continuity of the political order rather than a coincidence. In this respect, although populism aims to be a response to the solution of the internal crises of the political order, instead of solving the crisis of liberal democracies within the boundaries of liberal values, it turns into a form of politics that deepens the crisis of these values.

3. Populism as the Crisis of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is one of the most effective responses to the ruling crisis of liberalism. Although neoliberal economic policies, which started to rise on a global scale after 1980, exhibit different practices from country to country, with a series of practices such as the privatization of public assets, the withdrawal of the state from social security and development, the rise of financial institutions, the privatization of central banks, mergers, and opening up the areas of health, education, etc. market interventions, they have gained a dominant position not only as an economic policy, but also as a holistic style of politics that shapes social and daily life (Duménil & Levy, 2009: 43). When the crisis of the welfare state experienced in the 1970s was combined with the tendency of profit rates toward falling and the political and social crisis experienced by global Keynesianism, neoliberal policies began to dominate. Neoliberalism in this respect has taken the form of class restoration that envisions a new distribution of resources and allows the economic wealth of a small minority. Neoliberalism, contrary to the classical liberals' night watchman understanding, is a style of politics that requires the state to be organized in such a way that does not interfere with the spontaneous functioning of the market, but at the same time requires the state to take an active role in shaping citizens. The state will not interfere with the economy, but will be effective in areas such as daily life, education, and religion. The main claim of neoliberal policies, which became effective after 1980, is that the market society to be established by limiting all kinds of state intervention against the market and privatizing public assets will both be an ideal economic order and guarantee freedom. The crisis experienced in practice by neoliberalism's understanding of a self-regulating market society made it necessary in the post-1990 period to regulate the global economy through a series of global or regional agreements, to transform the state within the framework of the market logic, and to restructure the state in a way that regulates phenomena such as social security, urban regeneration and immigration (Munck, 2005: 63). What is behind the crisis of neoliberalism today is that the ideals that

it put forward at the beginning have not been realized. The market-oriented transformation of the state has not allowed the expansion of freedom, as opposed to neoliberals' claim, increased the fragility of citizens who have reached social welfare through the protectionist policies of the welfare state, brought along the accumulation of the resources in the hands of a limited elite, and led to the rise of inequality, insecurity, poverty and polarization on a global scale.

Economic injustice, which emerged in the distribution of resources as a result of neoliberal policies, has led to the emergence of populist policies on a global scale with a widespread support. Populist movements, parties or leaders, albeit in different forms and names, have put forward a policy that would broaden their social base against the problems caused by neoliberal policies, claiming to defend the interests of the people against economic elites. It is possible to say that two populist responses have emerged against the crisis of neoliberalism. The first is the rise of left-wing populist movements, which have gained broad popular support against the devastation of neoliberal policies and envision the fair and equal sharing of resources. Second, in the rise of far-right populist politics in the European context, the rise to power or popular support of the national discourse, which is based on the idea that the factor that caused poverty is the migrants, refugees and culturally foreigners from different countries, rather than neoliberal economic policies. While populists act with different motives, positioning themselves against the destruction caused by neoliberalism, they claim that power should be taken from a limited minority and maintained by politicians who will ensure the true representation of the people. In this respect, populism should be seen as a response to the governance crisis caused by neoliberalism in the economic and social sphere. Especially when looking at the right-wing populist movements, although they have achieved a wide public support against the economic inequality caused by neoliberalism, these movements have not put forward a radical critique of neoliberal policies. Right-wing populists see economic inequalities as the accumulation of resources in the hands of a limited elite other than the people, rather than a problem arising from the economic philosophy of neoliberalism. The solution is formulated as taking these resources from the elite and giving them to the real people. In countries where populist leaders, movements or parties remain in opposition, populists put forward a politics of distribution that will take the resources accumulated in the hands of a limited economic elite from them and distribute these resources to the people. On the other hand, in countries where they come to power, they follow a policy that will eliminate the inequalities caused by neoliberal policies through patronage, favoritism and bribery for their own supporters (Müller, 2019: 16). Instead of seeing neoliberalism and the inequalities it causes as a problem, they prefer to follow a policy that

centers on discourses that cause social exclusion against different social groups and in this way expand their social base. For this reason, although populists aim to come to power by seeing the sources of inequality, insecurity, and unequal distribution of resources caused by neoliberalism as a problem caused by economic elites, when they come to power, they keep out the groups and people who they think do not constitute the people, and they create an unequal and unfair political order again. Therefore, although the social conditions caused by neoliberalism constitute one of the driving forces behind the rise of populists, populists contribute to the deepening of the social crisis by reproducing the conditions caused by neoliberalism in order to protect their power.

4. Populism as the Crisis of Globalization

Globalization is a phenomenon that involves the interdependence of individuals, nations and groups, showing that we gradually "live in one world", as a result of the expansion of economic, political and cultural fields on a global scale (Giddens, 2009: 126). The concept of globalization has been seen as an inevitable process that has shaped the world for the last thirty years by many actors from daily life to business world, from political powers to media. Radical globalizationist approaches, which defend the claim that globalization is an inevitable process, argue that we live in a global world order, that nation-states can no longer be seen as sovereign units, that the global circulation of labor, goods and capital has entered an irreversible path, at the same time, from the global climate crisis to global criminal networks and terrorism, that all processes take place in a global space, and they address the increase of multinational companies, the integration of financial markets and the spread of popular culture as concrete indicators of the establishment of a global society (Held & McGrew, 2008: 13). The main reason for the tension experienced on a global scale is that the claims that a single functioning political, economic and cultural order has been established, which has become concrete in the claims of radical globalizationists, have entered into a crisis. Of course, although globalization seems to point to a smooth world from the beginning, it leads to a series of tensions that emerge in different periods. Tensions between global networks and local nationalisms, national interest and the global market, territorialism and deterritorialization, local culture and universal culture have formed the basis of global tensions from the very beginning (Brown, 2010: 8). As radical globalization advocates claim that global competition, instead of globalization being a phenomenon that operates equally all over the world, has caused the fragmentation of local economic networks, injustice in the distribution of income among social groups, and the concentration of resources in the hands of a limited group (Rodrik, 2020). Along with the current tensions of globalization, a series of developments

that have emerged in recent years have once again brought to the agenda that a functioning global order will only be a myth. The crisis experienced by the European Union after Brexit, which claims to create a model for the global order, building of the wall at the Mexican border to prevent illegal immigrants, and the states recalling their national capital to the country, has caused the claims of the globalization discourse to go into a crisis.

Globalization is not only in a political and economic crisis, but also in a cultural crisis. The claim that globalization is a process of social and cultural hybridization is also questioned. It has been claimed by many theorists that with globalization, a common ground would be created in people's daily life, values, norms and lifestyles, and a global culture would emerge (Berger, 2002: 2). It was assumed that globalization would trigger a cultural cosmopolitanism, a hybridization or a unidirectional cultural world would be created in which common values in terms of attitudes, behaviors and beliefs would be created through global elites or popular culture. Everyone, from business world to politicians, from youth to ordinary people, has been seen as the bearers of these cultural codes as entertainers of global culture. With the globalization process, the increase in transportation facilities that facilitate the movement of people from one place to another, changes in communication technologies, the global spread of popular culture, ethnic and racial encounters created by migration processes have led to the emergence of different forms of conflict rather than integration. The increasing trend in the flow of people on a global scale has made it possible to meet different cultural identities, and legal and illegal immigration has caused the emergence of a multinational composition by transforming the structure of nation-states based on a single nation. The big cities of the world have now turned into places where individuals from everywhere and all classes flow into the same place and have to live together. The intensity of cultural encounters caused by globalization has not only enabled a hybridization based on difference but also led to a process in which differences exclude each other. For example, considering the changes in the global labor market, a significant change has occurred in the global flow of migration and immigrant labor. The need for legal and illegal immigrant labor in the global labor market has often led to the emergence of racial division and cultural conflicts (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 135). Globalization is not just the scene of conflicts caused by encounters in space. Culturally, the process of building common norms and values has resulted in the emergence of the process of re-appropriating and attributing meaning to "the world that has slipped out of our hands" (Giddens, 2000: 37). Contrary to what was assumed, the cultural impact of globalization has made it possible to invoke and resurrect traditional or historical cultural values rather than the creation of hybrid or common cultural values. The reason why

populists see original cultural values as a constructive element for the uniqueness of the people is precisely because of the ease of settling the slipping world back into place, and using identities of the past as an original beginning.

The crisis of the idea that globalization would create a single economic, political and cultural society is one of the important driving forces behind the rise of populist movements. The claims that globalization destroys the local, weakens the national identity, and disrupts the working life by transforming it into a multi-ethnic structure, that the national culture is eroded, and that traditional lifestyles have been transformed have a central place in forming the basic discourse of right-wing populist politics. It is possible to say that hate speech against minorities and foreigners was effective in the strengthening and coming to power of right-wing populist movements, especially in Europe (Fassin, 2018: 8). Holding these groups responsible for a series of changes / negativities caused by globalization lies behind the fact that anti-immigration has become the central discourse of right-wing populist politics. Although the discourses of populist movements are different, they gain the support of social groups that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social inequalities created by globalization and the loss of their cultural identity (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 230). The radical changes created by globalization on individuals' lives also have an important effect on the rise of populist movements and their gaining a social base. With globalization, the decline of the influence of the traditions and customs that shape human life, the trivialization of the founding constants that determine identity, the religion losing its previous determining power in shaping daily life, the change in the patriarchal structure of working life, and the increasing reflexivity of people on their own lives also play an important role in the rise of right-wing populist movements. Since especially right-wing populist movements see the changes caused by globalization as a kind of deterioration, they aim to use conservative and nationalist discourses about the need to protect the past by glorifying it to create a mass base.

Populist movements have sought to strengthen their social base by relying on the claims that globalization erodes local cultural values, leads to uniformity of cultural experience, destroys local elements that establish identity, and makes culture marketable under market conditions. Of course, rather than seeing populist movements as a political attitude that led to the emergence of cultural exclusion, they should be seen as movements that use these existing phenomena in society for their own political ends. Pointing to the impossibility of a cosmopolitan world with discourses such as nationalism and indigenousness against the foreign, differences and practices of globalization (Ingram, 2017: 644), a number

of populist parties such as the National Front in France, the Independence Party in England and the American Tea Party mobilizes the opposition formed in the society for their own political discourses. In this respect, populism, as a discriminatory identity politics, challenges the pluralism of liberal democracy, and acts from a single, homogeneous and genuine idea of the people rather than an understanding that is equal, fair and recognizing differences (Müller, 2019: 16). The populists' imagination of pure people is therefore central to the creation of mass mobilization that allows groups considered to be outside the people to be excluded and marginalized. Since populism tends to base the establishment of the people as a pure subject often on an authentic and essentialist conception, the populist subject is positioned against the other through a certain essential identity. This other is formulated as the elite, or foreigners, who often spoil the pure nature of the people (Ingram, 2017: 647). Populism is the opposite of cosmopolitanism precisely because of its essentialist qualities. Therefore, as opposed to the cosmopolitan world imagination of globalization, it acts on essentialist foundations such as nationalism and indigenousism. In this respect, while populism should be seen as a politics style that has risen as a result of the crisis that globalization has entered, it should also be seen as a politics style that causes the crisis of the idea of a globalized functioning world to deepen due to its anti-cosmopolitan attitude.

5. Conclusion

The crisis of liberal democracy, the crisis of neoliberal policies and the crisis of globalization have been effective in bringing populism back to the agenda of politics in recent years. The rise of populist leaders, movements and parties on a global scale should be seen as an exigency rather than a coincidence. What does it mean to see the rise of populist politics as a kind of exigency? Populists come to power with different ideologies, different identities and discourses as seen in the experiences of different countries, or they gain wide public support. Behind the rise of populism, a kind of criticism of the political elite in the context of the limits of liberal democracy, a criticism of the economic elite in the context of the limits of the neoliberal economy, and the criticism of immigrants and foreigners in the context of the crisis of globalization come to the fore with a different tone or originality. In this respect, the rise of populist movements should be seen as a means of managing the crisis which the idea of a world order functioning with its economic, political and cultural dimensions has entered into, and as a means of controlling the crises in a way that will prevent radicalization of social groups created by the crises and enable them to be mobilized again for the continuity of the order. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2019: 57) point out, mobilization is "a wide variety of individuals struggling to raise

awareness of a particular problem and this leading them to act collectively to support their cause". It is possible to say that populist politics has organized a mass mobilization with different forms of mobilization in the form of leader, party and movement, which is claimed to represent the people, as can be seen in different countries experiences. As can be seen in many cases, populism emerges in the form of a social movement organized in the form of a grassroots movement or mobilizing social demands by taking the form of a party as a combination of leader and grassroots movement, as well as a series of discourses involving the ultimate representation or liberation of the people in the leader's personal charisma (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 58). The main reason why populist politics follow different routes is that the economic, political and cultural routes of the countries are different from each other. In other words, the fact that the dimensions of the economic, political and cultural crisis have emerged in different countries in different forms and intensities leads to the emergence of different types of mobilization. Another reason why the mobilization style is different is that the political cultures of the countries where populist politics emerge show different characteristics. Although the emergence of populist politics has different characteristics, populism is not a critique of the overall functioning of the system or a style of politics that aims to radically abolish the system; on the contrary, it should be seen as a style of politics that aims to create an order in a crisis by reproducing the crisis caused by the functioning global order myth and creating a wide base for the social radicalization tendencies caused by the system. This is because although crises have provided a starting point for the mobilization building of populists, sometimes the constant state of crisis enables the social ground required for populists empowerment. For this reason, populism creates the possibilities to keep this mobilization alive by pointing to a moment of constant crisis. Populism should be viewed not as a deviation or an irrational choice of the disconnected masses, but as a style of politics with the goal of achieving power relying on the ruling crisis caused by the order or the discourse of an existence of a crisis. In this respect, populism is neither a danger to democracy in the absolute sense, nor a desire to radically change the system, if we do not consider the rights of minorities and immigrants and freedom of expression as the indispensable prerequisites of democracies. On the contrary, it is a new form of government and politics in the form of criticism of the promises of liberal democracy to achieve popular sovereignty, economic policies that have not made possible the fair and equal distribution of economic resources, and the unfulfilled promises of discourses that claim that a global world and a cosmopolitan culture are possible. The power of populist movements, as can be seen in many cases, is in their ability to make grassroots demands a part of public debate in countries where they are on

the rise, rather than coming to power or winning the votes of the vast majority (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 120-121). Therefore, populists have pursued an effective policy in carrying the discourses of the masses whose demands did not come to power to the center, and caused the crisis of the system to deepen through the demands of the masses. It would exactly be more correct to read the rise of populism as a phenomenon with a series of historical-social causes, rather than seeing the rise of populism as an accidental response to the economic, political and cultural crises we are in. In this respect, although populism claims to respond to the internal crises of the system or, to put it another way, to the crisis in the "government apparatus", it also has a dimension that reproduces and deepens the crises it tries to solve.

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CHAPTER III

DEBUNKING THE END OF DEMOCRACY DISCOURSES: THE CASE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY

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1. Introduction

As a form of government democracy has taken various forms and has gone through many phases. Today, it is widely considered to be the best and perhaps the only viable form of government. For some researchers, the Western roots of democracy make it difficult for this form of government to establish itself in other cultures.

Also the Turkish democracy has been tested with many internal challenges and faces many obstacles in the way of becoming a "mature democracy". The wave of democracy that was initiated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been going through an autocratic trend. Whether this global democratic recession or backsliding is gradual or alarming is debatable. However, there is a rising perception that democratic institutions are in retreat. The countries that have become skeptical to democracy or experiencing democratic recession hit the headlines but those that have still strong democratic institutions remain in the background and although European democracies receive blows a radical erosion of norms has not been observed yet.

The democratic recession is a global phenomenon, profound political changes like we are experiencing this day have been seen before. However, unstable political changes, intolerance and skepticism toward foreigners surely foreshadow crises but they do not mean end of democracy. Therefore, the return of authoritarian great powers coupled with democratic rollbacks does not necessarily lead the change of a predominantly democratic system but it may lead a gradual erosion of democratic institutions within the system.

We rather tend to believe a temporary stagnation in democracy characterized by a short term crisis. Hence, in this paper the global

recession in democracy within the context of Turkish democracy was examined.

The tutelary mechanisms designed by the statists elites who wanted to protect top-down revolutions is a problem that prevents Turkish democracy being consolidated. The military and bureaucratic elites that founded the republic dominated the army and the judiciary, and these elites had long believed that elected governments could be hostile to revolutions. As a result of this, the military bureaucratic elite who wanted to protect the revolutions staged coups. These coups and memorandums seemed to be peculiar to Latin American and Turkish democracies. However today democratic backsliding seems to be all pervasive and it is fair to locate the current crisis Turkish democracy is experiencing within a global context. The paper also tackles the domestic structuring of foreign policies and debates concerning the quality of democracy.

2. Global Democratic Recession

We are living in an era when people live with the far right, the far left and different kinds of extremists all shouting at the same time. Many declare that all politicians are crook or all journalists lie. In postwar Italy this form of skepticism and anti-politics was called qualunquismo (Applebaum, 2020, 142). The Western liberal democracies are marked with some tolerance for disorder and criticism. The failure of democracies has always been possible and political legitimacy based on a social contract has been shattered.

The liberal democratic state attempts to control every aspect of life more extensively because it makes people believe that democratic state is under asymmetric threats. The liberal ideology is not apparent like its communist or fascist counterparts. Liberalism's historical rise and global attraction are hardly accidental; it has been supported by people living under tyranny, inequality and severe poverty. The other political philosophies have failed to promote that it could provide political stability, liberties and economic development with regularity and predictability. This is why Francis Fukuyama could declare that the other ideal regimes have died and that liberalism was the end of history (Deneen, 2018, 21).

Today the fascisms of the 1920s and 1930s have been reawakened. The fascism of those times was celebrating the violence over law; it proposed a leader with mystical powers and was claiming that globalization and global financial network were part of a global conspiracy (Snyder, 2018, 20). To them democracy was creating an illusion of equality for the sake of a group of elites.

After the fascist and communist experiences it was thought that the American democracy was exceptional. However, only after 1965 the United States became fully democratic (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, 167). Like Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chavez and recep Tayyip Erdoğan Donald Trump began his tenure by launching attacks on his opponents and criticizing media (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, 144). All roads lead to global conspiracies and populist anger.

"Erdoğan's default explanation for political opposition to his rule is that his enemies are conspiring against the Turkish people" and the conspirators include also Western powers, global financial network called interest rate lobby. In Poland the Law and Justce Party (PiS) blames the global system for all kinds of problems. Agents of foreign regimes are to be blamed for internal problems (Runciman, 2019, 65). In both cases democracy is used to oppose against the non-native elements that threaten the national interests of the mentioned countries.

Democracy is tired and a replaceable system which has encountered many challenges. Even the threat of populism that democracy faces is not totally new. But currently it is experiencing a type of authoritarian threat that is more pragmatic. Toxic rhetoric against oppositions and a kind of undemocratic liberalism undermines its foundations.

Actually, liberal democracy is a promise to the masses, a promise to minorities to protect their rights from an oppressive majority and a promise to economic elites to guarantee their property. Its flexible nature has helped to make liberal democracy uniquely stable (Mounk, 2018, 54). But a uniquely stable liberal democracy experiences a decline in the quality of democracy and this backsliding is not peculiar to just Turkey and the reason for this is that the liberal order did not bring benefit to everyone. In all cases, many people believe that their identities are not being given adequate recognition either by the outside world or by other members of the same society. Those identities vary and they are all manifestations of identity politics (Fukuyama, 2018, 9).

3. The Turkish Ordeal by Democracy and Domestic Restructuring of Foreign Policy

Successful democracies require finely tuned balance; a balance and a contract between state and individual. In countries like Turkey where a paternalistic approach is predominant in state-individual relations, Western democracy is at times associated with Western hegemony. To develop a new moral and political identity civilizational policies are introduced and domesticization of foreign policy is favored.

Like anywhere in the world, the decline in democratic institution has become a hot debate in Turkey. Some would associate this democratic backsliding with authoritarianism, but indeed they are two different political strategies. In a typical democracy, people are governed with what they deserve. But, with industrial capitalism local hierarchies disappeared and a more direct relationship was established between an individual and state. Likewise, the relationship between individual and nation intensified, which probably created more shared democratic sentiments. Therefore, Democracy is linked with social psychology and nationalist sentiments are essential parts of a democracy.

In particular, the Turkish democracy has been reshaped by external pressures and its foreign policy is subject to a kind of domestic restructuring. As in the case of Eurasianists, Turkish democratic policies were also structured based on a civilizational agenda. To this approach, it is appropriate to locate Turkey as a unique culture and civilization.

Actually, these civilizational claims have been voiced more loudly after Özal and his liberal conservative approach came to power. An attempt to enable society's true colors to emerge from its Kemalist veneer (Jenkins, 2008, 149) was made. From its foundation the AKP, which regarded itself once as the continuation of Özalist tradition, sought to express itself as a liberal, conservative democratic party.

Nevertheless, public sentiment calls for alternative roles for Turkey, which impacts the quality of Turkish democracy because the majority sometimes demands anti-democratic and illiberal moves and the ruling party is "attuned to public sentiment" (Karagiannis, 2020, 2). Furthermore, upon the introduction of presidential government system comes to mean a regime shift and this shift is not an isolated incident. Many other countries are also labelled as moderate autocracies.

Likewise, the issue that the problems of Turkish democracy being used as an instrument in European and American politics led to a growing concern among Turkish political elite that Turkey is under the threat of foreign and domestic elements. This shift in Turkey's politics has also been reflected in the relations between Turkey and the EU and the Turkish side blamed the EU as anti-democratic, anti-foreigner, anti-immigration and anti-Islam (İnat, 2017, 51-52).

In a perspective regarding the respect to democratic values and sovereignty European powers should either decide that they do not want Turkey as an EU member, and will avoid policies that would mean interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey and develop a relationship based on mutual respect for sovereignty with Ankara. Or, they need to develop a frank policy about Turkey's EU membership just like the policy that prevailed in 2004 and 2005 so that they will regain the right to

make suggestions to Ankara about human rights, democracy and other issues (İnat, 2017, 52). The Turkish democracy is vulnerable to European fragilities.

Coupled with these vulnerabilities populist rhetoric might also gain votes and keep a nation proud, but when applied to foreign policy and internal democracy, it can bring trouble. In the wake of the April 16 referendum that granted President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan new powers, Turkey's confrontational foreign policy also influenced its internal democratic dynamics (Bekdil, 20,17, 2). And it is important to appeal to average Turk in this regard.

In this context, it is not reasonable to observe that, over the course of the past ten years, the rise of Turkey as a preeminent middle power is one of the most remarkable success stories in world diplomacy. (Falk & Farer, 2013, 354). The Turkish retreat "zero problems with neighbors" has given ammunition to critics of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's claim of soft power realism and revealed certain innocence in the original formulation of such a radical rupture with Turkey's earlier more traditional reliance on hard power capabilities, including the centrality of its membership in NATO (Falk & Farer, 2013, 354), which also has led to a Turkish reassessment of Western democratic values.

Turkey's regional and global role exhibits a self-asserting character and seeks multilaterism and domestic structuring of foreign policy comes to mean that a global democratic backsliding may serve to Turkey's foreign policy aspirations. Therefore, Turkey no longer offers the Middle East an influential model for a Western democracy. Coupled with a successful economic stability and regional power status Turkey seeks to adopt new strategies.

The decline in expectations with respect to EU membership leads Turkey to allocate more resources into Libya, Syria, the Balkans and Caucasus; however, the relations with Europe are also sought to be kept in order not to damage trade relations and immigrant deal. Democratic standards and values become of secondary importance. The reason for this is that the Turkish public opinion has become disillusioned with the EU membership. The rise of Islamophobia and democratic backsliding in Europe, coupled with economic crisis has made public opinion indifferent to Europe. However as the migrant crisis is central to relations:

"By the end of the summer, both the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Agreement were wobbling under the weight of such a large influx of migrants. EU leaders began discussing different ways to distribute migrants in the European territory and ease the burden on border countries – i.e. Italy and Greece. Since no unanimous agreement was achieved over how to manage migrants within the EU territory,

efforts were directed at addressing the issue with countries of origin and transit and one actor was identified as the provider of the solution to the political chaos in the EU: Turkey. Due to its open door policy, Turkey is home to 2.8 million registered Syrians" (Benvenuti, 2017, 9).

Despite the interdependency with respect to migrant crisis, The AK Party also wanted to expand the resources to people who would further integrate with world markets and, most important, the Middle East, North Africa, and the former Soviet republics. The AK Party didn't stress the need for Europe to do business as much as Turkish business elites. And that meant that the AK Party didn't feel obliged to comply with the EU reforms that had largely been responsible for its rise to power (Hansen, 2017, 118). And the quality of democracy did not become as essential as it was once. The majority of public opinion keeps partly supporting this view to this day.

The public is also open to manipulation and channelization and that is one issue that Turkey has vulnerabilities. Turkey exhibits vulnerabilities in the face of possible attempts to manipulate public opinion. Deliberately misleading publications pushed by domestic and international actors potentially interfere with a transparent democratic process. It is wise for Turkish decision-makers to encourage civility, and design tools and policies to evade such possible interventions (Yurdakul, 2020, 17). The aim may be to distract audiences or dissuade them from believing an account or explanation that is not offered as part of the array of narratives (Costello, 2018, 2).

One way to argue the quality of democracy passes through the question that whether Islam and democracy are compatible and to what extent the conservative Turkish government can manage to interiorize democratic values. Turkish Islamism has been labelled by a nationalist constituent that differentiates it from similar expressions of political Islam around the world. Even if Turkish Islamists recognized the umma as the supreme nation of all Muslims, the glorification of Turkey's Ottoman legacy was often linked to a claim for Turkish leadership in the Muslim world and despite the various Pan-Islamist initiatives built by Saudi Arabia between the 1960s and the 1980s, Turkey's Islamist authors have tended to build a distinct discourse, in which Turkey is to emerge as the sole suitable leader of the Muslim umma, and there is no reference to any existing state-led initiative (Calabro, 2017, 158).

For a long time after the Middle Eastern countries gained their independence Turkey was held as an example of democracy in the region but to some political Islamists of Turkey, Turkey was also a country with deep Islamists roots and It should reassert its identity even though this could lead to a clash with democratic values; however, the Islamic

utopianism view in which was the leader of the Muslim world did not wake much interest in most of the Muslim countries. Even Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries harshly criticized this Pan-Islamist ideology. This is one of the reasons why D-8, designed by Necmettin Erbakan, became unsuccessful.

Another reason why Turkey and the Turkish democratic model came into conflict with those Muslim countries is that the "Turkish illiberalism "(Stein, 2017, 4) is on the rise and "promoting the possibility that Turkey can manage relationships with powerful countries that are American adversaries (Stein, 2017, 5) has caused anxiety among those countries which have good relations with the West. Therefore, Turkey struggles to cast a role to itself between Muslim and European countries.

Although it is not as popular as it was once the 'strategic depth' doctrine calls for an activist engagement with all regional systems in the Turkey's neighborhood (Murinson, 2006, 948). Turkey proposes that the United Nations needs to be restructured and the collective security mechanism ought to be revised to enable it to respond adequately to 'global strategic realities. (Murinson, 2006, 950).

To recast a new role in domestic and foreign policy and Turkey uses the means of public diplomacy: "public diplomacy refers to a government's engagement with foreign societies in ways that improve these societies' perceptions about that government's country. (Ülgül, 2019, 161). It attempts to increase the positive image of a country within foreign societies and influence those societies positively and also at the individual level, it is possible to assert that President Erdoğan is more inclined to conduct personal diplomacy than any other Turkish leader to date. One can argue that Erdoğan has significant trust in his ability to show strong leadership, which reflects his determination to control the domestic and foreign policies of his country (Ülgül, 2019, 174).

However, if one looks to Turkish democracy from a historical perspective, the need to dissolve the anti-democratic governmental structure formed especially after the 1961 Constitution, and produced by internal powers that are closed, bureaucratic and detached from the public and also vulnerable to being occupied by movements via filling state cadres. And the possibilities of change for Turkey in terms of meeting the new democracy and political system needs of the 21st century (Uçum, 2017, 23) calls for attention.

Another issue is that the multidimensional turmoil, which the international order experiences today is primarily fueled by the efforts of the United States to exploit its hegemony and to further its economic interests at the detriment of others' economic growth. (Duran, 2019, 9). In the struggle between liberalism and nationalism, consolidated

democracies are increasingly siding with the latter. This trend, in turn, deepens the gap between liberalism and democracy (Duran, 2019, 11). This deeply influences Turkey's domestic and international positions. Erdoğan's address at one of the Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly offered insights into how Turkey positioned itself within the international system of the new era (Duran, 2019, 16) in this respect.

One can also argue that "Turkey was never a fully functioning democracy, but members of the U.S. government and policy community always believed that the Turkish political system was democratic enough. Elections were held regularly, they were free and fair, the military handed the reins of government back to civilians after coups, and Turks wanted to join the EU. As a result of the AKP's wide-ranging reforms in 2003 and 2004, many in Turkey and the West believed the party would be a steward of the country's democratic transition" (Cook, 2018, 14).

This position is associated with the fact that Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has pursued a balanced foreign policy based on a sustainable effort to deepen Turkish ties with regional countries while preserving relations with the transatlantic community and powers in Turkey's near abroad. The challenge for Western governments does not stem from Turkey's efforts to deepen relations with its neighbors. Instead, the point for the United States and Europe is how Turkish politicians are using foreign policy as a tool for political gain—and how this trend could erode domestic support for Turkey's alliance with Europe and the United States (Stein, 2017, 1).

Some newer democracies, however, may not be as well equipped to resist those rulers who limit or destroy individual liberties in their quest to garner more rents. In nascent democracies such as Poland, Hungary, and Turkey through a gradual democratic recession of the institutions are observed. Backsliding toward illiberal policies has the affirmation of democracy because leaders in these relatively new democracies understand how to play to a Western public opinion which is less prudent in its use of political terms (Coats, et. al., 2018, 278).

Moreover, the concept of elitism and the definition of elite as well has transformed within the Turkish democratic tradition. Elitism offers an authoritarian politics because it violates the most basic norm of modern democracy, the principle that power does not belong to anyone forever. Elitism identifies power with the ruling elite and closes the political sphere to alternative symbolizations and attempts to define it. Within this elitist structure, those in opposition are outside of legitimate politics. They cannot save themselves from being pushed and are demonized. To this kind of elitism, the ruled part of society is corrupt, unreliable, and

rude. For this reason, power cannot be left to the control of the society; state power must be in the hands of the elite. This situation reveals specific political practices and structures. Accordingly, the demands of the society should be filtered in the context of the interests of those in power, or worse, they should be ignored. Society cannot know what is good for itself (Aslan, 2019, 107).

The state of democracy in Turkey cannot be evaluated without taking into consideration the contexts of global democracies that are claimed to be in decline. In fact Turkey has a relatively long tradition of democratization, however, the domestic and foreign challenges it faces beclouds its attempts to carry out quality improvement in democracy. The declining of democracy is observed not only in the functioning of basic democratic institutions, freedoms, political and social equality, and participation in political decision-making mechanisms but also in public opinion.

4. Conclusion

The problems established democracies face, democratic recession and diminishing of quality of democracy, compel us to reconsider the idea that democracy is without alternatives. Democracy's ideological rivals offer hybrid regimes in which democratic elements exist but the conditions for a full democracy are not met. This indicates the fragility of democracies and the Turkish democracy is vulnerable to many challenges democracies face.

Turkey has a tradition of a top-down oriented democracy and skepticism to liberal democracy can be kindled quite easily due to internal and external factors that shape the country's political landscape. The debate on the quality of the democracy is connected with long term conflicts that strain Turkey on regional and international levels.

The tentative relations with the EU and other Western powers mark the democratic course of Turkey and threaten the quality of fragile democracy. In fact, the political elite began to change in Turkey with a motivation stemming from the Europeanization of the country. But this transition did not bring about a deep-scaled change in the quality of democracy. Although the change of elites in Turkish political life gave rise to the establishment of elected elites in power, it did not give a fresh orientation to its democratic institutions.

In this regard, most of the research on the global crisis of democracy indicates that today democracies do not collapse suddenly, but gradually decline. They state that some leaders who come to power with competitive elections exhibit authoritarian tendencies and sometimes may

attack democratic institutions. They point out that political parties should defend democracies and prevent autocrats coming to power.

Although it has an authoritative origin, the modern crisis of democracy is not a form of fascism; rather, it is a reconsideration of democratic institutions. A moderate authoritarianism has almost always existed in Turkish democratic tradition. However, the expectation towards for a stronger and high-grade democracy has always accompanied this authoritative tendency.

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CHAPTER IV

NEOLIBERAL WORK, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GATED COMMUNITIES IN ISTANBUL

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1. Introduction

There are some studies on the gated communities of Istanbul, however they are mostly focus on neoliberalization, globalization of Istanbul, and the increasing link between Turkey and global markets/economy, suburbanization, emerging new middle class, urban segregation etc., however our approach is a novel one. This paper takes the issue of gated communities from a broader perspective and focus on the questions: why have the gated communities become so popular? Why so many people feel they need to live/reside/take refuge in them? And above all what is the relationship between globalization, neoloberalization of the city (Istanbul) and anxiety, fear, insecurity, risk society and uncertainties, erosion of trust which have become prevalent in Turkey and rising popularity and demand of gated communities?

For a long time, cities have been seen as spaces of physical expression of social interactions, actions and ideologies (Fainstein, 2001; Harvey, 1985). For that reason, physical changes in public space may be highly explicative in understanding large scaled public changes. As a matter of fact, cities may take a main role in the formation of daily life, as in the example of neoliberalism. Even though the efforts of authors such as (Harvey 1989 and 1985; Hackworth 2007, pp. 79-97) and Smith (1996; 1990) become prominent in that area, the lack of sufficient studies still remains as a general problem. This is especially true for Turkey too. In this study, we evaluate the public fear and uncertainty experienced recently in Turkey, especially in Istanbul in neoliberal changes context. Within this scope, this paper attempts to find out the realities related to risk and uncertainties of the daily lives of the individuals living in 'gated

communities' that have emerged in the process of neoliberalism in Istanbul.

In the mid-1970s, the consequences of rising neoliberal policies all over the world soon turned into a reality that influenced all areas of daily life (Harvey, 2007). But the political and economic moves on to neoliberlization in Turkey, we see mostly in the 1980s. These years have also been the years when the public shrunk rapidly through privatizations and free market practices have become the dominant determinant factors (Keleş, 2008). While all these transformations were taking place in the metropolitan area in Turkey with the 1990s (especially in Istanbul) a 'new middle class' which was the product of global works/employment and the new services sectors had emerged and gained visibility as an urban reality. The fact that all kinds of work activities of these 'new middle classes' take place in global contexts it has brought about the everyday life that brings with them close and indifference to local operations and local city experiences. In addition, as the levels of income, combined with their higher education levels, which were increasing comparing to the local laborers, the 'traditional modern city' experiences have become 'unwanted social burden' in the name of their everyday lives. Therefore, as all such other examples seen in the world, an unique urban practices so called 'gated communities'-a new kind of residential production-has emerged as a specific new requirements of this 'new middle classes' in Turkey in the 90s.

In the process of becoming a globalized world city, Istanbul is filling up with the gated communities, modern office buildings, five-star hotels,and luxury consumption areas that offer world famous brands by the 2000s. The rapid and unprecedented expansion of gated communities took many as surprise. Considering that the number of houses in Istanbul is 5.3 million, more than 10% of the current city is located in such settlements and more than 1 million people live in such settlements in total (Şahin, 2019). Gated communities have emerged as a significant sociological phenomenon in Istanbul so we decided to carry out the field research in the city.

In this context this chapter has two key aims. First, to broaden our knowledge of the nature and extent of gated communities in Istanbul, second, it considers the emergence of gated communities in the neoliberal city context in relation with culture of fear, anxiety, risk society and uncertainties, and discusses the reasons for their increasing numbers and popularity.

2. Risk and anxiety in the new era

Risk, according to the Douglas, can be understood as a social and political construct. Nothing is inherently risky "out there", but anything can be treated as a risk if a group of people claims that it has the potential

to adversely affect their interest and values (Dougles and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7). In other words, `each form of social life has its own typical risks portfolio. Common values lead to common fear and, by implication, to a common agreement not to fear other things` (ibid., p. 8). In addition, `risk crystalizes, categories, and normalizes dangers, fears, and anxieties that define and limit a given society` (Hacking 2003, p. 17). On the other hand, for Beck, reflexive modernization has dissolved the traditional parameters of industrial societies. Traditions that used to directed and shaped life course, like class culture and consciousness, gender and family roles, the nuclear family, and life time employment have now been weakened and challenged. This development accompanied by high levels of anxiety and insecurity in return, these detraditionalizations happen *in a social surge of individualization* (Beck 1992, p. 87). Risks produced by late modernity are also the result of dramatic changes in the structure of private lives (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003, p. 4).

We see a distinct type of divergence carried within the present capitalist stratification comparing to the previous forms that we consider crucial in terms of our work in the analysis of modernism. What is common point in such types of analysis is the idea of impossibility of modernity to explain the reality experienced through 'holistic narratives' (Lyotard, 2014). The meaning of such an expression is that in these days we no longer live in similar conditions to the conditions of the early stages of modernism (Beck, 2011; Lyotard, 2014; Giddens, 2010).

Giddens argue that the modern institutions differ from all the former public order styles in that; their dynamism, traditional customs, the level of attrition of habits and global effects. At the same time, modern institutions affect the very personal parts of our lives as well as completely altering the nature of our daily lives in public interactions (2010, p. 11). In this context, the assumption of Giddens on 'beyond tradition societies' of today's era is, in a way an emphasis on the fact that the rational one is being opposed to 'the determinations of the traditional one'. This process which opposes to the routines and determinations belonging to the traditional one is the narrator of a process in which the suspicious one is being cantered. Another outcome of this process is the conversion of scientific criticism to daily routine lifestyle. The conversion being discussed resulted in the questioning based on 'radical doubt' to be pervasive. In all these contexts, daily conditions related to traditional life has been redesigned coherent to a new time and space construction (Giddens, 2010, p. 13). What we state about late modern/neoliberal is the redesigning of daily life according to ever radicalizing conditions. Thus, the changes modern life faces are amongst the main factors of the reason why emerging gated communities exist in cities. For this reason, throughout the study, we are going to continue to debate modern city as 'traditional modern' and 'late modern' city

according to its content and daily style by putting the stance of Giddens at the heart.

This change what Giddens expresses as it reorganization of time and space is also an emphasis of a narrative of uncertainties building a spatial context. In this respect, one of the most important qualities of late modern era (for us, neoliberal era) is it to form a new life form specific to the changes public space undergoes.As a consequence, what we come across where life's standards start to be shaped by a context of uncertainty, as well. Indeed, the neoliberal city reality that appears as a big uncertainty process has been reforming specific to mentioned contexts. The emergence of 'gated communities' (in our opinion) -just as in Istanbul- constitutes one of the ever-radicalizing spatial formation trends specific to uncertainty and fear atmosphere. As Douglas emphasizes (2005) 'security is a reality being built on the stability of the space'. However, when in neoliberal environment city and space is shaped around uncertainties day by day, gated communities appear as one of the reflexive life strategies of 'late modern individuals. In this respect, the demand of late modern individual of neoliberal city can be said to be one of the solution processes to stabilize life against the radical uncertainties of life with radical doubts.

When had a closer look to the emphasis of Beck on 'reflexive modernity' context, it is also the reality which led to gradual rise of 'passivity that condemn public attitude' stated by Furedi (2001, pp. 13-19). The housing presentation which is not independent of neoliberal employment (hence, new middle-class) is not unattached to the demand of a specific lifestyle to neoliberal jobs. Bauman -like Beck- points out the current state is inherent to neoliberal changes (Bauman, 2011; 2012a). Anxiety and fear factors which have become the main part of daily life have normalized fear culture that has never been seen before (Baumann, 2011, p. 59). He continues:

"Numerous locks on the house and yard doors, multi security systems, alarms, and surveillance cameras have passed to middle-class spaces from upper-class villas. Living behind mechanical locks, electronic walls, alarms, pepper gas, tear bomb and laser guns is a part of the survival strategies of an individual in cities."

According to Bauman, based on these behaviours such as avoiding, isolation or passivation have their specific economic backgrounds. Such uncertainties which come out with the transition from liberal conditions to neoliberal conditions turned the life of a late modern individual to a horror episode (2011). As part of world risk society, non-Western societies share with the West not only the same space and time, but also the same basic challenges of the second modernity (Beck, 2005). Therefore, this is paper suggests that Turkey have become part of the world risk society. In this respect studies like Delibaş (2017; 2013) and

Şahin (2019) dealing with various aspects of risk, anxiety, fear and uncertainties prevalent in contemporary Turkish society.

3. Neoliberal city, global jobs, insecurity and shift in everyday lives

As global jobs are rising on the hyper spacing networks (Jameson, 2009); in opposition, passivity and isolation strategies in local areas, namely the tendency to live in gated communities' increase. As a matter of fact, the state of uncertainty and uncanny of the jobs of late modern individuals produce similar 'risk, fear and uncertainties' in their lives. In this respect, the aim of 'questioning daily life shaped by employment' of this study is because of the valuable details being observed in terms of employment and life during our study. It is possible to utter that gated communities are preferred by the ones who work at neoliberal jobs, for they contain neoliberal lives within their scope. In this aspect, it is not seen possible to go very far without taking into account the content of neoliberal market where the images of 'new city' (neoliberal or late modern city) is being spoken. Because Bauman (2000) says that lives shaped on uncanny is resulted by markets full of uncanny and uncertainty. In such a world where permanency has become insignificant, building all the relationships on transience is merely an outcome (Sennett, 2011).

In this regards, Bourdieu emphasizes that these conditions make the future a ball of uncertainty, for the instability of today has been becoming a process which does not permit holding on to the future and planning it. For someone who cannot control the present, the future is nothing but an uncertainty. Individual lives that are outcomes of neoliberal conditions are being shaped on the basis of a huge future anxiety and uncanny anymore (1998). What make uncanny permanent are those repetitive conditions to weaken individuals as an actor. Hence, 'suspicion' is one of the important criteria of living safely where uncanny is at rise (namely, public space) (Giddens, 2010). In such conditions where permanent narratives comes to an end, stability increasingly becomes impossible; thus, flexible lives are turning into realities that are inured to base on the increase in 'uncanny'(Bauman, 2011, p. 142).

Another attractive property of neoliberal market conditions that attribute various compositions to individuals is that it is shaped in the 'flow' context. The 'real power' like Castells states in the new market conditions has become a power which exceeds the countries and reaches the global hallmarks anymore. However, the main feature of the real power is its 'state of flow' (Castells, 2008). This 'flow'; on the other hand, threatens every sort of stability and long-term narrative; therefore, interaction (Bauman, 2012b; 2017). When the images which arise in the new conditions are 'transient incidences', products of the flow, the narrative of traditional stability are getting worthless. Institutions which

take responsibility are vanishing one by one in a world where flow and transience has been normalized (Bauman, 2011, p.132). When individuals are obliged to take responsibility of every situation, they make 'personal biographies' or 'stories' 'closure' a way of life. The less effective and valuable 'institutions' with traditional sorts of social liabilities become against the global actors, the more this situated is gotten used to. In this respect, new market eradicated the social responsibilities of the heads in local as they free them (Bauman, 2012b; 2017).

In the new market in where individual performances are cantered on the stage, individuals perceive biographical solutions as difficult and laborious. However, when there is no institutional identity taking responsibility, the solutions can only be temporary, instant and even 'imaginary' qualities (Sennett, 2011; Bauman, 2012b). In a place where uncanny is at rise and individuals cannot produce permanent solutions to overcome depression it is necessary to compensate the absence of approachable solutions with imaginary solutions (Bauman, 2011, p. 133). The consequence is the rise of uncertainty and the permanency of unsafe living conditions. In this respect, while neoliberal labour market puts the flow in the context of freedom and self-confidence at the centre, it fundamentally advises in the context of risk those individuals to be driven into unstable lives. These new conditions, shaped in the context of 'more freedom`, and steadily moving away from permanent narratives, essentially promise more 'uncertainty' under the name of 'flexibility' (Sennett, 2012, pp. 10-11).

New economic conditions have begun to make work-induced instabilities (naturally, uncertainties) as deep as ever. This situation not only demolishes stability, but also it makes transience into the most logical life strategy. The business environments which are carried by the global financial actors have started to create a new business environment renewed by 'new capitalism' -or neoliberal economic conditions-, and a new concept of public relationships. 'In this new decentralizing world' (Hayek, 2010; Friedman, 2008), 'getting bored quickly' (and also not bearing the burden) has become one of the most classical behaviours. It is no longer possible to postpone gratification or living disciplinarily while amorphous working conditions encourage foresighted lives. Temporary lives are outcomes of new impermanent conditions and especially work conditions (Sennett, 2012, pp. 29-30). As a result, long term neighbourhood and neighbour interactions of traditional modern city have altered to social burdens 'late modern individuals cannot bear.

There is no obligation to show self-control in this world, for self-controlled behaviour is unable to regulate when all is transient. Impermanent relationships have rendered human interactions worthless (Bauman, 2011). As the 'arrow of time broke', shallowness has become a way of life. However, shallow lives channelled individuals to itself by

defeating all the public characters. This focus is in fact is withdrawing to oneself. People live facile lives any longer because profundity and permanency-indexed life styles are much different to abilities to bear responsibility. In order to deal with the ambiguities existing in the space where everything is temporary, the individuals particularly avoid the permanent contacts and the social obligations of their products. For this reason, superficiality has become the best everyday life strategy. It is not possible to descent deep where flexibility and flow dominate. Sociality which does not have a realistic touch and that does not even allow it, and city life that is compatible with it is the norm. "The flexibility process creates a wall between the surface and the depth; the weak rules of the flexibility regime can only grasp what is on the surface" (Sennett, 2012, p. 74). For this reason, in the new era, permanent types of relationships are becoming increasingly unworthy. While life is lived amongst uncertainties permanency cease to be logical (or rational). In this case, uncertainties based on public life subsequently present significant details. Hence, the answers to the uncertainties of public life or the real reason for insecurity are becoming clearer.

4. Methodology

Our study was conducted in contexts that are specific to the qualitative research, and our target audience was selected within the framework of 'non-probability sampling model'. However, due to the prudence of the concerned audience and their avoidance of using the public spaces of the traditional modern city, access to them was difficult. For this reason, it was tried to reach the appropriate samples by using the 'snow boll technique' in order to reach the relevant audience. The interviews were started with 5 people reached within the framework of our different references at the beginning and by using snow ball technique we reached in total 57 people (29 male, 28 female). The entire interview group consists of people living in gated communities in various parts of Istanbul (13 different regions).The reason for the termination of the study in 57 th person was due to the fact that the responds were frequently repeated itself and the research team decided to finalize the field work after 57[th]person. Interviews conducted during the field research were conducted through in-depth interview technique and audio recordings were taken during each interview with permission from the interviewers. A total of 50 hours (49.13 hours) of audio recording was compiled and analysed within the context of discourse analysis within the context of discourse analysis technique. In spite of the large data group, the data group shared in this study is a small scale in terms of our study. In terms of the fact that we can continue to argue as a 'case study' based on what we consider to be very important in the context of the construction of the relevant research, we did not see a limited sharing of

this faceted sharing dimension on the grounds that it did not cast a shadow on meaning.

5. Results

5.1. Uncertainty and the employment

The most distinctive feature of the interview group in this study was the fact that they had very intense and uncertain work tempo. A vast majority of the interview group within this investigation stated that it was not likely to separate working time and private time (in terms of working at home vs. at work) in terms of themselves or their partners. Participants expressed that they generally do similar jobs related to their employment in their private lives -in other words, outside the work-. In addition to working tempo, answers related to the uncertainties of working hours were usually encountered.

As a first example, 'Participant 9',[1] working as a general manager at a shipyard with extensive global connections, has used expressions that emphasize the extent of the uncertainty of the excessively intensive business climate that has existed for many years. The 'Participant', in his speech expresses that intensive working hours produce 'necessities' which steals from his private time. The reason for excessive work tempo is closely related to the uncertain rhythm of his job. For people like him, 'when neoliberal job sets its aims on top of uncertainties' (Sennett, 2012), every situation that the job is not finished make it hard to perceive a permanent success in life. Therefore, that is the reason why employees make such a work discipline 'an obligation' or 'a need' by themselves. When the success criterion of the job becomes ambiguous for the workers, the job turns into a tempo aiming to finish the job given. However, the 'ongoing' context of a new job is a way of justification their long and tiring working pace.

> We work 11- 12 hours a day… We start working at eight am. We go home at 20.30-21.00 in the evening. On Saturdays, I work until 4 pm (15.00-16.00). I have not been working on Sundays for the past five years, but I worked on Sundays before. I used to always work two -three Sundays of the month. As we institutionalized, it got lesser... but we used to work 15 hours a day before that. Nobody tells me to "stay. We have responsibilities, we have consciousness. I have to stay at work. (Participant 9, aged 42)

Another participant who stated the uncertain work tempo and very intense working conditions is 'Participant 37'.[2] When looked at how he expresses the intensity at work, the fact that there is no "notion of

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[1] Participant 9; 42 yearsold, maleengineerworking as general manager at a shipyard.
[2] 'Participant 37'; 43 yearsold, a maleengineer- company consultant,working as a consultant in a company.

space" for him is easily understood. Because, he says that there is no such notion as "weekend, or day-night" for him

The points 'Participant 37' makes, is the stamen of how he could not manage to clear out the boundaries between his job and personal life in his daily life. What he expresses as "the pace is always rising" is nothing but his working rhythm pulling himself to its swirl. In such a condition, when jobs dominate social life, success is merely getting caught up in work. For this reason, 'when no progress is a failure criterion in a new job', it is necessitated to let the flow of jobs which includes all sorts of uncertainties dominate social life by workers. He (Participant 37), naturally had to "marry his job" in a case where the job dominates the social life of him. Because, the job controls the borders of his life (time, space, sociality, etc.) by making it uncertain in every aspect.

5.2. Neoliberal employment, flow and flexibility

As employment/working flows on the basis of 'mobility' under the new conditions, it became a reality which no longer can promise permanency. Under such conditions, given that all is overlaid on 'transience', 'traditionalism' has turned into unnecessary repetitions for those who work at such jobs. Because, in the new world where 'the flow and mobility of the job' is important, such things like traditionalism or locality are realities which may hinder the flow and the mobility. In this respect, global mobility and pace inherent to the 'nature of the new employment' are the explicative of the lost permanence of daily lives as well as making individuals 'movement freak'. As a matter of fact, the statements of the 'Participant 52'[3] tells the story of the situations that make 'uncertainty' permanent by getting caught up in the flow of the job.

At this point, when success cannot produce a social narrative about life, it ensures that the individual's satisfaction with the job makes not to stop until the job is finished a job responsibility (or ethics). Because in their lives there is not a permanent indication which give feedback to them other than the state of the package works.

When looked at the rhythm of the flow, the house that the Participant tells has strayed from being a product of fixed and permanent conditions to a stopover point where their global flows are organized; moreover, a mere "train station" -phrased by Sennett- (2012). When his business trips, which he says to happen two or three times a month, has become the work rhythm of his partner, the organization of private life reveals an organizational condition in the context of "no conflict of business trips" instead of in the context of their togetherness. Inevitably, the house becomes a space designed according to this organization. In fact, what emerges without these individuals being aware is the fact that the house is

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[3] 'Participant 52': 39 yearsold, is a femaleengineerworking as a manager in a company.

not a private space belonging to them, but it to become a space where they are taking a break in the name of their jobs in the flow of their businesses.

> I have business trip tempo due to my employment. It mainly consists of domestic business trips... My partner also has travel tempo. We are paying attention these trips to coincide. In order to be able to look after children… We have an assistant here to support us. (Participant 52, aged 39)

Participant 1',[4] like 'Participant 52' emphasizes 'necessity of the job' as he tells the dizzying state of the flow. The intense travel pace of the Participant's job due to its global (neoliberal) connections has turned into a very ordinary situation in his life. This case corresponds to the point which Bauman (2012b) states 'touristizingglobals'. As a matter of fact, for these people, as movement is a lifestyle, 'stopping' or 'being based on the local' is the biggest worry factor. This is the reason why such individuals avoid permanent relationships in the city and their daily lives.

Participant 37, is telling us how 'flexible job' and 'flexible time' condition had appeared. The 'flexible capacity of his work' has been the cause of his losing control of the boundaries between his private life and working life. The point which made: "for me there is no difference between home and work" is in fact the narrator of how much work can be a part of his personal life.

5.3. New Jobs, competition and the breakdown of permanent relationships

Our data indicates that almost all of the participants have attributed positive meanings to past experiences (traditional modern city experiences in their childhood). In addition, in the 'cities of their childhood' that each Participant described while telling their stories regarding 'traditional modern city'; it is seen that they say positive things about 'agoras', 'types of relationships', socialites, solidarity networks, and security conditions. On the other hand, close to all of the participants expressed that all of these features have been lost in the present city (late modern city or neoliberal city).

The account of 'Participant 17',[5] who works in an international fleet company, seem to belong to an employee's assessment who has internalized the conditions of 'the new jobs'. Because he, `Participant 17`, reveals the uncertainty, flow and instability of the job, even career competition and destructiveness as "needed constructivism". Stability -

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[4] 'Participant 1'; 42 yeasrold, is a maleengineerworking as a company partner.
[5]'Participant 17'; 29years old, maleeconomist,workingfor an internationalfleetcompany.

according to Sennett (2011; 2012)- means a deadlock in the name of the people of the 'new world', or falling in the centre of the failure notion. As Bauman put it (2003; 2006), when the future gets a ball of uncertainty in such a world, permanencies as a result of the long-term narratives jobs may produce has stopped to be among situations that are wanted or expected. Because, success itself is no longer long-term. Now success is purely individual, and career path is about destroying the others. The ambiguity of the job; therefore, confines the story of life to intimateness. In such an environment common cases as a product of permanent narratives become invalid and meaningless things.

5.4. From traditional to late modern city

In the context of neoliberal work and employment women's position has changed considerably. Social sciences yet need to reflect women's' perception, work and daily interactions in this new social arrangement. To this date, it is not fully grasped. Women's position became quite important when considered especially in the context of neoliberal jobs/employment, neoliberal city, market and family conditions. Since the beginning of the 1980s, women begun to show up in the job market with men, in almost all professional fields, by getting very good education in all business lines and by becoming competent. From the early 1980s onwards, more and more women got universities degrees, gained professional skills and became visible in all sectors; from banking to health care; from university/academic positions to media and so on. Considering the increased sense of insecurity, fear, paranoia, perception of risk and uncertainties, like Beck's subject of risk modernity. On the one hand, as the very demanding necessities of the traditional modern city and family life, more and more people feeling escape behind the walls of gated communities.

A 31-year-old- female medical doctor ('Participant 46'),[6] who works at the 'new capitalist' conditions speaks of the woman, as she confronts to the ones she says as "us" is the traditional modern woman who no longer has a part in the public space and whose traditional roles still continue. What she says in her interview as to what she "owns thanks to working" is the story of how she has gotten senseless (unwilling) to social interactions outside the house, or outside in general, in the neoliberal process where both partners have intensive work tempo. This intensity caused by the work flow reveals that they can no longer "find time" for the traditional ones, stated by her. For this reason, she states that there is no room for long-term social interactions that she truly needs to 'invest in' such as 'neighbours'. This; as a consequence, brings out a process, the way she puts it, "closes them to all the social interactions outside". In this respect, uncertainties become more of conditions that

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[6] 'Interwiever 46'; a femaledoctorwhoworks as a specialist in a researchhospital.

determine the type of social interaction beside the rhythm of the jobs. The point that the she suggests is that "*people naturally do not trust each other for they do not get to know one another because of their work*" is a narrator of how life depending on work can be loaded with social uncertainties. This is an outcome of how life changes as the business changes.

> Working life is not like before anymore. The sense of trust has gotten different, as well. People no longer trust each other, because everyone is working. There used to be more housewives; naturally, the neighbours were more intimate and intense." (Participant 46, aged 31)

Our next participant (Participant 45'),[7] is 35-yare-old male academician in a medical faculty, is also telling how the traditional modern city's specific relationships have changed its way of life in terms of his own. What he says as "human interactions fall behind because of work life" is a determination that details the new human interactions as a result of 'new employment' conditions. The things that he utters in the form of "we are very busy" and "we are lying fallow in this way while we are constantly rushing" and "we are not willing" are essentially the expressions stemming from their business cantered lives that is 'the reason why they isolate themselves in the gated communities'. In this respect, his emphasis on "our socio-economic profile has altered due to our financial change" is the teller of the reason why they [the residents of gated communities] are 'reluctant' for the traditional neighbourhood interactions. It is not unusual distrust towards the local and traditional to rise up -Baumann (2012b)-when uncertainty prevails. When life becomes a solely individual battle, local or traditional roles turn into a burden/inessentiality. What the Participant says in this respect is a result of this situation.

> It seems to be stemming from the business life. New relationships or human interactions come after work. The work is very intense, we are constantly rushing and we are in constant struggle. Those feelings get blurred. However, I felt it when I was young. For example, the place we lived in was like a neighbourhood. We used to know everybody in the neighbourhood. (Participant 45, aged 35)

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[7] 'Interwiever 45'; he is a maledoctorwhoworks as an associateprofessor in a researchhospital.

5.5. 'My mother use to have good neighbours':Loss of the Neighbourhood

The 'Participant 41',[8](36 years old - female with a PhD) who is also an academician, has returned to Turkey after staying a long time abroad (in the USA) by getting her doctoral degree. The participant emphasizes that "my childhood has passed in the suburbs in Istanbul". What she portrays as "outskirts" has the accents of intensely active 'interfaces' (agoras) regarding the city for them. The street being a sharing space (even a playground for them) was a space that could promise security, very far from the notion of 'a dangerous space' as a product of uncertainty or uncanny. On the other hand, the participant emphasizes that, even though she lives in the gated community, she does not feel that her own children are safer comparing to the past in her own childhood in Istanbul (reference to her childhood in Istanbul). The point she makes is regarding her childhood as "life was simple" includes a situation where 'daily practices' were also simple. This simplicity was the ability to be involved in agoras which used to be active. However, as this simplicity diminishes; it leaves its place to uncertainties. Increasing popularity of the gated communities are results of the fear coming from the uncertainties of her job. The 'notion of security' she had touched upon regarding her childhood is the notion of 'security', which is a product of active use of the city, that in return can eradicate uncertainty. The lifestyle in 'their gated communities' that cannot go past the uncertainty notion even though it is closed to 'active use' of individuals; hence, protected to outside, ensures that he perceives their lives' practices as 'dangerous'. When their living space is closed to their daily practices it fails to promise a permanent security to their perceptions.

> I lived in the outskirts of Istanbul in my childhood… We could very easily go out and play there in our childhood. We can bear let our kids out in these gated communities nowadays…" (Participant 41, aged 36)

In addition, she says: "my mother had neighbours with responsibilities" is in fact the narrator of the close relationships constructed by unplanned interactions and uncanny. The encounters that allow unscheduled routines as it is in the kind of city where her mother lived, are social concepts which make the private lives of the individual open to the foreigners. For this reason, unplanned, uncanny and unaccountability that existed in her mother's life also made her active against where she lived.   These encounters in her mother's public relationship were instruments that ensured stabilization and security in her

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[8]'Participant 41'; is 36years old, famale (PhD) InternationalRelations-Lecturerworks at a privateuniversity is a scholar.

daily life. The disappearance of uncertainty had a parallel reality to being open to the outside. What he exemplified as "as a neighbour calls, my mother would turn down the stove and go", was actually a style of relationship that was the reason why her mother could feel safe in her resident. As much as her mother's unplanned and uncanny behaviours made social sharing possible, it also made encounters (in terms of diminishing uncertainties) rather common. At this point, security was ensured solely by the police forces or it was rather a mere perception of our relationship types as opposed to physical equipment (Jacobs, 2013). In this respect, the relationships of his mother, who is a traditional modern woman, not only allows permanent togetherness but also promises security as a result of this.

He, unlike his mother, chooses to buy 'artificial stability conditions' in the name of reducing uncertainties in his residential area where there is no permanent relationships. "Nannies", "rules" etc. are the control arguments that are tried to be bought, which are results of 'social funds' his life lacks.

> "Mom had long lasting friendships there. Forty years, and they are still in contact. I'm still seeing my friends from there. A lot of people there are still like that. But now my life is not so... Street was a very good concept for me. The sidewalk and street was like a playground… At those times, there was both trust and love in human relations ... We used to stay there for a week until my mother came home. Where are such neighbours now? But we leave our children to the nannies only. We are setting rules so they can raise our child accordingly." (Participant 41, aged 36)

6. Discussion and conclusion

This paper has tried to find out the underlying causes of growing popularity of gated communities and discusses the major driving forces that brought their constitution in Turkey.It is estimated that there are, in the metropolitan area of Istanbul, 560 thousand gated communities with more than one million inhabitant in such developments suggests their growing popularity as well as patterns of interaction and separation which imply widespread bearings of on the one hand the globalization and neoliberalization of the city, work/employment and its impacts on everyday life and on the other hand, underestimated implications of culture of fear, anxiety, erosion of trust which are best telling signs of growing perceptions of risk and uncertainties which have gained prominence in late modern societies of late twenty end early twenty-first century.

In this paper we have tried to suggest that two aspects of gated communities particularly significant. First, our findings show that the gated communities emerged and gained popularity as a result of macro-economic changes which Turkey became part of from the early 1980s. As one of the best examples of global city Istanbul have become the bastion of neoliberal transformation. Results show that one of the strongest drivers for residents to move into gated communities is the neoliberal middle-class jobs that require new living space that reflects the necessities of work and living conditions.

Neoliberal city, work and life conditions is one of the key points to understand why gated communities proliferates particularly in Istanbul. They emerged as a perfect match for the flow, flexibility and mobility-indexed features which 'new working conditions' encapsulate. New job being functionalized around global work tempo's flow and mobility has become a wanted standard in the city, as well. For this reason, whatever stops the flow and mobility (including the permanent relationships of daily life) has turned into burdens for neoliberal individuals. 'New employment' experiences that are pretty open to global interactions has a rather distant stance to local interactions, and even its results; daily life practices. The more distant the notions regarding global jobs get towards the local, the more distant it gets to its stability, tradition and routine practices.

Besides, lives of new jobs, which are built upon hard to control, ever flexible time and space, and uncertainties, make traditional relationships of 'late modern city individuals' a threat in terms of their routines. Uncertainties which make what is job and what is not, thanks to this, result in a permanent work tempo which makes the boundaries of life even harder to grasp day by day. When this is the case, the probability of individuals to face the uncanny and uncontrollability of traditional city experiences morph into fear and uncertainty factor they cannot overcome. In this respect, gated communities that promise stability for 'late modern individuals' have been getting more and more common as public spaces which pledge stability as opposed to permanent uncertainties inherent to the lives being a product of flexible jobs. In addition, in the new market conditions where career battles are the main determinants, bearing traditional social burdens have increasingly become unnecessary. In this respect, traditional city experiences (neighbours, neighbourhood relationships, etc.) turn into unnecessary, even boring stuff in terms of their responsibilities and burdens. When such analysis throughout the study is taken into consideration, gated community residents present much distinct reactions from the practices of the city of their childhood or their parents live.

In their influential study of gated communities, Blakely and Snyder (1999) point out that `in this era of dramatic demographic,

economic and social change, there is a growing fear about the future in America` (1999, p. 1). `Many feel vulnerable, unsure of their place and stability of their neighbourhood in the face of rapid change` (Ibid., p. 1-2). According to Tulloch and Lupton, people have become compelled to make themselves the centre of the conduct of life, taking on multiple and mutable subjectivities, and crisis are seen as individual problems rather than socially based. In the absence of fixed norms and expectations such as those which had structured modern societies (marriage, gender roles, employment etc.) individuals are forced to produce their own biographies and invent new certainties (2003, p. 4). As already established, from the early 1980s and as result of neoliberal restructuring policies, Turkish society challenged by a very rapid demographic, economic, cultural and social changes produced what Back (1992) termed as reflexive modernization and detraditionalization of traditional certainties which is led to high levels of anxieties and insecurity.

Second, gated communities are growing at a time when insecurity, culture of fear, anxiety, erosion of trust, risk society and uncertainties have become the predominant characteristic of not only the western societies but also developing societies as well. Beck argued that "in world risk society, non-Western societies share with the West not only the same space and time but also- more importantly- the same basic challenges of the second modernity" (2005: 2). Our findings suggest that majority of informants chose to live in the gated communities because of increased sense of risk and uncertainty in all aspects of everyday life. It is seems one of the most important reason behind the growth of gated communities in Turkey is widespread fear and heightened perceptions of new kinds of risks associated with public space, streets, fellow citizens as `strangers` or the `unwanted other`, environmental risks, and especially, `free floating fears` that can virtually be associated with anything and everything. In a similar case study of gated communities in the US, Low has found that residents experience 'feelings of insecurity, fear, paranoia, worry and status anxiety' (Low, 2008, p. 49 quoted in Blandy, 2018, p. 139).

Although many of our informants were raised in traditional-modern city neighbourhoods in where the streets were a sharing space (even a playground for them), interpersonal relations were strong, people trusted each other. As often mentioned, 'life was simple' in those days. However, nowadays streets are 'full of strangers`. The spatial refuge of the gated development can also be viewed as way of protection against risks such as crime, poor environment and unwanted social contacts (Atkinson and Flint, 2008, p. 890) or fear of stranger as the `unwanted other`. As trust in other people diminishes, the home becomes a protected haven, ever more disconnected from the public realm (Blandy, 2018, p. 137). This is particularly true for Turkey. The country has been scoring

the lowest levels of trust of all kinds; from public bodies to media; from politicians to jurisdiction trust has been diminishing over the last decade or so (Delibaş, 2017).

As sensitivities to contact with outsiders increase, the imperative to shield becomes greater with strategies employed to manage the exposure to perceived risks and desired social contact and spatial environments. `Life at gated communities', which have emerged as the 'beyond tradition residential areas' of neoliberal city, have turned into lives which presents stability and permanence in the context of risk, fear and uncertainties that had formed because of the nature of the new jobs.

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CHAPTER V

THE EFFECT OF PARENTING BEHAVIORS AND COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS ON THE ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

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1. Introduction

For the overall development, the early stages of life constitute a critical importance. In the early childhood period, the main system of the child is the "family" (Aydoğdu & Dilekmen, 2016). Parents' attitudes shape the children's personalities, self-perceptions, and relationships with others. These parental attitudes can be classified as; the parents' acceptance of the child, overprotection, authoritarianism, warmth, care, sensitivity, control and punishment towards the child (Baumrind, 1995; Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).

Differential parenting attitudes may result in children who are sensitive, affectionate, responsible, anxious, avoidant, happy or unhappy, exaggerated, and reckless individuals (Yaprak, 2007). The consistent and regular attitudes of the primary caregiver towards the child have a decisive role in their psychological adjustment. The positive, consistent and supportive attitudes of the caregiver support the children's personality development, whereas the negative, inconsistent and restrictive attitudes may cause some mental problems, incorrect beliefs and perception patterns and cause some deterioration in perception (Seven, 2008).

The care dimension of parents is about providing care and support. With this attitude, the parent tries to reduce the child's distress and support the child to cope with any threats and difficulties. Care may involve both emotional support (compassion, sympathy, care, encouragement) and instrumental support (information, advice) (Collins, Guichard, Ford & Feeney, 2006). The effective care dimension increases the parent-child relationship quality (Collins & Feeney, 2000). Children of parents who

display these attitudes become self-confident, entrepreneurial, responsible individuals (Yavuzer, 2010). In the controlling parental attitude, the parent monitors and observes the child's behavior and gains information about the child and then sets regulatory rules for the child in behavioral control. This attitude can also be defined as an attempt to inspect and control (Öztürk, Kındap, & Sayıl, 2006). In psychological control, the parent tries to control the feeling and thoughts of the child. Attitudes such as excessive intervention, detachment and withdrawal of love are can be given as example behaviors in this attitude. For the developmental outcomes, while the optimal levels of behavioral control is associated with positive ones, psychological control causes negative consequences such as depression and anxiety (Barber, Olsen, & Shagle, 1994). In the overprotective parental attitude, the parents devote their life to the child and adopt an overly altruistic role. This situation causes the child to be an irresponsible and not self-sufficient individual. Dependent on their parents, unable to act independently and with low self-esteem, these children fail to produce their own ideas (Yavuzer, 1990).

Studies which are examining parents' attitudes towards their children and children's attachment styles have revealed a significant relationship between these two variables (Neal & Horbury, 2001; Perris & Anderson, 2000). People develop intense emotional bonds with those whom they consider valuable to them throughout their lives. These intense emotional bonds are described as "attachment" (Bowlby, 1973). Especially in infancy, the age of 0-2 is a sensitive period in which the individual develops himself most rapidly in terms of physical, mental and emotional aspects. The baby is dependent on the caregiver, as the skills that will enable him to survive are not yet developed. The relationship he establishes with the caregiver in this period is essential for his mental and emotional development (Morsünbül, Çok, 2011; Tüzün, Sayar 2006).

First of all, the psychoanalytic theory explained this parent-child attachment as "the reason why the child is attached to his mother is that she meets the nutritional needs of him". Subsequent researches have revealed that this explanation of psychoanalytic theory is incomplete and inadequate. Bowlby developed "Attachment Theory" accordingly (Soysal, Bodur, İşeri & Şenol, 2005). Bowlby explains attachment theory with three basic concepts; seek close proximity, safe haven and safe base. When the baby perceives a danger or threat, he wants to have close physical contact with the primary caregiver. If closeness is provided, the baby feels safe and strong, which enables the baby to wonder and examine the environment because he knows that it is a safe base where he can take shelter for comfort and safety whenever he needs or wants. The results of Harlow's experiment indicated that, meeting the nutritional needs alone is not enough for the establishment of the bond between mother and baby, and that the general

attitudes of the parents have important effects on the life of the individual, and the lifelong effect of the mother-infant relationship has been revealed (Bowlby, 1969).

In this direction, Ainsworth et al. developed assessment of "The Strange Situation" to measure the level of attachment of babies to their families (Holmes, 1993). In this assessment, the possible responses of the baby when encountering a stranger were examined and as a result of the evaluations, three major attachment styles were found. (Ainsworth, 1989, Holmes 1993). The securely attached babies can easily get close to other people and use their caregiver as a safe base while exploring the environment, because their needs of care and affection were met (Ainsthworth, 1989; Goldberg & Perry-Jenkins, 2004). Securely attached individuals have found to be better in the ability of understanding emotions and problem solving where they can easily establish social relationships with other people (Thomspson, 2006).

If the baby develops an anxious-avoidant attachment (insecure avoidant), he does not share his feeling with the primary caregiver, avoids and ignores the intimate relationship. There is no expectation of suggestion, contact or closeness from the caregiver. These children were often abused (emotional, physical, sexual) or their needs (basic, physical, emotional, social) were ignored by their primary caregivers (Arslan, 2008). Because the child thinks that the caregiver is resistant to his reactions and punishes him, he avoids asking for help-support in adulthood, does not express his feelings and thoughts openly, does not invest in social and emotional relationships, and remains hesitant about being close with others (Hazan & Shaver, 1994).

If the baby develops an anxious-resistance attachment (insecure ambivalent/anxious), he approaches with suspicion to strangers. When the primary caregiver moves away from the setting and comes back, he overreacts, does not calm down easily, he wants to get closer to his caregiver and also exhibits an angry, restless attitude. In adulthood years, the main problem of these children's relationship is describing their partners as distant and cold and to think that their love is unrequited (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). In this attachment style, the primary attachment object has not met the child's needs in a timely and consistent manner (Ainsthworth, 1989; Goldberg & Perry-Jenkins, 2004).

There are plenty of studies displaying that the parental attitudes and the early years attachment styles play a critical role for the development of trust which impact the overall development of the individuals throughout their lives (eg., Schuengel, Verhange, Madigan, Fearson, Ooosterman & Cassibba, 2015). The results of a longitudinal study examining the change in attachment styles indicated that, 72% of the participants maintained the

attachment styles that they developed during their infancy. This statistic was obtained when babies who participated in the Ainsworth's Strange Situation at the age of one attended Berkeley's Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) 20 years later. (Waters et al., 2000).

The link between the attachment styles and the romantic relationship was also examined (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1994, Pistole, 1995). Attachment theory assumes that romantic relationships have a fundamental role in human development, and states that attachment patterns which begin to take shape during childhood, affect expectations, beliefs, social behavior patterns, and emotion regulation model (Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Attachment begins to take shape with the formation of the baby and forms the building block of the sense of "security" in life. This building block affects the emotional sharings of the individual, such as a romantic relationship in his later life (e.g., Simpson, 1992). During infancy and childhood, parents are the individual's initial attachment figure, but with adulthood, the attachment figure begins to be peers or partners in romantic relationships (Ainsworth, 1989).

Adulthood is a period where the individuals search for their identity continues. In this current stage unlike adolescence, the certain questions of the individual about who they are and what they desire from life and romantic partners has begun to be answered more precisely (Arnett, 2007). A romantic relationship is where two individuals feel sexual, emotional and spiritual passion for each other and hence the partners reward each other for these feelings (Branden, 1988). According to Moss and Schwebell (1993), romantic relationships are based on five essential factors. These are commitment, affective intimacy, cognitive intimacy, physical intimacy and mutuality. Researchers have emphasized that attachment styles which individuals establish in their romantic relationships in the adulthood are very alike to the attachment styles they developed towards their primary caregiver in their childhood. Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall classified the attachment styles in romantic relationships as ''secure attachment, insecure-resistant (anxious) attachment, and insecure-avoidant attachment'' (Selçuk et al., 2005). Anxiously attached individuals have difficulty separating from their partners, want to minimize their emotional distance with them, and they always want to be noticed by their partner and to be the centre of attention. In addition, issues of concern are often closely related to separation, disapproval, and anxiety to satisfy others. Those who are avoidantly attached are generally like to loneliness and think they are self-sufficient (Shaver, Hazan & Bradshaw, 1998).

There is a significant and positive relationship between secure attachment and the perception of a happy, friendly, reliable and intimate relationship (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). Besides, a significant and positive

relationship was found between the avoidant attachment style and the obsessive, inconsistent, emotionally unstable, sexually over-eager and overly jealous attitudes. It was found that individuals with anxious attachment attach more importance to their relationships and perceive more frequent problems in relationships. At the same time, it was understood that individuals with anxious attachment style needed more closeness and trust in the relationship (Uyar, 2019). It was found that people with a secure attachment had higher relationship satisfaction compared to people with other attachment styles. In addition, securely attached individuals focus on their own and their partner's emotions when a conflict arises and become more accommodating, while anxiously attached individuals compromise themselves and try to adapt to their partner's wishes. Individuals with avoided attachment style stay away from compromise and focus on the most problematic points of the conflict (Pistole, 1995).

It has been emphasized that the perceived parental attitudes in the first years of life also affect the individuals' worlds of emotions and thoughts and shapes their perception and interpretations. These shaped perception and interpretation styles determine the reactions individuals will give to the events they experience. According to cognitive theory; events are shaped according to the people's view of the world, beliefs, expectations, perception and interpretation rather than their own qualities (Beck et al., 1979). If dysfunctional thoughts are distorted in the cognitive structure of the individual, the point of view to events and situations can be different as against the reality. This situation can also negatively affect the emotional state and cause some psychopathologies (Ardanıç, 2017; Tükçapar, 2011). Individuals encounter many stimuli throughout their lives, process, evaluate and interpret these stimuli within the framework of perceptions that began to take shape in childhood (Uyar, 2019). According to Beck, early experiences provide an environment for the individual to develop some basic dysfunctional and biased schemas about himself and the world. The attitudes that individuals are exposed by their caregivers at an early age; it causes them to organize their perceptions in this direction, and their feelings and behaviors show negative tendencies. These schemes are extremely rigid, extreme, one-dimensional, absolute, resistant to change, and cause negative automatic thoughts. Even though these thoughts occur out of individual control, they affect the life of the individual negatively (Beck, 2001). How individuals react to the situations they encounter, what they feel are related to schemas, automatic thoughts and personality traits, started to develop during the childhood years (Garnefski, Kraaij & Spinhoven, 2002). Therefore, individuals' cognitive distortions are thought to be closely related to parental behaviors and attachment styles (Uyar, 2019).

Cognitive distortions can be considered as negative biases or tendencies for the information processing (Tükçapar, 2011). Cognitive distortions trigger each other and by time they become a general way of thinking of the individual which results in systematic logic errors in perception (Ardanıç, 2017). Beck, Rush, Show, & Emery (1979) found that there are seven types of cognitive distortions specifically in individuals. This list was expanded by Burns (1980) and identified as ten cognitive distortions in total. Thinking styles about cognitive distortions are explained as follows (Beck, 2001); dichotomous thinking as a style that also known as "black or white", "bipolar" or "two-way thinking". In this distortion, events and persons are perceived very rigidly. The ability of the individual to perceive events more flexibly is not active (Blackburn, 1996). Selective abstraction thinking style as called "mental filtering" and "selective blindness" is the second one. In this distortion, although there are many different evidences about the event experienced by the individual, the individual focuses on the negative detail and makes evaluations in this direction (Beck, 2001). The individual refuses to evaluate the events from a general perspective and comments. This is a kind of finding out the negative with "tweezers" from the whole and ignoring everything else (Özer, 2000).

Arbitrary inference thinking style is called as "reasoning according to feelings". In this cognitive distortion, it is possible for the individual to make a determination according to him own feelings and thoughts by evaluating internal and external materials without any clue and evidence about an event or situation (Beck, 2001). The individual who has this way of thinking assumes that reality is also negative because everything seems negative to him. The forth one is the mind reading in which the individual claims that he knows what other people think of him and prefers to believe his own opinion without the need to investigate other possible causes (Türkçapar, 2011). Catastrophizing thinking style include negative assumptions about the future that made without much considering the realistic results, where the individual feels anxious as a result of the disaster scenarios. In overgeneralization thinking style, the individual makes a judgment about himself and others based on a single event. The person draws general rules from a single event by carrying the experienced situation far beyond than the event itself (Klar, Gabai & Baron, 1997). An overgeneralization person frequently uses words such as "always, nobody, never, everyone, absolutely" (Özer, 2000). In labelling and mislabelling style, although there are other evidences available, these are completely ignored, and the individual creates "judgmental, rigid, negative "adjectives" about himself and others. In addition, once the labelling occurs, the individual begins to display attitudes that support this adjective (Ardanıç, 2017).

Ignoring the positive is also another way of cognitive distortion, in which the individual devaluates positive things by naming them as unimportant, ordinary, worthless or by chance (Türkçapar, 2011). On the other hand, for the personalization thinking style, the individual perceives events and situations that are unrelated to himself. He does not think that there may be different causes, and thus attributes the cause of negative behaviors or situations to himself even when there is no connection (Beck, 2001). For the other cognitive distortion, the should statements, the individual has absolute judgments about himself and how other people should behave, and he exaggerates the thoughts that everything will go awful if these requirements are not followed. In this way of thinking, the individual can impose heavy responsibilities on himself and other people.

It has been found that individuals with anxious and avoidant types of attachment, have more distorted thoughts. Insecurely attached individuals tend to suffer from more damage of their relationships, which can be caused by cognitive distortions (Stackert & Bursik, 2003). It has also been found that there is a significant positive relationship between cognitive distortions and fear of rejection, unrealistic relationship expectation, misperception of others, shyness and fear (Koydemir & Demir 2008). Children who received love, affection and attention from their parents define themselves as loveable and competent individuals in adulthood. Individuals whose emotional needs were not met or were met inconsistently develop negatively distorted beliefs such as inadequacy and disapproval, and the effect of these beliefs is clearly observed on romantic relationships (Sharf, 2000).

To summarize, attachment constitute a necessity for the survival and functional development of the newborns (Morsünbül & Çok, 2011). It is known that the link between the mother and child creates mental representations of the self and the environment, and these mental representations determine attitudes in future close relationships (Ditommaso et al., 2003). Parental attitudes determine the child's perception of the world. Likewise, parental attitudes play an active role in the development of cognitive schemas that enable individuals to make sense of themselves, other people and the world (Beck, 2001). Perceived negative parenting attitudes (such as critical, rejecting, overprotective, negligent) and the inability to meet the baby's needs in a healthy and consistent way in the first years of life lead to the formation of many negative basic beliefs (e.g.: failure, inadequacy). Many studies have shown that childhood experiences, parental attitudes and internal working models are effective on the perception of romantic relationships in adulthood (Bozkurt, 2006; Fraley & Shaver, 2000). In accordance to the above review, the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of perceived

parental attitudes that measured retrospectively and cognitive distortions on their attitudes in romantic relationships.

2. Method

This is a descriptive study conducted to determine the predictive effects of parental attitudes and cognitive distortions of individuals on the perception of romantic relationships.

2.1. Participants

The sample of the study consisted of 245 adults who were aged between 18-35. 38.4% of the participants are female, and the average age is 25.12. The snowball sampling technique was used to reach the participants. Data were collected through online surveys and lasted approximately 1/2 hour.

2.2. Measures

Demographic information about age, gender, primary caregiver, marital status, economic status, and educational level was collected. Self-reports of questionnaires were used to measure two dimensions of parenting behaviors (overprotection and care/control), experiences in close relationships (avoidance and anxiety), and cognitive distortions (interpersonal/social and work/success).

2.2.1. The Parental Bonding Instrument

The Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI), was developed by Parker et al in 1979. Participants were asked to retrospectively indicate how much each statement on the scale reflects the behavior of their primary caregiver, considering their first 16 years of life. PBI was adapted to Turkish by Kapçı & Küçüker (2006). It is a four-point Likert type scale which includes 25 items. While there were two separate factors in the original scale as care and overprotection/control, control items were included in the care dimension in Turkish version of the scale. Controlling behaviors were found to be coincide with overprotective parental attitudes in the Western culture, they are considered as a part of the caring parental attitude in our society (Kapçı & Küçüker, 2006). In terms of subscales, the Cronbach alpha value for the mother form in the care/control dimension was .91, and .90 for the father; in overprotection dimension .64 for mother and .78 for father. For this study, the internal reliability was .89 and .79 for the care/control and overprotection dimensions consecutively.

2.2.2. Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R)

Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) scale was developed by Farley et al. (2000). It was adapted into Turkish culture by Sümer (2006; YİYE-II). It consists of 36 items (18 avoidance and 18 anxiety) and two subscales: avoidance and anxiety. Each item measures

the emotions and thoughts in romantic relationships and is evaluated with a 7-point Likert scale. If the participants are not in a romantic relationship, it is asked them to imagine and fill in the responses as follows. The avoidant attachment dimension is calculated by taking the average of the even-numbered items, and the anxious attachment dimension by taking the average of the odd-numbered items. The increase in scores is an indicator of anxious and avoidant attachment. The Cronbach alpha coefficient of the avoidance dimension has a high level of internal consistency with .90 and anxiety dimension with .86 (Sümer, 2006). For the current study, the internal reliability was .85 and .88 for the avoidance and anxiety dimensions consecutively.

2.2.3. The Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS)

The Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS), was developed by Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & Seeds (2011). The scale was adapted to Turkish culture by Ardanıç (2017). The scale includes two short stories each describing ten cognitive distortions, and a scale prepared in 7-point Likert type (1 "Never" and 7 "Always"). One of the short stories was prepared to evaluate the interpersonal (social) area and the other to evaluate the work/success area. The Cronbach alpha value of the scale was found to be .96 and .93 consecutively for the interpersonal/social and work/success dimensions (Ardanıç, 2017). In this study, the internal reliability was calculated as .83 and .87 for the interpersonal/social and work/success dimensions consecutively.

2.3. Data Analyses

Descriptive statistics of variables for data analysis, bivariate Pearson correlations to examine the relationships between scales, and reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) were calculated. Skewness-Kurtosis values were examined to examine the normal distribution of the variables. SPSS program was used for the hypotheses testing.

3. Results

The demographic characteristics of the sample (Table 1) and the results of correlation analysis (Table 2) of the variables were summarized. As it can be seen, most of the sample consisted of males (61.6%). In addition, the education level of the majority of the participants (75.5%) is at the associate/bachelor's degree level. Considering the income level of the sample, the income level of 41.2% of the participants varies between 2500-5000 TL. 59.2% of the participants were not currently in any romantic relationship.

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of individuals

Sociodemographic Information	Frequency	Percent
Gender		
Female	94	38.4
Male	151	61.6
Educational Status		
Pre-primary / primary school	4	1.6
Secondary school	9	3.7
High school	20	8.2
Associate / bachelor's degree	185	75.5
Master's	25	10.2
Doctorate	2	.8
Income Level		
Low (0 – 2500 TL)	48	19.6
Medium (2500 – 5000 TL)	101	41.2
High (5000 – 10.000 TL)	56	22.9
Very high (10.000+ TL)	40	16.3
Relationship Status		
Not in relationship	145	59.2
Platonic	7	2.9
Flirting	18	7.3
In a relationship/engaged	69	28.2
/married	6	2.4
Separated /divorced / widow		
Primary Caregiver		
Mother	213	86.9
Father	10	4.1
Grandmother / grandfather	18	7.3
Aunt / uncle	2	.8
Paid caregiver	2	.8

Table 2 shows the correlations and descriptive analyses (mean and standard deviation) of all variables. According to this table, there was no statistically significant relationship between age and any other variables. On the other hand, there was a significant positive relationship between parents' overprotective attitudes and parents' care/control attitudes (r=.295, p<.05). Contrary to this, there was a significant negative relationship between parents' overprotective attitudes and anxious attachment style in romantic relationship (r=-.214, p<.05). This means that as the parents' overprotective attitudes decrease, the anxious attachment levels of individuals increase in their romantic relationships. There was a significant negative relationship between parents' overprotective attitudes and the cognitive distortions in the fields of achievement (r=-.258, p<.05) and

social/interpersonal (r=-.288, p<.05). This means that as the parents' overprotective attitudes decrease, the cognitive distortions levels in the fields of achievement and social/interpersonal of the individuals increase. Likewise, there was a significant negative relationship between parents' care/control attitudes and both avoidant (r=-.106, p<.05).and anxious attachment style (r=-.315, p<.05). Similarly, there was a significant negative relationship between parents' care/control attitudes and the cognitive distortions in the fields of achievement (r= -.278, p<.05) and social/interpersonal (r= -.293, p<.05). In other words, individuals who perceive their parents' attitudes as highly caring and controlling develop less avoidant and anxious attachment style in their romantic relationships, as well as have less cognitive distortions in the fields of interpersonal/social and achievement.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlational Analyses
of the Variables

	Mean (SD)	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1.Age	25.14 (3.98)	-.07	-.01	.00	-.06	.04	.03
2.Over-protection	11.40 (4.58)		.29**	.07	-.21**	-.25**	-.28**
3.Care/Control	41.22 (8.81)			-.10*	-.31**	-.27**	-.29**
4.Avoidant attachment	57.76 (19.15)				-.00	.29**	.20**
5.Anxious attachment	64.47 (21.03)					.37**	.53**
6.Achievement CDS	35.31 (12.45)						.74**
7.Interpersonal CDS	40.33 (11.58)						

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Finally, there was a significant positive relationship between the achievement sub-dimension and the interpersonal/social sub-dimension in the cognitive distortions (r =.744, p<.05). In other words, if individuals have a high level of cognitive distortion in any cognitive distortion sub-dimension, they also have a high level of cognitive distortion in the other cognitive distortion sub-dimension. Given the magnitude of the correlation values, there was a strong linear relationship only between the two sub-dimensions of cognitive distortions.

Then, independent sample t-tests were used to examine the difference in the parents' care/control and overprotective attitudes, their cognitive

distortions in the interpersonal/social and achievement domains, and avoidant and anxious attachment styles in romantic relationships with respect to the gender. According to the findings, there was a significant difference in perceived overprotective parental attitudes [t (243)=3,30, p <.05] between female and male. Females (M=12.6; SD=4.9) perceived their parents' attitudes as more protective in childhood than males (M=10.65; SD=4.22). In other words, parents exhibited more protective attitudes towards their girls than their boys. On the other hand, there is not found a significant difference between female and male participants for other variables.

In order to examine whether parents' care/control or overprotective attitudes, avoidance or anxiety attachment styles in a romantic relationship and cognitive distortions in the interpersonal/social or achievement domains change across educational status, income level, relationship status and primary caregiver a one-way ANOVAs were conducted. Findings showed that educational status had a significant effect on parents' overprotection attitudes, F(5,239)=3.26, p<.05. The mean for the pre-primary/primary school group was 9.75 (SD = 3.50), the mean for the secondary school group was 6.78 (SD=4.09), and the mean for the high school group was 9.55 (SD=4.45), the mean for the associate/bachelor's degree group was 11.91 (SD=4.41), the mean for the master's group was 10.92 (SD=5.26), and the mean for the doctorate group was 12.00 (SD=2.83). As can be seen, while individuals who did doctorate, were the group that perceive their parents' attitudes as the highest protective in their childhood, secondary school graduates were the group that perceive their parents as the least protective. In addition, educational status had a significant effect on cognitive distortions in the achievement area, F(5,239)=2.54, p<.05. The mean for the pre-primary/primary school group was 45.25 (SD=5.50), the mean for the secondary school group was 36.00 (SD=10.50), and the mean for the high school group was 40.30 (SD=7.72), the mean for the associate/ bachelor's degree group was 34.21 (SD=12.43), the mean for the master's group was 38.89 (SD=14.92), and the mean for the doctorate group was 20.00 (SD=5.66). As it is seen that pre-primary/primary school graduates had the highest level of cognitive distortion in the field of achievement, while individuals with a doctorate were the group with the least cognitive distortion in the field of achievement. On the contrary, educational status did not have a significant effect on parents' care/control attitudes, F(5,239)=1.24, p>.05; avoidant attachment style, F(5,238)=.96, p>.05; anxiety attachment style, F(5,239)=2.02, p>.05 and cognitive distortions in the field of social, F(5,239)=1.79, p>.05.

Income level did not have a significant effect on parents' overprotective attitudes, F(3, 241)=.35, p>.05; parents' care/control

attitudes, F(3, 241)=.91 p>.05; avoidant attachment style, F(3, 240)= 1.83, p>.05; anxiety attachment style, F(3, 241)=1.22, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of achievement, F(3, 241)=1.24, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of social, F(3, 241)=.38, p>.05. Moreover, relationship status did not have a significant effect on parents' overprotective attitudes, F(4, 240)=.2.01, p>.05; parents' care/control attitudes, F(4, 240)=.92, p>.05; avoidant attachment style, F(4, 239)=.54, p>.05; anxiety attachment style, F(4, 240)=.61, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of achievement, F(4, 240)=1.40, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of social, F(4, 240)=1.15, p>.05. Finally, primary caregivers did not have a significant effect on parents' overprotective attitudes, F(4, 240)=.82, p>.05; parents' care/control attitudes, F(4, 240)=.52, p>.05; avoidant attachment style, F(4, 239)=.81, p>.05; anxiety attachment style, F(4, 240)=.26, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of achievement, F(4, 240)=.18, p>.05; cognitive distortions in the field of social, F(4, 240)=.22, p>.05.

Table 3. The Predictors of Avoidant and Anxious Attachment Styles

| | Avoidant Attachment | | Anxious Attachment | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	59.204	39.216	57.141	44.544
Gender	-.042	-.014	.054	.039
Relationship status	.044	.000	.112	.087
Overprotection		.173*		-.038
Care/control		-.068		-.174**
Achievement CDS		.313**		-.085
Interpersonal CDS		.005		.528**
R^2	.01	.11	.01	.32

Notes: Standardized regression coefficients; N = 244. * p<.05; ** p<.01.

Next, regression analyses were conducted to predict the avoidant and anxious attachment styles with the parenting and cognitive distortions variables (Table 3). After controlling for the predictive effect of gender and relationship status, overprotective parenting style and achievement oriented cognitive distortions positively predicted the avoidant type of attachment (effect sizes are %17 and %31 respectively). When the individuals experienced higher levels of overprotective parenting and

adopted achievement oriented cognitive distortions, these individuals tend to display avoidance in their romantic relationships. In contrast, after controlling for the predictive effect of gender and relationship status, care/control type parenting style negatively and interpersonal oriented cognitive distortions positively predicted the anxious type of attachment (effect sizes are %17 and %53 respectively). So, when the individuals experienced lower levels of care/control type of parenting and adopted interpersonal oriented cognitive distortions, these individuals tend to display anxiety in their romantic relationships.

4. Discussion

In this study, the effects of perceived parental attitudes and cognitive distortions on the attachment styles in romantic relationships were examined. It is known that perceived parental attitudes in childhood play an active role in shaping individuals' interpersonal relationships (Bowlby 1969). Furthermore, cognitive distortions that emerge in the light of parental attitudes and self-belief systems prevent individuals from establishing secure relationships (Akın, 2010). The results obtained from this study also demonstrate that parental attitudes are related to unrealistic thought patterns in individuals' perceptions.

In this study, a significant positive relationship was found between parents' overprotective attitudes and parents' care/control attitudes. Although perceived care and affection are associated with positive effects (Sümer, Aktürk & Helvacı, 2010), there are many studies showing that control and overprotective attitudes have also negative effects (Barber, Olsen & Shagle, 1994; Yavuzer, 1990). Some studies suggest that perceived control and protective attitudes have not always negative consequences, when these attitudes are integrated with care, they can support the social development of the child (Sümer, Aktürk & Helvacı, 2010). The reason for this contradiction can be explained by the fact that the attitudes and behaviors interiorized by the society vary from culture to culture (Chao, 1994; Darling & Steinberg, 1993). As Kağıtçıbaşı (2017) suggests, in collectivist cultures such as Turkish culture, parental discipline and warmth are not opposite poles but complementary components.

The results of this study also indicated that as individuals' perceived level of care/control or overprotective parental attitude decreased, they tended to be more anxious and avoidant attachment in their romantic relationships. Attachment is a strong emotional system that a person develops against people who are significant for him (Ainsworth, 1989) and is a multidimensional concept that is shaped by the environment and the inner changes of the person. The sensitive and supporting attitudes of the caregiver causes a secure bond with the baby and thus the baby creates a positive self-model towards himself and others (Ainsworth, 1989).

Research has shown that children of parents who display a caring, protective attitude and exercise optimum levels of behavioral control are securely attached, whereas children of families who display a reckless and unprotected attitude and who conduct less behavioral control develop an avoidant or anxious attachment style (Koehn & Kerns, 2018). This relationship can again be culturally related to the collectivist structure of Turkish culture. As a society, Turkish collectivistic culture tends to perceive possessive, protective and control attitudes positively, and although suchlike attitudes may be perceived negatively in other societies, these attitudes can reinforce secure attachment in collectivistic cultures (Sümer, Aktürk & Helvacı, 2010).

In Turkish culture, where the concepts of warmth and closeness have an important role (Akçınar & Baydar, 2014), parents' high-level care/control and overprotective attitudes prevent individuals from creating cognitive distortions in the field of achievement and interpersonal. There are many research findings that reveal the relationship between the attachment pattern that develops between the infant and the primary caregiver since the first months of life, and the individual's mental health and perception of events in both childhood and adulthood (Rohner & Britner 2002). Individuals' beliefs and assumptions about themselves and their environment form cognitive schemas. Later, a pattern is formed from these schemas and automatic thoughts, and in similar situations, the individuals remember these schemas and perceive the situations in the same way, reacts to them automatically and feel the same emotions (Beck, 2001). Although the literature generally supports that increasing the perception of family cohesiveness reduces cognitive distortions, there are also studies that control and overprotective attitudes have no significant effects (Bozkurt, 2006). On the other hand, since authoritarian attitudes of parents such as control and protective in Turkish culture can be perceived as care and involvement (Akçınar & Özbek, 2017), the lack of these attitudes can be perceived as withdrawal of love and can be interpreted as negative and threatening in the individual's cognitive system.

It was observed that as individuals' levels of cognitive distortions increased, their anxious and avoidant attachment levels in their romantic relationships increased accordingly. These findings are supported by data in the literature in which cognitive distortions are positively associated with variables such as fear of rejection, unrealistic relationship expectation, and fear of loss (Koydemir & Demir 2008). The importance of deteriorations in romantic relationships for the life of the individual has been emphasized by many studies (Umemura, Lacinová, Kotrčová, & Fraley, 2018). Unrealistic evaluations of the person can trigger emotional, mental and behavioral problems in romantic relationships. People who have not developed a secure bond in relationships tend to experience

damage from the relationship and develop more cognitive distortions. In addition, individuals' withdrawal of such relationships may be based on ongoing distorted thoughts from their past experiences. In other words, it is possible to talk about a bipolar interaction in this case (Stackert & Bursik, 2003).

Research findings showed that individuals who have high cognitive distortions in any field also have a high level of cognitive distortion in the other field. It is supported by the literature that cognitive distortions trigger each other (Ardanıç, 2017). Fundamental beliefs, consisting of the deepest beliefs, constitute the content of the cognitive schemas that enable us to perceive the world. In this context, while a new information received is cognitively processed, it triggers and distorts other existing schemas, and distorted evaluations affect each other and enable more automatic thoughts to reach the level of consciousness (Beck, 2001). Considering the parental attitudes by gender, women define their parents as more protective than men. This situation can be explained by the society's definition of boys as stronger and more resilient whereas girls are more sensitive and vulnerable (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 2000; Mızrakçı 1994; Yavuzer, 2010). Despite this, there are also findings that perceived foster parent attitudes do not differ according to gender (Özyürek & Şahin, 2005).

As a result of the findings, it was determined that the perceived overprotective parental attitudes also differed according to the education levels of the individuals. According to the results, while the ones who had doctorate degrees defined their parents' attitudes as protective at the highest level, secondary school graduates were the group that perceived protective attitudes the least. Although it is estimated that this result is due to the limited sample size of the aforementioned groups, there are many studies parallel to these findings. In this context, it can be interpreted that foster parenting attitudes in Turkish culture can be perceived as encouraging and supportive by individuals and integrated into life Hess & McDewitt (1984). On the other hand, it was also found that educational status also had an impact on the level of cognitive distortions in the field of achievement. In this context, pre-primary or primary school graduates were the group with the highest level of cognitive distortion in the field of achievement, whereas individuals who had a doctorate education are defined as the group with the least cognitive distortion in the field of achievement. This finding can also be associated with the limited sample size, apart from this, similar findings have been found in the literature (Duman, 2018). However, it is ambiguous whether having a higher educational level causes a decrease in cognitive distortions or whether individuals are progressing academically because they have a low level of cognitive distortion. More detailed studies are needed in the literature based on this topic.

In this study, the parental attitudes studied retrospectively with adults and the parental attitudes towards children have important effects on the individual's introverted and extroverted attitudes has been proven and the lifelong effect of the mother-infant relationship has been revealed. In this context, the contribution and importance of this research to the literature is as follows; this research drew attention to the effects of parental attitudes and cognitive distortions on each other and the perception of romantic relationships. Romantic relationships constitute an important part of most individuals' lives. Moreover, the cognitive distortions developed by individuals can create problems in many areas and prevent them to function well.

There are some limitations of the present study. First of all, cause-effect relationship was not included in the study since the results were limited to explaining the relationship between variables. Secondly, the sample size in the study is limited and the demographic distribution of the sample is not representative. Thirdly, although the attachment styles in romantic relationships were measured in the study, no measurement tool was used regarding the parent attachment style. If the attachment styles of the individuals to their parents were examined in addition to the parental attitudes, different questions could be answered. Fourth, data based on self-report was collected with a cross-sectional design. This situation may have created a memory-based problem when answering past questions about parental attitudes or biased information may have been obtained.

In this context, the research can be repeated for a representative sample. In order to examine the lifelong continuity of attachment styles with further research, a new measurement tool can be added to the study that measures the parent attachment style. More empirical knowledge and studies are needed to better analyse the changes in parental attitudes from culture to culture. In order to examine the possible effects of parental attitudes on individuals in more detail, observation-interview technique can be used, focus-group studies can be conducted, and these data can be collected with longitudinal methods. Furthermore, more attention can be given to the guidance and counselling services in schools in order to support the psychosocial development of the child, and seminars can be given to parents, thus preventing possible deterioration in the child's perception system.

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CHAPTER VI

THE ALTERNATING BRICK AND STONE MASONRY IN EARLY OTTOMAN MOSQUES (THE 14th CENTURY)

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Introduction

The 14th century was the time of formation era for the Ottoman State. The first half of the century started with the conquest of important provincial centers such as Bursa (1326) and Iznik (1331) and then the transition of the South Marmara Region from Byzantine to Ottoman domination took place. The second half of the century continued with transition to Thrace (Rumelia) in 1354 and a rapid expansion to the Balkans after the conquest of Edirne in 1361. As a result of incredible expansion in Northwestern Anatolia and the Balkans, the Ottoman Turks had achieved certain progress towards the institutionalization of the state and generated better financial means. Throughout the second half of the 14th century Ottoman architecture was also improved with the construction of monumental mosques (İnalcık and Quataert, 2000, 19).

At first, it cannot be stated that the quality of building materials used in the 14th century was suffcient from an architectural perspective. Rough-hewn stone and rubbles as well as bricks had been widely used in masonry of almost all Ottoman mosques of the century. Therefore, Early Ottoman Architecture has a speciality for the use of alternating courses of brick and stone bonding walls. However, before the Ottomans, the alternating masonry of brick and stone had not been used in Anatolian Turkish Architecture and Islamic Architecture despite that it was one of the main characteristics of Byzantine Architecture. Examination of the construction materials in Early Ottoman Mosques demonstrates that cultural and technical transfers from Byzantine to Early Ottoman architecture had occured. Thus, the current study aims to illustrate the characteristics and principles of alternating brick and stone masonry in Early Ottoman mosques of the 14th century.

1. Alternating Wall

Alternating wall can be defined as *"a wall formed by consecutively laid courses of different materials such as brick and stone from bottom to the top"* (Sözen and Tanyeli, 2003, 18). However, alternate courses can be applied horizontally as well as vertically from the bottom to the top of the walls (Ersoy, 1994, 89). Besides that, there are also two main types of alternating with the use of same or different types of construction materials (Batur, 1970, 136; Kutlu, 2017, 132).

1.1 Types of Alternating Wall

The alternating use of the same type of construction material can be applied in accordance with different dimensions and colors. For instance, alternating courses of the stone blocks in different colors is very common in Islamic architecture. "*Ablaq*" as a term used to define this kind of alternating masonry (Petersen, 1996, 1-2). Whereas the dimension-based alternating can be described as wall masonry where different size of the stone blocks repeatedly sequenced in a specific order (Batur, 1970, 137). This type of alternating wall is much common in buildings of Western Anatolian Turkish Emirates of the 14th century (Aktuğ Kolay, 1999, 27; Batur, 1970, 179-180).


Figure 1: Alternating Brick and Stone courses for decorative purpose at Başçı İbrahim Mosque's facade (Bursa, 15th century)

Alternating masonry with different types of construction material refers to walls formed by repeatedly sequencing at least two different kinds of construction materials. The most common use of this type can mainly be observed in the alternating courses of sequencing brick and stone walls (Batur, 1970, 136; Kutlu, 2017, 132).

There are three types of brick-and-stone alternating masonry: vertical, horizontal, and compound alternating (Kutlu, 2017, 133). Vertical Alternating occurs when the brick and stone courses consecutively bonded from the bottom to the top (Ersoy, 1994, 89). Actualy, brick and stone vertical alternating is related to bonding timber technique that usually applied with a purpose of reinforcement of a wall. Bonding timber technique is a system where bonding timber placed on stone course or courses for wall reinforcement and where façade sides of timber are masoned with bricks (Ötüken, 1990, 395-398). This technique is defined as "recessed brick" (Ousterhout 1990, 163-170) or "gizli hatıl tekniği" (Ötüken, 1990, 395-396).

In the meantime, there are many common applications of the vertical alternating. Brick-and-stone courses on the same wall are generally sequenced according to a 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 and 4/1 systems. However, the 3/1 and 2/1 orders of alternating masonry were widely preferred and applied in Ottoman Mosques of th 14th - 15th centuries (Kutlu, 2017, 133).


Figure 2 and 3: Vertical Alternating brick and stone wall (1/1 order: 1 brick / 1 stone) and (2/1 order: 2 brick / 1 stone)

Complex implementation of the vertical Alternating refers to the technique where bricks-and-stone courses consecutively masoned in a several orders within the same wall (Batur, 1970, 190-191). A complex implementation of 3/1 and 1/1 orders may briefly be explained with a following example (See Fig. 4, 5).


Figure 4 and 5: Vertical (Complex) alternating wall (3/1+ 1/1) and (3/4 + 1/1) order

At the same time, in horizontal alternating technique bricks and stone blocks masoned side by side within the course repeating each other along a horizontal axis. In this method, placing one or two vertical bricks

between the stones is the most common application (Ersoy, 1994, 89; Kutlu, 2017, 134).


Figure 6 and 7: Horizontal alternating: 1 or 2 perpendicular brick use.

The Compound Alternating is applied to wall technique in which both bricks and stones successively bonded along both vertically and horizontally (Batur, 1970, 190-191). This technique is also called "cloisonné" (Ousterhout, 2016, 188-189) and "çerçeveli teknik" or "kasetleme tekniği" in Turkish (Ötüken, 1990, 397; Kutlu, 2017, 134).

Figure 8: İznik Nilüfer Imareti (today's İznik Museum)

1.2. Literature Review on Early Ottoman Alternating Wall

At first, in 1970 Afife Batur published a long and detailed article with title of "Osmanlı Camilerinde Almaşık Duvar Üzerine". It was a pioneering article thanks to her systematic approach to building materials, defined within the framework of basic units, sub-units and their relations with each other (Batur, 1970, 135-216). In the article, the author firstly gives some definitions to the alternating wall, and then makes suggestions regarding its origins. Afterward, she classified and evaluated the Ottoman Mosques which have alternating wall structures dating from the 14th – 18th centuries in a chronological order. As a result, Batur has revealed that brick-and-stone alternating is the most commonly used technique while the

alternating based on the dimension and color of material is evident in a smaller number of building examples.She analyzed and evaluated the buildings from the perspective of the brick-and-stone alternating masonry with a detailed table. Within the framework of her study different types of the alternating walls and closely related architectural elements such as arches, eaves, drums for domes, and mortar beds as well as their characteristics and decorative applications and techniques were also investigated (Batur, 1970, 173).

Another study related to the subject is the article with title of "Geç Bizans Erken Osmanlı Duvar Teknikleri" published in 1983 by M. İ. Tunay. He aimed to reveal whether there are similarities between Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman wall techniques from the aspects of using the "heart motif" on facades. As a result of the heart motif comparisons at Seyyid Mehmed Dede Zaviye at Yenişehir near Bursa with some of the Byzantine buildings he uncovered that due to the differences in the wall texture of the Zaviye that was built by Turkish craftsman and masons, despite the mutual use of the "heart motif". He concluded that there were also some masters and architects in Byzantine origin among the craftsman and masons (Tunay, 1983, 1691-1696).

Furthermore, Ahmet Ersen's significant work which was defended as a doctorate dissertation in 1986 and was published with the title of "Erken Osmanlı Mimarisinde Cephe Biçim Düzenleri ve Bizans Etkilerinin Niteliği". In his book, Ersen discussed Byzantine impacts on Early Ottoman architecture. He also examined the Byzantine alternating wall techniques and its features and emphasized their relations with other structural elements. Moreover, he analyzed the early Ottoman architecture after the evaluation of Byzantine facade forms. While examining the 14th-century Ottoman walls, he made quite remarkable comparisons with the Byzantine alternating walls (Ersen, 1986).

Moreover, Y.S. Şener's study was completed as a master thesis in 1993. In 1997, he also published it as a long journal article with the title of "14. Yüzyıl Bursa Yapılarında Erken Osmanlı Duvar Örgüsü" (Şener, 1997, 193-249). Şener initially defined the materials used in wall masonry and then examined the 14th century Bursa buildings one by one in a catalog. In his study, the buildings were reviewed in chronological order but were not classified according to building types. He assessed the properties of materials (stone block sizes, brick dimensions) of each building gone through maintenance and revised orders and pointing characteristics applied at wall masonry (Şener, 1993, 1- 216).

In addition, the book titled "Batı Anadolu 14. Yüzyıl Beylikler Mimarisinde Yapım Teknikleri" published by İlknur Aktuğ Kolay in 1999 is one of the significant books in the field. The researcher first explored the

building construction traditions seen in Western Anatolia before the Turks, and subsequently critiqued wall techniques, materials and construction techniques. She conducted the assessment of the construction techniques, materials usage, and applications of structural elements in the architecture of Western Anatolian Turkish Emirates (Aktuğ Kolay, 1999).

Figure 9: İznik Hacı Özbek Mosque

The latest study on the subject is Mehmet Kutlu's article published in 2017 with the title of "XIV-XV. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Camilerinde Görülen Tuğla-Taş Almaşıklığı Üzerine Gözlemler". He firstly emphasized the importance of the previous studies on the subject and evaluated alternating brick and stone walls in Early Ottoman Mosques of the14th - 15th centuries. He also compared the results of his study with the outcomes of the detailed and long article of Afife Batur.

1.3. Origin of Alternating Masonry in Ottoman Architecture

Alternating masonry with use of brick-and-stone courses began to be seen in the Anatolian Turkish architecture since the 14th century. It is derived from the Byzantine architecture. Actually, "*opus mixtum*" or "*opus listatum*" of Roman architecture was approved the source of Byzantine alternating brick and stone masonry (Ousterhout, 2016, 185). The fact that brick-and-stone alternating technique was not seen in Anatolian Seljuk architecture but appeared in the architecture of Early Ottoman and Western

Anatolian Turkish Emirates. This circumstance could be a result of the Ottoman State having as a heir to Byzantine lands and its civilization, technical and cultural heritage.


Figure 10: Bursa Hıdırlık Mosque

Particularly in 1204, the Byzantine Empire, which had to move its capital from Constantinople to Iznik (Nicea) due to the Latin occupation, started intensive construction activities in Bursa region. Most of the buildings were constructed with the techniques based on the brick-and-stone alternating masonry. The fact that the Ottomans, who dominated Bursa region about a century later and constructed their architectural works with the techniques of brick-and-stone alternating masonry indicate on existence of a relationship (Batur, 1970, 187). Despite that Ötüken detected some influences of Seljuk architecture on the decoration of pointings at the walls of Byzantine buildings (Ötüken, 1990, 402). This process of interaction has not been in the form of simple adaptation or imitation of all the elements of Byzantine architecture. It is possible to observe the stage of "transfer and interpretation of transfer" in the first half of the 14th century. However, in the second half of the century, it has been preceded to the stage of formation of distinctive Ottoman alternating brick and stone masonry (Ersen, 1986, 44-45).

In Early Ottoman alternating masonry as a building material rough-hewn stone and rubbles were generally used. Its obvious that the bricks used in Early Ottoman architecture are slightly different from the Byzantine ones in terms of both dimension and shape. Early Ottoman

bricks are generally having sizes of 14x28 cm and 30x30 cm, whereas their thickness is detected to be around 4cm and rarely 4.5cm (Ayverdi, 1966, 536; Şener, 1997, 199-207).

Figure 11: Koca Naip Mosque (Bursa, 14th century)

In this period, the iteration ratio of brick-stone courses on wall varies inconsiderably, and the order merely reflects consistency by maintaining the same ratio. For instance, walls are constructed by the repetition of the basic (3/1) application of vertical alternating masonry where, a course of stone is over three courses of bricks. 14th century Ottoman walls differ radically rom the Byzantine ones from this feature point of view. In the first half of the 14th century Ottoman vertical alternating masonry was based over the only a single course of stone (Batur, 1970, 191). Byzantine alternating masonry allegedly based on a single course of stones is almost unapparent in the capital, Constantinople, however it is possible to witness orders constituted by two, three or even four courses of stone blocks (Ousterhout, 2016, 185). Nonetheless, the vertical alternating method based on a single course of stones is essential in the examples of Arta, Mistra and Thessaloniki which located far from the Byzantine capital Constantinople (Ersen, 1986, 45; Ousterhout, 2016, 187-189).

The implemented applications of the complex vertical alternating masonry frequently encountered in the samples of Early Ottoman period indicates that the evidence of Byzantine influence. In some examples of

this practice, 3/1, 3/4 and 3/5 brick-and-stone course order are applied by repeating 1/1 order. In this context, it is not a coincidence that the complex vertical alternating examples are generally encountered in the early period (Kutlu, 2017, 137-138).

Horizontal alternating technique which occurs when bricks are vertically placed between stones is also of Byzantine origin (Batur, 1970, 191). This technique can be observed in the Early Ottoman architecture in the form of one or two bricks vertically masoned between stones.

Figure 12: Bursa Murad I Hudavendigar Mosque

2. Alternating Brick and Stone Masonry in Early Ottoman Mosques

The data for the alternating brick and stone masonry of sixteen mosques of the 14th century has been collected and illustrated in the Table 1. This study only considers and carefully examines the well-preserved examples of the era

As a consequence, it is possible to observe rough-hewn stone and brick use in thirteen of the sixteen compared buildings (88%) and rubble stone-and-brick materials in eleven (70%) of mosques whereas both rough-hewn and rubble stone materials found to be used is the nine (56%) of them (See Table 1).Furthermore, it is clear from the data in Table 1 that the hewn stones are found to be rarely used in only a few structures and that the hewn

stones were jointly applied with rough-hewn stone and rubbles. On the other hand, there are rare samples of the masonry with the use of a single type of stone material in the facades of the building.

The fact that the structures built with stone-bricks and rubble stone-bricks are common throughout the century produces the perception that there is no significant improvement in material use. However, it is possible to observe improvement in material use especially from the period of Murad I (1362-1389) in contrast with the overview of the 14th century. In the 14th century Ottoman mosques, both simple and complex applications of the vertical alternating were widespread. The simple practices of vertical alternating masonry represented by alternative sequencing of brick and stone courses in 4/1, 3/1, 2/1 and 1/1 orders. The most common practice (seen in nine of sixteen buildings) among them is the 3/1 order. It is followed by the 1/1 order in seven mosques, 2/1 order in four mosques and 4/1 order in two structures.


Figure 13 ve 14: Bursa Alaeddin Mosque (vertical complex 3/1 + 1/1, vertical 1 brick)

The complex alternating is seen in six buildings and the earliest of them is the Alaeddin Mosque in Bursa (1335). There are three courses of brick and four or five courses of stone followed by one course of brick and one course of stone on the walls of Bursa Alaeddin Mosque. Other structures where the complex practices of vertical alternating masonry are detected are Bursa Orhan Mosque (1339-40), Bilecik Orhan Gazi Mosque (first half of 14th century), Bursa Kavaklı Mosque (mid-14th century) and Bursa Hızırlık Mosque (second half of the 14th century).

Furthermore, use of one vertical brick in horizontal alternating masonry of the 14th century Ottoman mosques is seen in fourteen (88%) of the sixteen buildings. Use of two vertical bricks in horizontal alternating is found in only three of structures (See Table 1).

3. Evaluation and Conclusion

Alternating masonry of brick and stone courses which did not exist in Anatolian Seljuk Architecture was inherited by Ottomans, in the

geography where it was founded, from Byzantine architecture. It has emerged as the most common wall technique in the 14th century Ottoman mosques. Some researchers suggest that its widespread use can be explained by factors like the lack of enough quality and availability of stone materials in Bursa and its environs, and by the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not have sufficient financial sources in the 14th century.

Figure 15: Demirtaş Paşa Mosque (Bursa, 15th century)

The lack of enough stone resources and financial limitations may explain the presence of buildings constructed with rubble stone, brick and mudbrick in this region. However, the factors mentioned above are insufficient to explain the appearance of brick-and-stone alternating masonry applied by a certain order and technique.

The use of brick and stone (hewn, rough-hewn and rubble) courses in alternating masonry of the 14th century Ottoman mosques can be evaluated from the aspect of the building materials, the intensive use of rough-hewn stone and rubbles is evident. Nevertheless, in the second half of the century, a noticeable improvement in the quality of construction materials can be observed.

Some of the examples of Early Ottoman Mosques indicate that alternating brick and stone masonry was preferred not for technical or architectural factors but for aesthetical taste of the era. For instance, the facades of theYerkapı Mosque, Aynalı Mosque, Demirtaş Paşa Mosque at

Bursa have well alternating brick and stone walls. In contrast, the rear fronts or facades of these mosques do not have alternating brick and stone masonry and the rear front walls are made of construction materials of modest quality (Fig. 15). As a result, the alternating masonry was probably preferred for monumentality and decorative purposes.

Figure 16: Yakup Çelebi İmareti (İznik, 14th century)

Secondly, the most frequently implemented type of vertical alternating masonry is found to be the order of 3/1 during the 14th century. The results are similar with those of Batur (1970, 173) and Kutlu's articles (2017, 142). According to Batur, the 3/1 order exists in nine of twelve mosques (75%) while Kutlu have detected it in ten of seventeen mosques (58%). In Table 1, the order of 3/1 is found at nine (56%) of sixteen mosques of the era.

The complex applications of the vertical alternating adopted from Byzantine architecture were observed mostly in the 14th century buildings and particularly in Orhan Gazi period (1326-1259). The complex vertical alternating was encountered in four buildings at the first half of the century and in two structures at the second half of 14th century (See Table 1). The complex applications have considerably decreased during the process of the systematic implementation of simple orders of vertical alternating masonry and due to the increase in quality of the building materials used. These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies (Batur, 1970, 173; Kutlu, 2017, 144).

The horizontal alternating masonry, which is considered as Byzantine origin but not preferred in the buildings of Byzantine capital, is the technique that can be observed in the 14th century Ottoman mosques.

The development of the technique within this timeframe can be summarized as following: In the 14th century, use of one perpendicular brick was seen in fourteen (88%) of the sixteen buildings and use of two perpendicular bricks are seen in three structures (19%) (See Table 1). Currently obtained results are consistent with the previous studies. While Batur revealed one perpendicular brick alternating in six (50%) of the twelve mosques and only two structures (17%) having two perpendicular bricks in horizontal alternating (Batur, 1970, 173). Kutlu (2017, 146-147) detected technique of one perpendicular brick alternating in thirteen (76%) out of seventeen mosques and use of two perpendicular brick alternating in four (24%) of seventeen mosques.

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Table 1: Alternating Brick and Stone Masonry in Early Ottoman Mosques (14ᵗʰ Century)

NO	MOSQUES	CITY	DATE	HEWN STONE-BRICK	ROUGHHEWN STONE + BRICK	UNHEWN STONE + BRICK	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	VERTICAL (COMPLEX)	VERTICAL ONE BRICK	VERTICAL TWO BRICK
1	Hacı Özbek Mosque	İznik	1333		●	●			●	●		●	
2	Alaeddin Mosque	Bursa	1335		●	●	●				3/4 + 1/1	●	●
3	Gazi Orhan Mosque	Bursa	1339-40	●	●	●			●		3/4 - 3/5 + 1/1	●	
4	Orhan Gazi Mosque	Bilecik	first half			●	●		●		3/1 + 1/1		
5	Kavaklı Mosque	Bursa	mid. cent.		●	●					3/5 + 1/1	●	
6	Orhan Gazi Mosque	Yarhisar	first half		●		●		●			●	
7	Hüdavendigar Mosque	Bursa	1366	●	●				●				
8	Nilüfer İmareti	İznik	1388		●				●	●		●	●
9	Ertuğrul Mosque	Bursa	1395		●			●				●	
10	Hıdırlık Mosque	Bursa	second half		●		●				3/5 + 1/1	●	
11	Yerkapı Mosque	Bursa	second half		●	●	●					●	
12	Yakup Çelebi İmareti	İznik	last quarter		●	●	●		●			●	
13	Hüdavendigar Mosque	Plovdiv	last quarter		●	●		●	●		3/1 + 2/1	●	
14	Koca Naip Mosque	Bursa	last quarter		●	●			●			●	●
15	Ebu İshak Mosque	Bursa	last decade			●		●				●	
16	Yıldırım Mosque	Edirne	last decade		●	●	●	●				●	

Note: Ali Paşa Mosque is also originally built at Bursa in the 14th century. However, it was heavily destructed by an earthquake in 1854. Therefore, it was rebuilt and renovated, so its original wall structure was not preserved. Thus, Ali Paşa Mosque is not listed on Table 1.