

DISTINCTION VERSUS RECOGNITION: SOCIAL CLASSES AND ANTAGONISMS IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Mertcan Ozturk



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to investigate everyday social conflicts in a gentrified area of Istanbul, called Tophane. It argues that established understandings of incidents in Tophane as being the result of the Islamist-secular cleavage are flawed. Instead, the thesis presents a class-based explanation for social conflict, which on a theoretical level argues for the utility of combining Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the 'struggle for distinction' (1984) with Axel Honneth's theory of the 'struggle for recognition' (1995). Social conflicts in Tophane coalesce around the contentious interactions between old residents and newcomers amidst processes of gentrification. These contentious interactions are made the focus of empirical research through a four-month ethnographic study. Data from this research reveal key findings surrounding gentrification, social interactions, and group making.

The chapter firstly outlines why everyday life can be considered a terrain of conflict and tension between different social groups in Turkey. This requires a brief introduction to the historical, political and religious circumstances of Turkey. Secondly, I discuss the way in which these everyday social conflicts have manifested in the area of Tophane by examining the 'Tophane incidents' of 2010-2016 and how they have been commonly interpreted as the result of 'neighbourhood pressure' and as 'spontaneous' acts. I problematise the extant accounts of the Tophane incidents, and introduce the new conceptual framework that will be employed to understand them. The chapter ends by outlining the critical questions for empirical research.

1.1 Everyday Social Conflicts in Turkey

The historical, political and religious situation of Turkey has produced a range of conflicts between social groups at the level of everyday life. Although there are conflicting opinions on how long Turkey has been socially divided along the Islamic-secular axis (see Mardin, 1973; 2006; cf., Wuthrich, 2015), there is broad agreement that the polarisation has become aggravated and visible after the parliamentary elections of 2007 (Bedirhanoğlu, 2009; Tuğal, 2015; Uzgel, 2009). This was mainly because after the parliamentary elections of 2007, the AKP receded from the relatively 'democratic' stance that it had adopted since 2002 when it first came to power as a single-party government. Instead, it drafted its political agenda primarily on Islamic themes and used a rather divisive tone in order to do so. In 2007 onwards, the AKP drifted away

from its conservative, democratic identity and its relatively compromising rhetoric, and took to create a new set of social norms and values that was based upon Islamic principles (Bedirhanoğlu, 2009: 64; Tuğal, 2015: 98, 119; Uzgel, 2009: 12).

The cultural and moral leadership of the AKP is based on building a society that defends Islamic values, rather than representing a section of the population that embraces these values (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012; Oğuz, 2014: 92-93; Yaşlı, 2014: 29; Yücesan-Özdemir and Özdemir, 2008: 39). The efforts of the AKP to build the ideal society, however, are aimed at creating a social base that ideologically identifies itself with the Party, instead of transforming the society as a whole. To build its social base, the AKP first aimed at creating a political ‘other’ (Çobanoğlu, 2014: 295). To do this, the AKP harnessed the cultural conflicts and clashes that existed between the middle classes (who live in metropolitan areas and lead a secular lifestyle), and the new proletariat who later migrated to these areas. The AKP tried to organise the ‘feeling of incompetence’ that is often observed among the lower classes who migrate to urban areas but find it difficult to adapt to the urban lifestyle (Koç, 2014: 209; Tekeli, 2008: 190).

The AKP introduced a political and ideological meaning into the cultural cleavage between the lower classes and urban middle classes, and tried to organise the urban poor to create a social base for the party (Bayırbağ, 2015: 52; Gürel, 2014: 27; Özatalay, 2015: 122-123). The modern and secular lifestyle in Turkey was represented by the urban middle classes, who, in turn, imposed this lifestyle and associated cultural codes as the only acceptable lifestyle on the lower classes who later migrated to the cities (Ayata, 2003: 43, 54; Bora, 2015: 163, 225; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2009: 141-143). The success of the AKP lay in its mobilisation of the negative dissident energy among the urban poor, and its propagation of an optimistic belief that such negativity can only be solved by setting a more comprehensive political goal. This political goal was to make Turkey an influential and prestigious country, both regionally and globally. To convince the electorate that this goal is indeed feasible, the AKP resorted to statements that glorified the imperial history of the Ottoman state (İnal, 2015: 207). The AKP, with this political fantasy, promised power, dignity and restoration of honour to the dispossessed urban poor.

However, the party also put emphasis on the threats that undermined its promise. In other words, the fantasy of ‘Strong Turkey’ was always accompanied by paranoia. The idea that the AKP instilled into its social base in this regard was that the secularists and their lifestyle were a threat. The AKP pointed to the social opposition of the secularists against state power as the main reason for the failure to achieve its political objective. Blaming the secularists for its failure to bring back the social prestige promised to its

social base, the AKP kept alive the feeling of being hindered, particularly among the urban poor (Paker, 2016: 219).

What aggravated the cleavage between secularists and Islamists in Turkey was the AKP's calls to its social base to shoulder a kind of political and moral responsibility for the future of Turkey. This was also the main reason why the AKP labelled the secularists as a social threat instead of directly threatening them: to create a social base which can identify itself with the party by organizing a certain section of the society against the secularists. By giving a moral mission to the social groups which it tried to consolidate, the AKP put these groups in charge of organising some aspects of everyday life in accordance with Islamic norms and rules. This, however, brought about claims that the right to use force, which had long been monopolised by the state, was handed over to these groups, for example in everyday life (Turan, 2015: 56). According to this approach, the AKP encouraged the abovementioned population to exert pressure on the lifestyle of secularists. To do this, the AKP particularly exploited the groups that consisted of proletarians who had migrated from rural to urban areas, but were effectively lumpenised in time (Doğan, 2014: 201). This secular-Islamic polarisation of the society has been commonly understood as the main cause of various social problems in the recent history of Turkey.

Whilst not denying the significance of social conflicts around Islamist-secular lines, the thesis argues that an Islamist-secular lens is over-used when it comes to analysing everyday social conflicts in Turkey. Instead, the thesis argues for the importance of a class-based interpretation of social conflict in contemporary Turkey. One of the major contributions of the thesis is to show the limits of religious understanding when it comes to some of the conflicts that arise in everyday life for Turkish people, and to revive interest in a class-based analysis of Turkish society. This will be achieved by examining everyday social conflict between the working classes who have migrated from rural areas and the urban middle classes in a specific area of Istanbul - Tophane - and subjecting these conflicts to analysis using a theoretical framework drawn from the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1991) and Axel Honneth (1995).

1.2 Social Conflicts in Tophane

In order to investigate everyday social conflicts, the thesis focuses on a particular residential area of Istanbul, called Tophane. Tophane is a residential quarter which is located in Beyoğlu district, conveniently perched on the coast of the Bosphorus. It sits at the intersection of Galata, Cihangir and Karaköy, and is one of the oldest industrial areas in Istanbul. Tophane was one of the most vibrant areas in Istanbul and was known for its multicultural demography, which was dramatically changed after the

incidents of September 6-7 in 1955. The series of attacks which targeted non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul resulted with most of the members of minorities leaving or being expatriated from the city. The settlements abandoned by minorities were populated by migrants arriving from Eastern Anatolia, particularly from Siirt and Bitlis. As a result, the neighbourhood was transformed into a working-class area primarily populated by migrants from rural areas.

Tophane provides a particularly interesting context for the study of everyday social conflicts. Between 2010 and 2016 it was home to a set of well-publicised physical attacks by neighbourhood residents upon exhibition visitors, revolving around the latter's uses of alcohol, referred to as the 'Tophane incidents'. The first incident was the series of attacks targeting multiple art galleries on September 21, 2010. Galeri NON, Outlet, Elipsis, Pi Artworks and Galeri Apel were holding a joint opening event on the same night, when a group of people, arguably consisting of residents of the neighbourhood, attacked the galleries (CNN Türk, 2010). The second attack, which was similar to the previous incident, was on May 9, 2014: a group of neighbourhood residents attacked the opening event for a graffiti exhibition at Mixer Art Gallery (Hürriyet, 2014). The third act of aggression was also during the opening of an exhibition on February 21, 2015, targeting Daire Art Gallery (Sözcü, 2015). The fourth attack was on June 17, 2016 at a record shop named Velvet Indieground Records. Visitors were listening to the live online streaming of the latest album of the British music band Radiohead when they were attacked by the residents of the neighbourhood. This incident in particular had wide-ranging repercussions in the public, and Radiohead sent a solidarity message to the victims of the incident (Evrensel, 2016). The fifth and the last attack happened during the opening event of the exhibition 'Kuytu' on October 2, 2016 (Bianet, 2016).

The Tophane incidents exemplify the predominance of Islamist-secular understandings of social conflict. They were widely interpreted as resulting from a clash of lifestyles and values, particularly over the consumption of alcohol. The physical acts of aggression by the residents of the area against art galleries were associated with the abovementioned political and social divisions. Statements which claimed that the events resulted from the secular-Islamic cleavage in Turkey had broad resonance among the wider public. These arguments were largely based on the claim that the residents of Tophane reacted because the participants at the opening events in galleries were drinking alcoholic beverages, and that this triggered the incidents. As a result, despite the lack of any comprehensive studies, the claim that the attacks came as a reaction to the consumption of alcohol in the area and thus wider social polarisation along religious lines, has been widely accepted by the public.

The incidents in Tophane remained on the public agenda for quite some time, mainly because various conflicting arguments were offered about the political and social

structure of Turkey, often building on the acts of violence in Tophane. According to one side of the debate, which primarily consisted of secularists, the incidents confirmed the claims that the AKP was aiming to politicise cultural differences that cannot be reconciled (Ocak *et al.*, 2010; Özdil, 2010; Süreyya, 2010; Yılmaz, 2010). This group argued that the incidents in Tophane were evidence of the systematic pressure that has been exerted on the secular lifestyle in Turkey (Boran, 2010; Kılıçbay, 2010; Şen, 2010). The idea that the attacks in Tophane were actually planned and organised, also brought about claims that similar acts of violence may occur in the future due to social polarisation in Turkey (Oran, 2010). On the other hand, according to the AKP and conservative groups, the attacks against the galleries were merely spontaneous incidents, which were triggered by the sensitivity of Tophane residents to preserve the moral values of the society (Y. Aktay, 2010: 19; Bayramoğlu, 2010; Bulaç, 2010). This group suggested that the spontaneity of the attacks in Tophane demonstrated that Turkish society has always been conservative (Aköz, 2010; Çiçek, 2010; Eygi, 2010; Elönü, 2010; Şefkatli Tuksal, 2010).

The reason for the differences between the arguments of the two sides is due to conflicting opinions about the social and political structure of Turkey. Both groups in the debate suggested that the reason for the attacks was alcohol being served during the events. The main difference in the analyses of these groups is about the cause of the secular-Islamic polarisation in Turkey. As such, both sides fail to offer sufficient insight into the incidents in Tophane. This thesis offers a critical approach towards the argument that the incidents in Tophane resulted from secular-Islamic polarisation, something that has for too long marked political discussions in Turkey.

1.2.1 Neighbourhood Pressure?

According to several scholars, the attacks against the galleries in Tophane were typical examples of the phenomenon called ‘neighbourhood pressure’, which is a sociological definition of collective intolerance against diversity or differences turned into a collective consciousness and action (e.g., Arıkan and Uçbay, 2010; Boran, 2010; Kılıçbay, 2010; Şen, 2010). According to these scholars, neighbourhood pressure and the attacks in Tophane should be examined in the context of the conservatisation of Turkey and the role of the AKP in this transformation (Çandar, 2010; Eğin, 2010; Özdil, 2010). The AKP is seen as complicit in the generation of neighbourhood pressure, and in the attacks in Tophane, because they sought to impose a lifestyle that was based on Islamic values, and thus assigned a moral and cultural mission to its social base to do this. As such, the discontent of the neighbourhood residents about alcohol being served during the gala events for exhibitions is interpreted as proof of a kind of intolerant and sectarian conservatism in Turkish society (e.g., Günal, 2010; Yılmaz, 2010).

The demographic structure of Tophane also supports these accounts. The previous section of the chapter suggested that the AKP encouraged proletarian masses, particularly those who had migrated to urban areas later, to oversee daily life in cities. Tophane is a working-class neighbourhood where the majority of the residents are immigrants from Siirt and Bitlis, and this demography has been considered proof that there was some kind of connection between the attacks on galleries and the efforts of the AKP to mobilise lower classes (e.g., Çandar, 2010; Oran, 2010). Consequently, what happened in Tophane was thought to be an attempt by the conservatives - with the support of the state authority - to unilaterally seize public life and the public sphere (e.g. Eğin, 2010; Günal, 2010: 14). This is also why the secularists consider the attacks in Tophane as a form of intimidation against themselves, because, according to these groups, the real target of the attacks was the secular lifestyle itself (Uluengin, 2010).

AKP officials and pro-AKP opinion leaders posed certain counterarguments against this interpretation (e.g., Aköz, 2010; Y. Aktay, 2010; Bayramoğlu, 2010; Bulaç, 2010; Çiçek, 2010). The argument that conservatism has its roots in Turkey and is readily embraced by the majority of the population, on the other hand, has been the most important factor for the AKP in taking a position on the issues of neighbourhood pressure and the attacks in Tophane. This argument is important because it allows conservatives to claim that certain acts of violence in everyday life are not a result of a systematic pressure against a certain group, but a result of the society striving to preserve its cultural and moral values (e.g., Birand, 2010; Semerciöglü, 2010). This approach renders violence an inevitable ‘natural reflex’ to preserve moral values (Bora, 2016: 31). The AKP’s efforts to downplay any reaction arising from moral values as the ‘reaction of sensible citizens’ not only helps to legitimise physical aggression, but also implies that the majority of the society may spontaneously show such reactions in similar situations (when individuals fail to comply with the prevailing moral principles) (Dölek, 2014: 60-61). On the one hand, the AKP downplays the attacks in Tophane by arguing that the civil society in Turkey primarily consists of conservative groups who uphold Islamic values. On the other hand, the Party uses the Tophane incidents to exemplify and justify this claim.

1.2.2 Problematisation of the Extant Accounts

Despite these debates, the concepts and assumptions that are used to explain the attacks in Tophane (for example, conservatism) are essentially the same. This demonstrates that analyses of the incidents have not been based on a comprehensive study, but, to the contrary, have been limited by the dominant secular-Islamist paradigm in Turkey. As such, the incidents have not yet been fully understood and explained, and even

a simple question can show this: that is, why were restaurants and bars in Tophane, which had also been serving alcoholic drinks, not also targeted on the grounds of moral values? And why were the attacks rather sporadic across time rather than consistently taking place? If the context of the attacks in Tophane was indeed the secular-Islamic cleavage, then similar tensions would affect other aspects of everyday life, and frequently. However, this was not the case.

This suggests that what happened in Tophane did not qualify as sufficient evidence to show a relation between the attacks and use of alcohol without further study. What is needed is a comprehensive investigation of the Tophane case, which is the primary aim of this thesis. However, the purpose of the research is not to prove that the attacks were, or were not, related to the consumption of alcohol at the galleries. Instead, the thesis aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of the Tophane incidents in terms of the daily antagonisms that underlie them. The thesis argues that a much more complex set of social struggles exists between groups in the neighbourhood than can be captured by the Islamist-secular cleavage.

1.3 Gentrification and Social Struggles between Local Residents and Newcomers

The thesis adopts the premise that conflict is not generated merely along Islamist-secular lines in Tophane, but primarily between those who have resided in the area for a long time (the local residents), and those who are newcomers to the area. Instead of focusing on the fact that alcohol was being served when the attacks took place, the thesis focuses upon the places that were targeted – *i.e.*, art galleries. The fact that the targeted venues were art galleries is indicative of the process of gentrification at play in Tophane. Art galleries have been considered by many urban sociologists as one of the primary elements of gentrification (e.g., Cameron and Coaffee, 2005; Mathews, 2010; Zukin, 2016). This does not mean that each art gallery is necessarily a symbol of gentrification. However, the timeline of operation of these art galleries in Tophane, as well as the economic and socio-cultural structure of the neighbourhood, has made the gentrification process in Tophane visible. Whilst Tophane is one of the oldest industrial areas in İstanbul, populated predominantly by rural-to-urban immigrants, and was famous for the hookah cafés until a decade ago, today it is one of the alternative cultural hubs in the city.

Gentrification, in essence, is the demographic, economic, social and cultural transformation of working-class neighbourhoods, which are located in central urban areas and which are often populated by lower classes but later become popular among middle classes. This process may result in working classes being displaced to other neighbourhoods, or with current residents staying in the neighbourhood and living side by side with members of the middle class. However, in either case, gentrification refers

to a spatial coexistence of groups from different classes, even if for a limited time period. As such, gentrification helps us to categorise social groups in a broader context. For the thesis, this means that the conflicts that lie behind the attacks can be understood in terms of the relations between existing residents of Tophane, and newcomers to the neighbourhood.

I therefore suggest that any understanding of the Tophane incidents requires an understanding of the contentious interactions between existing residents and newcomers. These contentious interactions have been well captured in literature on gentrification, which shows how processes of redevelopment in areas like Tophane have produced everyday conflicts between social groups (González, 2016; Hyra, 2006; Newman and Wyly, 2006). The thesis argues however that gentrification approaches have insufficiently attended to social class. One of the major contributions of the thesis is to show how social conflicts in Tophane between old residents and newcomers - generated by processes of gentrification - can be best understood in class terms. Despite some use of Bourdieu's theory of social class in existing literature on gentrification, there are many more insights to be gained into the everyday social struggles of groups in Tophane by adopting Bourdieu's conceptual framework in a more holistic manner. Furthermore, an original contribution of the thesis further lies in arguing for the combination of Bourdieu's theory of social class (in particular the struggle for distinction) (1984, 1985, 1987a, 1991), with Axel Honneth's theory of struggles for recognition (1995).

1.4 Conceptual Framework

The thesis hypothesises that the social tension in the neighbourhood arises from the relationships and social interactions between the older and newer residents in Tophane. Sociological concepts that help us to identify relationships in everyday life between social classes, and to explain why they may be prone to conflicts, are therefore required. This takes us beyond the framework offered by literature on gentrification. While the concept of gentrification indicates tension between older and newer residents, and suggests that it may be class-related, it falls short of explaining why the economic and socio-cultural differences between these groups may lead to tensions. Thus, what is needed to understand the incidents in Tophane is a framework that allows for the study of how class differences shape the relationship between different social groups.

1.4.1 Symbolic Domination

The Bourdieusian concept of 'symbolic domination' (1991) addresses the aforementioned need. To understand why the coexistence of different social groups in

the same physical space may lead to tensions, we need to understand the connotations of class differences. According to Bourdieu (1984), the economic and socio-cultural differences between classes do not lead to a conflict by themselves, because these differences are neutral in the first place and do not bear a meaning on their own. Rather, the conflict between classes is related to the meaning of these differences. Social classes have to justify why their own characteristics grant them a privilege, since their characteristics do not have any meaning *per se*. This is done by means of categories, which serve to establish a cause and effect relationship between the owned capital and some other desirable characteristics (Bourdieu, 1985). When one of the classes associates its capital with a positive characteristic, it attributes negative traits to the other classes which do not have that particular type of capital. As such, class differences turn into recognised distinctions as well as social cleavages (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013).

This thesis studies the relationship between the social tension in Tophane and the concept of symbolic domination on the basis of two types of social struggle in everyday life: ‘struggle for distinction’ as put forward by Bourdieu (1984), and ‘struggle for recognition’ as defined by Axel Honneth (1991). In this aspect, symbolic domination should be considered as an overarching concept that is used to offer a model to investigate an existing social problem. Now, I account for what these types of struggle mean in terms of symbolic domination, as well as the opportunities they provide for an empirical study.

1.4.2 Struggle for Distinction

According to Bourdieu (1991), symbolic domination is a form of exposure. In other words, symbolic domination is the domination of one social class over the other, rather than a struggle between two social classes (Wacquant, 2013: 272). This is because the asymmetry between the type and amount of the capital owned by these classes precludes any reciprocal struggle between them. Based on this reason, Bourdieu (1991) claims that lower classes are more likely to undergo symbolic domination being exercised upon them. Now, the reason for Bourdieu’s critical approach towards symbolic domination is not only on account of this social reality being rebuilt by the upper classes in their favour, but also because this is often done arbitrarily (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). To understand whether the social tension in Tophane is related to symbolic domination, we need to empirically study if the potential reasons and outcomes of symbolic domination prevail in the neighbourhood. This is where the struggles for distinction and the struggles for recognition come into play.

This thesis looks into whether the new residents in Tophane struggle for distinction in everyday life in order to understand whether they have subjected the existing residents to symbolic domination. Theoretically speaking, this amounts to claiming that symbolic domination results from the struggles for distinction: the reason for association of types of capital with various characteristics by means of categories, is that the owned capital does not have any meaning *per se* and thus does not grant any privileges to the owner. This demonstrates that the categories are only used as part of the struggles for distinction. It is argued that the categories used by the new residents of Tophane in defining the existing residents in particular ways should be analysed, but these categorisations will not directly reveal symbolic domination. Therefore, to understand whether these categories are related to symbolic domination, we need to understand if these categories are related to the newcomers' quest for distinction. And to do this, we need to look into whether the new residents partake in struggles for distinction in everyday life.

1.4.3 Struggle for Recognition

Honneth's struggles for recognition (1995) helps to observe whether the existing residents of Tophane have undergone symbolic domination. Theoretically this means that symbolic domination leads to struggles for recognition: just as there is no causality between owning a type of capital and having positive characteristics, which is why the categories are needed, there is no causality between being deprived of some type of capital and having negative characteristics. However, the categories used by upper classes in defining lower classes typically strive to establish such causality, because, to ensure that owning a certain type of capital has positive connotations, deprivation of this capital must be attributed with negative connotations. Symbolic domination is the attribution of negative characteristics which are associated with deprivation of a certain type of capital to the lower classes, who do not own this type of capital. However, it should be noted that this essentially refers to an imposition of these characteristics on lower classes, which is why struggles for recognition results from exposure to symbolic domination.

This analysis of the social tension in Tophane on the basis of the cause and outcomes of symbolic domination will make an empirical study more feasible, and help us to understand the tension between the parties on the basis of relationships. The physical attacks against the art galleries result from a broader yet implicit tension. This is why the thesis focuses on analysis of everyday life in Tophane instead of the attacks. However, as the ultimate purpose of the study is to offer an understanding of the attacks, the relationship between this social tension and the attacks should be demonstrated. The presence of symbolic domination in Tophane does not directly reveal the cause of

the attacks. Thus, what we need is to understand how symbolic domination in Tophane may have led to the attacks. This thesis aims to achieve that by displaying the ways in which the struggles for recognition mediate between the ongoing and wider social conflict in Tophane and the physical attacks.

1.5 The Importance of Empirical Research, and the Research Questions Explored by the Thesis

The thesis aims therefore to investigate the everyday social struggles and contentious interactions that underlay the Tophane incidents. Whilst Bourdieu and Honneth are used to theoretically unpick these social struggles and understand them in class terms, the theories are primarily used in dialogue with original empirical data. The research generated data on everyday social struggles through a four-month ethnography in Tophane, where I lived and hung out in its different areas and with its different residents. Alongside participant observation in neighbourhood places like art galleries and cafes, the research included qualitative interviews with old residents (9), and newcomers (16).

Collecting empirical data helps to avoid abstract theorising about the causes of the Tophane incidents, and enables us to overcome reliance upon a simplistic explanation of the incidents in terms of, for example, the Islamist- secular conflict. The claim that certain political, cultural and moral conflicts exist between two different social groups – *i.e.*, secularists and Islamists, might appear as a tangible social reality when the policies of the AKP are taken into account. When such polarisation, however, is offered as the direct reason for other social incidents, such as the attacks in Tophane, one should recognise that the phenomenon has been turned into an abstraction. Such a relationship may only be assumed as a starting point for a study that include an empirical overview of various aspects of neighbourhood pressure in Tophane, how it has been organised, and how it penetrates everyday life. However, such studies have not, as yet, been undertaken. Instead, the argument that the attacks were a reaction to the use of alcohol at the galleries was widely accepted.

Offering an understanding of the tensions in Tophane means investigating the relations that underlie the incidents, which first and foremost requires empirical research. To do this, however, the thesis does not focus upon the incidents themselves. Instead, it addresses the incidents in Tophane on the basis of a wider social conflict. It is thus suggested that understanding the reasons behind this social tension may help to explain the incidents in Tophane.

That being said, the wider social conflict is essentially an abstraction used to embody the relations that lie behind the attacks. In other words, the only thing that has been demonstrated by the attacks targeting art galleries is that gentrification is at play in

Tophane. This does not mean that the incidents were a direct result of the gentrification process. Arguing otherwise would mean that the attacks were an explicit and clear result of gentrification without requiring further empirical study. Methodologically, this argumentation would involve the same problems as the argument that the attacks were a result of secular-Islamic cleavage and neighbourhood pressure, just because they took place when alcohol was being served at the galleries. In both cases, the methodology is flawed. Therefore, this thesis uses gentrification not as an explanation of the incidents but as the context of the study.

Accordingly, the main research question that this thesis addresses is '*How do struggles for distinction and recognition intertwine in contemporary Tophane, Istanbul?*' The sub-questions are:

- i. In what ways does gentrification generate new forms of social conflict?
- ii. What struggles for distinction predominate in Tophane?
- iii. What struggles for recognition predominate in Tophane?
- iv. Do these struggles aid understanding of the Tophane incidents?
- v. What is the broader relevance of the Tophane case considering such key questions as Turkey's secular-Islamic cleavage?

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The next chapter, *Chapter Two*, offers a methodological and theoretical review of the limits of, and the potentials brought by, the conceptual discussions which have accompanied the transformations accompanying gentrification. Among these potentials is a deep insight into how gentrification operates in general, which includes a modelling of the stages of gentrification. This operationalisation of the concept of gentrification offers a methodological advantage in that it allows us to identify the stage of gentrification that is at play in the neighbourhood under study. This chapter also discusses how the literature on gentrification addresses the coexistence of different social groups in the same physical space. The chapter emphasises that the meaning of the spatial coexistence of different social classes should be re-considered in a relational way, due to the gentrification literature's weakness in this regard.

Chapter Three provides a comprehensive evaluation of the politics of gentrification by using Bourdieu's concept of struggles for distinction and Honneth's concept of struggles for recognition. The chapter first discusses why gentrification should be understood as a phenomenon which emerges as a result of struggles for distinction between dominant classes. This chapter uses the concept of struggles for distinction to evaluate the economic and cultural dynamics underlying gentrification.

As such, it goes one step beyond the prevailing culturalist/neo-Marxist dilemma in the literature. The chapter explains why the struggles for distinction continue to be at play during the gentrification process, and demonstrates how this may result in the existing residents being subject to symbolic domination. Finally, the chapter examines why the residents who are exposed to symbolic domination may be forced to struggle for recognition as a reaction to this.

Chapter Four elaborates on the data collection methods that are required by the theory-informed research questions that are posed to gain insights into the social tension in Tophane. The chapter explains the forms of sampling that are used, and how the data collection methods were implemented during the research. Information is provided about the interviews and the strategy used. The chapter justifies why two different topic guides are used for the interviews with locals and newcomers in Tophane, and addresses the purpose of the questions posed to these two groups. The chapter also offers details on when and how the participant observations took place. The chapter ends with the challenges encountered during the research, and the ways in which they were addressed.

Chapter Five draws upon the data to describe the neighbourhood of Tophane in terms of its historical development and current spatial dynamics, the latter drawn from observations and daily walking tours. It provides an outline of the two main groups of Tophane residents: locals and newcomers. The distinction between these two groups plays a significant analytic purpose in my argument. In the following chapters I argue that there is a need to concentrate on the interactions between these two groups as the primary unit of analysis; however, here it is first necessary to outline the groups separately and set out their main characteristics. This chapter draws upon fieldwork data in order to construct the lifestyles of locals and newcomers within the particular urban spaces of Tophane, and analyses their lifestyles as the result of their particular composition of economic, cultural and social capitals in a Bourdieusian sense.

Chapter Six presents the finding that there is a lack of social interaction between the locals and newcomers in Tophane. The chapter argues that the lack of interaction stems from the struggles for distinction among the newcomers, which gives rise to symbolic domination. The first part of the chapter demonstrates how the struggles for distinction played out for the newcomers, and how this competition among the newcomers affects their everyday decisions and practices. The second part offers an overview of the newcomers' perceptions and comments about the locals in Tophane. This part also includes a critical analysis of the categories used by newcomers to describe the locals, because these categories are not merely a description – they offer some clues about moral judgements and why newcomers avoid any contact with the locals.

Chapter Seven argues that the social tension in Tophane is a result of the lack of interaction, and the tension is made visible by the struggles for recognition among the locals. The first part elaborates on why the locals are forced to struggle for recognition, by analysing the impact of the lack of interaction on the locals, with due consideration to the locals' comments on the attitude of the newcomers towards themselves. The second part focuses on how the locals struggle for recognition in everyday life, and how this makes social tension more visible. The third part gives examples of the situations in which the locals do not resort to struggles for recognition, and emphasises why struggles for recognition should be seen as a reaction to lack of interaction, and therefore symbolic domination.

Finally, *Chapter Eight* provides a summary of the overall findings, arguments and contributions of the thesis. This chapter revisits the relationship between the social tension and the gallery attacks in Tophane, highlighting what the research findings mean in terms of the tensions in Tophane. Additionally, the chapter offers an evaluation of the theoretical implications of Tophane case. This is followed by an explanation of how new research in various areas may be triggered by the arguments in this thesis. These areas include gentrification, class relations, and the political and social structure of Turkey. The chapter concludes with some recommendations about the issues which should be taken into consideration in any future research on Tophane and Turkey more widely.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF GENTRIFICATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of gentrification, notably by demonstrating the ways in which the term has undergone changes since it was first introduced by Ruth Glass in 1964. Gentrification had long been used to refer to renovation of working-class neighbourhoods that resulted in dislocation of sitting, low-income working-class residents by middle-class populations called gentrifiers. As such, gentrification had been conceived as a negative development by definition, examined through its disruptive consequences amongst which displacement ranked first. In that regard, the first section of the chapter focuses upon gentrification understood as a displacement-related, conflictual state by respectively taking Neil Smith's (1979a) classic rent-gap theory and Clay's (1979) classic stage model into account. Rent-gap theory provides causal and economic explanations of why gentrification takes place specifically in working-class neighbourhoods, which is also to account for why displacement targets predominantly working-class residents. In comparison to Smith's rent-gap theory, Clay's stage model provides a more detailed portrait of gentrification, dividing the process into four stages so as to account for exactly how rents go up in a systematic fashion.

The second section expands upon contrasting evaluations of what should be understood by gentrification *without* displacement. Insofar as urban policies have been put into place in order to accomplish social and economic integration of different social classes, gentrification has ceased to cause displacement of low-income residents but leads instead to diverse groups sharing the same physical space and living together. As such, a new, wider debate has existed about how to re-conceptualise this form of gentrification, which has thus far divided the related literature into two groups. The first group advocates gentrification without displacement inasmuch as they regard the co-existence of diverse groups as a liberating development. The second group argues that gentrification without displacement is *still* disruptive in that changes in the retail landscape cause a sense of loss of place on the part of local residents. The

chapter concludes by arguing that both perspectives are limited in that they underplay questions of class, and crucially, the interaction between different social classes sharing the same physical space. It is suggested that the interaction between local residents and gentrifiers, which is missing from extant accounts, is a key characteristic of gentrification without displacement and one which requires further theoretical and empirical investigation.

2.2 Gentrification: Displacement-oriented phenomenon

One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle-classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences [...] The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their status, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighborhoods. Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly, until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed (Glass, cited in Lees *et al.*, 2008: 4).

As the above quote implies, the term ‘gentrification’ was coined by Glass to draw attention to a process which is thought to begin with the spatial rehabilitation of disinvested inner-city neighbourhoods, and results in the displacement of existing working-class inhabitants. Glass’ portrayal of the process as such is of particular importance, for it implies that gentrification is not reducible to such physical changes as house upgrades and infrastructural developments. According to her, gentrification is rather a social, economic and cultural phenomenon in that the process causes considerable shifts in the demographic composition of lower-income working-class neighbourhoods (Glass, 1964).

The problem of displacement of low-income residents shapes the initial definition of gentrification. Although displacement can be regarded as the final stage, it arguably stands at the epicentre of gentrification and constitutes the major reason why gentrification has so far been criticised as a negative process. This is to say that the conceptualisation of gentrification as a societal process is actually deduced from the displacement of working-class inhabitants. What exemplifies this best is the passage quoted above, where Glass introduces the term gentrification. Even though her narrative on gentrification sounds prospective, it was not until the replacement of subaltern populations by more affluent newcomers (in the case of east London) had become noticeable that she deduced the process and coined the term gentrification.

Constituting the point of departure for making sense of gentrification in a retrospective sense, displacement of lower-income residents marks the early studies of gentrification. In that respect, a number of accounts have proliferated to provide details about the ways in which gentrification compels lower-income inhabitants to move elsewhere and causes displacement over time (Engels, 1999; Beauregard, 1986; Chernoff, 1980; Hamnett and Williams, 1980; Marcuse, 1985, 1986). Moreover, a number of studies aim to explain the relationship between gentrification and displacement (Annunziata and Lees, 2016; Butcher and Dickens, 2016; Davidson, 2009; Hyra, 2015; Levy *et al.*, 2006; Martin, 2007). Below I will focus on two theories, which offer classic explanations of the gentrification process and provide a point of critical departure for the discussion of gentrification literature more broadly: Smith's (1979a) 'rent-gap theory' and Clay's (1979a) 'stage model.' Rent-gap theory is of particular significance because it aims to explain why some certain disinvested residential areas are more likely to undergo gentrification compared to others. The stage model, on the other hand, seeks to provide understanding of what is likely to happen throughout the whole gentrification process.

2.2.1 *Rent-gap Theory*

As mentioned previously, gentrification refers to a process by which 'poor and working-class neighbourhoods in the inner city are refurbished by an influx of private capital and middle-class homebuyers and renters' (N. Smith, 1996: 7). According to Smith, gentrification stems from 'disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalised under the present land use' (N. Smith, 1979a: 545). That is to say, not all disinvested working-class residential areas equally attract gentrifiers. Demarcating those neighbourhoods through their potential ground rent level, Smith (1979b) argues that the disinvested quarters located notably in inner cities are more likely to start hosting newcomers and undergo gentrification compared to their suburban counterparts.

This means that low rents do not determine gentrification *per se*. Whether they are centrally or peripherally located, disinvested neighbourhoods may well offer affordable rents in a similar way. However, the process of gentrification does not take place in every single working-class residential area. Smith (1982) claims that gentrifiers tend towards the working-class neighbourhoods where rents are not merely low but *lower* compared to the opportunities offered. According to him, quarters to be gentrified must therefore fulfil two major conditions at the same time: whilst they necessarily have to contain a potential for revalorisation and revitalisation, they must nonetheless contain some drawbacks which are essential for affordable rents. If a disinvested residential area has nothing to offer except cheap rents, Smith (1987: 462-465) argues that there

is likely to be neither gentrification nor displacement. That is because the actual low rent level is considered to reflect the potential value of that specific neighbourhood. This explains why lower-income neighbourhoods located in suburbs are less likely to undergo gentrification and, hereby, displacement.

Providing an explanation for the underlying mechanism of gentrification, rent-gap theory enables us to comprehend why some certain working-class neighbourhoods have undergone the process whereas others are still hosting lower-income inhabitants. In so doing, the theory also makes it possible to predict which residential areas amongst those yet-to-be gentrified disinvested working-class quarters are more likely to undergo gentrification and, thus, displacement in the long-term. It is nevertheless worth noting that Smith's theory, whilst explicating what paves the way for gentrification, is not concerned with expanding on exactly how gentrification bridges the rent-gap. Like Glass (1964), Smith (1998: 31) also draws attention to the very processual dimension of gentrification; in fact, he treats the phenomenon as nothing but a process in which actual rents increase and begin to overlap potential ground level, which is why he claims that displacement is internal to gentrification. However, since he does not elaborate on the factors that might raise rents, his account remains limited. It needs to be complemented by another narrative, which focuses upon what has been left untheorised by Smith, that is, Clay's stage model.

2.2.2 Stage Model

Unlike Smith's rent-gap theory which offers an explanation merely in structural terms, Clay's stage model takes structural elements into account together with actors involved so as to indicate the ways in which gentrification, as a process, brings about displacement. According to Clay (1979), the gentrification process consists of four successive stages. Whereas settlement of first-wave newcomers marks the first stage, retail gentrification does the second. As will be mentioned below, Clay argues that retail gentrification is a turning point because it puts a neighbourhood on the map as an authentic space. Considering the escalatory demand for housing, Clay points out that what characterises the third stage is the threat of displacement which now starts to concern older, lower-income tenants. Although the fourth stage signifies that the neighbourhood has been fully gentrified, as there remains no low-income inhabitants, Clay nonetheless asserts that neither rents nor house prices cease to go up. When the first-wave of newcomers are displaced by those who are affluent enough to afford the premium prices, they are assumed to seek new working-class quarters where there is a rent gap to utilise. As such, according to the model, gentrification has a domino effect in the sense that once a neighbourhood has been fully gentrified, it leads other disinvested quarters to go through the same stages.

2.2.2.1 Settlement of the First-wave of Gentrifiers

Clay argues that the gentrification process in a particular neighbourhood begins with the arrival of ‘risk-oblivious’ people (1979: 57). According to him, these people predominantly consist of artists and designers, occupied in creative industries, and are single to a great extent (Blasius *et al.*, 2015). Clay points out that there is a tendency amongst these people to collectively move into such low-income neighbourhoods where working-class inhabitants dwell together with subaltern or marginal groups. At this stage, there appears to be no striking, spatial changes; physical renewal or upgrading is limited to interior decoration undertaken by the newcomers themselves, who are equipped with artistic skills. Since the scale of renovation remains modest and domestic, Clay argues that these neighbourhoods are still in relatively poor condition, disinvested and far from becoming publicised. Therefore, according to Clay, the housing market does not undergo any dramatic change yet (1979). As such, non-gentrifiers are assumed to comprise the majority of those who are residing in the neighbourhood (see Dangschat, 1991; cf., Kerstein, 1990).

2.2.2.2 Retail Gentrification and Changed Consumption Practices

Public recognition of the neighbourhood that is about to surface differentiates this phase from the former (Clay, 1979). That recognition arises from retail gentrification, which arguably accelerates a thorough residential gentrification and, therefore, demographic changes. Amongst the newcomers, whose number keeps growing, Zukin (1987; 1991) claims that some tend towards entrepreneurship and start running their own business so as to cater for the cultural and social needs of those who want to spend their spare time where they live. This brings about fundamental, spatial changes to those working-class neighbourhoods (Cole, 1987). A number of independent art galleries, boutiques, coffee shops and gourmet restaurants are seen to flourish in this stage (Boddy, 2007; Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Zukin *et al.*, 2009). All these novelties, centred on the field of consumption, start to establish the area as being noteworthy. Insofar as daily life turns out to be vibrant, these neighbourhoods start to host visitors who seek authentic urban fabric (Peterson, 2005). This stage can therefore be seen as a transition phase, altering pre-existing consumption practices together with the consumer profile, whereby gentrification proceeds to the next stage.

2.2.2.3 Social Conflicts and Displacement of Local Inhabitants

The third stage is of particular importance, representing intensification within the process of gentrification. According to Clay (1979), in this stage the neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification begin to witness tension between older residents and

gentrifiers, as the displacement threat dictates itself in a more formidable way than ever before. The social and spatial changes taking place in the previous stage capture the media's attention, which is thought to lead more affluent groups to assess whether or not those inner-city quarters are liveable (Butler and Robson, 2001). Construction firms and real estate companies become involved in the process at this point, with the aim of improving the site for both residential and commercial use in a way that captivates those who tend to wait until their expectations are met in order to move, or invest in, a new area (Bridge, 2001a; Hackworth and Smith, 2001: 468). As such, the neighbourhood becomes rehabilitated and cleansed from the physical limitations that used to keep rents at a low level. Although such spatial developments inevitably push up rents and house prices by improving those districts and property values (Harvey, 2001), Clay asserts that the reconstruction of buildings, apartments and houses does not cause a rapid displacement of sitting tenants (1979).

Hence, local people tend to defeat the threat of displacement by dissuading those who are willing - but yet to settle - from moving into their own neighbourhood. As such, they strive to undermine the appeal of their district by displaying either rhetorically or physically hostile attitudes towards those who have recently settled in the neighbourhood, out of which social conflicts arise (see Robinson, 1995; Newman and Wyly, 2006; González, 2016). The strategy revolving around territorial criminalisation nonetheless does not enable lower-income tenants to win a permanent victory and keep residing in their neighbourhood. According to Clay (1979), such conflictual states do not last long; non-gentrifiers cannot override either displacement or gentrification in the long run. What they can achieve at most is a reprieve for their own displacement until they are left with no choice but to move elsewhere. The decline in socio-economic diversity is considered to be exactly what differentiates the fourth stage from the third one, marking the beginning of the final phase.

2.2.2.4 Gated Communities in the Inner City

Clay (1979) points out that towards the end of the gentrification process, those neighbourhoods go back to square one in terms of their demographic composition. As such, the fourth stage resembles the pre-gentrification era in the sense that the district no longer hosts socio-culturally or socio-economically diverse groups (Lees, 2003). Whilst these residential areas used to be occupied merely by lower-income residents before the collective settlement of risk-oblivious newcomers, they are now hosting predominantly those who can afford premium prices required to reside in a fully gentrified neighbourhood (Hamnett and Butler, 2013). Since the neighbourhoods are demographically homogenised, Clay (1979) argues that in the fourth stage there remains no grounds for collective tension or for rage to explode.

However, the reason he does not expect any social conflict in that stage of gentrification is not because displacement ceases to be a threat once local residents have re-settled in other disinvested working-class quarters. In fact, displacement continues to prevail throughout the fourth stage; nevertheless, the reason it does not generate unrest at this time is because it now targets the first-wave of gentrifiers. Here, Clay (1979: 60) makes a vital distinction between the displacement of older inhabitants and of those occupied in creative industries, arguing that displacement does not traumatise those newcomers in the same way it does local residents. Rather than resisting displacement, those gentrifiers displaced in the fourth stage are expected to move into other inner-city working-class quarters where rent gaps have not yet been exploited. As such, Clay asserts that this type of displacement relaunches the process from the first stage and leads those districts to go through the same stages, like their counterparts, until they become thoroughly gentrified (see Lees *et al.*, 2010).

2.2.3 Discussion

My argument is that rent-gap theory and the stage model complement each other, as Smith (1979a) and Clay (1979) are both inspired by the way in which Glass (1964) coins the term ‘gentrification’ and what it means as a process. Each account aims to improve the comprehensiveness of Glass’ definition, by providing details and explanations about gentrification. The purpose of Smith’s (1979a) rent-gap theory is to account for the *raison d’être* of gentrification; and it achieves this by recognising a critical distinction amongst disinvested working-class neighbourhoods. Smith argues that low rents *per se* do not explain the existence of gentrification; the rationale for gentrification is rather the actual rents being (considered) lower compared to their approximate potential value. That can happen only if the residential area has some captivating features together with some drawbacks.¹ Smith’s rent-gap theory enables us not only to make sense of why a certain neighbourhood has been gentrified, in a retrospective way, but also to predict the likelihood of any other quarter undergoing such a process in the long run. Providing a comprehensive understanding of the ways in which actual rents reach and exceed their potential ground level, Clay’s stage model complements Smith’s rent-gap theory and underpins Glass’ portrayal of gentrification as a formidable process which results in the displacement of older inhabitants. Expanding upon the stages that disinvested working-class residential areas go through during the gentrification process, the stage model indicates exactly how displacement

¹ Whilst the poor housing conditions and infrastructural problems are thought to be what causes the actual rents to remain low in those quarters, their central location is what makes those rents lower than their potential.

comes to happen gradually. However, that is not the only merit of Clay's illustration of gentrification.

The model can also be seen as a methodological device to use in order to confirm whether or not a neighbourhood is *really* undergoing gentrification. It has been argued that gentrification begins with the collective arrival of risk-oblivious people, who comprise the first-wave of gentrifiers (Clay, 1979: 57; Hwang, 2016; Lees, 2003; Lees *et al.*, 2010; Ley, 1994). That, however, raises the question of how to make sure that there are some newcomers. It is arguably hard to verify the beginning of gentrification through gentrifiers, as it is difficult to guess how many of them there must be in order for one to claim that the gentrification process has begun (Atkinson, 2002). My argument is that such confirmation can be carried out through retail gentrification. It is known that the settlement of those occupied in creative industries, constituting the first stage of gentrification, also paves the way for retail gentrification which characterises the second stage. Here, the presence of such symbolic spaces as art galleries, boutiques and cafes can be regarded as a sign of gentrification – *i.e.*, there are some gentrifiers, as these places grow in parallel with the number of those who seek to fulfil their cultural and social needs where they are residing.

According to Clay's stage model, it is nothing but the decline in socio-economic diversity that is believed to allow one to differentiate the last two stages from each other. Theoretically speaking, this means that the displacement of older tenants should ideally enable us to distinguish whether a certain neighbourhood is still being gentrified, or already gentrified. That being said, it is arguably not an easy task to capture such demographic mobility and ensure that local residents no longer reside in the quarter. Herein lies the significance of social conflict, conflict which Clay (1979) expects to arise insofar as non-gentrifier inhabitants are threatened by displacement. As previously mentioned, in Clay's model social tensions are identical to the third stage, where subaltern groups are yet to be displaced. Clay argues that this engenders tensions which are to prevail throughout the whole third stage. That is to say, so long as there is a conflictual state between different groups sharing the same physical space, one can rightly infer that the residential area has not been fully gentrified yet. The conflict demonstrates that older residents have not been displaced but are still present in their neighbourhood. As such, the conclusion one should reach is that the quarter under investigation is undergoing the third stage of gentrification.

At this point, it is nevertheless worth noting that gentrification is a context-bound process (Hamnett, 1984: 314). Thus, it should not be treated as a phenomenon which dictates its own trajectory. Rather, ways in which it operates depend on many determinants, as will be mentioned shortly. As such, it is of particular importance to realise that Clay's

(1979) stage model might not be explanatory if the orbit of gentrification has undergone a change for any reason. Although the model can still be used for methodological purposes, one should nonetheless be cautious before applying it.

2.3 Gentrification Without Displacement: Co-existence of Diverse Groups in Spatial Terms

There have been a large number of explanations concerned with the causes of gentrification, most of which are accounts shaped by gentrification-induced displacement of sitting tenants. Based on the initially-observed trajectory of the gentrification process, which used to end up by compelling low-income residents to move into other disinvested working-class neighbourhoods, gentrification had long been conceived of as a market-oriented, economic phenomenon (cf., Rose, 1984). However, this earlier understanding of gentrification as a conflictual and negative phenomenon has been brought into question by the protective measures undertaken by either state or local authorities, as part of their aim at a social mix between different social classes (Slater, 2004; Watt, 2009; Uitermark *et al.*, 2007). This ultimately enables non-gentrifier inhabitants to keep residing in their neighbourhood without having the fear, or at least with less fear, of displacement (Uitermark, 2003).

With social-mix policies developed to preclude the negative effects of the process, gentrification has turned out to be a phenomenon which does not necessarily reduce, but can enrich, the socio-economic and socio-cultural diversity of inner-city working-class quarters (Rose, 2004). As such, because local inhabitants are freed from being displaced due to their lack of finance, many scholars have claimed that gentrification as such no longer has to be read predominantly through its tragic consequences related to displacement and social conflicts, as before (e.g., Freeman, 2005; Freeman and Braconi, 2004; Vigdor *et al.*, 2002). However, such demographic and social changes have given rise to a wider debate on how to conceptualise gentrification when it does not result in displacement, a debate that has separated urban sociologists into two opposing camps, as follows.

2.3.1 Positive Gentrification

Those scholars who affirm gentrification by conceiving of the spatial togetherness of diverse groups as liberating, justify their affirmative approach through the argument that gentrifiers are open-minded, diversity-friendly and tolerant. Prior to expanding upon the ways in which they reach that conclusion, however, we should dwell on the reason they suppose that it is of particular significance to take the agency of gentrifiers into consideration. As mentioned earlier, Smith's (1979) rent-gap theory examines the causes

of gentrification in economic terms, providing a structural account as to why specifically working-class quarters undergo gentrification. According to Smith, gentrification takes place nowhere but disinvested inner-city quarters because of the wide disparity between actual rents and the potential ground rent level. As such, gentrification is considered to occur only if gentrifiers and investors see some financial benefits.

For a group of urban sociologists, on the other hand, the existence of gentrification is much more complex than Smith claims (Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Rose, 1984; 2004; Zukin, 1982). It has been argued that the rationale behind gentrification is not reducible to economic factors such as a rent gap, but related to the dispositions of those who move into those areas (Webber, 2007; Zukin, 2008). It goes without saying that in the context of gentrification it is not the movement of low-income residents into upper-class quarters, but the movement of gentrifiers into working-class areas, that alters socio-demographic compositions. It has been posited that making sense of the spatial co-existence of those from different social backgrounds therefore requires deeper understanding of the process (Ley, 1994; 1997; 2003). To a certain extent, Smith's (1979a) theory might offer some answers to the question of why diversity expands in such working-class neighbourhoods; nevertheless, it is arguably not well equipped to reveal either why gentrifiers as a group might have vacated their previous residence, or which part of city they came from. According to this group of scholars (e.g., Bridge, 2001b; Zukin, 1982; 1987), at odds with Smith, there must be other motives than low rents for gentrifiers to move into a residential area where they reside with those they have little in common with. This begs the question of which class the gentrifiers are ranking among, as will now be examined.

2.3.1.1 Gentrifiers: Group of 'New Middle-class' Dwellers

A number of studies have expanded on the fact that class stands at the epicentre of gentrification (e.g., Hamnett, 1991; Wyly and Hammel, 1999). As discussed earlier, gentrification, as a process, begins with collective settlement of a group of newcomers called gentrifiers (Clay, 1979). It has long been argued that those gentrifiers represent a certain social class. Recall Clay's stage model, the first-wave of gentrifiers is comprised of a group of artists and designers. The implications of such findings have been interpreted in a Bourdieusian sense. A number of urban sociologists have thus been concerned with the task of grasping the position that this group of gentrifiers occupy in the social field (e.g., Bridge, 2001b; Butler, 2002; Butler and Robson, 2003a; Ley, 1997).

According to Bourdieu, what causes asymmetries between class positions are differences in the overall volume and composition of the capital possessed. This means that it is a prerequisite to obtain the knowledge of gentrifiers' existing capital, so that their class origin can be understood. Bourdieu argues that there are different types

of capital, such as economic capital, cultural capital and social capital.² Economic capital refers to a set of resources which is ‘immediately and directly convertible into money’ whereas social capital means ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 2002 [1986]: 286). When it comes to cultural capital, Bourdieu states that it can exist in three forms:

in the *embodied* state, *i.e.*, in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the *objectified* state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the *institutionalized* state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee (Bourdieu, 2002 [1986]: 282, original emphasis).

Several studies have argued that gentrifiers represent a new middle-class group, on account of being richer in cultural capital than in economic capital (e.g., Butler and Robson, 2003b; Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Ley, 1997; Rose, 1996; Zukin, 1987; Zukin *et al.*, 2009). Arguably, the overall volume and combination of gentrifiers’ capital has made it difficult to fit those people into the traditional middle class, which is thought to be richer in economic capital than in cultural capital, as gentrifiers have the reverse combination of capitals. Departing from gentrifiers’ observed ties with the field of arts, Zukin (1990) argues that what characterises this group is its remarkably high possession of cultural capital. According to Ley (1994), the extant capital of such gentrifiers as artists and students is composed not only of a high level of cultural capital, but also of a relatively low level of economic capital. In a similar vein, Rose conceives gentrifiers as a group comprised of the ‘highly educated but only tenuously employed’ (1996: 134). It is nonetheless vital to note that the perception of gentrifiers as a new middle-class group has stemmed not only from a stark contrast between the capital possessed by gentrifiers and the traditional middle classes, but also from a great difference in terms of their mindsets, which brings the habitus of gentrifiers into question.

2.3.1.2 *Cosmopolitanism: The Habitus of New Middle-class Gentrifiers*

Where their parents’ generation saw dirt and danger in the asphalt jungle, young city dwellers found beauty in the tumble down and excitement in the rough (Zukin, 2008: 726).

² Symbolic capital will be taken into consideration in the following chapter.

In a similar way to Zukin, Ley thinks of new middle-class gentrifiers as the next generation of traditional middle-class families, who reside in suburban gated communities (2003: 2536). The knowledge of gentrifiers' class background, as such, indicates where gentrifiers were born and raised. However, neither the knowledge of gentrifiers being a new middle-class group, nor that of their acquisition of high levels of cultural capital, suffices to reveal exactly why this group has avoided living in the suburbs and moved into inner-cities, chiefly into working-class neighbourhoods. According to Zukin, even the mere act of settling in such quarters *per se* signifies 'a distinctive habitus in Bourdieu's sense', demonstrating that gentrifiers are quite different from their parents (1987: 131). Bridge is also one of those applying Bourdieu's habitus to argue that gentrifiers separate from the traditional middle classes (2001b: 211-212).

Still, these accounts are arguably not saying much as to where gentrifiers' reluctance to reside in gated communities has originated from; showing a need to be explicit about exactly what is meant by the term 'habitus'. Although Bourdieu discussed habitus in various ways, the concept is generally understood to mean a 'system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level as categories of perception and assessment of as classificatory principles as well as being the organising principles of action' (Bourdieu, 1990: 12-13). Habitus, as such, has become a productive conceptual tool for grasping the causes of gentrification, as it is thought to help capture gentrifiers' reasons for moving into low-income residential areas where subaltern groups dwell. Numerous studies have employed habitus in that respect, with the aim of making sense of the agency of gentrifiers (e.g., Bridge, 2001b; Butler, 1997, 2002; Butler and Robson, 2003a).

People are comfortable when there is a correspondence between habitus and field, but otherwise people feel ill at ease and seek to move – socially and spatially – so that their discomfort is relieved [...] Mobility is driven as people, with their relatively fixed habitus, both move between fields [...] and move to places within fields where they feel more comfortable (Savage *et al.*, 2004: 9).

Savage's evaluation of habitus as principally socio-spatial suggests that the reasons for gentrifiers to move into inner-cities are not separate from the reasons for them to abandon suburban gated communities. As Allen argues:

Sociocultural diversity is a leitmotif in the new tastes for central city housing and neighborhood. One of the great amenities of dense city living, it is said, is exposure to such social and cultural diversity as ethnicity. A composite statement of the idea made up from many fragments is as follows: A milieu of diversity represents a childrearing advantage over 'homogeneous suburbs', because

children are exposed to social ‘reality’ and to the give and take of social and cultural accommodation with those who are different. For adults the urban ambience of diversity is a continual source of stimulation and renewal and a reminder of the cultural relativity of one’s own style of life. It is said to be a relief from the subcultural sameness and ‘boredom’ of many suburban communities (Allen, 1984: 31-32).

Several authors thus far have advocated that gentrifiers not only appreciate, but also seek diversity (in the widest sense of the term), on account of their habitus (De Oliver, 2016; Ley, 2003; Zukin, 2008). According to them, habitus provides the explanation for why children of traditional middle-class families have settled in inner-city working-class quarters where they are to have little in common with existing residents. As such, it has been argued that what differentiates new middle-class gentrifiers from other fractions of the middle class is not simply the former’s possession of cultural capital at higher levels, but also their way of thinking.

Accordingly, habitus-oriented interpretations of gentrifiers’ residential choices have led some scholars to claim that gentrifiers are cosmopolitan on account of their durable disposition towards social engagement. Across a wide range of disciplines there have been various evaluations of what should be understood by cosmopolitanism (e.g., Beck, 2002; Binnie and Holloway, 2003; Binnie *et al.*, 2006; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Ley, 2004; Millington and Young, 2003; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). In terms of gentrification, however, Hannerz defines cosmopolitanism as ‘an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other [...], an intellectual and aesthetic stance towards divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity’ (1996: 103). Drawing upon the ways in which Binnie and Skeggs (2004) conceptualise the term, Young *et al.* argue that cosmopolitanism can be thought of as ‘the possession of a specific attitude and set of skills which permit the understanding and negotiation of cultural diversity’ (2006: 1688).

Cosmopolitanism has been utilised to provide retrospectively causal explanations of gentrification, as it is thought to constitute the underlying rationale behind gentrifiers’ collective movement into working-class neighbourhoods. That is to claim that gentrifiers are present in such quarters not due to them being captivated by rent gaps, but because they did not feel ‘at home’ where they were born and raised. Cosmopolitanism bases the existence of gentrification on gentrifiers being always-already open-minded, tolerant and diversity-friendly rather than seizing financial opportunities in inner cities. However, the role of cosmopolitanism is not limited to offering cultural accounts in terms of gentrification and gentrifiers; it has also changed the ways in which gentrification is conceptualised. Inasmuch as gentrification is

evaluated as a process stemming from new middle-class dwellers' aspirations and quests for cultural diversity, it is considered to be a positive phenomenon engendering liberating consequences, as will now be examined.

2.3.1.3 Gentrification: Rejection of the Traditional Middle-class Norms and Values

The collective settlement of new middle-class gentrifiers in working-class neighbourhoods has long been conceived as a rejection of the traditional middle-class norms and values in political terms, which constitutes the main reason that gentrification is assessed as a positive phenomenon. As discussed above, there has been a widely shared view that gentrification stems from the agency of gentrifiers; the acquisition of high cultural capital, along with the embodiment of a cosmopolitan habitus, is thought to be what stimulates gentrifiers to leave the suburbs and move into inner-city quarters (Bridge and Dowling, 2001). Allowing room for causal explanations of gentrification in a retrospective manner as such, these features of gentrifiers are also considered to be what distinguishes them as a new middle-class group. According to some authors, however, gentrifiers' residential choice to settle in a working-class quarter goes beyond proving how distinctive they are in terms of their habitus and existing cultural capital, manifesting a defiance against expressions of ethnic or class homogeneity prevailing in suburbia (e.g., Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Ley, 2003; Zukin *et al.*, 2009).

Several studies have argued that there is a left-liberal political ideology lying beneath gentrification; and it is believed to be exactly what has transformed gentrification from a mere spatial mobility into a political demeanour (e.g., Ley, 1994; 1997). According to Caulfield, for example, gentrification is a 'critical social practice' (1989: xiii); he conceives gentrifiers as not a simple group of city dwellers but rather those who battle against repressive middle-class conformity (1994). In a similar vein, Ley identifies gentrifiers as 'non-conformist in their lifestyle and politics' (1997: 56). According to him, inner-city working-class neighbourhoods offer 'either a refuge or a site of resistance for youth from bourgeois values' (Ley, 2003: 2536). As such, there has existed a claim that, in a wider context, gentrifiers' collective settlement is part of an egalitarian movement which welcomes difference and supports cultural diversity (Ley, 1997; Ley and Dobson, 2008; Rose, 1996, Warde, 1991).

The acceptance that gentrifiers have egalitarian dispositions is key to understanding why a large number of urban sociologists argue that gentrification should be seen as a positive phenomenon so long as it does not cause displacement (Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Freeman, 2005, 2006; Freeman and Braconi, 2004; Musterd and Andersson, 2005; Steinmetz- Wood *et al.*, 2017; Vigdor *et al.*, 2002). According to them, gentrifiers' movement into working-class neighbourhoods does not merely offer a multicultural

snapshot of those areas, but also transforms each into an emancipatory space. In other words, gentrifiers settle in inner-city areas not simply because they seek cultural diversity but, rather, to construct an alternative urban space which offers freedom for all, like a carnival in the Bakhtinian sense (Zukin and Braslow, 2011: 136). Rejection of traditional middle-class norms and values is believed to be liberating for subaltern and marginal local communities, too, who have been socially excluded due to not being able to meet what ‘society’ wants (Freeman and Braconi, 2004). Since gentrification no longer leads to displacement of sitting tenants, but co-existence of diverse groups, gentrifiers’ political concerns and desires are thought to be what renders gentrifying working-class neighbourhoods as a space of freedom, where resistance to domination and social hierarchy is continually practiced. As such, it has become quite a hegemonic approach to see gentrification without displacement as a positive phenomenon which is thought to emancipate inner-cities by liberating the deprived and minorities from feelings of inferiority (Florida, 2002). That being said, it did not take long for another group of urban sociologists to oppose these cultural readings of gentrification, and to evaluate them as the ‘eviction of critical perspectives’ from the literature (e.g., Slater, 2006; 2008; 2010; Slater *et al.*, 2004; Davidson, 2008; cf., Freeman, 2008), as will now be discussed.

2.3.2 *Negative Gentrification*

There has been a tendency among critics of gentrification to identify those gentrifier-driven understandings of gentrification as associated with, in Storper’s (2001) words, ‘mirage of the cultural turn’ (e.g., Slater, 2006; Slater *et al.*, 2014; Smith, 2002). According to this group, those who have based their affirmation of gentrification on the agency of gentrifiers have overlooked the potentially devastating impacts of gentrifiers’ settlements in working-class neighbourhoods on existing residents. Prior to expanding upon their arguments, however, it is useful to emphasise that although those who have conceived of gentrification without displacement as a negative phenomenon have criticised culturalist and positive accounts of gentrification, they have not claimed that gentrification is disruptive because gentrifiers are neither tolerant nor diversity-friendly. Put simply, they have objected to affirmative definitions of gentrification; however, they have not considered related justifications, nor have they put forward a counter-argument on the agency of gentrifiers. Rather, they have focused upon other consequences of gentrification rather than displacement, and argued that gentrification cannot be seen as a positive phenomenon, despite the fact that it no longer dislocates low-income populations. This is because it still deepens socio-economic inequalities and, in so doing, leads long-term residents to develop a sense of loss of place, as will now be further detailed.

2.3.2.1 Gentrifiers: Global Community

Despite the preventive measures taken against the displacement of local residents, there have been a large number of urban sociologists who still perceive gentrification as a negative phenomenon and, hereby, criticise the process (e.g., Atkinson, 2005; 2015; Davidson, 2008; Davidson and Wyly, 2015; Lees, 2008; Manley and Johnston, 2014; Slater, 2006). Unlike those who have affirmed gentrification on account of taking the agency of gentrifiers into consideration in the Bourdieusian sense, this group of authors have not seen gentrifiers as a group comprised of dwellers having both distinctive habitus and high levels of cultural capital, but demarcated them in a neo-Marxist way (e.g., Davidson, 2007; Fernandez *et al.*, 2016; Smith, 1996; 2005; Rofe, 2003). According to them, gentrifiers rank among a class that have expanded with globalisation and neo-liberalism, as will be elaborated shortly below. As discussed previously, what has led the former camp to identify gentrifiers as a separate, new middle-class group is the view that gentrifiers do not resemble either their parents or other traditional middle-class members. In a paradoxical manner, even those who have objected to such an affirmative conceptualisation of gentrification have also classified gentrifiers as a new middle class; however, what they have understood by new middle class is quite different.

Gentrifiers rank among the new middle class, according to this group of urban sociologists, because they are representatives of a global community comprised of business sector professionals who are not only highly- educated but also highly-paid (e.g., Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Rofe, 2003; Roseberry, 1996; M. P. Smith, 2005; Sklair, 2012; cf., Bridge, 2007). It has therefore been argued that gentrifiers' economic capital is not relatively low at all, but high in terms of its volume (Hamnett, 1994, 1996; Hamnett and Cross, 1998). As such, there has existed disagreement on what differentiates gentrifiers from other fractions. Whereas the first group has taken gentrifiers' possession of cultural capital into account, as detailed previously, the second group has placed greater emphasis on their acquisition of economic capital. According to them, gentrification is far from being a new middle-class resistance to any kind of upper-class domination or social exclusion but is related to neoliberal urbanisation, whose beneficiaries are nobody but new middle-class gentrifiers (e.g., Atkinson, 2000; 2002; Buck, 2001; Wyly and Hammel, 2005).

2.3.2.2 From Retail Gentrification to 'Social Displacement'

A large number of authors have dwelled on retail gentrification to justify their criticisms of gentrification and indicate how the process causes socio- economic inequalities to be concentrated and intensified in working-class neighbourhoods (Butler and Watt, 2007;

Davidson and Wyly, 2012, 2013; Dorling, 2011, 2012; Hamnett and Butler, 2013;). As a reminder, retail gentrification marks the second stage in Clay's (1979) classic model of gentrification, demonstrating that the gentrification process has already begun – *i.e.*, that gentrifiers have already settled in the quarter. What the critics of gentrification without displacement object to is the hegemonic perception that changes in the retail landscape are also for the benefit of long-term residents, enhancing the quality of their life.³ Within this critical body of literature there has been wide agreement that retail gentrification worsens the living standards of long-term residents by deepening socio-economic inequalities between those who share the same physical space (Atkinson, 2000; Crump, 2002; Deener, 2007; Hyra, 2006; Pattillo, 2007). Hamnett and Whitelegg, for instance, have argued that whilst changes in consumption practices and spaces pave the way for price increases, the latter not only makes it hard for non-gentrifier, local inhabitants to take part in social activities, but also leads them to experience deprivation in a more vehement way than ever before and, hereby, feel themselves more deprived than they used to (2007).

According to some, as illustrated previously, gentrifiers' cosmopolitan mindset is believed to help local populations overcome the social isolation they have thus far been left with no choice but to endure (e.g., Musterd and Andersson, 2005; Steinmetz-Wood *et al.*, 2017). According to others, however, gentrification can hardly allow room for a social mix, but results in socio-spatial polarisation, whilst commercial gentrification keeps low-income inhabitants out of those places where gentrifiers are inclined to spend their spare time and socialise (e.g., Arthurson, 2004; 2012; Hamnett and Cross, 1998; Mitchell, 2017; H. Smith, 2003; Paton, 2010; Walks and Maaranen, 2008). Marcuse (1985) has argued that consumption spaces whose clienteles are comprised solely of gentrifiers grow at the expense of local stores, diminishing the number of places where locals while away. For Atkinson, what follows that kind of spatial segregation is social segregation – *i.e.*, 'social displacement' (2002; 2015); this means that the mere fact that working-class neighbourhoods have long been gentrifying without displacing long-term occupants is not sufficient to affirm gentrification, for the process, together with retail gentrification, is now thought to make local residents feel 'out of place' and harm their residential belonging, as will be discussed below.

³ There is no rationale for some to negate those alterations as they widen the range of products in stores and improve the quality of social services (e.g., Florida, 2002; Freeman and Braconi, 2004). According to Freeman, gentrification without displacement, together with retail gentrification, 'provides the opportunity to improve the quality of life of deteriorated neighborhoods and mix residents from differing socioeconomic strata with benefits for both the indigenous residents and the larger society' (2006: 169). However, it is no accident that it was not until the settlement of gentrifiers that such symbolic spaces as art galleries, boutiques, gourmet restaurants and cafés became visible in inner-city working-class neighbourhoods. This means that these are places designed notably to cater to the social and cultural needs of those who are believed to have sophisticated tastes.

2.3.2.3 *Loss of Place and Identity*

A number of authors have identified the loss of place identity associated with gentrification (e.g., Butler, 2003; Shaw and Hagemans, 2015; Watt, 2006). According to them, commodification engendered by retail gentrification damages long-term residents' place attachment and, finally, eradicates their place identity. Prior to elaborating on the ways in which gentrification causes such dramatic changes in non-gentrifiers' sense of place, however, it is of particular importance to examine why working-class inhabitants are more inclined to develop residential belonging than gentrifiers (see Fried, 1963; Rivlin, 1987). A possible explanation may be Bourdieu's argument that place attachment is not a simple choice to make, but is about 'loving the inevitable' due to the deprivation of capital: 'the lack of capital intensifies the experience of finitude; it chains one to a place' (Bourdieu, 1999: 127). According to him, it is no accident that those who seem to have developed such belonging rank among subaltern populations, as place attachment helps them relieve the burden of not being able to move elsewhere in order to reside. In a similar vein, Shaw and Hagemans argue that 'for those who have uncertain or low economic status and therefore fewer reasons and resources to travel and develop social ties outside the neighbourhood, place of residence becomes an important nexus around which identification and belonging are formulated' (2015: 326-327).

In order to understand the disruptive effects of gentrification on identity, it is useful to draw a fine distinction between 'loss of place' and 'loss of space' (Davidson, 2009) – a distinction which, in fact, stems from a wider dissatisfaction with existing accounts on the meaning and operation of displacement. Predominantly, displacement has been conceived of as changes solely in terms of household occupation (J. Fraser, 2004; Davidson, 2008). Nevertheless, the displacement process is arguably much more complicated than that; it does not take place only when low-income tenants are compelled to vacate their property because they cannot afford to remain in the area. To claim otherwise, according to Davidson, amounts to reducing displacement to a 'pure spatial re/dis-location of individuals' (2009: 223). He argues that such a restrictive understanding of displacement does not make it clear why one should see spatial dislocation of local inhabitants as a tragic fact:

Eviction from the neighbourhood in which one was at home can be almost as disruptive of the meaning of life as the loss of a crucial relationship. Dispossession threatens the whole structure of attachments through which purposes are embodied, because these attachments cannot readily be re-established in an alien setting (Marris, 1986: 57).

So long as displacement is reduced to spatial dislocation, the latter's absence is considered to be evidence of the non-existence of displacement and, hereby, non-occurrence of unfavourable impacts of gentrification. That is exactly what Davidson opposes. According to him, a sense of loss of place should not be limited to physical displacement; non-gentrifier inhabitants may still feel alienated while remaining in their place, insofar as they are excluded from everyday life due to retail gentrification (Davidson, 2009). Such a feeling is thought to be similar to the one Marris expects to arise when long-term occupants are forced to abandon their place and settle elsewhere, chiefly other lower-income working-class quarters which have not yet undergone gentrification. As such, it has been argued that loss of place identity engendered by social displacement worsens locals' quality of life no less severely than spatial dislocation, 'producing the feelings of grief associated with any major loss' (Shaw and Hagemans, 2015: 339):

A home exists where sentiment and space converge to afford attachment, stability, and a secure sense of personal control. It is an abiding place and a web of trustworthy connections, an anchor of identity and social life, the seat of intimacy and trust from which we pursue our emotional and material needs (Segal and Baumohl, 1988: 259).

There has been a large volume of studies documenting that gentrification without displacement is not an entirely positive phenomenon, but still generates social and economic problems on the part of long-term residents who are mostly deprived of economic capital. The urban policies aiming at a social mix may prevent physical displacement; however, changes in retail landscape are considered to result in social displacement which reduces room for those people to feel at home. It has been discussed that retail gentrification is thought to deepen socio-economic inequalities by confronting local residents with the hardship of lacking resources, necessary to gain access to the recently opened consumption spaces in their neighbourhood. According to DeFilippis, however, such changes not only leave low-income occupants out of local life but also, in so doing, deprives them of power and control over the place (2004). As argued above, place attachment is stronger among working-class residents for they are left with no option but to make a virtue out of a necessity and develop a sense of residential belonging. As such, social displacement, together with retail gentrification, is expected to lead them to a sense of loss of place. The conclusion is that gentrification is not related to 'urban renaissance', in which diverse groups band together against social exclusion and the conformity of suburbia, but rather 'urban colonialism', which brings about the takeover of inner-

cities by new middle-class gentrifiers (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; N. Smith, 2002; Watt, 2008).

2.3.3 Discussion

Some scholars have defended the view that gentrification should be seen as ‘emancipatory’, provided that it does not displace older residents (e.g., Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Ley, 1994; 1997). They have inferred this from gentrifiers whom they have attempted to identify by drawing heavily upon Bourdieu’s theoretical framework. They have taken the agency of gentrifiers into consideration and dealt with the question of why gentrifiers might have moved into such inner-city working-class neighbourhoods and not preferred to live in gated communities, unlike their parents. The ever-increasing preference for settlement in those neighbourhoods has led a large number of urban sociologists to investigate what differentiates gentrifiers from those residing in the suburbs.

Taking the diversity in gentrifying neighbourhoods for granted, several authors have claimed that gentrifiers have a different, ‘cosmopolitan’ habitus in comparison to traditional middle classes who hesitate to step outside their comfort zone (Blasius *et al.*, 2015; Zukin, 2008). As such, gentrifiers have been identified as a new middle-class group comprised of those who not only appreciate but also seek cultural diversity to celebrate on account of being open-minded, tolerant and occupying a left-liberal position on the political spectrum. A number of urban sociologists have consequently seen gentrification as a liberating process, for it is thought to have been based on a rejection of traditional middle-class norms and values.

Such a reading of gentrification through the agency of gentrifiers may add to our understanding of the existence of gentrification as a social phenomenon; however, it arguably does not provide details about the further stages and co-existence of diverse groups: here, it is a must to distinguish that the inference that gentrifiers are diversity-friendly on account of their habitus and possession of cultural capital might help us grasp their settlement in working-class quarters but does not prove that gentrification avails non-gentrifier residents. Although the latter requires empirical investigation, those who have advocated gentrification have not examined what local inhabitants think of gentrifiers, but have found gentrifiers’ characteristics to be a good enough reason to conclude that gentrification transforms inner cities into more emancipatory places in a carnivalesque manner.

Criticising the removal of working-class residents from narratives on gentrification, the second group of urban sociologists has expanded on the ways in which existing, low-income residents experience the process, with the aim of grounding why gentrification without displacement is not a positive phenomenon but

still disruptive (e.g., Davidson and Wyly, 2015; Marcuse, 2015; Slater, 2006; Shaw and Hagemans, 2015; N. Smith, 2005). According to those critics of gentrification, the negative impacts of gentrification should not be limited to displacement; even though existing residents may well be freed from being forced to vacate their property, the mere fact that they are no longer destined to move elsewhere, they argue, is not enough to treat gentrification as an emancipatory process. On the contrary, it has been widely posited that gentrification without displacement can be no less devastating in the sense that it leads older inhabitants to a sense of loss of place. Although there seems to be nothing that may threaten their stay in the neighbourhood, several studies have reported that low-income residents cannot adapt themselves to the dramatic changes engendered by retail gentrification, which ends up with social displacement.

This latter interpretation appears to be a more critical evaluation of gentrification without displacement. Nevertheless, this is not to say that there are no theoretical problems with the view. Despite accusing those who have focused on the agency of gentrifiers into account that they overlook local residents and their experiences, the authors who have criticised gentrification without displacement seem to have done the same to gentrifiers. In their accounts, gentrifiers have been referred to merely in order to ground the changes in the retail landscape; as such, gentrifiers have been perceived as nothing but the agents of retail gentrification. Second, describing long-term, non-gentrifier occupants only as economically disadvantaged groups, these authors have simply identified the disruptive effects of gentrification as associated with economic problems. What exemplifies this best is loss of place identity: older residents have been regarded as destined to be alienated from their own neighbourhood due to nothing but retail gentrification, as the latter is thought to leave almost no affordable consumer space for those people to socialise and take part in local life.

Whether gentrification without displacement is treated as a positive or a negative phenomenon, what casts doubt on each conceptualisation are the ways in which their conclusions have been drawn. In spite of reaching opposing conclusions, each camp has made a similar mistake: even though gentrification without displacement points out the co-existence of diverse groups, none of the above approaches has considered moral issues or attempted to provide a relational understanding of gentrification without displacement by analysing its meaning and impacts through daily contacts between those who share the same physical space despite coming from different socio-cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. Rather, as demonstrated above, they have tended to take *either* new middle-class gentrifiers *or* economically subaltern local residents into account.

2.4 Conclusion

Gentrification has direct implications for various diverse groups sharing the same physical space. Nevertheless, it is hard to say that those who have made either empirical or theoretical contributions to the gentrification literature have laid special emphasis on the co-living of different social classes. Clay's (1979) stage model, for instance, provides comprehensive details about the phases gentrifying neighbourhoods are likely to go through until they are cleansed of all 'negative' elements and turned into gentrified quarters, where solely the affluent reside. Even in his model, however, the co-existence of different walks of life, if not overlooked, has been read through displacement. Recall the social conflicts Clay expects to arise between local residents and gentrifiers in the third stage: it was argued that such conflictual states have nothing to do with social interaction between diverse groups, but stem from poorer populations foreseeing their own displacement. According to Clay, low-income groups are thought to resort to violence in order to reduce the appeal of their neighbourhood and prolong their stay. Here, it might be useful to remember that spatial dislocation, despite its dramatic impacts on those displaced, does not spread over the entire process but takes place in the third and fourth stages. However, Clay does not seem to have considered the ways in which local inhabitants and gentrifiers live together, perceive and treat each other in the first two stages, when displacement is not at stake.

I argue that gentrification is primarily a process that requires a consideration of class relationships. Neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification provide an appropriate empirical context for researchers to investigate how social classes are involved in everyday interactions, how they encounter and approach each other, what types of differences they have and how those differences are perceived, what norms and values they share in common despite occupying asymmetrical positions in the social field, and what may be the moral outcomes of such co-living. Investigating all of this in the context of gentrification would also offer some suggestions about how to better grasp gentrification as a concept. However, instead of posing questions like these, urban sociologists in general have attempted to conceptualise gentrification without placing diverse groups into wider class relations. Recent developments have made it vital to take those questions into account more than ever before, since gentrification has transformed into a process which may no longer cause displacement.

The fact that the co-existence of different social classes could become permanent does not seem to have made a great deal of difference in the literature, for the question of what it means for diverse groups to reside together has been left neglected in both empirical and theoretical terms. Although those urban sociologists who have offered positive definitions for gentrification seem to have touched upon spatial co-existence

of different social classes, considering their argument that gentrifiers are tolerant and diversity-friendly, it should nonetheless be acknowledged that taking merely gentrifiers' characteristic features into account does not provide justification for affirming gentrification on behalf of non-gentrifier groups. For the second group of scholars, comprised of critics of gentrification, it is still difficult to say that they have recognised how essential it is to consider diverse class groups together when taking gentrification into account. As argued above, those who have negated gentrification have examined changes in the retail landscape and their effects on local inhabitants more than moral issues that might result from social interaction between different classes. Based on the discussion as a whole, the politics of gentrification has arguably been missing from the existing literature. Considering gentrifiers and local residents together within the same context, the following chapter examines the politics of gentrification and argues how conflictual and grievous it may actually be for *all* those groups which share the same physical space.

CHAPTER 3

DISTINCTION VERSUS RECOGNITION: THE POLITICS OF GENTRIFICATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter expands upon the politics of gentrification – *i.e.* the question of what it means for diverse groups to reside together and share the same urban space, by drawing heavily upon two different types of class struggle. The first is Bourdieu’s ‘struggle for distinction’, which will help us to grasp the struggles of gentrifiers. The second is Honneth’s ‘struggle for recognition’, which will add to our understanding of the struggles of local residents. It should be acknowledged that the chapter, despite outlining two distinct theoretical frameworks, does not make a purely theoretical point in its own right. Rather, the underlying intention is to thematise the spatial co- existence of different social classes and, by so doing, to provide a better understanding of the politics of gentrification. It thus prepares the ground for the empirical chapters which come later in the thesis.

The main argument of this chapter is that social integration cannot be easily established between those who come from different class backgrounds, but have started living together in the same quarter. The chapter argues that social conflicts are likely to mount as a result of co-existence, and seeks to ground these conflicts in wider class relations. These class relations are expressed by three concepts: ‘struggle for distinction’; ‘symbolic domination’; and ‘struggle for recognition’. Struggles for distinction account for gentrifiers, and suggest reasons as to why a social mix in areas undergoing gentrification is problematic. Symbolic domination thematises the potential impact of such a failure of social integration upon long-term occupants. Finally, struggles for recognition show the ways in which non- gentrifier inhabitants may cope with the moral costs of sharing the same physical space with those who are perceived as superior.

3.2 Struggle for Distinction

This first section of the chapter focuses upon gentrifiers, arguing that the motive behind their settlement stands at the epicentre of making sense of the politics of gentrification. As such, this part takes the agency of gentrifiers into consideration – just as a number of authors have done (e.g., Ley, 1997; 2003; Zukin, 1987; 1990; 1991; Zukin and Kosta, 2004; Zukin *et al.*, 2009), by putting Bourdieu’s theory of class to work (Bourdieu, 1984; 1985; 1987a; 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; 2013). Employing the same theoretical framework, however, I actually propose opposite claims. Existing literature, as we saw in the previous chapter, has argued that gentrifiers have moved into the inner city because they are distinctive from their middle-class parents who reside in suburban gated communities (Zukin, 2008). In a contrary manner, I argue that what makes gentrifiers a separate group from other fractions of the middle class is not their naturally distinctive ‘habitus’, or their possession of cultural capital (Bridge, 2001b: 211-212; Ley, 2003: 2536), but their very attempt to distinguish themselves from those segments of the middle class.

Arguably, as will be further discussed, neither habitus nor capital *a priori* makes its possessor distinctive; otherwise, there would be no need for agents to strive to convert their existing capital into symbolic capital. In Bourdieu’s sense, distinction is not something given or naturally inhabited, but a profit to be appropriated. Both agents and social classes rival each other to appropriate this profit, which in turn produces a struggle for distinction. This understanding of distinction as a struggle raises the question of whether gentrifiers might have moved into working-class quarters to differentiate themselves from traditional middle-class groups. The first part below accordingly argues that gentrifiers reject traditional middle-class norms and values not because they are always-already diversity-friendly and tolerant, but to legitimise their residential choices. This means that gentrifiers do not aim to develop an alternative urban space in political terms, but to form an alternative urban lifestyle. As will be argued, it is through this alternative lifestyle that gentrifiers endeavour to convert their cultural capital into symbolic capital and claim to be distinctive and superior.

3.2.1 The Struggle between Gentrifiers and Traditional Middle Classes: Understanding Gentrifiers’ Collective Settlement in Working-class Neighbourhoods and the Raison d’être of Gentrification

As mentioned in the previous chapter, what has led a number of urban sociologists to see gentrification as an affirmative process is the notion that gentrifiers are not like those who comprise the traditional segments of the middle class (Caulfield, 1989;

1994; Ley, 1997; 2003). Gentrifiers are regarded as a separate social group in that they are not keen to reside in ‘gated communities’, where they are believed to be born (Zukin, 1987: 131; 2008: 726). Gentrifiers moving into inner-city working-class neighbourhoods is therefore taken as a sign of their reluctance to pursue a traditional middle-class lifestyle, which is arguably exclusionary and still prevails in suburban enclaves. Inspired by Bourdieu’s theory of class, these scholars claim that rejection of such a lifestyle is related to gentrifiers’ habitus and possession of higher amounts of cultural capital (e.g., Bridge, 2001b; Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Ley, 1997; 2003; Rose, 1996; Zukin, 1990). As such, gentrifiers are considered to be cosmopolitan and diversity-friendly in cultural and societal terms. Put this way, both gentrification and gentrifiers’ presence in low-income residential areas turn out to be positive facts that one can hardly negate.

Putting Bourdieu’s key concept of ‘distinction’ to work as a struggle, this part argues that *struggles for distinction* can provide a much more relational understanding of both gentrification and gentrifiers’ characteristics, compared to the extant accounts which have extended acquisition of cultural capital to dispositions and practices. Since many empirical studies on gentrification confirm that gentrifiers predominantly consist of those occupied in cultural industries (Florida, 2002; Lloyd, 2006; Scott, 2014), there are good reasons to conceive of these people as holders of considerable amounts of cultural capital. It nonetheless would be an *a priori* assumption if one asserts that gentrifiers are broad-minded and ready to appreciate cultural differences by nature, owing to such an acquisition. As such, there is still a need to explicate why gentrifiers in general are more inclined to be pro-diversity than exclusionary, as follows.

Arguably, gentrification is not separate from the struggle over ‘the dominant principle of the domination within the dominant class’ – a struggle to ‘secure the best conversion rate for the type of capital with which each fragment is best provided’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 310). As Bourdieu designs the concept, there are three main forms of capital: economic, cultural and social (2002 [1986]). Capital is of particular significance in Bourdieu’s theory of class because agents’ class position in the social space is determined by the overall volume and composition of the capital possessed (Bourdieu, 1987a: 4; Crossley, 2002: 177). That being said, there is another type of capital on which Bourdieu places a greater emphasis: symbolic capital (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013). Bourdieu argues that agents may well hold capital of various compositions; however, they demand recognition for a certain type of their extant capital, which is considered to be the highest in terms of its volume (Bourdieu, 1977: 122; 1987a: 11; 1991: 170, 238-239). Be it economic, cultural or social capital, any of these can start to function as symbolic capital once it has provided its possessor with what Bourdieu calls ‘a profit of distinction’ (1977: 181-182, 197).

As will be further detailed below, gentrification is part of cultivated subjects' aim to convert their existing cultural capital into symbolic capital in a Bourdieusian sense. Here it is worth recalling Bourdieu's point that positions in the social field are not fixed but always at stake: despite the role of capital in dividing the social space asymmetrically into different social classes, there is no such appropriation of capital that can preserve one's position once and for all. Needless to say, the amount of one's extant capital may well increase or decrease. However, this is not the only factor that Bourdieu expects to alter class positions. Changes in the social field do not always go hand in hand with class mobility. What acquisition of a certain type of capital, or belonging to a particular social class, means and signifies may also undergo dramatic shifts in how they are categorised (Bourdieu, 1977: 122; 1990: 131). According to Bourdieu, categories help social classes to subordinate the types of capital they are lacking to the one each is equipped with best. As such, he conceives struggle over categorisations as 'a forgotten dimension of the class struggle' and an essential part of the subjective re- making of reality (Bourdieu, 1984: 483).

Here, I assert that gentrification represents the ambitious way in which those comprising the dominated fraction of the dominant class challenge the upper classes on the aestheticisation of life (see Bourdieu, 1977: 77-78; 1998: 76). The development of a new, vibrant urban lifestyle is arguably related to this kind of strategy, considering the fact that such a lifestyle is more likely to privilege the possession of cultural capital over that of economic capital. Given the composition of gentrifiers' existing capital – that is, a combination of high amounts of cultural capital and relatively weak economic capital, the commitment reveals itself and becomes more understandable. This also accounts for why the authenticity of inner-city areas has always been 'discovered' by this specific group, rather than by more affluent segments of the society (see Bourdieu, 1984: 310-311).

Such a reading of gentrification, however, casts doubt on what has so far led many scholars to affirm the phenomenon: conceiving the 'back-to-the-city movement' as a reaction to the traditional middle-class lifestyle. Here it is worth asking how far gentrifiers' decisions to move into working-class neighbourhoods can be treated as a virtue, or part of a political struggle. From a Bourdieusian perspective, it goes without saying that choosing what lifestyle to pursue is not a simple decision to make, but is determined by a wide range of elements from habitus to capital (Bourdieu, 1991: 238-239). As Bourdieu expresses:

The most improbable practices are excluded, either totally without examination, as *unthinkable*, or at the cost of the double negation which inclines agents to

make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the inevitable (Bourdieu, 1977: 77, original emphasis).

Now, there is a general misconception that dealing with economic constraints is merely endemic to the subaltern groups. Although a number of studies have demonstrated that gentrifiers in general do not own sufficient economic capital to stand against economic difficulties, some urban sociologists still advocate that it is gentrifiers' cosmopolitan mindset that has made it unbearable to live in segregated communities from the very beginning (e.g., Caulfield, 1994; Ley, 1997; 2003). As such, gentrifiers are believed to be always-already determined to go after the urban anonymity. Unfortunately, this does not give us the whole story on gentrification. The other side of the coin is a question about whether those who are to become gentrifiers might move into low-income residential areas due to economic necessity (Bourdieu, 1984: 324-328). If so, then there remains no grounds to speak of a virtue; rather, gentrifiers' negation of the traditional middle-class lifestyle turns out to be making a virtue out of necessity (*ibid*: 55).

Gentrifiers' diversity-friendly rhetoric stands at the centre of making a virtue out of necessity, serving the purpose of veiling the probable economic reasons behind their moving-into inner-city working-class neighbourhoods (Bourdieu, 1984: 40). Here it is worth emphasising that my intention is not to assert that gentrifiers can by no means display any tolerance towards others, notably class others. What I challenge rather is the construction of a so-called cause-and-effect relationship between the possession of cultural capital and being diversity-friendly. The problematisation should not be equated with downplaying the role of habitus and capital. On the contrary,

I advocate that both should be considered. However, we should acknowledge that these concepts alone are not capable of explaining why it is that no other groups but gentrifiers become cosmopolitan. I argue that habitus and capital can help us to grasp certain practices and dispositions only if they are operationalised to make sense of a wider question. This question revolves around how social groups pursue distinction (Bourdieu, 1991: 170, 238). Gentrifiers may be diversity-tolerant or they may not; but either case is arguably related to their quest for distinction.

Bourdieu designs the concept of 'distinction' by drawing heavily on his observations that every social class claims to have the 'legitimate' lifestyle (1984). As such, it is not a coincidence that lifestyles are based on different norms and values. Here one might point out that such divergences are self-explanatory in the sense that they reflect the hierarchy between classes. Indeed, the differences in norms and values are related to the differences in class positions. However, the relationship is not as

simple as it sounds. Although social classes are separated from each other in terms of both their capital and norms, those norms should not be treated as given things (Bourdieu, 1991: 238; Wacquant, 2013: 276). In this regard, my argument is that classes are inclined to develop the norms that are likely to allow room for the claim of superiority. That is to say, what mediates between the possession of capital and the adoption of certain values is the pursuit of distinction. Put in this way, norms appear to be things that are built. Arguably, norms and values are designed and constructed in such a way as to put across the capital possessed at the highest volume, so that this particular type of capital can be converted into symbolic capital, necessary to appropriate the profit of distinction (Bourdieu, 1977: 181-182, 197). Plus, it is not accidental that those norms and values also help classes to trivialise other types of capital which they are relatively deprived of (Bourdieu, 1987a: 11; 1991: 238). When a specific norm is under investigation, it is therefore essential to think relationally and pose the question of what other values are targeted. Taking this into account can also explicate why the group attempts to pursue distinction in that specific way, as will now be examined in the context of gentrification.

What gentrification symbolises, then, is not only a refusal but also a counter-challenge. When gentrifiers reject embourgeoisement, their rejection in fact amounts to rejecting the dominant principle revolving around economic capital (Bourdieu, 1984: 55). Now it is a well-known fact that the amount of gentrifiers' cultural capital is remarkable; nevertheless, it is not enough to have such an acquisition: what should be done is not to maximise the amount of extant cultural capital but to increase the symbolic worth of the ownership of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). This is exactly what gentrifiers aim to achieve through an urban lifestyle which manifests itself in gentrification: to convert cultural capital into symbolic capital. Subordinating the appropriation of economic capital through cosmopolitan norms and values, this vibrant lifestyle enables gentrifiers to challenge the economically unbeaten upper classes via the possession of cultural capital.

3.2.2 Struggles amongst Gentrifiers

Nevertheless, the merit of conceiving distinction as a struggle is not limited to providing a better understanding of the existence of gentrification; struggle for distinction is also key to grasping the politics of gentrification as it allows us to thematise gentrifiers' dispositions, practices, and approaches to others in the further stages of gentrification.

Many terms have been coined so far to identify the group of gentrifiers: new urban frontier (N. Smith, 1996), hipster (Cowen, 2006; Greif; 2010; Hubbard; 2016; Michael, 2015; Maly and Varis, 2016), creative class (Florida, 2002), new middle class

(Ley, 2003; Zukin, 1987) are the most common. In spite of some slight differences in their emphases, each comes up with a similar description of gentrifiers as remarkably richer in terms of their cultural capital, although relatively lacking economic capital. This portrayal of gentrifiers is apparently based on Bourdieu's understanding of capital and class. However, it is worth noting that it also signifies a certain group in Bourdieu's categorisation of the dominant class.

Bourdieu (1984) divides the dominant class into three sub-factions according to the overall volume and composition of their capital; these groups are, as expressed by Honneth:

the group of tenured intelligentsia, intellectuals and artists; the group of independent professionals; and, finally, the group of owners and managers of large-scale industry (Honneth, 1986: 62).

Constituting the dominated faction of the dominant class, the first group draws heavily on its cultural capital to avoid any downclassing. According to Bourdieu, those comprising this group are inclined to 'express their distance from the bourgeois world, which they cannot really appropriate, by a refusal of complicity whose most refined expression is a propensity towards aesthetics and aestheticism' (Bourdieu 1984: 55). As such, rather than more affluent segments of the dominant class, this group of artists and intellectuals is expected to be more interested in setting alternative trends and becoming the 'taste-makers' of society (ibid: 310-311).

Amongst those alternative trends, residing in the working-class neighbourhoods located in inner-city areas is arguably the most favourable one. Nevertheless, gentrification is a good example of what Bourdieu calls: 'an inventory of thinly disguised expressions of a sort of dream of social flying [and] a desperate effort to defy the gravity of the social field' (Bourdieu, 1984: 370-371). We know that gentrifiers must form a captivating lifestyle so that they can put their cultural capital across and claim to be distinctive. However, this nevertheless should be a lifestyle that cannot be imitated at the same time – in order for gentrifiers to preserve their rarity – considering the fact that 'popularisation devalues' (Bourdieu, 1993: 114). Now, this group is arguably not able to achieve both due to their relatively weak economic capital (Bourdieu, 1984: 324-328). Although 'aesthetic enjoyments and daily pleasures' are an essential part of the vibrant lifestyle gentrifiers attempt to form (Honneth, 1986: 62), it is worth noting that they are vulnerable to being popularised since they are not as unaffordable as the bourgeois ones.

As many studies observe, gentrifiers tend to fabricate an authentic ambience within the mess of inner-cities, which goes hand in hand with the proliferation of art galleries, boutiques and cafés (Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Peterson, 2005; Scott, 2014; Zukin,

2011; Zukin and Braslow, 2011; Zukin et al., 2009). Zukin calls these ‘the ABCs of gentrification’ (2016: 204). According to her, such places are symbolic in that they are designed to offer a set of cultivated consumption practices for their clientele to ‘perform their difference’ in cultural terms (Zukin, 2008: 730). The authentication of urban space aims to construct a new ideal type which is unsurprisingly based on the possession of cultural capital in high amounts. This kind of sophisticated self enables gentrifiers to escalate the symbolic meaning of what they are equipped with best: cultural capital.

Starting to characterise gentrifying neighbourhoods, the vibrant lifestyle nonetheless *confronts gentrifiers with a paradox to overcome*. Retail gentrification revitalises working-class neighbourhoods in a way as to put the very cultural distinction across. Restaurants serving exotic foods (see J. May, 1996), premium coffee shops (see M. D. Smith, 1996), art galleries and museums (see Bourdieu, 1987b), all can be conceived of as the spaces designed for those believed to be already vested with cultural capital and sophisticated tastes. Here, what raises the symbolic worth of owning cultural capital is the assumption that cultural capital must be acquired first to partake in those cultural and consumption activities. However, this also leads others to realise that capital is worth appropriating at any cost:

The people who read that there is a very strong correlation between educational level and museum-going have every likelihood of being museum-goers, of being art lovers ready to die for the love of art (Bourdieu, 1993: 23).

As Bourdieu points out, even the mere act of going to a museum for any reason may render one cultivated. So long as such correlations are publicised, the acquisition of cultural capital becomes worth investing in. When cultural capital starts to function as symbolic capital as such, it is worth distinguishing that museum-going ceases to be a concomitant of the possession of cultural capital but turns into a means to acquire cultural capital with minimum effort. This can be extended to the above-mentioned cultural representations or consumption practices, too, which similarly offer economical ways to become a sophisticated self in the shortest time (Zukin, 2008; 2009; Zukin and Smith Maguire, 2004). It does not necessarily have to be a threatening fact that the acquisition of cultural capital is admired by others. On the contrary, its symbolic efficiency depends on this. That being said, arguably the ownership of cultural capital no longer belongs to a few as it did before.

Commodifying the possession, gentrification has made it less difficult to appropriate cultural capital and has increased the number of those who claim to represent the ideal urbanite type. What exemplifies this best is Ley’s argument that gentrifiers do not comprise a single, homogeneous group anymore (1997). To better understand the transformation that struggles for distinction have undergone in

the context of gentrification, it is therefore worth dwelling further on the scholarly distinction Ley (1997) makes between the groups called pioneers and followers. According to him, the pioneers consist of those who are predominantly occupied in artistic fields. These people are believed to be ranking among the first group who have moved into low-income working-class neighbourhoods and initiated gentrification. Ley (1997) nevertheless argues that another group of gentrifiers emerges over the process. The followers refer to those who decide to settle in inner-city areas once the urban life has become authentic enough to experience. Although these latecomers are more affluent than the newcomers, Ley (1997) adds that they do not hold as much cultural capital as the pioneers do.

As has been discussed, the *raison d'être* of gentrification is to convert cultural capital into symbolic capital by developing a vibrant lifestyle together with a new ideal type. The collective arrival of followers therefore shows that the pioneers have reached their goal and succeeded in legitimising the new urban lifestyle. We know that the followers mostly come from the dominant segments of the dominant class, unlike the pioneers included in the dominated faction of the same class. If gentrification had not increased the acquisition of cultural capital and equipped it with symbolic power, the latecomers arguably would not have been willing to move into those residential areas and adopt the pioneers' lifestyle, which targets their own values. As such, there would have been no such group as the followers. This means that the followers are after the profit of distinction that the acquisition of cultural capital is now promising.

Inasmuch as gentrification achieves to base 'the dominant principle of the domination' on the possession of cultural capital, the struggle for cultural distinction undergoes a transformation. Gentrifiers are no longer concerned with criticising traditional middle-class norms to canonise their own lifestyle and extant cultural capital. Thus, the existing struggle is not taking place between the new middle-class gentrifiers and the upper classes anymore. The followers' aspiration to join the group of pioneers and become the ideal type has turned the struggle into an intra-group struggle which now concerns all the gentrifiers. Evidencing the very symbolic function of cultural capital on one hand increases the number of those who claim to have sophisticated tastes and dispositions, but nevertheless threatens the profit of distinction to be appropriated from achieving a cultivated self. Due to their static uses of Bourdieu's concept of 'distinction', many overlook the dynamics that may confront gentrifiers with each other. However, as Bourdieu emphasises:

It is through the competition among the agents with vested interests in the game that the field reproduces endlessly the interest in the game and the faith in the value of the stakes (Bourdieu, 1987b: 203).

I argue that with the settlement of the followers, the struggle for distinction has started to take place amongst the gentrifiers themselves in terms of whose acquisition of cultural capital is more rigorous and authentic. Here it is worth noting that Ley's (1997) distinction between the two separate groups of gentrifiers is actually at a high level of abstraction; arguably, the pioneers and the followers are hardly distinguishable in practice. For the latter aim to embody the ideal type constructed and represented by the former so it is inevitable that the followers start to resemble the pioneers. The above-mentioned cultural representations and consumption practices enable the members of this group not only to maximise their relatively low cultural capital but also to conceal this very lack and act like those whom they admire. As such, it becomes harder to differentiate those who are the true owners of cultural capital from others who cut corners to become culturally distinctive. This is not simply a scholarly challenge, but very practical in that it annoys the pioneers, who think that they are the trend-setters.

Although there are good reasons to believe that the struggle is now taking place between the pioneers and the followers, it is vital to state that this is nevertheless a single-sided struggle with no addressee. It would be naïve to expect the latecomers to admit that they in fact are quite different from the first group of gentrifiers. Arguably, this brings each acquisition of cultural capital into question; as such, the pioneers are left with no choice but to prove the authenticity of their possession in order to demonstrate that they are not trend-followers. That being said, this is not an easy task to accomplish. Otherwise, these groups would be distinguishable in the first place. I therefore claim that, in practice, the gentrifiers attempt to put their cultural capital across by accusing each other of being copycats. Since it is hard to spot the camouflaged followers, this means that even the pioneers might be accused of being wannabees. Consequently, the ambiguity is still valid; and each position is at stake.

Cultural practices and representations of the cultivated self are not stable but always determined by the struggle for distinction, which now requires the gentrifiers to weather the potential accusations of not being that sophisticated. Because there is no such practical means that can a priori differentiate a trend-setter from a trend-follower, new distinction mechanisms need to be set and activated in everyday life (this accounts for why the dispositions and tastes of gentrifiers should not be taken for granted and treated as concomitants of their possession of cultural capital. They are likely to change inasmuch the dynamics of struggle for distinction shift, which is why they need to be investigated empirically). Now these mechanisms may revolve around a set of new, alternative consumption practices. Nevertheless, the extent to which such new practices will enable the newcomers to separate themselves from the latecomers is questionable. There is not any guarantee that those practices will be identical solely to

the pioneers. Thus, it can be argued that practices per se are no longer sufficient enough to offer permanent distinction.

Appropriation of the profit of cultural distinction now depends on how far a gentrifier succeeds in avoiding any practice, behaviour or disposition that might allow other gentrifiers to accuse her of being a copycat. Still, it is not self-explanatory why a particular action should cause disrepute or cast doubt on one's acquisition of cultural capital. When accusing each other, the gentrifiers therefore need to ground their accusations. Here negative categorisations and identifications are of particular importance, allowing the gentrifiers to justify why the practice which has led them to treat its perpetuator as a wannabe should have been avoided in the first place. This arguably explains why Bourdieu (1987a, 11; 1991: 238) emphasises the role of negations in the subjective re-making of reality. In the context of gentrification, it is through such judgements that the gentrifiers attempt to prove the authenticity of their existing cultural capital.

It is a paradox that Bourdieu's concept of 'distinction' is utilised to demonstrate how diversity-tolerant gentrifiers are, whilst the same concept is in fact incompatible with the term of 'tolerance' on account of the reasons outlined above (Bourdieu, 1985: 729). The notion of 'distinction' inclines agents to find certain features, choices and dispositions distasteful. In struggles for distinction it is just the objects of dislike that may change whilst the need for distaste itself remains the same:

Snobbishness or pretension are the dispositions of believers who are forever haunted by the fear of a breach, of an error of judgement and of committing a sin against good taste. (Bourdieu, 1990: 141).

Pure tolerance is an unrealistic expectation because, theoretically speaking, there must always be some group whose lifestyle and values are to be belittled. As Bourdieu frequently stresses, the struggle for distinction is based on negativity; and negations feed the profit of distinction (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013: 299-300). This means that the contextual aspect of the struggle for distinction is limited to whose lifestyle is to be criticised. More to the point, the negation is inherent in the struggle for distinction, which is why whosoever partakes in the quest for distinction is highly likely to be intolerant at some point (see Bourdieu, 1985: 729; 1993: 37, 177). The finest example is the above-mentioned gentrifiers who are conceived as diversity-friendly: they are seemingly diversity-tolerant, yet this is not because they have nothing to do with negations, but because the lifestyle they collectively reject belongs to upper classes.

3.3 Symbolic Domination

Drawing on Bourdieu's other key concept of 'symbolic domination', the chapter now continues by examining why gentrifiers, despite their strong cosmopolitan rhetoric, may become reluctant to interact with subaltern and disadvantaged social groups with whom they share the same urban space. As such, the first section focuses upon the ways in which cultural diversity might be negotiated in gentrifying neighbourhoods, particularly when cultural capital begins to operate as symbolic capital. Discussing the potential impact of gentrifiers' perceptions on local residents, the second section takes Bourdieu's understanding of dominated agents into account. It argues that there is a need for another theoretical framework to provide a better understanding of the social costs of gentrification on the part of long-term occupants.

3.3.1 *Lack of Interaction and Social Mix: Limits of Cosmopolitanism and Being Diversity-friendly*

According to a number of case studies, conducted notably in the United Kingdom, gentrification does not generate either social integration or a social mix, but rather social segregation (e.g., Butler, 2003; Butler and Robson, 2003c; Davidson, 2008; 2010; Jackson and Butler, 2015). Take Islington, a gentrifying area in London, for instance. Butler (2003) argues that there is a common desire amongst the gentrifiers to avoid encounters with those who do not fit the ideal type. This is not the case merely for the new residents of Islington, however, as a similar tendency has also been found in another district of London. Brixton resembles Islington in the sense that the newcomers think that they barely share anything in common with those born in the neighbourhood (Butler and Robson, 2003c). In Manchester, according to Young *et al.*, the reluctance to get in contact with local residents turns into 'a fear' where they observe that the gentrifiers are inclined to find some groups 'undesirable' on account of the distinction made between 'acceptable differences' and 'unacceptable differences' (Young *et al.*, 2006).

These examples apparently contradict cosmopolitanism, which means 'an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other [...] an intellectual and aesthetic stance towards divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity' (Hannerz, 1996: 103).

Inasmuch as gentrification proceeds through different stages and begins to captivate more affluent fractions of the dominant class, there remains no need for gentrifiers to strive to legitimise their authentic lifestyle by targeting the values and norms of upper classes. Growing settlements of the followers into gentrifying areas not only shows that gentrifiers' lifestyles have become legitimate, but also lessens the need

for counter-hegemonic, cosmopolitan norms and values to justify such urban lifestyles. There are good reasons to assume that gentrifiers are therefore no longer concerned with increasing the legitimacy of their lifestyle, but rather with securing their position that is now threatened by those who have come to realise that appropriation of cultural capital offers distinction.

Here I argue that such contextual changes in the struggle for distinction have compelled gentrifiers to become, or pretend to be, more intolerant than before. Gentrifiers have to conform to the changes which now require them to be more intolerant – if they are to put the authenticity of their cultural capital across and appropriate the profit of distinction. In so doing, however, gentrifiers have to conceal their interest and justify the changes in their own attitudes. According to Sayer, ‘the whole purpose of [Bourdieu’s] *Distinction* [1984] is to counter the view that judgements of taste are disinterested and free of the influence of the habitus and the struggles of the social field’ (2002: 15). Bourdieu targets the so-called disinterestedness of dispositions and judgements arguably because he believes that success in the struggle for distinction depends on how well agents conceal their interests in the profit of distinction (1994). According to him, agents cannot admit their pursuit of distinction for it contradicts with agents’ desire to be perceived as superior by nature. Being restricted by their own cosmopolitan norms and values, gentrifiers therefore cannot start to accuse local residents in order to ground their sudden unwillingness to engage with those people. Now, what this brings into question is how to perceive differences and negotiate cultural diversity in that new context.

I argue that in the face of such hardship, gentrifiers resort to symbolic power and pathologise the deprivation of cultural capital. Here the pathologisation serves two purposes. Firstly, it allows gentrifiers to manipulate why they are no longer keen to get in contact with non-gentrifier inhabitants in a way which helps them veil their interest in avoiding doing so. As such, they manage to secure their pursuit of distinction by denying it. Secondly, it enables gentrifiers to imply how vital it is to possess cultural capital for having the desired characteristic features – so that they can keep basing the dominant principle of domination on cultural capital. This amounts to victimising local groups, on account of their lack of cultural capital, in the name of gentrifiers’ quest for distinction. However, the pathologisation is highly likely to go beyond mere victimisation and instead cause local residents to suffer in moral terms, as will be argued shortly.

Classifications and identifications are an essential part of the ways in which gentrifiers attempt to pathologise the deprivation of cultural capital so as to vindicate lack of interaction. As Bourdieu points out, ‘*the perception of others* [...] is in fact organised according to interconnected and partially independent oppositions’ (1991:

92, original emphasis). Given this, it becomes understandable why local residents are perceived by gentrifiers as culturally deprived rather than economically disadvantaged. That being said, to what extent the deprivation of cultural capital constitutes a good reason to shy away from interaction is open to discussion. It is not clear either, why interaction with a culturally subaltern agent should disrupt one's own cultural capital. Objective differences must therefore be turned into recognised distinctions. In other words, the deprivation of cultural capital must be correlated with other identifications, so that it can be operationalised as a negative signifier and used as a self-evident justification for the question as to why those who are uneducated must be eschewed. In order to achieve this, and conceal the real reason behind their reluctance to interact with local inhabitants, gentrifiers need to transform the lack of cultural capital into something that means more than simply being uneducated. As a result of that pathologisation, being uneducated becomes equated by gentrifiers with being philistine, provincial or rough. Those categories are not descriptive but stigmatising; and each has a pejorative meaning. Bourdieu calls this 'the system of *paired adjectives*' which is 'employed by the users of the legitimate language to classify others and to judge their *quality*' (ibid: 92, original emphasis).

3.3.2 Pathologisation of the Deprived: Making Sense of Stigmas Using Bourdieu

There appears a series of conceptual problems in Bourdieu's understanding of symbolic domination when it comes to grasping those who are subjected to stigmatisation, as we have seen in the context of gentrification. According to Bourdieu (1991), symbolic power is a sort of power exercised in recognition of those who are believed to be different in terms of their lifestyle and existing capital. Bourdieu therefore argues that symbolic domination does not take place amongst equals but rather between those who occupy different positions in the social field (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145). Since the asymmetry results from the distribution of capital, Bourdieu (1993: 59) expects the dominant to feel authorised to judge the dominated rather than *vice versa*. As such, Bourdieu (1991: 105-106, 140) claims that it may well be helpful to conceive of the dominant as the executor of symbolic domination, and the dominated as the victim of it, when the relations between those who rank among different classes are taken into consideration.

Arguably, Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic domination is inspired by the way Goffman (1963) discusses mixed contacts. Goffman points out that individuals are aware of whether they are carrying any stigma, or not, on the basis of their physical look. With this type of self-knowledge, according to him, individuals engage in everyday life. In a similar vein, Bourdieu equips agents with practical mastery and sense of self, too (2005: 213). The difference is, Bourdieu does not base

that self-knowledge on physical appearance but rather on a position occupied in the social field (1998: 97-98). Inasmuch as the overall volume and composition of the capital possessed determines which position to occupy, it determines the ways in which agents are to perceive themselves. Here Bourdieu (1990: 61) relies on habitus, arguing that agents are thought to have reached a sense of self through that of place in a once and for all manner (cf., Bottero 2009: 406-409, 417; Bottero and Crossley, 2011: 104) This is how Bourdieu expects different walks of life to come across in daily life:

Every confrontation between agents in fact brings together, in an interaction defined by the objective structure of the relation between the groups they belong to, systems of dispositions such as a linguistic competence and a cultural competence and, through these habitus, all the objective structures of which they are the product, structures which are active only when embodied in a competence acquired in the course of a particular history (Bourdieu, 1977:81).

In other words, *the interaction is the visible and purely phenomenal resultant of the intersection of hierarchized fields* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 257, original emphasis).

According to Bourdieu (1991), symbolic domination is highly invisible because of the fact that those who endure symbolic power cannot perceive it. Here Bourdieu draws heavily upon another key concept in order to ground his argument: 'doxa'. Doxa signifies the correspondence between 'the objective order and subjective principles' (Bourdieu, 1977: 164). As such, Bourdieu uses the term interchangeably with 'uncontested acceptance of the daily lifeworld' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 73). Now, it is worth noting that in Bourdieu's theoretical framework there is an epistemological asymmetry, which reveals itself best in his understanding of doxa. I argue that doxa, as Bourdieu designs, stands merely for those who lack certain types of capital and, thereby, occupy lower positions in the social field. Whereas the dominant can partake in the re-making of social reality, notably by activating various categorisations (which is to exert symbolic power), the dominated are left with no choice but to miss out those subjective interventions (some of which concern themselves). By doxa, Bourdieu compels the deprived to (mis)perceive social reality as entirely objective and, hereby, legitimate. Consequently, the subaltern understanding of self is assumed to remain almost the same throughout the time the symbolic power being exercised.

Even though Bourdieu points out that 'ressentiment is [...] the form par excellence of human misery; it is the worst thing that the dominant impose on the

dominated' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 212), his concept of 'doxa' costs him the notion of suffering. Elsewhere, Bourdieu claims that 'the doxic attitude does not mean happiness; it means bodily submission, unconscious submission, which indicates a lot of internalized tension, a lot of bodily suffering' (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 122). However, he does not explain why the dominated suffer whilst they are always-already inclined to (mis)recognise the negative subjective experiences as well-deserved (Sayer, 2010). As such, there remains no grounds to grasp where subaltern injuries come from. It is therefore essential to stress that the sufferings Bourdieu mentions are not first-person experiences of the deprived; rather, it is Bourdieu himself that suffers on behalf of the dominated, whom he does not allow to suffer. Now, that is quite problematic in epistemological terms. Nevertheless, Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic domination and symbolic power does not solely revolve around epistemology. Although he does not acknowledge it explicitly, there is a more a fundamental reference point: lack of self-esteem.

Bourdieu's argument that symbolic domination cannot be recognised by those being subjected to it is in fact based on ontological claims rather than epistemological ones. Equating deprivation of capital with that of self-respect, Bourdieu (1987a: 16) allows no room for the dominated to have a positive sense of self which is arguably necessary to detect stigmatisations. This means that it is rather Bourdieu himself that makes the mistake of pathologising material deprivations in the first place. As will be discussed in detail, I argue that subaltern agents may have positive ego-ideals despite their lack of either economic capital or cultural capital. In other words, deprivation of a certain type of capital does not necessarily have to eradicate one's affirmative sense of self. According to Bourdieu, however, the dominated cannot develop such relation-to-self at odds with their position in the social field (1985: 736).

Bourdieu states that symbolic domination is 'something you [the dominated] don't feel pressured by' (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 112). This is largely because stigmas, whereby the privileged are believed to partake in the subjective re-making of the reality, do not challenge but correspond to the ways in which the deprived perceive themselves and the social world. As such, it should not be wrong to say that the so-called impalpability of symbolic domination has nothing to do with lack of epistemological incapability, but that of self-esteem. Arguably, neither symbolic domination nor symbolic power is invisible in and of itself; it is rather the deficiency of self-respect that renders each unperceivable. In order for the subaltern to identify stigmatisation as subjective categorisations, they must be able to distinguish between their own personal characteristics and the stigmas imposed upon them. This apparently requires them to have a positive sense of self. This demonstrates that the epistemological problems relevant to Bourdieu's theoretical understanding of symbolic domination arise out of

his ontological assumption that material dispossession and lack of self-esteem are one and the same.

Overall, I argue that due to the problems above it becomes implausible to keep using Bourdieu's theoretical framework when it comes to those who are believed to have endured symbolic domination (see Bottero, 2010). His framework helps us provide a different, much more relational reading of gentrification compared to existing accounts (including many which draw on his work), alerting us to the intra-group rivalries that concern gentrifiers – rivalries, according to which gentrifiers continually re-adjust their practices, manners and discourses. All this allows room for empirical research, making it possible to pose relational research questions. Bourdieu's highly categorical arguments on the dominated, however, limit our understanding of local residents, who are arguably subaltern and, hereby, may have been subjected to symbolic domination by gentrifiers. Bourdieu's approach to those who lack certain types of capital is problematic in that he does not permit the dominated to have a positive relation-to-self.

According to Bourdieu, lack of self-esteem leads subaltern agents to 'silent suffering' which takes the form of self-loathing (1991: 97, 139). The dominated are thought to remain indifferent to any stigma imposed upon them, since Bourdieu perceives them as already paralysed by material deprivations and the feeling of inferiority. To Bourdieu, the dominated cannot break that impasse; he insists that one can hardly speak of 'resistance' when 'stigmatised groups [...] claim the stigma as the basis for their identity' (ibid: 95). In practice, Bourdieu deprives the dominated of feeling resistant to any stigmatisation, leaving them with no choice but to endure symbolic domination and self-pity. The way in which Bourdieu locates the dominated in asymmetric relations is therefore limited; it is barely equipped to provide an explanation when/if the marginal go against symbolic domination. Hence, the following section introduces Honneth's *struggle for recognition*.

3.4 Struggle for Recognition

Making use of Honneth's theoretical framework, this section of the chapter argues that gentrifiers' reluctance to interact with 'the Other' is likely to pressurise local residents and jeopardise their self-esteem and relation-to-self.⁴ It has been discussed

⁴ Here I draw upon Honneth's early work (1995) which, unlike his later works (e.g., Honneth, 2007, 2014), focuses upon interactions rather than institutions. The changes Honneth has made in his research objects are of particular importance, given the underlying theoretical and conceptual reasons. The *raison d'être* of Honneth's *struggle for recognition* is to design a theoretical framework that take social conflicts into account in moral terms. Honneth's emphases on interactions are not arbitrary but part of his analytical effort to thematise social discontent and suffering, the latter of which characterises *The Struggle for Recognition* (Honneth, 1995). As such, synthesising Hegel's intersubjectivism and Mead's social psychology, Honneth provides a comprehensive explanation on the likelihood of interactions causing social sufferings and therefore social conflicts. Although the explanatory power of struggle for recognition

that gentrifiers are supposed to conceal their pursuit of distinction. As such, arguably, they cannot admit the fact that they are shying away from non-gentrifier inhabitants because interaction with them does not promise a profit of distinction. This coincides with the instance where gentrifiers start to exert symbolic power (see Bourdieu, 1977: 190-191). Gentrifiers pathologise local residents' deprivation of cultural capital in a way that veils the real reason behind their eschewals and provides another justification for why they desire to avoid encounters with them:

While the negative judgments may be verbalised, they can also be signalled intentionally or unintentionally through expressions and compartment [...] *It may be prompted by inaction as well as action* (Sayer, 2005: 152-153, emphasis added).

I suggest that lack of interaction leads local residents to speculate on why newcomers might be hesitating to get in touch with them. According to Bourdieu, 'at the risk of feeling themselves *out of place*, individuals who move into a new space must fulfil the conditions that space tacitly requires of its occupants' (Bourdieu, 1999: 128, original emphasis). There are good reasons to believe that in the context of gentrification, interaction with people already living in the local community is one of those tacit requirements. It enables newcomers not only to introduce themselves but also to indicate that they are eager to get to know local residents. Bourdieu argues that such exchanges 'cost nothing to perform and seem such natural things to demand that abstention amounts to a refusal or a challenge' (1977: 95):

stems from Honneth's success in grounding the relationship between suffering and (re)action (Honneth, 2011: 177- 178; 2016a: 128), this seems to have bothered Honneth. This is because, whilst Honneth expects his concept 'struggle for recognition' to serve to discuss the moral order of society in a normative manner, his theoretical framework has been utilised to retrospectively analyse some rebellious groups at odds with his intention (Honneth, 2003: 133-136; 2011: 189). That being said, Honneth (2010: 65, 166) nonetheless admits that due to his own conceptualisation he is left with no choice but conceive those groups as struggling for recognition. The weight Honneth started giving to institutions is part of his aim to reconceptualise the notion of recognition, the latter of which he believes is essential to open the moral order of society up for a normative debate as hoped for (Honneth, 2003: 158; 2007: 328, 335; 2010: 165; 2016a: 109). Honneth, via such a conceptual shift, achieves the task which seems the most urgent to him: to provide a positive definition of recognition and restrict the use of struggle for recognition in making sense of rebellious groups and repressive forms of social movements (Deranthy, 2016: 47; Genel, 2016: 30). However, this arguably costs him the matter of social suffering, where the explanatory capacity of his earlier theoretical framework stems from. Now, there are two reasons for making use of Honneth's earlier works: first, the context of gentrification requires a closer examination of interactions rather than institutions. Secondly, it is more likely to comprehend the meaning of spatial togetherness of diverse groups with an explanatory framework compared to a normative one.

Actors continually evaluate the behaviour of others, including that of class others. Although, for the most part, they may take its causes for granted, they sometimes try to explain it. Such explanations tend to reflect the relative position of the observer (judge) and observed (judged) but they may also be sincere attempts to understand rather than air prejudices. In so doing they run into difficult issues of explanation and justification, and attribution of responsibility, credit and blame, and fine distinctions between judging behaviour, character and identity (Sayer, 2005: 211).

Lack of interaction is arguably what gives the gentrifiers' demeanour away, a demeanour that allows local residents to perceive what newcomers think of them. As such, local people develop knowledge of what they look like in the eyes of those who refuse to interact with them. That type of knowledge gained through a second-person perspective is what Honneth calls *me* (Honneth, 1995: 76). He argues that agents can be well treated only to the extent that they meet 'the social norms [...] and society's expectations' (ibid: 81). Drawing on Honneth's argument, I claim that ill-treatments such as gentrifiers' eschewals lead local residents to infer that they themselves are not up to the mark according to others. As local people attempt to interpret the lack of interaction with newcomers, they come to know how gentrifiers assess them.

Sufferings arguably arise out of the tension between *I* and *me* (Honneth, 1995: 75). Honneth conceives *I* as 'a very primitive sense of the self' formed in the pre-linguistic stage. According to him, this kind of relation-to-self is principally affirmative as it develops before subjects become socialised and start to be assessed by others (Honneth, 1995: 76; 2016b: 176-177). Here it is worth pointing out that Honneth's understanding of *I* precedes Bourdieu's habitus, which refers to 'socialised subjectivity' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 126). The difference as such constitutes the main reason Bourdieu and Honneth reach different conclusions. Since Bourdieu starts the development of relation-to-self with habitus (cf., Bottero, 2009: 406; 2010: 10; Crossley:

2002: 189; Sayer, 2005: 22; 2009: 2), he does not expect the deprived to embody a positive sense of self (Bourdieu, 1977: 77-78, 164). For Honneth, however, the constitution of *I* takes place prior to any socialisation; as such, a sense of self precedes sense of place in the social field. He therefore defends the view that subjects can have an affirmative relation-to-self despite their deprivation and lower-class position (Honneth, 1995: 131-136; 2011: 177-178).

As was claimed earlier, affirmative relation-to-self is essential for one to distinguish whether one has been subjected to an ill-treatment or not. If local residents are allowed to have a positive relation-to-self based on Honneth's theoretical framework,

it becomes clearer as to how a lack of interaction can cause a tension between *I* and *me*. It has been discussed that lack of interaction propels those avoided to form an image of themselves through the gaze of gentrifiers. As such, local people begin to make sense of the ways they are perceived and identified by newcomers. Since their existing affirmative relation-to-self inclines them to think that they do not deserve to be ignored or eschewed, they take lack of interaction as an insult. Nevertheless, although local residents do not approve of gentrifiers' perceptions of them, the pejorative image they are compelled to form of themselves in the wake of a lack of interaction arguably casts doubt on their affirmative *I* perspective. As Sayer (2002: 14) puts it, 'the disadvantaged, in effect, become dependent on the judgments of those against whom they are struggling' (Sayer, 2002: 14).

This is key to making sense of hidden subaltern injuries in the context of gentrification. As Sayer points out, 'the need for recognition is [...] noticed more in its absence than its presence' (2005: 55). Lack of interaction accordingly makes local residents feel pressured into striving for recognition; as such, they paradoxically demand recognition from gentrifiers who are thought to wrongly perceive them. Even though local people accuse newcomers of unjustifiably shying away from them, they are left with no choice but to hope that gentrifiers interact with them so as to confirm that their positive ego-ideal is not delusionary but true. Arguably, however, gentrifiers cannot fulfil such expectations and admit that one need not possess a high amount of cultural capital to become someone worth communicating with. That would undermine 'the dominant principle of domination' on which gentrifiers have endeavoured to base their acquisition of cultural capital, as illustrated previously in this chapter. Thus, it does not seem plausible that locals' expectation lead newcomers to re-consider their attitudes and become eager to interact with local inhabitants. Having said that, I argue that gentrifiers' ongoing reluctance to encounter locals causes dramatic changes. So long as a lack of interaction continues to remain, local residents begin to perceive newcomers' demeanour as a rejection of their own demand for recognition. As such, a lack of interaction starts to jeopardise locals' self-affirmative moral worth more vehemently than ever, making them doubt for the first time whether they have positive traits at all.

Honneth argues that in those cases where a positive *I* perspective is threatened by *me* (*i.e.*, the way in which others perceive and treat the subject), agents tend to preserve their ego-ideal at any cost (1995: 81-82). Indicating what gentrifiers think of them, a lack of interaction leads local residents to form a stigmatised image of themselves. Knowledge of the self that is obtained through the eyes of newcomers reminds local residents of their own deprivation of cultural capital, propelling them to realise that their demand for recognition is continually refused. Once they have comprehended

that the dominant principle of domination revolves around the acquisition of cultural capital in remarkably high amounts, they come to the conclusion that they cannot meet those norms due to their deprivation. As such, non-gentrifier inhabitants become convinced that they will not be treated as asked, but rather stigmatised, so long as those norms and values prevail.

That creates a situation in which there are only two ‘choices’ for those who have been subjected to symbolic domination and stigmatisation: either to accept the norms and values legitimised by gentrifiers, or to reject them. They arguably cannot concede those norms, as the acknowledgement itself amounts to admitting the very symbolic power of cultural capital. Given their extremely thin but nonetheless self-affirmative ego, the deprived can hardly find it legitimate that self-esteem and moral worth depend on cultural capital acquired. Otherwise, they are left with no choice but to start regarding the deprivation as pathological – just as gentrifiers are inclined to. However, that would inevitably cost them their positive relation-to-self. As such, drawing on Honneth’s theoretical framework, I assert that the deprived are compelled to refuse the dominant norms and values, as refusal turns out to be the only way for local residents to secure their moral worth (see Honneth, 1995: 137-138).

According to Honneth, ‘it is only by regaining the possibility of active conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of humiliation’ (1995: 138). This means that denial *per se* is not sufficient but must be followed by actions, to regain the affirmative sense of self which has been jeopardised. Here Honneth is inspired by Hegel, who first introduced the term *struggle for recognition*, as he conceives of actions as an essential part of the struggle just as Hegel did. He states that one cannot speak of struggle for recognition without ‘the injured person’s resistance’ (ibid: 22). It is therefore vital to expand on how the injured resist symbolic domination. This is key to grasping the form that subalterns’ rejection of the dominant values takes in the context of gentrification.

What Honneth means by ‘actions’ is in fact reactions to the norms and values which have led the deprived to doubt whether they deserve recognition at all. As such, he calls them ‘destructive reactions’ and argues that:

the reason why the socially ignored individuals attempt, in response, to damage the others’ possessions is not because they want to satisfy their passions, but rather in order to make the others take notice of them (Honneth, 1995: 44).

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such destructive reactions do not target a random group of others but are directed to those who are thought to be representatives of the

dominant norms and values. This is arguably because what the injured aim for is not simply to win the attention of others but to show that they are not ashamed of violating the prevalent rules and etiquettes to which others strive to conform. By resorting to destructive reactions, they arguably attempt to defy the shame of lacking cultural capital imposed upon themselves, and strike back against those who are assumed to refuse their demand for recognition.

It is a paradox that subaltern agents need to challenge and go against the prevailing cosmopolitan norms if they are to fortify their self-affirmative perspective. That is paradoxical because, by so doing, they ‘unintentionally feed the vicious circle that marginalizes them. Feeling excluded, they are led to adopt behavior that excludes them even more, simultaneously discouraging the rare gestures of good will made toward them’ (Champagne, 1999: 58). Although the deprived become defiant and start to resist against the dominant values that are used to justify how pathological it is to lack cultural capital, it is not a choice in the usual sense of the term. In fact: ‘such mixtures of shame and defensiveness and defiant pride are typical of situations in which people have to seek self-respect in circumstances that are not of their choosing’ (Sayer, 2005: 160). In a similar vein, Goffman points out that ‘lacking the salutary feed-back of daily social intercourse with others, the [isolated] can become suspicious, depressed, hostile, anxious, and bewildered’ (1963: 13).

Honneth’s struggle for recognition, based on Hegel’s early intersubjectivism and Mead’s (1934) socio-psychological distinction between *I* and *me*, demonstrates that deprived agents may well adopt the stigmas imposed upon them; however, it argues that they do so because they are compelled to reject the dominant norms and values, if they are to sustain their affirmative sense of self. This narrative contrasts with Bourdieu’s theoretical framework in that Bourdieu claims that the deprived cannot form a positive image of themselves since they are born into a position which is always- already stigmatised. By claiming so, however, Bourdieu allows no room for subaltern subjects to demand recognition (cf., Wacquant, 2004: 11). According to Bourdieu, there cannot be such a demand because the deprived are not in need of any form of recognition due to their feeling of inferiority (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 23-24). As such, the main conclusion Bourdieu comes to is that the dominated cannot resist symbolic domination (1991: 95).

Drawing on the aforementioned distinction between *I* and *me*, however, Honneth discusses that identity and performance need to be distinguished in a retrospective way (1995). That is to say, adoption of stigmas does not necessarily indicate the fact that the deprived have no positive relation-to- self but always-already feel inferior. If deprivation *per se* had as much impact on eradicating a positive sense of self in the first place, as Bourdieu formulates, there would be no such normative demands for mutual

recognition. However, what those people demand from others is to avoid extending their deprivation to pejorative identifications and treat them as hoped for. This makes it clear that the deprived can have an affirmative ego-ideal, and therefore may suffer from the ways in which they are perceived and treated by others. As Sayer states, 'resentment about this stigmatisation is often stronger than resentment about lack of material wealth' (2002: 7; see Reay, 2005; Sayer, 2005).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the politics of gentrification may well be conflictual in social terms because gentrification - whilst stemming from gentrifiers' purpose to convert their cultural into symbolic capital so they can determine 'the dominant principle of domination' - leads local residents to reject, target and violate the dominant norms and values legitimised by gentrifiers. Having placed gentrifiers and local inhabitants into wider class relations, the chapter has thematised the spatial co-existence of diverse groups through two distinctive class struggles. However, the politics of gentrification is conflictual not because there are simply two separate class struggles (for distinction or recognition), but because the struggle for distinction *generates* the struggle for recognition. Whilst gentrifiers refuse traditional middle-class norms to form and legitimise a lifestyle which makes them distinctive on account of their possession of cultural capital, local residents may reject, target and violate gentrifiers' values to defy the shame of lacking cultural capital. As such, Honneth's struggle for recognition can be conceived as a resistance to struggles for distinction and symbolic domination in the context of gentrification. The theoretical articulation between Bourdieu's struggle for distinction and Honneth's struggle for recognition through symbolic domination adds to our understanding of gentrifying areas which seemingly have witnessed social conflicts between local residents and gentrifiers. It also provides the theoretical framework for the empirical exploration presented in this thesis of the underlying relations behind such conflictual states in the case of Tophane, Turkey. It is to the methodology employed to investigate the everyday class struggles in the gentrifying area of Tophane that I now turn.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This research draws its data from an ethnographic study of a neighbourhood district of Istanbul: Tophane. The ethnography employed a combination of participant observation and semi-structured interviews in order to explore the everyday social conflicts present in a neighbourhood undergoing gentrification. Research on gentrification has a well-established history of sampling cases, contexts or physical areas for the purposes of investigation (e.g., Butler, 2003; Butler and Robson, 2001; Hamnett, 2003; Jackson and Butler, 2015; Young *et al.*, 2006). Tophane offered itself as a particularly interesting and appropriate setting for a study of gentrification and social conflicts in Turkey because of the well-publicised Tophane incidents, which I have previously discussed. As I have argued, existing analysis of these incidents rests upon the secular-Islamist cleavage as the origin of social conflict in the gentrifying neighbourhood between local residents and newcomers. However, through ethnographic investigation, this research aimed to complicate those accounts by engaging in a detailed study of the complex everyday lives, interactions, and struggles of Tophane's residents. Alongside Tophane, it also became necessary during fieldwork to include Cihangir and Karaköy, two gentrified neighbourhoods surrounding Tophane. This is because my newcomer participants were inclined to spend their free time and socialise in these areas rather than the neighbourhood where they were either residing or working.

The nature of social conflicts could only be illuminated through ethnographic immersion in the research setting, which saw me spend four months living in Tophane. During this time, I conducted twenty-three semi-structured interviews with twenty-five residents of Tophane. The nature and purpose of the interviews is elaborated in section 3 of this chapter. Alongside the interviews, I conducted participant observations in the neighbourhood and its public and semi-public spaces, which I recorded in a field diary (spaces such as cafes, restaurants, tea houses, club houses, and art galleries). I account in detail for the purpose and nature of these participant observations in section 4 of this chapter.

The chapter makes it clear that this methodological approach was informed by my theoretical framework, where interviews alone would not have been able to get at the embodied nature of habitus, or the everyday nature of social conflicts which revealed themselves in the encounters and interactions between residents, and in the spaces they inhabited. In a manner similar to Scheper-Hughes (2004), I therefore decided to ‘follow the bodies’. I looked for signifiers including dress, gestures, use of symbolic spaces, and consumption practices. These embodied routines of habitus could not be accessed through participants narrating them in interviews. Interviews with residents were crucial however in providing residents’ own narratives, voices and interpretations of the interactions and struggles that were observed, and gave access to the categories of classification employed, revealing social and moral judgements of others (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013: 296). The chapter thus discusses the nature of the data sought from observations and interviews and the reasons for bringing them together. In this respect, it should be noted that the observational data and interview data are used in dialogue throughout the empirical chapters that follow, sometimes converging and sometimes contradicting, to produce rich accounts of everyday life and social conflict in the neighbourhood.

Before detailing the interview strategy and participant observation, the chapter starts with an account of how research participants were sampled (section 1), and provides a breakdown of the interview sample (section 2). Then, after enlarging upon the interview strategy (section 3) and participant observation (section 4), the chapter discusses how trust was established with the local community and newcomers (section 5), and describes ethical challenges encountered during the research (section 6).

4.2 Sampling of Research Participants

Due to the theoretically informed nature of the research, I employed purposive sampling. This technique samples participants, as well as settings, strategically, and with reference to a given criteria so as to enable the research questions to be addressed (Bryman, 2012: 418; O’Reilly, 2008: 195; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). By signposting the units of analysis, the research objectives signposted the criteria according to which participants were to be chosen (Flick, 2009: 122). As stated in Chapter One, the research aimed to provide a better understanding of the ongoing social conflict in Tophane, compared to extant accounts shaped around Turkey’s secular-Islamic cleavage. Based on the research objective, which was to explore the (complex) context in which the Tophane incidents occurred, the aim was not to take snapshots of the attacks, but to critically explore the everyday life of Tophane and focus upon the daily experiences and struggles of Tophane’s residents. As such, through purposive sampling, I selected

research participants from two categories: local residents of Tophane and newcomers to the area, as they are main groups that appear to be in everyday contention with one another and represent different class positions, identities and lifestyles in the neighbourhood according to politics, religion and outlook. By local residents I refer to those who were born and are still residing in Tophane, whereas by newcomers I refer to those who have moved to the neighbourhood over the past decade – be their moving residential or commercial. At times in the thesis I also use the term ‘gentrifiers’ to refer to newcomers.

As the aim was to collect data primarily on residential, economic and social life in line with the research questions, participants were to be involved in at least one of those realms of the neighbourhood life of Tophane. According to these criteria, I selected 9 local residents and 16 newcomers for semi-structured interviews. Their participation in the Tophane neighbourhood ranged from café, restaurant and art gallery owners, to people who were the users of those spaces. A breakdown of the interview sample is shown in the next section.

During fieldwork, however, I also utilised snowball sampling. It is quite common for purposive sampling to be complemented by other sampling approaches such as snowball sampling (e.g., Marzano and Scott, 2009; Vasquez and Wetzel, 2009). This technique is characterised by beginning with a group of people, mostly identified as gatekeepers, and continuing with other participants, proposed by those key informants, who may also be willing to take part in the research.

The snowball approach and the use of gatekeepers was particularly helpful during my time living in Tophane, since (despite being born and raised in Istanbul) I had no prior acquaintanceship either with local residents or with newcomers. To a great extent, access depends on whether the research setting is public or closed (O’Reilly, 2005: 86). On one hand, Tophane was a public research setting as it was first and foremost a (gentrifying) neighbourhood, where I was also residing as part of my fieldwork. On the other hand, however, it was partially closed as a research setting due to its hard-to-reach local community. Noy (2008) argues that snowball sampling can be a useful strategy to be employed in such cases where access is restricted by external factors. In a similar vein, the sampling aided me to reach other local participants, especially those of whom I would not have been able to get in contact without my gatekeeper – I discuss and elaborate on the reasons for this claim below. Here, it should be noted that although local ties and strong acquaintanceships can arguably be regarded as the major handicaps to conducting research in semi-closed communities as the one in Tophane, making access hard for researchers, they can nonetheless be very useful once rapport has been established with key informants. This was the case in Tophane: local residents

had long known each other, and I asked my gatekeeper to help me identify those who could potentially take part in the research by fulfilling the criteria for selection.

I also utilised snowball sampling in tandem with purposive sampling when it came to recruiting newcomers. Newcomers were of particular significance, as their experiences and views added to the contextual understanding of Tophane as a gentrifying area. Although it has been argued that it is difficult to gain rapport in such public settings as cafés and restaurants (e.g., O'Reilly, 2008: 175), there are some good examples of how efficient 'hanging around' or spending considerable time in cafés on a daily basis can be a useful access strategy (e.g., Leidner, 1993; Wolf, 1991). I therefore began with people in coffee shops located in Tophane, based on the assumption that such symbolic consumption spaces could be fortuitous places to reach newcomers. Rather than asking consumers for interviews on the spot, the objective was to join them in the spaces and establish rapport. That being said, I did not have complete success with this approach. This was not because those to whom I introduced myself were reluctant, but they were neither living nor working in Tophane. As such, they were not familiar enough with the neighbourhood to take part in the research and did not meet the sampling criteria. I returned to my initial contacts, notably gallery owners, in order to learn whether they already knew people amongst their visitors or acquaintances, who were residing in Tophane. Consequently, I made use of these contacts to snowball my sample out to other newcomers who were present in the neighbourhood for residential purposes rather than commercial reasons.

3.3 The Interviewees

In total, I conducted 23 formal semi-structured interviews: 9 with local residents, and 14 with newcomers – two of the interviews with newcomers were conducted with more than one participant yet listed individually, as can be seen below in Table 1 which shows 25 interviewees in the sample.

The majority of my sample of newcomer participants involves those who are affiliated with art and cultural industries. Art galleries were chosen on purpose, not simply because they have been targeted by local inhabitants, but they were arguably key to understanding the gentrification process that Tophane has been undergoing. Whilst all newcomer interviewees are at least university graduates, no local respondents have a university degree. And, this reflects the educational status of those demographics more widely. Furthermore, most of the local residents did not complete high school. That being said, all local participants are home-owners (Chapter Five examines how these people have become property-owners despite their class background). Although they were all born and raised in Tophane, they are originally either from Bitlis or Siirt – Southeastern provinces of Turkey. Except the retired and unemployed, they all work in

the neighbourhood. Amongst the newcomer participants, there are no property-owners (of flats or a stores); they are all tenants. The group of newcomer interviewees were comprised of eight woman and eight men. On local respondents, however, the sample was comprised of men only. My endeavour to reach female participants amongst long-standing inhabitants remained unsuccessful, since they were usually absent from the neighbourhood life in a ‘public’ sense.

	Pseudonym	Affiliation	Occupation	Gender	Age	Interview Date
Interviewee 1	Sabri	Local Resident	Self-Employed	Male	32	16 July 2017
Interviewee 2	Ayhan	Local Resident	Self-Employed	Male	56	16 July 2017
Interviewee 3	Erdem	Newcomer	Owner of Gallery 1	Male	32	17 July 2017
Interviewee 4	Fatih	Local Resident	Self-Employed	Male	41	17 July 2017
Interviewee 5	İlhan	Newcomer	Owner of Gallery 2	Male	59	20 July 2017
Interviewee 6	Selma	Newcomer	Teacher	Female	36	21 July 2017
Interviewee 7	Ege	Newcomer	Restaurateur	Male	26	23 July 2017
Interviewee 8	Murat	Local Resident	Self-Employed	Male	36	27 July 2017
Interviewee 9	Sinan	Newcomer	Owner of Café 1	Male	44	28 July 2017
Interviewee 10	Yavuz	Local Resident	Retired	Male	66	29 July 2017
Interviewee 11	Zeynep	Newcomer	Actress	Female	41	31 July 2017
Interviewee 12	Kenan	Newcomer	Bibliopole	Male	32	1 August 2017
Interviewee 13	Gözde	Newcomer	Scriptwriter	Female	33	11 August 2017
Interviewee 14	Ali	Local Resident	Unemployed	Male	23	12 August 2017
Interviewee 15	Leyla	Newcomer	Owner of Gallery 3	Female	42	17 August 2017
Interviewee 16	Ahmet	Local Resident	Waiter	Male	27	18 August 2017
Interviewee 17	Bariş	Newcomer	Owner of Gallery 4	Male	31	28 August 2017
Interviewee 18	Feyyaz	Local Resident	Labourer	Male	34	29 August 2017
Interviewee 19	İhsan	Local Resident	Self-Employed	Male	44	2 September 2017
Interviewee 20	Pınar	Newcomer	Performing Artist 1	Female	33	6 September 2017
Interviewee 21	Cihan	Newcomer	Performing Artist 2	Male	37	6 September 2017
Interviewee 22	Seda	Newcomer	Artisan	Female	30	7 September 2017
Interviewee 23	Buket	Newcomer	Owner of Gallery 5	Female	40	8 September 2017
Interviewee 24	Melis	Newcomer	Co-owner of Café 2	Female	32	9 September 2017
Interviewee 25	Erhan	Newcomer	Co-owner of Café 2	Male	38	9 September 2017

Table 1 : List of interviewees

Although I had met all my informants several times before the interviews, where I had further clarified the aim and scope of the study, each respondent was provided with a participant informant sheet covering a number of key details such as why they

were being asked to take part, according to which criteria they were chosen, how their anonymity and confidentiality will be secured, and how the information gathered will be used. Informed about the possibility of withdrawing consent at any time, the informants were also told about how to get help or advice following the interview. It was already stated explicitly in the participant informant sheet; nevertheless, I felt it necessary to remind each participant that the research, in spite of its aim of making sense of the social conflict in Tophane, did not focus upon the physical attacks in a straightforward fashion but rather wanted to learn about their own daily experiences and social encounters with others in the area.⁵ The respondents were asked if they consented to be interviewed. Some of them showed reluctance to sign a consent form, either perceiving it as a risk, or viewing that there was no need for such a formality. As such, in these cases, they were asked to provide their oral consent via audio-recording at the beginning of the interview. They were also asked to confirm it at the very end, whilst the interview was still being recorded. Additionally, the participants were also asked for their consent to the use of a small digital voice recorder. Nearly all of them, except one, gave their consent to be recorded whilst being interviewed.

The participants were allowed to choose the place where the interviews would be held, as well as time and date. This nevertheless caused some minor problems from time to time, since a couple of interviews had to be re-scheduled at some of my informants' requests. Most of the interviews were held in public spaces such as cafés and restaurants, located in Tophane.⁶ However, the interviews with those who were self-employed and running their own businesses were predominantly conducted in quasi-private settings. All my gallery-owner respondents, for instance, preferred to be interviewed in their own gallery. Each setting, be it public or private, had its own pros and cons in terms of the interview process and quality: it was occasionally difficult to

⁵ As Bourdieu argues, it is quite essential for interviewers to avoid imposing their own problematisation upon interviewees. According to him, posing questions that informants would never ask themselves inevitably results in turning participants into a social scientist, compelling them to interpret the phenomenon under investigation for, and on behalf of, the researcher. 'A response worth of the name', he expresses, can be received by the interviewer 'if [interviewees] *appropriate the inquiry for themselves and become its subject*' (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu, 1999: 609, emphasis added). The reminder above was therefore of particular importance to prevent the risk of facing any pre-adopted rhetoric that might have derived from either a secular or an Islamic subject-position. The emphasis the research put on everyday life rather than the incidents was appreciated by both sides – *i.e.*, newcomers and local residents – and was sometimes regarded as the main reason they agreed to take part in the study. This was because, I was very often told, they were tired of the journalistic approach wondering about nothing but their views on the assaults – I return and dwell more on this topic in the section taking ethical considerations into account.

⁶ Although the informants were already given information that their participation would be voluntary, and they would not be given any premium or incentive for taking part in the research, I nonetheless offered some refreshments during the interviews being held in these public settings. Despite my will and attempt, however, I was not allowed to make a payment in some cases, in particular when conducting interviews with the local participants – I discuss this in more detail when mentioning reflexivity and gaining access as well as trust.

have a cut-free conversation with the interviewees in public settings, for example, due to a variety of distractions such as street noise, conversations being held by others, and being interrupted by the wait staff. Crucially, these distracting factors were at a minimum during the interviews taking place in private spaces. That is not to say, however, that private places had no drawbacks. The interviews held in public settings were usually followed by a more participant-led, informal conversation covering a wide range of topics. Some of these conversations lasted more than two hours, ending up with extensive notes being taken. Yet, I could not get the chance to have a similar conversation with those who I interviewed in private places, except on a few occasions, which only lasted between 15 minutes and 30 minutes.

The interviews took place between 16 July 2017 and 8 September 2017. Bryman recommends that qualitative researchers should spend some considerable time in the setting where their participants reside or work, so that they can be familiar with, and thus better grasp, the context of what has been said in the interviews (2012: 473). In a similar vein, I did not start conducting interviews immediately after having moved into Tophane. Instead, I spent approximately a month walking around the streets in order to familiarise myself with the neighbourhood and its surroundings, engaging in the neighbourhood life, taking part in some key events, and trying to establish rapport and gain access – these will be narrated below in the following sections. The duration of the interviews conducted with newcomers ranged from 53 minutes to 86 minutes whereas those with local residents ranged from 57 minutes to 112 minutes. All interviews, held in Turkish, were conducted and transcribed by myself, the latter of which was undertaken after completing the fieldwork. The overall amount of the finished transcripts was around 110,000 words. All the quotes from the audio-recorded interviews, along with the notes I took which are cited in the following three chapters, were translated by myself from Turkish into English.

4.4 The Interview Strategy

As explained in Chapter One, symbolic domination is the overarching concept of this study, which requires an analysis of how the main groups in Tophane see each other and which categories they specifically use when describing each other. As it is not feasible by means of participant observation to gather these data, which are necessary to understand the tensions in Tophane, the interviews are critically important, particularly to understand the implications of symbolic domination in the area (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 107). The study has a theoretically precise focus, and therefore the interviews had to be designed beforehand (Kvale, 1996: 96). Semi-structured interviews is the optimal interview method for the aforesaid research objectives because the questions formulated in advance should be asked to all of the interviewees. However,

as Bryman (2012: 487) notes, semi-structured interviews carry a methodological risk: these interviews, if not carefully managed, could turn into structured interviews with open-ended questions, which means that open-ended questions that are formulated beforehand do not suffice to make an interview semi-structured. Bryman notes that, to conduct a semi-structured interview that is worthy of the name, the interviewer should also be flexible (ibid: 487). On the basis of this justification, the interview topic guides that have been prepared for each group are categorised into four sub-titles, and one or two main questions are developed for each sub-title to allow room for interviewees to lead. The three empirical chapters that follow demonstrate the diversity of interview data thus gathered. This section focuses on the questions specifically developed for each group, how these questions were designed and how they were asked to the interviewees.

4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews with Newcomers

The newcomer participants were asked three different but intertwined sets of questions, based on the research agenda. The first part was designed to grasp details about the gentrification process prevailing in Tophane. Although the questions posed in this part were predominantly open-ended and designed based on the review of literatures on gentrification, they were articulated in lay terms in line with Bryman's advice (2012: 473). I avoided referring to the term 'gentrification', due to its negative connotations, and also avoided asking indirect questions that might have led the interviewees either to interpret the phenomenon or highlight others' experiences. The interviews began with introductory questions about how long the participant had been in the neighbourhood, and where he or she was living before. These were followed by more specific questions that asked the interviewees to elaborate and justify their reasons for moving to Tophane. The respondents were also asked to describe what Tophane means to them, as well as the pros and cons of living/working in the neighbourhood. More direct questions, such as whether they had a sense of residential belonging, and if they had ever considered moving to other surrounding neighbourhoods like Cihangir or Galata, were also asked in order to invite the interviewees to specify what distinguishes Tophane from the areas that have already been gentrified.

I asked these questions for several reasons: first, to learn more about the reasons behind the rent gap in Tophane (in other words, why the neighbourhood, despite undergoing the gentrification process nearly for a decade, has not been fully gentrified but remained as a gentrifying area unlike its counterparts such as Cihangir and Galata). Employing interviews in a Bourdieusian way necessitated more than interpreting the interviewees' point of view: the interviewer, according to Pouliot, must also 'locate (...) the position from which interviewees express their views' (2013: 52). As

such, I secondly aimed to obtain knowledge about the newcomers' overall volume and combination of existing capital in Bourdieu's sense, because that could not be acquired merely through their profession (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 244). And, finally, I wanted to examine whether politico-cultural or economic reasons had led the newcomers to move to Tophane. This was of particular importance not only to map the newcomers' position in the social field, which was a prerequisite for understanding Tophane as a social space, but also for investigating how far gentrification could be conceived as an emancipatory phenomenon, claimed by many of those who have employed Bourdieu's theoretical framework. As mentioned in Chapter Two, a number of advocates of gentrification have asserted that the phenomenon results from gentrifiers' high level of cultural capital and cosmopolitan habitus which leads them to reject the traditional middle-class norms and values and tend towards living in such culturally diverse areas as inner-city working-class neighbourhoods. The interviews, with these aims in mind, were neither 'explorative' or 'hypothesis-testing' (cf., Kvale, 1996: 97), but served both empirical and theoretical purposes.

The second part of the interview was based on the notion of social difference and its construction, and the interviewees were asked just one key question, that is, who they think comprised the local community of Tophane, and encouraged to share their perception of local residents on account of either living or working in the neighbourhood. This was particularly significant, as an aim of the research was to empirically examine whether diverse groups sharing the same physical space judge each other morally due to social differences, and, if so, in what ways. This could be captured and understood best through the categories of classification called upon to identify others, as they articulate social and moral judgements (Bourdieu, 1991: 92, 238). This also helped me further comprehend the newcomers' social position, in parallel with the first set of questions, for 'operations of classification refer themselves not only to the clues of collective judgment but also the positions in distributions that this collective judgment already recounts' (Bourdieu, 2013: 296). As Kvale points out, 'interviewing is a craft' (1996: 105), and it is a must for the interviewer to be non-judgemental (Bryman, 2012: 473). I therefore refrained from displaying any agreement or disagreement with the participants. What I did instead was repeat the identifications and adjectives used by the interviewees as defining characteristics of local residents, in order to encourage them to justify their evaluations.

The third part of the interview related to the social interactions between newcomers and long-standing inhabitants, where the participants were asked to describe and provide details about their encounters with locals in daily life (if they do, and the dialogue exchanged if included). This part was of particular importance, not simply because the major focus of this study was on everyday life, which has been frequently emphasised,

but everyday life is the main realm of symbolic struggles which result in transforming ‘objective differences’ into ‘recognised distinctions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013: 296-297). In Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, social groups or classes are not given entities but exist twice: objectively and subjectively (Bourdieu, 1987a: 2). And it is for this reason that Bourdieu puts a greater emphasis on symbolic power (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 14): ‘capable of producing real affects’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 170), it is key to grasping the very making of groups (Wacquant, 2013: 276, 281). It was therefore pivotal to learn more about the social encounters in Tophane, as ‘linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power through which relations of force (...) are actualised in a transfigured form’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 142). And, this could be learned primarily through the interviewees’ own experiences and linguistic expressions rather than participant observations.

Although Bourdieu’s theory of class is agonistic (Wacquant, 2013: 275), and therefore guided me to a great extent to explore the underlying reasons beneath the social conflict, social studies (notably focusing upon the concrete, critical, and conflictual facts, as this research does), should nonetheless undertake to explore a ground on which a dialogue can be initiated to end the tension (Neuman and Robson, 2007: 60). This arguably becomes more vital in the context of gentrification, given that gentrifying neighbourhoods in general host those coming from different social backgrounds. Besides, it is worth noting that such an attempt does not contradict but can (and does) serve explanatory purposes as well. Therefore, without referring to the Tophane incidents, I asked the interviewees to reflect on ways in which dialogue between the main groups can be established (or improved) in Tophane, followed by interpretive questions, which provided rich yet sometimes contrasting insights (these are discussed in Chapter Seven).

4.4.2 Semi-Structured Interviews with Local Residents

The local interviewees were posed almost the same questions, with the exception that the first part, consisting of questions on gentrification and Tophane, was prepared in a different way with regard to the review of literatures on physical and social displacement. As such, what was expected from this part was to learn whether locals have been verging on the threat of spatial dis/re-location due to the gentrification process, and whether retail gentrification has caused any sense of loss of place, *i.e.*, social displacement, on their part. Despite the formulation and underlying intention, these questions were not posed as such but in simpler ways. The participants were asked questions about the neighbourhood life of Tophane and relations with their long-term neighbours. As discussed in Chapter Two, place-attachment is a common characteristic of working-class neighbourhoods. The local interviewees were thus invited to evaluate

in what ways Tophane differs from other neighbourhoods. That being said, residential belonging can also be utilised as a means to infer the distribution of capital and existing resources in Bourdieu's sense, because it may well be related to making virtue out of necessity (Bourdieu, 1999: 125-128). In this regard, the participants were asked to justify their reasons as to whether they have ever considered moving out of Tophane, or not.

Though the second part of the interview was based on the notion of difference and perception of others in a similar vein, and the interviewees were asked to identify those who have moved in the neighbourhood over the past decade, the analytical strategy was different compared to that underlying the interviews with newcomers. It may thus be useful to further clarify what was aimed at here. As Bourdieu argues, each social space has (or creates) its own dominant and dominated poles. One, be that either as an individual or as part of a collective, therefore cannot occupy two different positions at the same time; and our position is determined by the distribution of capital (Bourdieu, 1993: 59; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 106). Having asked the question above, I therefore did not expect to equally learn in what ways the local participants categorise newcomers and judge their quality. This was because '*authority comes to language from outside*' – i.e., from the position occupied in the social field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 146, original emphasis; see also Bourdieu, 1991: 106). The interviews were of particular significance in this regard, too, as the main groups of Tophane could not be socially located through participant observations. Having treated the interviews themselves as 'performances (...) meant to do something in and on the world' (Pouliot, 2013: 49), in this section of the interview, I aimed to comprehend whether the locals, despite their deprivation, have a positive relation-to-self in a Honnethian sense (Honneth, 1995), or rather take the social world for granted, due to the same deprivation, as Bourdieu (1987a: 16) expects the dominated to do in a 'doxic' manner.

The third part of the interview was similarly based on the social interactions, where the respondents were asked to detail in what ways they encounter newcomers in everyday life, yet from a different theoretical presupposition. Although each linguistic exchange is likely to exert a sort of symbolic power, according to Bourdieu, this is more likely to happen in encounters where agents occupy asymmetrical positions on account of the difference in their overall volume and combination of extant capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 146). In this respect, what was expected from this part of the interview was to make sense of whether these interactions cause any moral sufferings by jeopardising the interviewees' sense of self, regarding to the theoretical framework of Honneth and his understanding of interaction, or intensify the 'misrecognition' in Bourdieu's sense. From a Hegelian point of view, as discussed in Chapter Three,

Honneth argues that there is a very thin line between suffering and acts of violence, and that what mediates between these two is the notion of ‘disrespect’ (1995: 22, 131, 135-136). As such, without asking in a straightforward manner, I aimed to learn if the participants find anything inappropriate in their encounters with newcomers, so as to grasp where the social conflict might have stemmed from – considering that ‘in so far as reasons and beliefs can be causes of social events, the evaluation of interpretive understanding is not so different from that of causal explanations as is often supposed’ (Sayer, 1992: 223).

The local participants, just as the newcomers, were ultimately asked questions about how Tophane can become an area where diverse groups start living together in peace. This may sound paradoxical, given that the social conflict in Tophane at first sight seems to have arisen out of the locals’ hostile attitudes towards newcomers, which have thus far manifested themselves in the physical attacks. That being said, having relied on Goffman’s argument that ‘tolerance [...] is usually part of a bargain’ (1963: 121), I invited the interviewees to reflect on the manner in which they would expect newcomers to act, whereby I aimed to distinguish whether the ongoing tension has stemmed from Turkey’s secular-Islamic cleavage, or from the questions of recognition and moral issues on account of the spatial co-existence of diverse groups.

4.5 Participant Observation

Participant observation is a data collection method which:

involves the researcher’s involvement in a variety of activities over an extended period of time that enables him/her to observe the cultural members in their daily lives and to participate in their activities to facilitate a better understanding of those behaviours and activities (Kawulich, 2005: 26).

Qualitative studies taking everyday life and its dynamics into consideration as the main unit of analysis, as this research does, therefore benefits considerably from participant observations (Schatz, 2009). Such observations provide access to practices which ‘form the empirical entry point to empirical analysis’ (Pouliot, 2013: 48). This brings us to Trow’s argument that ‘the problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation’ (1957: 33). Instead of paying daily visits to Tophane, as some other colleagues did whilst conducting their research, I moved into the neighbourhood in order to engage in social interactions with residents and to better observe the everyday practices of both newcomers and locals. However, since participant observations are highly likely to remain ‘unfocused and vague’ if not justified and guided by a theoretical vision (Mason, 2002: 89), it is important to explain why this method was employed.

For local residents, the rationale for using participant observation was to investigate whether there are ‘inconsistencies between subjects at any moment of time’, ‘inconsistencies within subjects and over time’, and ‘inconsistencies between the roles assumed and the activities performed by the same subject’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 6). These could not be grasped through interviews, but arguably were key to exploring what might have triggered the locals’ hostile attitudes towards newcomers. As mentioned in the previous section, an important part of the semi-structured interviews was to collect data on the notion and construction of social differences and identities. It was thus vital to participate in daily activities of older inhabitants, in order to observe to what extent (and in what circumstances) Tophane-born residents act in ways that correspond to the newcomers’ perceptions of them, the latter drawn from semi-structured interviews. This served two main purposes: combining the interviews with observational data, whereby I aimed to enhance the reliability of findings, and examining how far/well the world of local residents fit with Bourdieu’s model used to account for the worlds of those who occupy lower positions in the social field due to their deprivations of capital.

One of the most controversial issues regarding participant observations revolves around how to strike a balance between participation and observation. On the one hand, some have argued that researchers conducting ethnographic studies should place greater emphasis on participation than observation in accordance with the *raison d’être* of ethnography, which is to grasp things as an insider rather than an outsider (e.g., Charmaz, 2006: 25). On the other hand, others have claimed that the mere act of participation does not provide data in its own right unless complemented by observation (e.g., O’Reilly, 2008: 151-152). Although for those who give the priority to observation, participation is just a means of allowing room for observation, it is arguably hard to decide in advance which role to adopt and play throughout fieldwork. This means that researchers may move between different ethnographic roles: ‘participant as observer’ and ‘observer as participant’. These changing roles are very often determined by practice and therefore go beyond being simple choices to make and to adhere to consistently. Despite being allowed to have a seat, for instance, I was not allowed to contribute to the meetings of Tophane’s neighbourhood council, which takes place every two weeks on Tuesdays. I could only take notes regarding the issues brought forward by local participants. During the football matches of *Tophane Tayfunspor*, the local team established in 1955, however, I was more participant than observer. This was because I was invited by my gatekeeper to those games to have a common experience with other local fans and share their excitement. I therefore did not take any notes whilst watching the matches, as that could have been viewed as a sign of disrespect or lack of interest in their passion for the team.

This implies that participation does not necessarily have to be followed by observation each time but can be undertaken to maintain access, which is key to conducting further observations. Getting involved in these activities, I became able to introduce myself to other local residents, which in turn enhanced my recognition in the neighbourhood. This was of particular significance, because it reduced my initial over-dependence on my gatekeeper to socialise at all-male tea houses where Tophane-born inhabitants predominantly spend most of their time. Although these places are public and open to anyone who is willing to have a cup of tea, they in practice are closed settings due to hosting merely those who know each other for a long time. Nevertheless, through the above-mentioned participations, I managed to become a regular of these quasi-private spaces where I had several conversations with the local clientele. The clubhouse of *Tophane Tayfunspor*, which also serves as a café, was one of the places where I started to meet locals on a regular basis.

The more I gained trust and started to be recognised as a researcher, the more I felt comfortable with asking questions and taking notes throughout those informal conversations, the latter being essential to overcome the epistemological problems that could potentially have resulted from ‘going native’, as Berg points out (2001: 147). All this enabled me to observe the local lifestyle that has been developed by inhabitants in such a way as to function as a social organisation to survive in the city, which I further discuss in Chapter Five. However, the merit of participant observation was not limited to a better understanding of the neighbourhood life of Tophane. Such a close engagement with the local community also helped me capture the contradictions between locals’ practices and utterances, grasp where their vulnerability and defiant manners come from, and see what these attitudes enable them to ‘achieve’. These were of considerable importance in making sense of the social conflict in its complexity and putting the Tophane incidents in wider context, as will be detailed in Chapter Seven.

For newcomers, one reason for conducting participant observation was to investigate whether there are two different groups - trend-setters and trend-followers - in Tophane (a distinction analytically drawn between gentrifiers according to their habitus and existing capital, as argued in Chapter Two and Chapter Three) and, if so, in what ways they differ from each other in everyday life. Since ‘[h]abitus can be known by observing the enactment of dispositions in practice’ (Vaughan, 2008: 70), it was crucial to observe the daily and cultural activities of newcomers that involve their uses of spaces. However, it should also be emphasised that I decided to conduct participant observations, not simply because the type of data required was not available to be collected through interviews, but also to supplement the newcomers’ linguistic expressions about local residents, drawn from the semi-structured interviews, with

their class habitus in order to gain a relational understanding of the role of perceptions and categorisations in the subjective re-making of reality. As Bourdieu argues,

one cannot fully understand language without placing linguistic practices within the full universe of compossible practices: eating and drinking habits, cultural consumptions, taste in matters of arts (...) For it is the whole class habitus, that is, the synchronic and diachronic position occupied in the social structure, that expresses itself through the linguistic habitus which is but one of its dimensions (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 149).

Participant observations were indispensable based on this theoretical rationale, which in return made some certain activities more vital than others to take part in so as to observe newcomers' habitus and practices. I therefore paid regular visits to Tophane's art galleries, where I had earlier established initial contacts, and I attended some of their key events and exhibition openings, whereby I made new contacts and could observe the ways in which cultural capital was being performed by visitors. Cafés where newcomers were hanging out were no less significant than art galleries for carrying out participant observations. In fact, as mentioned previously, it is for this reason that during fieldwork I also included both Cihangir and Karaköy as research settings, where I would spend as much time as I was spending in Tophane, since a majority of the newcomers I got in contact with throughout fieldwork had no inclination to socialise where they were either working or residing, but rather in these gentrified areas surrounding Tophane. On account of my intention to observe, I was overt during all these activities and adopted the ethnographic role as a researcher, and I wrote my observations down in a pocket-sized fieldwork diary – the first section of Chapter Six draws heavily upon the observational data drawn from these participations.

Participant observations also comprised of routine walking tours across the neighbourhood, through which I aimed to observe social encounters between locals and newcomers as well as the authentic urban fabric of Tophane. The aim was to probe the level of retail and residential gentrification, the potential reasons behind the rent gap, and whether gentrification has generated spatial segregations between the two groups. I took extensive notes about the types of shops and stores on each street, as well as the function and physical conditions of existing apartment blocks. These 'thick descriptions' are used in Chapter Five, where I present the area in historical, spatial, and socio-demographical terms. At the beginning of my fieldwork, since I had yet to be known by newcomers and locals as a researcher, I was taking notes on my mobile phone, instead of using a notebook, in order to avoid suspicion. I was then writing these notes down in a notebook employed as fieldwork diary when I either returned

to my flat or sat at a café. When establishing rapport, however, these daily walking tours turned into occasions on which I started being invited by those I encountered to join them in chatting or having some refreshments. As such, I became able to speak to many local residents and newcomers on a daily basis, which increased the likelihood of access being gained. The content of the participant observation is summarised in the table below.

Location	Approximate Number of Hours of Participant Observation
Art Gallery	48
Café	120
Traditional Teahouse	90
Walking Tour	180
Football Match	12
Town Council Meeting	36
	Total Approximate Hours = 486

Table 2: Participant Observations

The following section will now expand upon how trust was established with the local community and newcomers.

4.6 Access, Trust and Reflexivity

The most critical and challenging phase in ethnography is, without doubt, the access to the social setting in question (T. May, 1997: 141). Access is a necessary condition for observation of the questions explored in the research project, and therefore it is the starting point of the fieldwork, which is why it is of critical importance (Berg, 2001: 137). On the other hand, access to the social setting entails many challenges due to several reasons. Certain characteristics of the research setting may make it relatively resistant to access by researchers, or certain characteristics of the researchers may bring about challenges in accessing the setting, including the age, gender or class origin of the researcher (O'Reilly, 2005: 86). Researchers, by their characteristics, cannot have any control over the perception of their self by the groups they intend to access (Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 207). Therefore, researchers should negotiate their position as a subject in order to be included in the environments and groups where they are seen as outsiders (Mason, 2002: 91). To make inroads into accessing these groups, which is a labour-intensive task, researchers often contact certain persons, i.e. gatekeepers, who can facilitate their work (Berg, 2001: 145). This is also the method I resorted to immediately after moving to Tophane, because living in the neighbourhood was not sufficient to gain access to the community. Some of these gatekeepers assumed this function because of their position in the research setting. In this context, institutions

can play a key role in identifying the persons who can act as gatekeepers. Therefore, I contacted a local newspaper based in Tophane to access the locals, and the art galleries in the neighbourhood to access the newcomers.

Access can only be ensured when there is a relationship based on mutual trust between the interviewees and the researchers (Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 210). In this respect, reflexivity is an indispensable part of access, and it is immanent to the whole research process, because the researchers should continuously reproduce the trust among the interviewees. Reflexivity, in this respect, requires the researchers to make deductions from the attitude that they have adopted in order to build trust among the group through the community gatekeepers (Mason, 2002: 194). In other words, reflexivity is ‘to give its full generality by questioning the privilege of the knowing subject, arbitrarily freed, as purely noetic, from the work of objectivation’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 214). When the researchers are not reflexive about their own position-taking, their relationship of trust with the participants would be simply reduced to the facilitation of gatekeepers, which means the researcher may be under the illusion that all participants, including the gatekeepers, are willing to be included in the research. Reflexivity is the first and foremost precondition to mitigate a ‘narcissistic’ attitude that a researcher may unknowingly adopt (ibid: 253). Furthermore, reflexivity is important because what is done to ensure access and build trust is not a technical matter required for data collection but part of the data gathered. Although data is generally considered to be tangible and conclusive, it is essentially a product of significant abstractions (ibid: 226). As researchers may turn into their own key informants through their experience with the interviewees (Hennigh, 1981), these experiences may then turn into data. The researchers are therefore responsible for offering a justification of the attitudes they adopt during fieldwork (Mason, 2002: 95).

As described in Chapter One, access to the local community is very important to observing whether the locals are involved in a struggle for recognition, and to understanding whether they are thus subjected to symbolic domination. However, accessing the locals in Tophane, who have become a relatively introverted community since the attacks against art galleries, is not the only challenge. The main problem is how to avoid imposing symbolic power as a researcher when analysing the basis of symbolic domination. The first condition for avoiding such complications is, according to O’Reilly, to ensure that the researcher is aware that they may easily impose symbolic power over the interviewee (2008: 60). However, this awareness does not inform the researcher on the methods that can be used to avoid these situations. This is exactly why reflexivity is important, because the researcher may find ways of avoiding symbolic power only by looking at the means by which such power can be imposed. From this perspective, reflexivity is not peculiar to the symbolic power held by researchers, and it helps researchers discover their relationship to their position as a subject. Any attempt

by researchers to quell potential concerns among the interviewees, which happens quite often according to Bryman (2012: 433), demonstrates that the researchers have an idea about what may be a concern. Therefore, reflexivity means an active deliberation on the part the researcher about the concerns which they may trigger among the interviewees.

My class origins and my educational status were the main factors that affected my relationship with the locals. The idea that being a middle-class researcher studying for a doctoral degree abroad could be sufficient to be seen negatively by the locals, most of whom are culturally subaltern, was what encouraged me to avoid such risks. I resorted to a different discourse to overcome this challenge for one reason: language, as much as being the primary instrument to enforce symbolic power (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 142, 146), can help one make others understand that they do not intend to impose such power over them. Therefore, I deliberately avoided using a well-informed discourse in my relationship with the locals. As Bourdieu discusses, ‘one of the properties of a “well-formed” discourse is that it imposes the norms of its own perception; it says, “Treat me with due form”, that is, in accordance with the forms I give myself’ (1993: 90). In line with this, occasional use of slang and street language significantly helped me convince the locals that I was not disdainful of them despite my class origins and my educational status (cf., Bourdieu, 1991: 88).

The language I used with the locals did not imply a denial of my class position or my educational status; however, it allowed me to avoid certain negative epithets that may be associated with these characteristics. In fact, this was what helped me evolve from a spy into a guest in the eyes of the locals. Although the community had become familiar with journalists and researchers after the incidents in the neighbourhood, my affiliation with the University of Manchester initially raised fears among the locals that I could be a spy. Although accusations of espionage against researchers are common (Lipson, 1994), I strictly did not expect that kind of suspicion could be raised since I am a citizen of Turkey. However, my gatekeeper clearly warned me about such qualms. Furthermore, my gatekeeper was not the only person who had these suspicions; the other locals whom I met through the gatekeeper were also questioning my presence in their neighbourhood. Interestingly, as a result of the language and the friendly behaviours I adopted, my affiliation with the University of Manchester aroused sympathy among the locals rather than casting doubt on my presence in Tophane. As I had moved to Tophane from Manchester, I became the guest of the neighbourhood in the eyes of the locals. Although they knew that my family and most of my friends were resident in İstanbul, the locals called me on daily basis to ask me if I needed anything or to invite me to have a cup of tea. This sympathy is also demonstrated by the fact that a local newspaper asked me to give them an interview, which will be detailed in the following pages.

Before analysing the newcomers, one has to understand what it theoretically means to negotiate the class-related differences between the locals and myself by means of language. Bourdieu argues that such negotiations set good examples of ‘a strategy of condescension’:

By temporarily but ostentatiously abdicating his dominant position in order to ‘reach down’ to his interlocutor, the dominant profits from this relation of domination, which continues to exist, by denying it (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 143).

Although Bourdieu’s argument appears to be valid at first glance, it has significant shortcomings. It appears valid, because the fact that I adopted the attitude described above was effective in helping the locals see me as a guest instead of a spy. However, Bourdieu does not explain what these circumstances yield for the dominated party. The dramatically positive transformation of the attitude of the locals towards me demonstrates, before anything else, their satisfaction with my approach towards them. This also indicates that negotiations on class-related differences may also give favourable results for the subordinates. More critically, it demonstrates what kind of treatment the locals in Tophane expect to see in everyday life, which particularly helped me discover the background of the tension in Tophane, as will be further discussed in the following chapters of the thesis.

As for the newcomers, although this thesis does not directly focus on the incidents in Tophane, the art galleries in the neighbourhood were significant to a certain extent. The importance of these galleries was emphasised because of the physical aggressions against them; however, their significance in terms of research lies in the fact that art galleries revealed the ongoing gentrification process in Tophane. I started communication with the art galleries via e-mail, as I believed a relatively formal relationship with them would be more effective. I explained the objective of the research in full transparency in those e-mails, and I was expecting that they would be willing to participate in the research because they were the targets of the attacks. Although my expectation did not turn out to be valid for all galleries in question, as some of them responded that they cannot participate in the research because of their policies, the majority of them were interested in the research (although it does not directly focus on the incidents).

The gentrification process in Tophane implies, as discussed in Chapter One, that the tension in the neighbourhood should not be reduced to the incidents between the art galleries and the attackers. Therefore, the newcomers living in Tophane were just as significant as the art galleries. As it was not possible to reach the newcomers in the

initial phases of the fieldwork, I asked for help from the owners of art galleries whom I had contacted before moving to Tophane.

Reaching the newcomers was partly challenging, because, despite not being few in number, they did not effectively create a community in which everyone knows each other. This is mainly due to the fact that the owners of the art galleries or coffee shops in Tophane were not residents of the neighbourhood, and the newcomers had their workplaces outside this area. Although I managed to reach the newcomers in the neighbourhood, I had to contact them via several gallery owners instead of a community gatekeeper. The disconnectedness among the newcomers was a significant challenge in accessing them; however, starting a relationship with the newcomers was relatively less challenging than with the locals, mainly because there was not any cultural or class asymmetry between this group and myself. My dominant ethnographic role in my relationship with the newcomers was the role of a researcher; however, in contrary to my communication with the locals, I was not forced to negotiate my class origins or my educational status with the newcomers. Furthermore, I did not feel obliged to continuously reproduce mutual trust with the newcomers through favourable acts and performances, as we held similar positions in the social domain. However, this came with a cost: a continuous management of my cultural and class- related differences with the locals turned me into a key informant for myself, while the relative ‘spontaneity’ of my liaison with the newcomers made it more challenging to make deductions about them on the basis of this relationship.

4.7 Ethical Considerations

When the research subject involves conflicting groups, any rapport with these groups entails certain ethical challenges, due to the tension between them. To make a relational analysis of the reasons for the tension, I had to establish separate relationships with these groups on the basis of mutual trust. As Bourdieu argues, ‘the desire to discover the truth, which is constitutive of scientific intent, is totally devoid of any practical power unless it is rendered as a “craft”’. This craft, according to Bourdieu,

is a real disposition to pursue truth, which disposes one to improvise on the spot, in the urgency of the interview, strategies of self- presentation and adaptive responses, encouragement and opportune questions etc., so as to help respondents deliver up their truth (1999: 621).

However, what was more challenging than building rapport with the main groups in Tophane was maintaining the rapport with one group without undermining the trust

relationship with the other group. A liaison with one of the groups had the potential to undermine the trust for me in the other group.

Although my position in the relationships with both groups was the role of a researcher, there were still some limits to the extent that I could control the relationship as a researcher. Despite my many attempts to emphasise that the research does not focus on the incidents per se, some of the interviewees (including both the locals and the newcomers) were very willing to discuss the attacks. In such situations, I remained non-judgemental towards both groups. However, I was never certain that my attitude was not considered to be ‘political’ by any of the groups. Therefore, whenever the interviewees discussed the attacks, I felt a significant concern that both groups could try to convince me to agree with them on their ideas about the incidents. I particularly felt such pressure when the local newspaper contacted me for an interview, which will now be further detailed.

When my local gatekeeper informed me of the interview request by the local news website, I initially thought that it could be a test. At that time, I did not have any doubts about the validity of my assumption, although I was proved wrong afterwards. I believed it was a credibility test mainly because I used the strategies described above to build rapport with the locals. It was not possible for me to turn down the interview request, because this could undermine the trust that was being built among the locals. As Bryman notes, ‘ethnographers may *feel* they have no choice but to get involved, because a failure to participate actively might indicate to members of the social setting a lack of commitment and lead to a loss of credibility’ (2012: 446, original emphasis). On the other hand, I had hesitations about giving an interview because I was convinced that I would be asked for my opinion about the gallery attacks. Although I was concerned that my attitude towards such questions would affect my relationship with either group, I accepted the interview request. It was only during the interview that I realised that my concerns were unfounded. The interview was mainly focused on my experiences and opinions about Tophane as a researcher who had been a resident of the neighbourhood for some time. As a result, the interview helped me consolidate trust among the locals while my rapport with the newcomers remained undamaged.⁷

Ethical responsibility is not only related to the process of collection of data but also to the process of production of information. Therefore, the considerations taken into account by the researcher when representing the collected data is critical: it is not simply a question of ‘natural discourse’ that is affected as little as possible by cultural asymmetry; it is also essential to construct this discourse scientifically, in such a way that it yields the elements necessary for its own explanation’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 611).

⁷ The interview is available at: <http://www.tophanehaber.com/mertcan-ozturk-ile-tophane-ve-semt-kulturu-uzerine-soylesi/179/>

The rapport detailed above was helpful in collecting the ‘natural discourse’ of the interviewees. The presence of a recording device, which often forces the interviewees to be more precautionous (ibid: 615), did not trigger any caution among the participants. As can be understood from the three chapters that follow, the interviewees did not appear to impose self-censorship. To the contrary, both groups used some expressions during the interviews which could be considered contemptuous or discriminatory. At this point, the challenge is related to the question of how the data should be represented. I report such comments by the interviewees, since they are vital for understanding the reasons underlying the social tensions in Tophane. Furthermore, I added Turkish (native) words for some of these expressions for the fear that their meaning may be lost in translation. Although the dominant motivation of this research is to reveal the basis of the tensions in Tophane, this cannot be done at the expense of the security of the interviewees. Therefore, all interviewees in the research were anonymised. Using pseudonyms, as Fetterman notes, is ‘a simple way to disguise the identity of individuals and protect them from potential harm’ (1998: 142). Moreover, the newcomers who have businesses in Tophane are numbered according to the type of their business, without revealing the name of business places.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the relationship between theory and method, and has analysed how the theory used mandates specific methods of data collection to understand the tensions in Tophane. It has provided details about the participants of the research, the sampling techniques, has justified why the semi-structured interview method was needed, and has given details of the participant observations. Furthermore, it has analytically and methodologically justified the importance of each of these methods of collecting data for answering the research questions about social tensions in Tophane.

The following three chapters discuss and analyse the empirical findings in order to explain the reasons for the social tensions in the neighbourhood. Chapter Five offers an analysis of the differences between the two main groups in Tophane, and draws a social map of the neighbourhood as a physical space. This implies a reconstruction of the neighbourhood as a ‘social space’ in a Bourdieusian way. Chapter Six and Chapter Seven explain why the tensions between the locals and newcomers in Tophane are a result of a lack of interaction. In particular, Chapter Six discusses why there is a lack of interaction between the two groups, using observational data about the newcomers, and analyses why a lack of interaction results in tensions, using the interview data about the newcomers. Chapter Seven demonstrates the negative impact of lack of interaction on the locals, using interview data, and offers observational data to demonstrate how this tension led to the incidents in Tophane.

CHAPTER 5

THE PORTRAYAL OF TOPHANE: CULTURALLY SUBALTERN LOCAL RESIDENTS VIS-À-VIS CULTURALLY PRIVILEGED NEWCOMERS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the neighbourhood of Tophane in terms of its historical development and current spatial dynamics. It draws upon fieldwork observations and daily walking tours, and aims to provide an outline of the two main groups of Tophane residents: locals and newcomers, between whom there has been an ongoing social conflict. In subsequent chapters, I argue that there is a need to concentrate on the *interactions* between these two groups as the primary unit of analysis; however, here it is first necessary to outline the groups separately and set out their main characteristics. This chapter draws upon fieldwork data in order to construct the lifestyles of locals and newcomers within the particular urban spaces of Tophane, and analyses their lifestyles as the result of their particular composition of economic, cultural and social capitals (Bourdieu, 2002 [1986]).

I accordingly begin by introducing Tophane and describing its historical development and the nature of its urban space. Secondly, I outline the characteristics of the local residents of Tophane - who originally moved into the neighbourhood from Turkey's Southeastern provinces such as Siirt and Bitlis - exploring the nature of their lifestyle and residential belonging. Finally, I focus upon the newcomers and the kind of lifestyles they have brought into the area. I argue that locals have a combination of low economic and cultural capital, but high social capital, which results in a distinctive communal lifestyle in Tophane. On the other hand, newcomers have relatively low economic capital but high cultural capital, and this drives the gentrification of areas of Tophane where cultural industries (notably art galleries) have flourished.

Providing details about these two main groups will be key to making sense of the social conflicts in Tophane, which will be the subject of the following chapters (Chapter Six and Chapter Seven). Each section of this chapter also considers the arguments

examined in Chapter Two, relating to literatures on gentrification, and argues why they are problematic in the case of Tophane. For example, the first section on the historical background of Tophane as a neighbourhood adds to our understanding of why social tensions do not stem from local residents being threatened by physical displacement.⁸ Taking locals' residential belonging and lifestyle into account, the second section shows that the social conflict in Tophane is also unrelated to a sense of loss of place.⁹ In the third section, a consideration of newcomers and their reasons for moving into Tophane, suggests that the gentrifiers of Tophane (despite possessing high levels of cultural capital like their global counterparts) did not settle in the neighbourhood because they were seeking diversity, or aiming to create an alternative urban space as part of their rejection of the traditional middle-class norms and values. Instead, they settled in Tophane because they could not compete with rent increases in Cihangir, the gentrified neighbourhood where they had previously been residing.¹⁰

5.2 Making Historical and Spatial Sense of Tophane

This section highlights the turning points in the history of Tophane, aiming to ground the argument that the wider social tensions between locals and newcomers do not stem from displacement. In his stage model of gentrification, as discussed in Chapter Two, Clay argues that long-term non-gentrifier inhabitants may resort to violence to reduce the appeal of the neighbourhood undergoing gentrification and to keep rents at an affordable level in order to protect themselves against spatial dislocation (1979). As will be demonstrated below, that is not the case in Tophane because most of the local residents are not tenants, but possess at least one real estate property. However, this

⁸ As examined in Chapter 2, Clay argues that social conflicts may arise in gentrifying neighbourhoods as part of non-gentrifier groups' attempt to secure their stay (1979). However, as will be detailed below, displacement does not constitute the reason Tophane has been witnessing a tension because the local residents are predominantly property owners. The first section elaborates on the developments that turned these people from rural-to-urban migrants to landlords, as a result of which they now can protect themselves against the gentrification process and displacement. This is of particular significance as it provides an explanation as to why Tophane has not become a gentrified area but still remains a gentrifying neighbourhood.

⁹ As mentioned in Chapter 2, it has been argued that although gentrification may not result in spatial dislocation of long-term residents, retail gentrification may lead them to a social displacement and harm their sense of belonging. As will be further detailed in the second section, the Tophane-born residents still feel at home in their neighbourhood. However, that is not because the retail landscape of Tophane has not undergone any change. On the contrary, as the final part of the first section illustrates, in the neighbourhood there is a wide range of symbolic spaces such as art galleries, boutiques, and cafés – which Zukin calls the 'ABCs of gentrification' (2016: 204). The reason retail gentrification has not had a negative impact on locals' place-attachment is rather that these people do not simply reside or socialise but also work in Tophane due to their deprivation of education.

¹⁰ This indicates that gentrifiers do not necessarily have to be diversity-friendly because of their acquisition of cultural capital. However, as argued in Chapter 2, such a positive correlation is what has led many to conceive of gentrification as an emancipatory process.

gives rise to a question: how did local residents come to own property despite their relatively low economic capital? To provide an explanation of why the gentrification process does not generate a threat of displacement to local residents, it is necessary to trace their class background and collective settlement in the neighbourhood. This section attempts to achieve that by drawing upon the historical development of Tophane.

5.2.1 A Three-hundred-year Military-industry Zone

Tophane used to be Istanbul's major industrial and commercial zone, on account of its location on a natural harbour. Being located on the Bosphorus coastline and having a straight and relatively long shore, led the area to be designated as a military-industrial zone in the mid-fifteenth century. Take, for instance, the neighbourhood's name, which reflects, and reminds us of this past: the term 'tophane' literally refers to a cannon foundry. The neighbourhood 'Tophane' derived its name from the iconic martial-industrial building called Tophane-i Amire, which Sultan II. Mehmed built after the conquest of Constantinople with the aim of supplying ammunition for the Ottoman army and navy (Tunc, 2004). Although the building is still of particular symbolic significance, other arsenals constructed along the Bosphorus shore would play a greater role in the trajectory of Tophane.

Since the area was intentionally developed as an arms ammunition plant, Tophane's residential and commercial vitality was restricted. The residential and commercial history of Tophane therefore dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, when the area began to lose its leading position in the Ottoman arms industry. Tophane would no longer remain a military zone after Tophane-i Amire's role in the military production was replaced by the Zeytinburnu Grande Fabrique – iron and steel factory opened in 1843 (Kurt *et al.*, 2016: 251). Despite the fact that the industrial dynamism remained limited, the merchantability of Tophane, together with the area's development of a commercial centre, was nevertheless premised upon the utilities constructed in this era. Tophane was an appropriate place for maritime trade not only because of where the quays were geographically located, but because of the vacated military complexes which rendered facility costs unnecessary from the beginning. Subsequent to the evacuation of military units, therefore, navy vessels gave place to merchant ships in the Tophane dock.

5.2.2 Becoming a Commerce-led Cosmopolitan Neighbourhood

Tophane soon became a customs zone. Whilst the customs bureau moved into the area, the ex-arsenals were converted into warehouses. Tophane already had a port and

dock facilities; nevertheless, as the trading volume grew, and commercial activities accelerated, those facilities remained incapable of providing sufficient marine services. As a consequence of the enlargement of extant service capacity, which contained physical improvements such as building further docks, Tophane developed into the main port of Istanbul where passenger ships started docking, too. The increasing commercial mobility and arrival of voyagers are of particular importance for grasping Tophane's cosmopolitan past, along with the territorial evolution (Mills, 2005).

By the late nineteenth century, Tophane had been a micro-scale non-residential district, covering the area from docks to military-industrial complexes; and the building 'Tophane-i Amire' had been indicative of the boundary point where the physical space named 'Tophane' used to end. During the second half of the nineteenth century Tophane's borders expanded towards Pera and Galata, respectively located north and north-west of Tophane-i Amire. Whereas Galata, as a Genoese neighbourhood, hosted merchants who mostly consisted of the Italian and French Levantines, Pera was both the consulate district of Istanbul and the residential area where non-Muslim Ottoman communities such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews were residing (Schuitema, 2013; 2015).

Given its military-industrial past, the maritime commerce constituted the second turning point in Tophane's history, this time leading the area to evolve into a neighbourhood on account of real estate developments initiated by international communities in Istanbul, who were to comprise the first inhabitants of Tophane. In spite of the vividness of Grande Rue de Pera, avenue which links Pera to Galata, and that of Tophane docks, the area located between these had been a vacant land by the mid-nineteenth century. With settlements of the above-mentioned groups, however, Tophane's residential history and territorial expansion began.

Arguably, it was not accidental that Tophane attracted the affluent Levantines as well as pre-existing non-Muslim inhabitants of Istanbul after the docks had been civilised and commercialised. If the buildings located in this quarter are considered, there is hardly a construction built earlier than the year of 1850, when the military production permanently halted in the neighbourhood. Take, for instance, the schools: Deutsche Schule Istanbul, founded in 1868, Getronagan Armenian High School, in 1886, Liceo Scientifico Italiano I.M.I., in 1888, and Galata Rum (Greek) Primary School, in 1901. Additionally, both Crimean Memorial Church and Saint Joseph's Orphanage, which can be considered as reflections of residential life, were built in 1868. Reflecting Tophane's cosmopolitan characteristics, all these buildings also illuminate that the residential life in Tophane does not date back a long time, compared to the long-standing existence of the international community in Istanbul, yet it has arisen from trade.

The neighbourhood continued to develop constantly throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century even though the commercial vitality was interrupted by the invasion of Istanbul in 1914, as the First World War began. However, it would not be possible to return to the heyday of commerce even when the warfare came to an end (not in 1918 when the First World War ended, but rather in 1923 when the Republic was founded by replacing the Ottoman Empire, succeeding the Turkish War of Independence that lasted from 1919 to 1923), because the Tophane shore and residential quarter both would be verging on dramatic changes.

5.2.3 The First Wave of Immigrants

The third crucial moment, which generated fundamental shifts in socio-demographic composition of the neighbourhood due to rapid subordination of commerce to industry, is again related to usage of the shore and existing facilities (e.g., warehouses that had been designed as arsenals initially). As part of the industrial development that the Kemalist leadership committed to after the Republic's foundation (Boratav, 1981), Tophane started to become one of the vibrant formal and informal labour market areas in Istanbul and, hence, the final destination of rural-to-urban immigrants who predominantly originated from Turkey's southeastern provinces such as Siirt and Bitlis.

Whilst until a decade ago, Tophane had been appealing to prosperous foreign traders, whose settlement made the area verge on a neighbourhood, it was now appealing both to skilled and nonskilled labour. The latter consisted of ex-peasants, whose grandchildren comprise the local residents today. Given that the Ottoman's first labour organisation 'Amele-i Osmani Cemiyeti' was founded by dockworkers in Tophane in 1894 (Sencer, 1969: 157), the area in fact had already been familiar to the working class. Yet the working-class presence in Tophane was limited to the shore, having almost nothing to do with the residential site separated from the former by Tophane-i Amire building. The clear-cut spatial and demographic division between these two areas, however, began to be gradually challenged by the first wave of immigrants.

Ford's Automotive Assembly Plant, opened in Tophane in 1929, underlies the third turning point, having enabled the area to reacquire its industrial vibrancy. By 1929, Ford Motor Company had 36 assembly plants across the world, from Detroit (USA) to Yokohama (Japan). The anticipation based on sales figures that Soviet Russia would be an up-and-coming market for the automotive industry, led the company to designate Istanbul as the new regional centre where products could be manufactured and dispatched (Odman, 2011). Designation of Istanbul, more particularly the Tophane port, as the new manufacturing base was a win-win situation for both Ford's Motor Company and the Republic of Turkey. The advantages Istanbul was offering for the company were not simply geographical or economic, but also political: Ford's Motor

Company aimed to utilise both Istanbul's proximity to Russia, which would minimise shipping costs, and the amicable relations Turkey had developed with Soviet Russia since the Turkish War of Independence. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, was also satisfied with the proposal as they thought the assembly plant would engender industrial dynamism.

The agreement that the Ford Company would employ 60% of the executives and workers from Turkish citizens put Tophane on the map, especially for the working class. In 1930 the assembly plant accordingly began manufacturing with 300 workers and approximately 100 officials in the Tophane shore. However, demand for labour in Tophane was not limited merely to production or administration, but spread to such labour-intensive sectors as construction and transportation. For example, although the Turkish Navigation Office relinquished the dock buildings, mostly consisting of warehouses, to Ford Motor Company in 1929, the area needed to be reorganised as a plant. Whilst construction workers and foremen, whose number reached 200, were hired for the project, Mr Collins (the first manager of the plant) stated 'even in the recruitment stage for construction workers, the number of applicants was ten times more than they needed' (cited in Odman, 2011: 113).

The plant is of particular importance, having played a major role in Tophane's transition from a cosmopolitan and substantial neighbourhood into the job market of Istanbul. Having pulled the labour force into Tophane, animation brought about by the plant also created its own crowd of jobseekers in the neighbourhood. The recruitment process in Ford Istanbul is illustrative of the huge asymmetry between the labour demanded and that supplied. Having migrated, ex-peasants joined and thereby augmented the ranks of the unemployed in Tophane. Yavuz (interviewee, 29/7/2017) talked about how his father was no exception: Yavuz, in his sixties, was born in Tophane; however, his father was among those who abandoned their hometown and came to Tophane in the early 1930s. It was not until he spent two years in Tophane that he could find a job and began working as a porter.¹¹ The majority of the existing locals were born in Tophane; however, their past in the neighbourhood dates back to the 1930s. Here Ford's Automotive Assembly Plant provides meaningful answers as to when and why the people I now class as 'local residents' came to Tophane, enabling us to trace their class background.

5.2.4 Socio-demographic Changes and the Transformation of Tophane into a Working-class Quarter

The fourth turning point in Tophane's history arose out of a dramatic incident, as a result of which the rural-to-urban immigrants would become the residents of Tophane:

¹¹ The interview was conducted in Tophane on 29/07/2017.

The September 6-7 Pogrom that took place in Istanbul in 1955 (Güven, 2006). The pogrom refers to a chain of mob attacks organised by the state in parallel with the ‘Turkification’ project, which in fact dated back to the late Ottoman era (Azak: 2010). Although the ‘movement’ was mobilised against the Greek community in Istanbul, other minorities – notably the Armenian community, were also affected by the assaults. Consequently, these groups were forced to abandon Istanbul and leave their real assets behind, shaping significantly Tophane’s subsequent trajectory (Mills, 2010).

As portrayed above, the residential quarter of Tophane used to be a cosmopolitan area, hosting a variety of ethnic minorities who had had a longstanding past in Istanbul. It was a wealthy neighbourhood, too, with its stone-built four-to-five-storey apartment blocks having a Bosphorus view. A considerable proportion of these real estate properties, including stores located on high streets, were either appropriated or purchased at minimum prices by the rural-to-urban immigrants who came to Tophane in the 1930s. Whilst they had been outsiders in the previous two decades, they *ipso facto* developed into landlords and the only inhabitants of Tophane where they had come to find a job. This accelerated the migration, predominantly from Siirt and Bitlis to Tophane (Geçkalan and Sezgin, 2011). The appropriation or possession of historical apartments could have been converted into tenements, which would have equipped the ‘new’ locals with a considerable volume of economic capital; however, instead they encouraged their kin to migrate and move into Tophane, where accommodation would no longer be an issue.

5.2.5 *Gentrification and the Enrichment of Socio-cultural Diversity*

It is worth noting that Tophane today is not an official administrative unit; rather, it is a name publicly given to a physical space consisting of four neighbourhoods [*mahalles*] such as *Hacimimi Mahallesi*, *Tomtom Mahallesi*, *Kemankeş Karamustafa Paşa Mahallesi* and *Kilic Ali Pasa Mahallesi*.¹² Whereas the residential life takes place in the first two neighbourhoods, the Tophane docks are situated where the last two neighbourhoods intersect. As such, it is hard to map exactly where Tophane begins and ends. Observations in the area found graffiti saying ‘Here is Tophane!’ [*Burasi Tophane!*] scribbled on the walls, and revealed the very symbolic borders of Tophane. If the farthest graffiti is considered, Tophane turns out to be a place demarcated by the streets respectively called Luleci Hendek Street, Istiklal Street and Bogazkesen Street. Whereas the former links the shore to Galata, the second connects Galata to Taksim Square, and the latter joins Taksim Square and the Tophane shore. The area

¹² Although these neighbourhoods are distinctive administrative units of Beyoglu district, they are all conceived of as Tophane in a well-publicised way.

can be conceived of as a triangle, which nevertheless has no equilateral shape (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Tophane's residential quarter

Bogazkesen Street (see Figure 2) is the most significant amongst all in that as a high street, it embodies the social diversity to which Tophane has been bearing witness for more than a decade. Practically, it is also the boundary between Tophane and Cihangir, the latter having already been gentrified and advertised as the hub of those holding a great amount of cultural capital. Bogazkesen Street is a fine example of the fact that Tophane is a more diverse place than Cihangir, considering that there is no unity among the stores located in terms of their type. Whilst the art galleries in Tophane are predominantly located on Bogazkesen Street, the same street is also host to traditional all-male teahouses whose clientele consists of the older inhabitants. Neither the authenticity, nor the diversity is limited to these, however. Gourmet restaurants and fancy boutique coffee shops, with cosy interior designs, neighbour take-away buffets run by the locals, which serve doner kebabs, frozen foods or sandwiches.

As a thoroughfare, Bogazkesen Street not only hosts local inhabitants or newcomers but also welcomes those who need to pass by the neighbourhood in order to arrive in Taksim, Cihangir or Karaköy. Bogazkesen Street is actually not long enough to serve as a high street, being less than five hundred metres. Yet, by the same token, it is the shortest route between Bosphorus and Istiklal Street and between Cihangir and Karaköy for both pedestrians and vehicles. This leads the residents to encounter a stable anonymous crowd in the neighbourhood, whose importance will be much clearer once daily encounters are taken into consideration.




Figure 2: Bogazkesen Street

Lüleci Hendek Street is a single-lane downhill road which links the historical and iconic Galata Tower, built by the Genoese in 1348, to the centre of Tophane, where the Istanbul offices of the Turkish Employment Agency and Tophane Park are situated (see Figure 3). Lüleci Hendek Street has a more eye-catching elegant view with its four-to-five storey stone-built apartments lined up in rows along the street. As his parents ranked among the pioneer immigrants and moved in Tophane well in advance of the pogrom, Yavuz (a local in his sixties) remembers his Greek and Armenian neighbours. According to him, the street and its alleys used to comprise the wealthier part of Tophane, where most of the non-Muslim minorities were residing. However, although it still seems affluent, the street itself is not as alive and crowded as Bogazkesen Street.



Figure 3: Turkish Employment Agency and Tophane Park

Kumbaraci Ramp is also of particular importance, dividing Tophane's residential quarter into two zones (see Figure 4). The ramp is parallel to Bogazkesen Street, connecting Istiklal Street to *Tophane Semt Konagi*, the latter where the neighbourhood council gathers every Tuesday – residents are welcomed to participate in meetings and to bring up any issue regarding the neighbourhood. Unlike Bogazkesen Street, Kumbaraci Ramp manifests a clear-cut socio-spatial segregation between older residents and newcomers. Situated in the middle, Hacı Mimi Mosque bisects the street. From the mosque up to Istiklal Street the ramp has a vibrancy owing to ateliers, design studios, advertising agencies, boutique cafes serving vegan food, and pubs. Also, the two theatres located here contribute to the urban dynamics. From the mosque down to the centre of Tophane, however, the ramp seems less vibrant in cultural terms in that there are only a couple of all-male teahouses and pool-halls, where long-term residents prefer to socialise, have a chat in groups and pass the time of day.



Figure 4: Kumbaraci Ramp

There was a tangible contrast between the two residential areas separated by Kumbaraci Ramp. The former one remaining between the ramp and Lüleci Hendek Street is located in Hacımimi Mahallesi and inhabited by both of the older and newcomer residents (see Figure 5). The majority of the newcomers preferred to reside particularly in this section of the neighbourhood, as most of the apartments are historical, dating back to the late nineteenth century, and still in good condition. During my fieldwork I resided in this part of Tophane, too. In addition to a large number of stone-built apartments, streets are cobblestone in a similar vein in this area; and this equips the sense of an aesthetic unity. Although apartments are mostly used for residential purposes and occupied by gentrifiers, some flats serve either as interior design offices or as yoga, pilates and dance studios. Here in this quarter, there is only one teahouse and working-

class restaurant, which caters for the needs of those working in the smithies located at the basement of some apartments. The combination of smithies and third-wave coffee shops has the effect of authenticising this part of Tophane.



Figure 5: Hacimimi Mahallesi, where newcomers are residing

The quarter located in Tomtom Mahallesi (more specifically between Kumbaraci Ramp and Bogazkesen Street), on the other hand, does not have much to captivate those who are on the quest for authenticity (see Figure 6). Side streets are narrower than usual; and basements of the apartments are not appropriate enough for a business to run. Except a plumber, a store selling second-hand household items and a tiny grocery, I found almost nothing that may reflect economic or social life. Since there is hardly any pedestrian or vehicle traffic, the zone has turned out to be the playground for local kids aged five to twelve. Laundry hung across the streets from one window to another, indicating not only that dwellers knew each other and acted with solidarity, but also that flats were relatively small and did not allow a space for drying clothes.



Figure 6: Tomtom Mahallesi, whose inhabitants predominantly consist of the local people

In spite of the fact that the apartments here were built earlier than those located in the former quarter, they seem to have been built merely to fulfil the need of accommodation, with no consideration of any architectural or aesthetic concerns. Arguably, this part of the neighbourhood ‘developed’ together with the further waves of immigration that succeeded the 1955 Pogrom. Here is the most homogeneous and least vibrant part of Tophane, and occupied solely by the local residents, whose lifestyle will now be examined in further detail.

5.3 The Residential Belonging and Tight-knit Local Lifestyle in Tophane: Locals Making a Virtue out of Necessity due to Their Educational Deprivation

Mahalle kulturu, which local residents use to refer to the name of the lifestyle prevailing in the neighbourhood, indicates that there has been no upward social mobility for locals, despite their possession of the properties vacated by the Greek and Armenian communities in 1955. This is because *mahalle kulturu*, in spite of older residents’ affirmative rhetoric, amounts to various solutions to compensate for the lack of formal education and cultural capital, the latter which is key to grasping the ongoing social conflicts in Tophane, as examined in the subsequent two chapters (Chapter Six and Chapter Seven).

Local resident Ahmet described the *mahalle kulturu* in the following way:

Here in Tophane everybody knows each other somehow. When you encounter, you say ‘hi!’ even to the one whom you know only by sight. Of course, if you go down to the Tophane Park, those over there may not recognise you in person. But if you tell them your father’s name, they recognise who you are at once. Here we have a great rapport on all hands. Like I said, if one does not know my brother, he does my father; if not my father, then he absolutely recognises my grandfather. This is how things work here, because there is a *mahalle kulturu* (Ahmet, local, 18/08/2017).

Identified with the reciprocal recognition neighbours grant each other, *mahalle kulturu* echoes a tight-knit communal lifestyle, which other local residents also appreciated:

Relations among the neighbours are so sincere in this *mahalle*. If I am to compare Tophane with other places like Fatih or Cihangir, Tophane comes first no doubt! Here is superior in that Tophane is a *mahalle* in the first place. It can easily be

felt that *mahalle kulturu* fits like a glove in this neighbourhood. I mean, when I walk down Bogazkesen [Street], I can't put my hand down because of greeting. I haven't seen such an intimacy elsewhere [...] Those who don't live in Tophane but have witnessed the rapport here even just once tell us that it should be a privilege to live here, for Tophane is quite a unique place. All this consequently enhances your sense of belonging to your *mahalle* [neighbourhood] (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).

Mahalle kulturu operates as a source of pride, constituting the underlying reason behind the sense of residential belonging in Tophane. However, we should nonetheless avoid taking a family-like community for granted. In spite of having direct implications for a set of communal relations prevailing at a neighborhood scale, *mahalle kulturu* is arguably not something into which local dwellers were born. If we take other statements from residents into account, it becomes much clearer that a tight-knit communal lifestyle needs to be actively sustained and does not simply revolve around the mutual recognition that local residents provide:

The *mahalle kulturu* which is about to vanish in Istanbul is still being preserved here. Tophane has been maintaining this culture; and it has to... [exhales] Because we have nowhere to go! (Ayhan, local, 16/07/2017)

Ayhan's statement gives rise to important questions about local residents, such as how far their pride about being from Tophane can be taken as given? And whether they are making a virtue out of necessity (loving the inevitable in Bourdieu's sense)? As argued in Chapter Two, place attachment and residential belonging are more likely to be seen in working-class neighbourhoods than middle-class quarters (Fried, 1963; Rivlin, 1987).

According to Bourdieu, 'the lack of capital intensifies the experience of finitude; it chains one to a place' (Bourdieu, 1999: 127). That is because, as Shaw and Hagemans explicate, 'for those who have uncertain or low economic status and therefore fewer reasons and resources to travel and develop social ties outside the neighbourhood, place of residence becomes an important nexus around which identification and belonging are formulated' (2015: 326-327).

It is nonetheless worth emphasising that in the case of Tophane, such spatial confinement does not arise out of economic constraints – the local dwellers are not tenants but householders. Take, for instance, Ahmet's family who purchased a 150-year-old Italian apartment after the September 6-7 Pogrom. Although Ahmet and his siblings were born in Tophane, they are originally from Bitlis. His deceased

grandfather handed the entire apartment down to his sons and daughters, providing each with a flat. As he narrates:

Since this area has a great value of property, you can easily possess three or four flats elsewhere with the yield if you sell yours in Tophane. My aunts, uncles, they all did that. 5 flats were already gone; now it is only us, from the family, left in the apartment. It has been almost ten years since they sold theirs and moved into other districts; but you know what, they nevertheless still come here on a daily basis, spending most of their time in Tophane (Ahmet, local, 18/08/2017).

Like Ahmet, long-term occupants of Tophane are willing to narrate such stories – stories of those who have moved out of Tophane yet have not been able to adapt to their new neighbourhood. In so doing, they actually aim to justify how unique Tophane is and, thereby, how hard it is to move elsewhere:

Tophane is by no means simply a postal address; it is not an ordinary *mahalle* either. It is not so conceivable for us, I mean the local people, to sell their properties and move into other neighbourhoods. It is impossible indeed, you know, as the folks here are all emotionally attached to their neighbourhood. My father and my brother also live in Tophane, having their own flats. If I sold mine, I am pretty sure it would be so remunerative that I could own a two-times-larger place in Basaksehir and even a wheel. You can't imagine how great opportunities have come to us so far; yet I nevertheless have not abandoned here. And, I won't... I don't have such an idea, nor do my acquaintances [...] It is hard to describe what it feels like... [pauses] You should have been born in Tophane. (Murat, local, 27/07/2017).

Even though Murat struggles to find the 'right' words to express what it feels like to be living in Tophane, there is clearly an affective investment at play or, more to the point, a strong emotional attachment to the neighbourhood, which is valid for other residents, too, as Fatih exemplifies:

Tophane is our homeland... Adjacency, kinship, fellowship, solidarity... These are what Tophane means to me and to the rest of us (Fatih, local, 17/07/2017).

For locals, *mahalle kulturu* is a nostalgic term containing a set of entirely positive connotations, which make them proud of their neighbourhood and awakens a sense of residential belonging. If we focus more upon their statements, however, it becomes

apparent that local inhabitants are inclined to use those affirmative connotations in quite self-referential ways:

Well, it is an honour for me to be a *Tophaneli* [Tophane-born], to be living in Tophane. We fall in love with our Tophane, with our *mahalle* [neighbourhood]. Look, the upward is Cihangir. You walk down Cihangir first, then come to Tophane and check whether the humanism, social justice, solidarity, association and esprit de corps are present here or there (Ayhan, 16/07/2017).¹³

Thus, there is a tendency amongst local inhabitants to draw heavily upon these notions when they are asked to justify their residential belonging and the tight-knit communal lifestyle that finds its expression in the term *mahalle kulturu*. Some studies on Tophane (e.g., N. Aktay, 2013; Ammeraal, 2012; Borovali, 2015; Ozata, 2012; Pehlivan, 2011; Wentink, 2014; Zeeman, 2014) have argued that the *mahalle kulturu* stems from the majority of the local residents always-already knowing each other on account of originating from the same province, be it Siirt or Bitlis. Nevertheless, this amounts to reifying the local community of Tophane. As Bourdieu points out, social capital is not readily given once and for all, but acquired through symbolic exchanges (2002 [1986]).

There are some micro-scale kinships amongst those born in Tophane, such as being tied to each other by intermarriages, employing a local lad from another kin whilst there is no need to hire him, taking on or loaning debts. All this can be conceived of as symbolic gestures of an unspoken pact of solidarity, which in turn intensifies the interconnection between those who have already been mutually dependent on each other. Therefore, local residents do not have high levels of social capital because of their kinship; rather, making use of their kinship, they attempt to enhance their existing social capital. This means that *mahalle kulturu* is less likely to be concomitant of kinship or pre-given social capital and more likely to stem from local residents' endeavours to increase the volume of their existing social capital. Therefore, in order to provide a better understanding about where such a tight-knit communal lifestyle has come from, we should consider why those born in Tophane are interdependent and need to display solidarity. Local resident Sabri stated that:

The subject of education has been deferred in Tophane; I decided to drop out of high school in the first year when I couldn't pass the course. Neither my father nor my mother stopped me then, as they didn't even go to school! You see, I

¹³ As mentioned in the previous section, Cihangir is a gentrified neighbourhood, encompassing the area between Taksim Square and Tophane.

didn't have a role model [...] You know the traditional saying '*cocugum oku, büyük adam ol!*' ['give it all you've got at school, so that you can become a big noise']; none of us has 'bought' that in Tophane (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).

In Turkey there is a common, public belief that education is the most advantageous way to climb the social ladder, which is why parents usually motivate their children with the above-mentioned saying to show them what they may gain in the future if they do their best today at school. However, as Sabri acknowledges, education does not rank in priority for the local community of Tophane. Amongst those whom I met during my fieldwork, there was not a single local respondent in possession of a bachelor's degree. Like Sabri, most of them are high school dropouts.

Nevertheless, the fact that Tophane-born residents have not given importance to education is understandable to an extent, because this 'choice' is not arbitrary but determined by class background (Bourdieu, 1977: 77). Since those who comprise the local community of Tophane today originally came from a rural-to-urban immigrant working-class background, as detailed in the previous section, education has not been conceived of as part of their struggle to become permanent in the city.

According to Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), education is given credence predominantly by well-to-do families because of their will to permanently avoid any class degradation. Although class degradation is a vital issue for locals, the apprehension is portrayed as being left with no option but to leave Istanbul and return to their hometown where they are originally from. Local inhabitants seem to have avoided class degradation for their own part, considering their ongoing stay in the neighbourhood. Whilst they were struggling to achieve that, however, the deprivation of education has been reproduced from one generation to another. And this constitutes the reason why there has been no embourgeoisement in the community despite their possession of the real estate properties, which used to belong to the ethnic minorities that comprised the initial residents of Tophane.

Lack of education, together with their anxiety to move back their hometown, leads local residents to make use of any resource that may allow them to enhance their extant social capital. As such, individual struggles to survive in the city develop into a more collective form, out of which such tight-knit communal lifestyle or, in other terms, *mahalle kulture*, comes. At this point, it is of particular importance to remember Bourdieu's expression that 'one has the Paris that goes with one's economic capital, and also with one's cultural and social capital' (1999: 128). Despite their desire to remain in Istanbul, the Istanbul that local residents have seems to be restricted to

Tophane. Even when they do venture outside of Tophane, , however, they want to come back to their neighbourhood immediately:

When we go elsewhere even for a short period of time, we do miss our Tophane. Would you believe it? (Ali, local, 12/08/2017)

While it may enable Tophane-born inhabitants to avoid class degradation, solidarity amongst the local community also makes them more dependent on each other and chains them to the neighbourhood. Although *mahalle kulturu* manifests itself as a proudly articulated residential belonging, the underlying constraints make it hard to interpret their place attachment in that way. Such a tight-knit communal lifestyle exists because residents are left with no option but to work and socialise where they are actually living. In the case of Tophane, this type of necessity arises out of lack of education and compels local inhabitants to rely more on acquaintanceship. That is to say, neither their lifestyle nor *mahalle kulturu* should be reduced to local residents always-already knowing each other. On the contrary, they are putting effort in to providing each other with recognition on a daily basis because they need to compensate for their lack of educational credentials as much as possible. Lacking in education, there remains no other place or realm than their own neighbourhood whereby they can make their living.

As examined in Chapter Two, some authors have argued that gentrification, despite no longer generating spatial dislocation of long-term inhabitants, still has disruptive impacts as dramatic changes in the retail landscape may leave no space for those residents to socialise, may eradicate their long-standing place attachment, and may ultimately lead subaltern groups to a sense of loss of place (e.g., Atkinson, 2015; Davidson, 2008; 2009; Jones, 2012; Reay; 2005; Watt, 2006; Wills, 2008). However, potential effects of (retail) gentrification, such as loss of place and social displacement, do not help us to make sense of the ongoing social conflict in Tophane, since the local inhabitants do not see either *mahalle kulturu* or their communal lifestyle as under threat. Although Tophane has been undergoing retail gentrification, therefore, the process does not seem to have harmed residential belonging because Tophane-born inhabitants continue strengthening the rapport among each other and lean on their community in order to cope with the costs of their lack of education. The next two chapters will focus more upon the ways in which deprivation of both education and cultural capital confronts local residents with newcomers, which is key to making sense of the tension prevailing between these groups. Before that, however, the following section considers gentrifiers and their reasons for moving into Tophane. This will help us to grasp not only why Tophane has been undergoing gentrification, but also the overall volume and type of the capital that gentrifiers possess in Bourdieu's sense.

5.4 The Collective Arrival of Newcomers: Cultural Dispositions or Economic Reasons?

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the Tophane dock has played a major role in shaping the stages that Tophane has gone through. First, it led the area to be designed as a military-industry zone. A wide range of facilities from warehouses to arsenals were built and the shore was physically improved for that purpose. In the 1800s, the dock had transformed Tophane both into a trade centre and a multicultural, wealthy residential neighbourhood. The residential life began with the settlement of various ethnic communities, who had already been residing in Istanbul, but decided to move into Tophane because of the commercial activities taking place on the shore. In 1929 the dock turned into the first assembly plant of Ford's Motor Company in Turkey, which invited rural-to-urban migrants to Tophane – migrants whose children and grandchildren comprise the local community today. However, the dock derives its importance not simply from the above-mentioned turning points in the history of Tophane. There is another significant factor, constituting one of the main reasons why Tophane has transformed from a working-class quarter to a gentrifying neighbourhood occupied by a large number of art galleries. Remaining idle for more than three decades, the warehouses at the shore have been redesigned to host the first modern art museum of Istanbul, *Istanbul Modern*, which has put Tophane on the map and led art galleries to move into the neighbourhood. As one Art Gallery owner put it:

Art galleries always flourish in particular streets, located around museums. As long as there is a major museum, no matter where it is – be it any district, there exist art galleries. This is because your potential visitors and clients are right there; and you have to follow them (İlhan, owner of Art Gallery 2, 20/07/2017).

Leyla, of Art Gallery 3, also supported the idea that Tophane started hosting art galleries because of the museum (29/08/2017). A great deal of the art galleries in Tophane today, like that of İlhan's and Leyla's, are located on Bogazkesen Street, Tophane's high-street that links Istiklal Street, the most iconic and touristic street of Istanbul, to the Istanbul Modern (see Figure 2). Before the museum was opened, most of these art galleries had been located in Cihangir. A large proportion of the art galleries that moved from Cihangir to Tophane present themselves as independent contemporary art galleries. Serving in relatively small but well-designed venues, they work with young artists. That being said, Tophane also hosts high-end art galleries, which work with reputable artists and sell art works at premium prices. Despite the difference between their policies, the Istanbul Modern seems to have attracted this type of art gallery, too:

We are quite different from those [other art galleries] who pile them high and sell them cheap. Constant expenses exhaust us for that reason. You must minimise those expenses as much as possible so that you can make a gain. To do so, however, you need to sell an artwork first [...] Well, we have our own collectors, to be fair. But still, you can't be dependent solely on them, can you? You must reach out to anonymous museum-goers, too. Even if just one visitor, out of a hundred, makes a purchase, it does mean quite a lot to us. It is a pity that we have to make such calculations and act accordingly. Nevertheless, that's why we've come here [Tophane] from Nisantasi (Erdem, owner of Art Gallery 1, 17/07/2017).¹⁴

In spite of occupying asymmetric positions in the field of art, the art galleries in Tophane have interests and concerns in common, and as a result they have collectively moved into the neighbourhood. Although their arrival was related primarily to the Istanbul Modern, these art galleries have not made do with moving close to the museum. Instead of counting upon anonymous visitors, the art gallery owners have come up with an idea to organise a number of joint events, called *Tophane Art Walk*. The objective was to make Tophane the new hub of art and art lovers, since the route includes the art galleries located on Bogazkesen Street in particular whilst excluding many others, chiefly those located in Cihangir. Buket of Gallery 5 is one of the owners who have moved their art gallery from Cihangir to Tophane in the past five years in order to take advantage of the walking tours.

As such, Tophane has become a vibrant art district of Istanbul, hosting a wide range of events from festivals to exhibitions, workshops to design weeks. For instance, the 14th Istanbul Biennial was held at the French Orphanage, which is located on Bogazkesen Street. The real estate company that has been undertaking renovation of the historical Yugoslavian blocks situated at Bogazkesen Street organises a design week twice a year. The company advertises Tophane as the new 'designhood'. Additionally, Tophane is hosting the Istanbul Coffee Festival, which is organised regularly. Today, the alleys of Bogazkesen Street are also full of cultural attractions such as 'the Museum of Innocence' established by Orhan Pamuk (recipient of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature).

Art has a role in enlivening inner-city working-class districts. Tophane is no exception in that both the Istanbul Modern museum and art galleries have animated the neighbourhood and transformed it from an area famous solely for its traditional hookah cafes into a vibrant quarter where festivals are held. According to Clay's (1979) stage model of classic gentrification, retail gentrification, driven predominantly

¹⁴ Nisantasi is one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Istanbul, emblematic centre of those who rank among the most affluent segment of the Turkish society.

by the field of art, is one of the main factors that captivates wealthier groups and encourages them to move into neighbourhoods that have both an authentic urban fabric and carnivalesque atmosphere (Clay 1979; see also Cameron and Coaffee, 2005; Ley, 2003; Mathews, 2010; Zukin, 2011). Public recognition of a certain residential area is expected to convince these groups, which are more affluent than the first wave of gentrifiers, that the area is now worth settling in. As such, rents and property values start to increase, and this trend continues until the rent gap is closed (*i.e.*, long-term inhabitants are spatially re/dislocated) (N. Smith, 1979a; 1987). Pınar, a performing artist, stated that:

Well, we [artists] are part of this [gentrification] process. I am aware that our presence does change and enliven the atmosphere; it contributes to the urban vibrancy. However, for those of us occupied in creative industries, it is essential to be in the city centre, somewhere reachable for many. We couldn't survive otherwise. And we have to achieve that [finding somewhere in the inner-city] with minimum cost since we have neither high budget nor financial support from the government. Tophane as such meets that need for now (Pınar, performing artist, 06/09/2017).

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Smith's rent-gap theory enables us to grasp why inner-city working-class neighbourhoods are more likely to undergo gentrification compared to the suburbs, where rents are arguably affordable, too. In fact, the theory suggests that low rents alone are not sufficient for gentrifiers to move into a quarter. Pınar's statement above indicates that there is a gap between the actual ground rent and potential ground rent level in Tophane. However, her expression also gives rise to a question: why do rents remain relatively low and affordable in Tophane despite the neighbourhood's central location and being surrounded by such gentrified areas as Cihangir, Karaköy and Galata?

The answer is that those born in Tophane, who are culturally subaltern due to their class background, still comprise the majority of the inhabitants residing in the neighbourhood, and they are not willing to move elsewhere. As elaborated in Chapter Two, gentrification proceeds through the spatial dislocation of long-term inhabitants as wealthier groups are inclined to consider the socio-demographic composition of a given area before settling there. Although retail gentrification has put Tophane on the map, the neighbourhood has not turned into a gentrified area – unlike its surrounding counterparts. Tophane is still a gentrifying neighbourhood because most of the Tophane-born residents are property owners and therefore have not been displaced by the ongoing gentrification process. This discourages those whose arrival is expected

to transform a gentrifying quarter into a gentrified area from moving into Tophane because, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the presence of such a tight-knit local community in Tophane makes the neighbourhood look relatively poor, and as if it is occupied by those who rank among lower segments of the society. In the opinion of some of the newcomers however, their presence in the neighbourhood produces an interesting cultural life in the area that attracts others despite the make up of the local inhabitants:

Pınar: As a matter of fact, we do not appeal to them [the local].

Cihan: We truly don't! Yet I nonetheless believe that our presence here [in Tophane] has encouraged some to settle in the neighbourhood, awakening them to the opinion that despite all this, there is still life going on in Tophane. (Joint interview with Pınar, performing artist, and Cihan, performing artist, 06/09/2017).

However, contrary to Cihan's interpretation, this group of newcomers have moved into the neighbourhood not because of the vibrant cultural life. Instead, the reasons are more economic than cultural. Newcomers that have moved into Tophane for residential purposes are mostly tenants and consist of those who could not afford the increasing rents in Cihangir. Selma, for instance, was a female elementary school teacher in her thirties who had been living in Tophane for three years. Before she moved into the neighbourhood, she had been living in Cihangir where she was sharing a flat. She had been able to afford to live by herself for four years. However, when Cihangir turned into a fully gentrified neighbourhood, she was left with no option but to find two flatmates to share the rent. Her rationale for moving into Tophane was based on rents being lower in Tophane than in Cihangir. This is a matter of great importance, not only to her, but also to others who no longer want to share a flat but live on their own. Tophane was her choice because it is only a five-minute walk from Cihangir (Selma, 21/07/2017).

The reasons that Selma highlights applied to Seda too. Quitting her job in the marketing sector, she started making her own organic soaps and now sells them online via Instagram. As she states:

It didn't take me so long to realise that I wouldn't be able to produce them [organic soaps] in a shared flat. I would need an extra room to put all the stuff, I mean, the materials and chemicals... I couldn't have made it while having three flatmates [laughs]. I do love Cihangir and the cultural atmosphere over there, yet I had to find an affordable place having at least two bedrooms, so

that I could convert one into an atelier. You know what that means!?! To pay the whole rent by yourself... I couldn't afford such a place in Cihangir, but I can do so in Tophane. Besides, it [Tophane] is just a stone's throw away from Cihangir (Seda, 07/09/2017).

Therefore, while both the Istanbul Modern museum and art galleries contribute to the authentic fabric of Tophane, this type of retail gentrification does not constitute the reason why gentrifiers have moved into the neighbourhood. Instead, Tophane hosts those who come from a different class background compared to the local community because Cihangir has become a gentrified neighbourhood. This means that the residential gentrification in Tophane - *i.e.*, socio-demographic changes in the composition of those residing in the neighbourhood - is related to the gentrification process that Cihangir has undergone. According to Clay's (1979) stage model of gentrification, as mentioned in Chapter Two, gentrification has a domino effect in the sense that displacement does not come to an end even after a given location has been gentrified. Clay (1979) argues that once long-term non-gentrifier inhabitants have been displaced, the process begins to compel the first wave of gentrifiers, who are less affluent and therefore cannot afford to stay in a gentrified quarter, to move into another inner-city working-class district where the rent gap has not yet been closed.

This demonstrates that Tophane follows some of the key patterns of the gentrification process. It has been affected by the process operating in Cihangir, and now hosts the pioneers who used to live in Cihangir but, since they could not compete with the increasing rents, had to move into Tophane. It shows that Tophane hosts those gentrifiers who have high levels of cultural capital but a relative lack of economic capital in Bourdieu's sense. Furthermore, Tophane's newcomers (including those who do not reside there, but run businesses in the neighbourhood), are predominantly occupied in the creative industries. This has turned Tophane into an area shared by diverse groups, such as culturally subaltern local residents and culturally privileged newcomers. This has happened not because of social mix policies developed by local authorities to protect non-gentrifier inhabitants against displacement. Tophane is instead socio-culturally diverse because the arrival of newcomers has not displaced those who were born in the neighbourhood, who both own real estate property and feel a strong place attachment to Tophane.

Tophane, therefore, has not become a fully gentrified neighbourhood despite the changes in its retail landscape. Today, Tophane offers a high degree of authenticity, reflecting the cosmopolitan and industrial past of Istanbul. Whereas the historical apartments are a reminder of Istanbul's commercial and multicultural heyday, the smithies that are still in operation provide a reminder of the industrial era. Nevertheless,

in spite of the presence of art galleries, ateliers, interior design offices, advertising agencies, theatres, dance, yoga and pilates studios, Tophane does not attract the more affluent gentrifiers (*i.e.*, followers). As such, Tophane remains a (still) gentrifying neighbourhood, where Tophane-born residents (who are mostly deprived of education, but own property), reside alongside newcomer ‘pioneers’, (who possess high levels of cultural capital, but relatively low economic capital compared to the more affluent gentrifiers in areas like Cihangir). As such, the newcomers in Tophane have been compelled into the area for economic reasons:

I would not have moved out of Cihangir if I had any other chance to stay (Ege, newcomer, 23/07/2017).

It is worth noting therefore, that the newcomers who reside in Tophane do not conceive of the local community as a component of Tophane’s ‘authentic urban fabric’. In a similar vein, they do not refer to the attractions of socio-cultural diversity when providing justifications as to why they have moved into the neighbourhood. As indicated above, the newcomers have settled in Tophane for economic reasons, not cultural ones. Their statements make it clear that they chose Tophane amongst other neighbourhoods to re-settle because of their desire to be close to Cihangir, and to enjoy the social and cultural vibrancy over there. This means that Tophane, despite being a gentrifying neighbourhood, is not yet a centre of attention, but a good alternative, at best, for those who wish to reside in Cihangir but do not have the economic capital to do so. This point adds to our understanding of why gentrifiers residing in Tophane do not socialise with local inhabitants in the neighbourhood, but rather in Cihangir, and helps to set the context in which social tensions arise between local residents and newcomers.

5.5 Conclusion

Tophane, with the arrival of newcomers, has turned into a gentrifying and socio-culturally diverse neighbourhood in the past ten years. Although gentrification as a process has a tendency to eventually eradicate socio-demographic heterogeneity, this chapter has made it clear that this has not happened in Tophane because of the neighbourhoods’ own unique dynamics. More than a decade since the gentrification process began, the local residents are still residing in the neighbourhood. Unlike fully gentrified areas such as Cihangir, Karaköy and Galata, Tophane, therefore, is still gentrifying. This is because the majority of the Tophane-born inhabitants inherited a wide range of real estate properties (from stores to apartments) from their ancestors

who migrated from either Siirt or Bitlis to Tophane in the late 1920s.¹⁵ This is of particular importance, providing an explanation as to why the social conflict between the main groups of Tophane does not arise out of displacement, or fears relating to that. The chapter has shown that owing to their possession of properties, the local inhabitants are not on the verge of being spatially dislocated by the ongoing gentrification process. In spite of hosting a large number of art galleries, boutiques, cafés, design ateliers and dance, yoga and pilates studios, Tophane is stuck between the second and third stages of gentrification. As a result, locals and gentrifying newcomers reside together.

The chapter has also detailed aspects of the communal lifestyle and residential belonging in Tophane. It has demonstrated that the social tension in Tophane does not stem from a sense of loss of place, since the Tophane-born inhabitants are proud of sustaining *mahalle kulturu* – i.e., their tight-knit lifestyle, in the neighbourhood. Instead of taking their place-attachment for granted, however, the chapter has argued that the reproduction of this residential belonging is related to a deprivation of education and cultural capital on the part of local residents – a deprivation that indicates that there has been no embourgeoisement for locals. The reason why local residents, despite being property owners, could not climb the social ladder is because their predecessors were rural-to-urban migrants whose priority was to hold on to the city by any means. Those who now comprise the local community have similar concerns to their ancestors, and as such, do not give importance to formal education but rely on what they are equipped with best: their neighbourhood social capital. The residential belonging and communal lifestyle in Tophane amount to ‘making virtue out of necessity’ in that regard. Both arise out of the long-term residents being chained to the neighbourhood because of educational deprivation. They do not sell their own property, nor do they think they could reside elsewhere, because the social capital whereby they make their living is only valid in Tophane.

The chapter has also accounted for the major characteristics of the gentrifiers of Tophane. It has argued that these newcomers do not have as much economic capital as cultural capital, and that their relatively low economic capital constitutes the main reason why they have moved from Cihangir to Tophane. Focusing upon the justifications that newcomers provide as to why they chose Tophane, the chapter argued that residential gentrification in Tophane is related to the gentrification process in Cihangir. The economic necessities behind their arrival indicate that once a given quarter has been gentrified, the first wave of gentrifiers also become vulnerable to spatial dislocation. As such, the case of Tophane verifies that gentrification has a

¹⁵ These people came to Tophane with the aim of finding a job in the assembly plant of Ford’s Motor Company; however, they became the new owners of the properties vacated by the Greek and Armenian communities in the wake of the Istanbul Pogrom that took place in 1955.

domino effect. Nevertheless, the gentrifiers' accounts have demonstrated that Tophane is not considered as authentic as Cihangir

– despite the former being more diverse in cultural terms than the latter. Therefore, this casts doubt on the so-called Bourdieusian argument that gentrifiers are cosmopolitan and diversity-friendly on account of their possession of cultural capital (e.g., Caulfield, 1989; 1994; Ley, 1997; 2003). As discussed in Chapter Two, it has been widely claimed that gentrification is driven partly by gentrifiers' politico-cultural desire to create an alternative urban space in the inner-city. If acquisition of high levels of cultural capital is regarded as what makes gentrifiers open to social engagement with subaltern groups, this means that the newcomers of Tophane are not 'true' owners of cultural capital – considering their wish to keep residing in Cihangir instead of Tophane. However, as argued in Chapter Three, there is no such intrinsic positive correlation between the possession of cultural capital and being diversity-friendly. The following chapter will present a new argument: for gentrifiers, what determines the stance they take in everyday life towards subaltern groups is not their acquisition of cultural capital, but their quest for distinction.

CHAPTER 6

STRUGGLES FOR DISTINCTION: INTRA-GROUP RIVALRIES AND THE LACK OF INTERACTION BETWEEN NEWCOMERS AND LOCALS

6.1 Introduction

Drawing upon fieldwork data, this chapter aims to provide an explanation for the observed lack of social interaction between newcomers and local residents in Tophane. It argues that the lack of interaction is related to a ‘struggle for distinction’ (Bourdieu, 1984) on the part of gentrifiers, which stands at the epicentre of the social conflict between locals and newcomers. In line with theoretical debates on the politics of gentrification, outlined in Chapter Three, this chapter argues that in everyday life newcomers shy away from local residents not because of their lack of cultural capital (meaning they are not ‘diversity-friendly’), but the very opposite: because they hold high levels of cultural capital. Their high levels of cultural capital propel them into a struggle for distinction in a Bourdieusian sense, a consequence of which is a lack of engagement with the local community of Tophane.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first highlights that struggles for distinction on the part of newcomers take place not just in their interactions with local residents, but also in their interactions with each other. The chapter starts therefore with an account of the intra-group rivalries observed amongst newcomers. These rivalries sought to establish who is more educated, cultivated, and sophisticated in their tastes amongst the gentrifier group. It argues that newcomers, despite their existing cultural capital, need to continually put the *authenticity* of that capital across to their counterparts. This is because positions occupied in the culturally privileged group of newcomers are not stable, but at stake.

The second part of the chapter argues that the struggle for distinction on the part of newcomers leads to a lack of interaction with local residents. Data show that newcomers hesitate to interact with culturally subaltern local residents because it might erode their cultural capital, or cast doubt on their claim to be distinctive, or lead their rivals to accuse them of being wannabes – *i.e.*, those who pretend to be cultivated. This

argument draws upon data from semi-structured interviews with newcomers, alongside field observations, to examine how newcomers perceive of those born in Tophane. The critical use of interview data is particularly crucial here. I argue that often the interview accounts of newcomers do not describe, but instead stigmatise local residents, and so veil rather than reveal the underlying reason behind the lack of interaction.

6.2 Intra-group Struggles for Distinction: Being ‘First among Equals’

This section demonstrates how the transformation of cultural capital into symbolic capital brings gentrifiers into conflict with each other. It argues that newcomers are engaged in intra-group struggles for distinction, through which they seek to protect their own position. This argument is firstly established by examining the consumption practices of newcomers in the café life of Cihangir and Karaköy, two gentrified neighbourhoods that surround Tophane, in which newcomers compete to show that they possess sophisticated and authentic tastes. I then move to consider art exhibition openings and the competition between newcomers to prove that they are the ‘true’ lovers of art, and the trend-setters, not the trend-followers. The examples used in this section are deployed to illuminate the dynamic and relational nature of the struggle for distinction, and to establish why agents are perpetually required to activate new distinction mechanisms and consumption patterns.

6.2.1 Theatrical Consumptions, Uses of Space and Position-Taking in Everyday Life: The Distinction between Cihangir and Karakoy in the Context of Cafés

[...] because to go somewhere is to consume it as well (Seda, newcomer, 07/09/2017).

Although daily activities – like visiting cafés - may be considered to be what agents take part in with no calculation, they in fact exemplify the ways in which gentrifiers take positions in struggles over distinction. What a certain consumption practice or space symbolically means is thus vulnerable to change in accordance with the manoeuvres and position-takings of those who pursue distinction, which finds its best expression in the contrast between café-going in Cihangir and Karaköy, two gentrified neighbourhoods that surround Tophane.

These two areas in fact display a great similarity; both are full of boutique cafés, gourmet restaurants and cosy pubs – consumption spaces that all supposedly appeal to ‘sophisticated’ tastes. However, I suggest that the newcomers’ intra-group struggles over the authenticity of cultural capital and its acquisition have confronted these two

areas with each other, and altered what each represents. Cihangir and its consumption spaces are identified with those whose cultural capital is believed to be authentic and self-evident, whereas Karaköy is seen as a *nouveau-riche* area, where merely copycats socialise in order to possess cultural capital at premium prices. It is nonetheless important to note that Karaköy was not always conceived of in that way. A number of my newcomer informants expressed that they had no hesitation in going to the cafés in Karaköy until the area dramatically changed (Ege, 23/07/2017; Gözde, 11/08/2017; Seda, 07/09/2017; Selma, 21/07/2017).¹⁶

Karaköy is not like it was five years ago, as there were remarkably fewer people hanging out in the area. We were a very small group, knowing each other in person. This was mainly because there used to be only a couple of spaces to sit. But now, there is a large number of them. All this has made me alienated towards Karaköy, where I used to feel part of a community (Gözde, 11/08/2017).

Yet the kind of changes mentioned by newcomers to justify why they no longer socialise in Karaköy were arguably not as deep-rooted as claimed. Instead, they had a tendency to dramatise the changes because Karaköy, and its Café life, had become less and less advantageous for them in their quest for distinction.

It goes without saying that the *raison d'être* of cafés revolves around catering to the needs of their consumers; however, the consumers' quest for distinction has reconfigured the definition of that need. It did not take café owners long to realise that their clientele were not just after well-made coffee or tea but 'something more' according to which cafés would necessarily be customised. As such, cafés have got involved in struggles for distinction, and started to compete against each other to offer a more authentic experience aside from food and drink. In fact, their primary role as symbolic consumption spaces that act to discriminate between groups of clientele was explicitly discussed by some of Karaköy's café owners:

Me and Melis had reflected upon which profile we'd like to serve before having had this café decorated, as interior decoration helps you create your own clientele typology. If you check on the place next to us, for instance, you'll see that our customers are completely different from its. Ambience is the most efficient gate keeper here; it is not us but rather the decoration which doesn't let anyone

¹⁶ Karaköy is an ex-industrial area which is located on the Bosphorus shore. The authentic urban fabric that stems from its industrial past makes the area resemble Tophane; however, what distinguishes Karaköy from Tophane is the former having no residential life. This has meant that Karaköy's spatial and symbolic changes have been mostly related to retail gentrification. (Erhan, interior architect and co-owner of Café 2 in Karaköy, 09/09/2017).

undesirable in this café on behalf of us. And this is exactly what we aimed for: to give many the impression that they won't feel comfortable if they step in, so that our own clientele can feel at home

We keep prices high on purpose to keep certain groups out, which is essential to standardise our clients and service quality. This may sound like discrimination against the populace, which I wouldn't object, yet we nevertheless have to be selective. Our menu reflects this policy as well. We serve our customers only what we're specialised in: hot beverages, sandwiches and desserts – that's all! The menu seemingly may not offer much to our clientele. But we do provide a cosy atmosphere here [in this café] with loft-style design and good music. Now I can't permit anything or anyone that might kill the vibe here, you know. It therefore matters to me who is going to sit next to one of my frequenters. Because we ensure their satisfaction in advance. And our customers, they all know they will be at ease when they come here. Otherwise, they would mind paying higher amounts of money and probably go elsewhere (Sinan, owner of Café 1 in Karaköy, 28/07/2017).

Cafés, with their involvement in struggles for distinction, start to impose a set of tacit requirements among which acquisition of remarkable amounts of cultural capital is primary. These criteria enable café owners to convince their own clientele that they serve only cultivated and sophisticated selves – *i.e.*, the 'true' owners of cultural capital. Since boutique cafés are designed to close their doors on many but welcome only select groups, existing customers are provided with a justification to feel high-calibre – even their mere presence supposedly confirms that they have met all the required standards. As such, cafés have become symbolic spaces where customers are vested with the approval of their taste and existing capital. This is illustrated in Melis's comments about the discerning nature of her establishment, which puts a price on sophisticated taste:

The café next to us has just launched a new campaign: brewed coffee and cheesecake, just for 10 [Turkish] Liras. Well, we're by no means fans of underpricing policy, which is why those who come and ask whether we also have such special offer goes there once they hear 'No!'. Here we are offering the same products for 23 Liras. Some find this pricey but it's not at all! Because coffee is not something you can drink on the cheap especially if it is a well-made, luscious one. Still, I am not naïve to expect those who lack gusto to appreciate this, you know. They may have their own reasons to prioritise the price over the quality (Melis, co-owner of Café 2, 09/09/2017).

To willingly pay premium prices for coffee is exactly what ‘true’ coffee-lovers are inclined to do, according to Melis. Here it is useful to recall Bourdieu’s argument that people engage in certain cultural activities to signify their levels of capital:

The people who read that there is a very strong correlation between educational level and museum-going have every likelihood of being museum-goers, of being art lovers ready to die for the love of art (Bourdieu, 1993: 23).

With respect to café-going, insofar as purchases like coffee are evaluated as signifiers of a sophisticated taste, those who lack but nonetheless aim for it, start to order high-priced coffee as part of their struggle for upclassing, or, as Melis puts it, to show that they possess the necessary ‘gusto’ to appreciate quality. The cafés located in Karaköy desire to make their clientele feel exclusive and distinctive by providing them with the approval of their cultural capital and good taste. In so doing, however, these places awaken in others in the gentrifying group the idea that their relative lack of ‘authentic’ cultural capital and less sophisticated taste can be remedied if they purchase an indicator of it – *i.e.*, if they order a product served inside. This has not only put Karaköy on the map, but has made the struggles over distinction accessible to others with the necessary economic capital to consume. In turn, this group of gentrifiers – the trend-followers – are then perceived to be either copycats, or *nouveau-riches* by the trend-setters:

I am not going to Karaköy anymore; it used to be nicer when there were fewer cafes. But Karaköy has changed a lot since then and become a *nouveau-riche* site [*sonradan gormelerin mekani haline geldi*]. Now it does not make any sense to me to pay that much for a single cup of coffee (Seda, 07/09/2017).

Today, Karaköy is seen as an area which allows those equipped with economic capital to enhance their relatively low cultural capital at premium prices and take part in struggles for distinction. Going to boutique cafés, either in groups or individually, is therefore one of those activities whereby gentrifiers (be they trend-setters or trend-followers) pursue distinction and crave to outclass each other. Where to go, as well as what to order, is neither arbitrary nor visceral but part of the struggle over the authenticity of existing cultural capital, and a way to perform the cultivated self. Ayse implies this when he says:

I just can’t take delight in Karaköy [...] Take, the third-wave coffee shops, for example: they all really do seem comfy, though nothing served is finest. But I tell you what the worst is, clients are not cultivated enough to distinguish the taste of what they’ve ordered. You don’t become a gourmet once you pay 18 Liras

for raspberry cheesecake, do you? Those over there nonetheless believe so, you know. They're only too pleased to buy that illusion but I am not... Karaköy, as it is, by no means meets my expectations (Gözde, scriptwriter, 11/08/2017).

Karaköy and its cafes as symbolic consumption spaces, are evidently on the list of some of the gentrifiers' 'don'ts'. However, I argue that this is not because Karaköy has simply been invaded by copycats – *i.e.*, those who are after buying a signifier of distinction. As has been argued in Chapter Three, for one to accuse someone of being a copycat is to veil one's own interest in doing whatever is likely to provide 'a profit of distinction' (Bourdieu, 1977: 181-182, 197). Thus, the existence of a wannabe crowd is not exactly what has discouraged some of the newcomers from going to Karaköy. It is rather the lack of distinction mechanisms in Karaköy that has caused this: the newcomers, who think that they are 'naturally' distinctive, are disappointed in Karaköy because they cannot find appropriate parameters with which to differentiate themselves from trend-followers or nouveau-riches.

This, together with their hesitation to socialise in Karaköy, signifies that although such diverse groups of gentrifiers as 'pioneers' and 'followers' can analytically be distinguished according to the overall volume and combination of their capital (Ley, 1997, 2003) (as discussed in both Chapter Two and Chapter Three), in everyday life there is no such clear distinction between these groups. Gentrifiers' anxiety to be seen and treated as cultivated, indicates that acquisition of a high level of cultural capital does not *a priori* differentiate its possessor from others, which is why even those who regard themselves as true owners of cultural capital also need to pursue distinction. For even trend-setters might be accused of being copycats in struggles over categorisation. Thus it is crucial for newcomers to differentiate themselves through daily consumption practices in symbolic spaces. For many of my respondents, this was done in the context of café-going by engaging in cultural consumption in Cihangir rather than Karaköy. Importantly, such daily practices enable them to signify what kind of newcomer they are *not*, as Selma puts it:

[...] Cihangir is not like Karaköy, you know... It is quite different indeed. I mean, the people are nicer first. They are intimate, not like those dying to climb on their high horse (Selma, 21/07/2017).

Despite the distinction that newcomers like Selma made between Cihangir and Karaköy, I did not observe such dramatic differences between these two gentrified neighbourhoods. As indicated above, newcomers state that they do not go to Karaköy anymore because it has turned into a nouveau-riche place. Although they refer to

the prices in Karaköy to justify their claim, the cafés located in Cihangir were not affordable either. They served goods at premium prices in a similar way to those located in Karaköy. Given their cosy decoration, they also appeared as committed as the cafés in Karaköy to fulfilling the cultural needs of their clientele.

Cihangir, therefore, is not an area freed from those who strive to enhance their cultural capital by making use of their economic capital. However, interestingly, although the newcomers of Tophane have been displaced from Cihangir by the arrival of more affluent gentrifiers, they still do not conceive of Cihangir as an area occupied by those called *nouveau-riches*. The reason they are inclined to evaluate Cihangir as a space where there are no copycats is arguably because they themselves choose Cihangir over Karaköy to spend their spare time. Take the above-cited statement of Selma for instance: she actually differentiates herself when she describes the people in Cihangir as ‘not like those dying to climb on their high horse.’ According to my observations, however, gentrifiers prefer going to Cihangir over Karaköy not because there are no wannabes in the neighbourhood, but because they can present themselves here as ‘naturally’ distinctive and get the upper hand in struggles for distinction.

So, how do gentrifiers manage to distinguish themselves from their counterparts, whom they accuse of being *nouveau-riches*, in Cihangir? During fieldwork, I realised that there were two different groups socialising in the neighbourhood. The first is comprised of those who are seemingly unpretentious in terms of their outfit - dressed mostly in a bohemian style - whereas the second is comprised of those who dress ‘classily’ - preferring rather elegant outfits over streetwear. The cafés in Cihangir are heterogenous, however, hosting gentrifiers from each group. These people, in spite of the differences in their outlook, perform their cultural capital and take part in the struggles over distinction. Nevertheless, I noticed that members of the first group attempt to appropriate profit of distinction by refusing that very profit. This group of gentrifiers, by putting casual clothes on, desire to show others that they are not after distinction -as they are already ‘naturally’ distinctive- and it is not a ‘big deal’ for them to hang out in Cihangir.

You don’t dress up for your own local café, do you? Now, there is something essentially ridiculous about all these people dressing classily: they come from different quarters all the way to Cihangir just for a couple of hours in the neighbourhood (Ege, newcomer, 23/07/2017).

Representing their denial of the struggles over distinction as such, these gentrifiers claim to be superior and treat others as ‘show-offs’, whose aim is to maximise a

relatively low amount of cultural capital at premium costs. Fussiness and classy outfits are despised in that regard and seem endemic to those who have neither sufficient cultural capital or know-how to partake in the social life in Cihangir, but nevertheless dare to pursue cultural distinction.

Importantly, in Cihangir, there is room for gentrifiers to operationalise their apparel in such a way as to put across their disinterest in the struggles for distinction and distinguish themselves. This is because the neighbourhood, unlike Karaköy, is a residential quarter. The residential life in Cihangir enables these agents not only to veil their quest for distinction, but to present themselves as the true owners of cultural capital and to naturalise their claim to be distinctive. Casual wear accordingly allows this group of gentrifiers to stage that they do not expect to receive symbolic profit in return for sitting in a café, whereby they not only differentiate themselves from other clients but accuse them of being wannabes.¹⁷

All this suggests that the reason gentrifiers are not going to Karaköy anymore is not simply that Karaköy has become popularised and occupied by those considered to be lacking appropriate ‘gusto’ and cultural capital. Cihangir is no less popular than Karaköy, as mentioned above. However, despite that, gentrifiers neither evaluate Cihangir in the way they do Karaköy, nor avoid spending their spare time in the neighbourhood. That is because in Cihangir rather than in Karaköy, they can distinguish themselves and persuade others that only theirs is the authentic cultural capital. Therefore, they do not conceive of others who also tend to socialise in Cihangir as a threat to their rarity. Gözde observes that Cihangir is getting popular day by day amongst those who still hang out in Karaköy; however, she adds that she is not keen to leave the neighbourhood for that reason. ‘I personally do not mind encountering those “Karaköy people” here in Cihangir,’ says she (11/08/2017).

The distinction that gentrifiers make between Karaköy and Cihangir, by assessing the former as a *nouveau-riche* area, indicates that positions in struggles over distinction are context-bound and always at stake: gentrifiers are reluctant to go to Karaköy not because they are uncomfortable with the presence of a group of trend-followers socialising in the area, but because they themselves are worried about being identified as one of them – since Karaköy does not offer them much to distinguish themselves as naturally distinctive and superior. Put in this way, it becomes clear that copycats do not consist of certain groups or persons. It is rather certain practices that render some ‘wannabes’. This necessitates agents to seem as disinterested as possible,

¹⁷ This same act does not have the same symbolic meaning in Karaköy, on the other hand. Since Karaköy is a non-residential area, seemingly unpretentious style does not help gentrifiers pretend to be disinterested in the struggles for distinction, especially when socialising in cafés, but contrarily reveals their desire to ‘become’ distinctive by looking fashionably dishevelled.

despite getting involved in the struggle, to show that they are already distinguished and hereby need not quest for distinction. Therefore, the fear of making a mistake and revealing one's own quest for distinction does stand for most – no matter how rigorous or authentic they perceive their own acquisition of cultural capital. This accounts for why gentrifiers, despite their cultural capital, appeared quite nervous in daily life: they felt obliged to straighten up and fly high because otherwise they could be likened to copycats. This dynamic also came into sharp focus during observations of art exhibition openings, as will now be elaborated.

6.2.2 *The Art Galleries and Exhibition Openings in Tophane: Art Objects or the 'Cultured Self' Exhibited?*

Now I can't invite everyone, especially the man in the street, to my events. I have to be selective on the contrary because your audience indicates the position that you and your gallery occupy in the field of arts. Whom to invite is therefore as important as the artists you have decided to work with (Erdem, owner of Art Gallery 1, 17/07/2017).

Most of the art galleries in Tophane have a common policy to limit the number of guests that are invited to the opening receptions (İlhan, 20/07/2017; Leyla, 17/08/2017; Buket, 06/09/2017). During my fieldwork, I had the chance to attend three exhibition openings at some of my informants' invitation, which allowed me to observe exhibition-goers and their pursuit of distinction at close range. This section argues that the invitation *per se* does not suffice to make guests feel privileged, as they are tacitly invited to challenge each other on possession of their cultural capital. And, as will exemplified below, they tend to do so by monitoring each other's behaviours in order to detect whether one has failed to conform to the etiquettes tacitly required of all invitees. This set of rules is used to confirm that only true art-lovers have been invited to the reception, which enables guests to see right through those who in fact did not deserve to be there. Invitees are asked not only to toe the line, but also to collectively condemn anyone putting a foot wrong as an 'outsider' in the name of art. As such, to avoid making an error that is likely to cause 'excommunication' becomes top priority for the audience, which contributes to the reproduction and sacralisation of those rules. Invitees, therefore, are deeply invested in the game of art, and seek to play it with skill and competence. As Bourdieu states:

The game makes the illusio, sustaining itself through the informed player's investment in *the game*. The player, mindful of *the game's* meaning and having

been created for *the game* because he was created by it, plays *the game* and by playing it *assures* its existence (Bourdieu, 1993: 250, original emphases).

Since invitees are assumed to have high levels of cultural capital and therefore *a priori* know what they must avoid doing in art exhibition receptions, a wrongdoing is considered a sign of a lack of cultural capital. And, because guests are offered the opportunity for symbolic paybacks in return for their conformity, tolerance to any ‘violation’ is out of the question, and evaluated as unwarranted as the mistake itself. The mere fact that one has committed an error signifies that the person has no idea what those tacit requirements are. For example, what should be avoided in the first place is to ask straightforwardly about the price of an artwork, as expressed by both İlhan of Art Gallery 2 and Erdem of Art Gallery 1:

We hand catalogues to our attendees on purpose to let them know in advance the values of what we are exhibiting here. Nevertheless, despite that, there are always some who come to me and ask how much a particular artwork is worth. This has happened so many times that now I can even distinguish beforehand who are more likely to ask if I make a discount and bargain with me [laughs]. But you know what is worse? You can’t tell them that this is not part of your job. You just can’t because you suppose that is what they should already know (İlhan, 20/07/2017).

Well, of course, we expect whosoever has come to our reception to be aware that they must comport themselves like they are in a sacred place. Because art is sacred itself. For example, I really can’t bear when someone points her finger at a painting and ask if she may learn how much that costs. Here [in an art gallery] you can’t act like you were in a grocery, can you? In so doing, however, they are not only treating me like a cashier but disrespecting other attendees (Erdem, 17/07/2017).

The *raison d’être* of such etiquettes is to ensure due performance of every single guest, and thereby the prestige of the crowd gathered at the exhibition opening. In such exclusive events and organisations, invitees are required to ennoble each other, so that group membership can be of particular value. This is because guests do not feel privileged in their own right. They need to make each other feel privileged so that they can feel so themselves. And etiquettes here conceal this reciprocal dependence between guests, rendering interpersonal reverences unnecessary. Invitees are asked to treat each other with due form not *vis-à-vis*, but rather by behaving themselves and not violating the unwritten rules that they are assumed to know beforehand.

That being said, here it is worth elaborating more on why guests are inclined to take some of those violations personally. Tacit requirements are in fact nothing other than a set of ‘don’ts’. In this regard, invitees are supposed to abstain from anything that might subject them to others’ condemning gaze if they want to receive approval and feel affirmed.. To the degree that guests fear others’ judgement and mind their manners accordingly, they expect their own presence and gaze to be sufficient to compel others to watch their behaviours. Violations thus are unhopd-for and raise some eyebrows, reminding of Bourdieu’s argument that:

Snobbishness or pretension are the dispositions of believers who are forever haunted by the fear of a breach, of an error of judgement and of committing a sin [...] (Bourdieu, 1990: 141).

What exemplifies misconduct best, which I witnessed in each of the three receptions, is taking a photo of either art objects or, worse, ‘selfies’ in front of artworks. To avoid photographs is not as important as avoiding asking the price of a piece of art in a reception. However, I observed that photo-taking was considered no less offensive by other invitees. These people expressed their dissatisfaction either by uttering their complaints in a surly manner, or by shaking their heads from side to side every time they saw someone taking a selfie.

Those taking photos or selfies at receptions usually posted them to social media concurrently (which can be followed through hashtags), to let their followers know that they are present at an event that only a few have been invited to. Although sharing photos from a reception enables them to show off that they are ranking among a privileged few, it nevertheless costs them a loss of status. The observational data drawn from the receptions implied that the struggle over distinction is not a melting pot in which agents from every walk of life compete with each other, but an intra-class rivalry, taking place amongst those who occupy higher positions in the social field. This constitutes the reason why advertising one’s own presence at a reception via social media is conceived of as playing to the gallery, and despised by other invitees, the latter of whom tend to avoid taking selfies for their own prestige on account of the awareness that any action aiming for outsiders’ admiration would make them look ‘low’ in societal terms. The examples above make it clear that guests can feel ennobled to such an extent that they have the fear of getting on the wrong side of each other, and make sure that they do not violate any etiquette. Here the reciprocal anxiety manifests itself only in the absence of violation, which is why conformity to etiquettes in fact signifies that invitees see each other as equals.

Etiquettes are there to tacitly remind guests that they are expected to surpass *each other*, not outsiders, in courtesy and performance of ‘the cultured self’. To have photos taken is therefore considered a violation, implying that one who has done so is no match for other invitees (as they seemingly need the outsiders’ eye in order to feel privileged). Inasmuch as invitees feel offended by the violation – as it intimates that their gaze has had no *a priori* inhibitive effect, they become too readily driven to create discomfort for those who they believe dare to play fast and loose with them. I observed that guests do that mostly by grumbling and staring at these people, whereby they aim to make the ‘offenders’ understand that they (despite being invited) are not true art lovers.

It is necessary to note that this does not imply that those having their photographs taken at such special events as art exhibitions lack cultural capital. Rather, these examples indicate that whosoever attempts to show off for any reason is destined to be lowered by others - regardless of one’s own existing cultural capital - as the act reveals that one is *after* distinction. Guests were therefore required to be cautious to avoid being seen as copycats by their counterparts, whom they in fact rival in the type and amount of capital possessed. This sheds light on why the struggle requires due performance of all cultivated selves, for neither the position occupied in the social field nor the capital possessed *per se* guarantees fair treatment, or offers distinction in its own right, unless complemented by bodily representations.

In order for a cultured self to make others recognise it as ‘naturally’ distinctive and treat it accordingly, the person needs to make sure that no reason or justification are given to other cultivated subjects, who are always- already eager to despise her as part of their own quest for distinction. Yet the art exhibition openings in Tophane show that agents activate and make use of new mechanisms, tacit rules and categories to overrule one’s endeavour and to deter one from pursuing distinction. This constitutes the main reason why positions in struggles for distinction are not occupied once and for all, but may well undergo change. Tacit rules of the game – a set of ‘don’ts’ around how to act - may shift, and cultivated selves must re-adjust their presentation of self to those shifts.

6.2.3 Summary

This section has presented empirical findings drawn from the observational data and interviews with newcomers to Tophane that reveal intra-group struggles for distinction taking place in such symbolic spaces as cafes and art galleries. Newcomers, whilst pursuing distinction, compel each other to avoid what might transform them from true owners of cultural capital into wannabes or copycats in the eyes of other cultivated

subjects. Distinction is an object of struggle as such, stemming from the paradox that possession of a higher level of cultural capital does not allow its possessor to distinguish itself from others who have lower levels of cultural capital, but can still claim to be cultivated and sophisticated. This means that inasmuch as gentrifiers strive to accuse each other of being outsiders, copycats, or *nouveau-riches*, they themselves may well be subjected to such criticism – no matter how authentic they feel their existing cultural capital is. Although gentrifiers do not explicitly acknowledge that they take certain decisions in everyday life in accordance with their quest for distinction, this is nonetheless understandable in Bourdieu's sense in that the pursuit of distinction has to be concealed at any cost (see Chapter Three).

The next section will argue that the existence of these intra-group rivalries has an important implication for the relationship between Tophane's newcomers and local residents, with struggles for distinction making it problematic for newcomers to interact with local residents (who, as we have seen previously in Chapter Five, are predominantly deprived of education). The next section pursues this argument by focusing upon the ways in which newcomers perceive and identify Tophane-born inhabitants, revealing their reasons for shying away from the local community.

6.3 Tophane and the Local Community in the Eyes of Newcomers: 'Subjective Re-making of Reality'

The perception of others [...] is in fact organised according to interconnected and partially independent oppositions (Bourdieu, 1991: 92, original emphasis).

This part of the chapter examines how newcomers draw on, and make use of, their own cultural capital to articulate the differences which, for them, describe and characterise those born in Tophane. The following chapter will consider the moral impacts of these identifications upon local residents; nevertheless, in order to grasp the ongoing social conflict in Tophane it is necessary first to demonstrate the ways in which the notion of difference is constructed by newcomers.

As argued in Chapter Three, the *raison d'être* of struggles for distinction is to determine 'the dominant principle of the domination within the dominant class' (Bourdieu, 1984: 310). Chapter Three also outlined how gentrifiers rank among the dominated fraction of this dominant class, considering that they have a combination of high cultural capital and relatively low economic capital. According to Bourdieu, this dominated fraction 'always tends to set the specific capital, to which it owes its position, at the top of the hierarchy of the principles of hierarchisation' (1991: 168). In the first part of this chapter, I have indicated how gentrifiers start to compete with each

other in the name of holding their own position in the fraction once cultural capital has been converted into symbolic capital. However, despite such intra-group rivalries, part of their struggle is to maintain the importance and symbolic worth of their possession of cultural capital. Examining gentrifiers' perceptions of local inhabitants, this section argues that newcomers attempt to achieve the symbolic worth of their cultural capital by ascribing several other meanings to the locals' deprivation of education.

This part of the chapter is divided into two sections: the first section considers gentrifiers' perception of local residents' tight-knit lifestyle – a lifestyle that has been shaped by their class background and lack of formal education, as argued in the previous chapter. As such, this section provides us with newcomers' own justifications as to why they, in spite of residing in Tophane, are not inclined to socialise in the neighbourhood. This is because, as will be indicated below, gentrifiers do not see the existing local lifestyle as part of a cultural enrichment, but rather as what has turned Tophane into a '*tasra*' [countryside] at the heart of Istanbul.¹⁸

In an intertwined manner, the second section considers newcomers' perceptions of the local community. It was discussed in Chapter Five that most of the long-term inhabitants of Tophane do not have a formal educational background. However, as will be indicated below, the categories that gentrifiers call upon to identify local residents during interviews do not portray them as simply uneducated, but as 'ignorant', 'philistine', 'rough', and 'lost individuals'. The statements by gentrifiers' certainly add to our understanding of why they conclude that they should stay away from locals, despite sharing the same physical space in Tophane. Nevertheless, when we take locals into account in the following chapter, it will be clear that gentrifiers, when recognising locals as such, do not simply articulate objective differences but actively construct social oppositions.

6.3.1 Spatial Stigmatisations in Tophane: Gentrifiers' Views on the Existing Local Lifestyle

I have been in Tophane for two years. But you know what, I nonetheless sometimes ask myself what the hell I am doing here, if it has been worth it [...] I have nothing personal to do with this neighbourhood – it's just business (Kenan, newcomer, 01/08/2017).

'The great social oppositions objectified in physical space tend to be reproduced in thought and in language as oppositions constitutive of a principle of vision and division, as categories of perception and evaluation or of mental structures' (Bourdieu, 1999: 125).

¹⁸ These accounts will also highlight and underpin the underlying economic rationale behind gentrifiers' moving-into Tophane, which has been discussed in the previous chapter.

As detailed in the previous chapter, it is the overall volume and composition of the capital possessed that forms the basis for differences between the newcomers and local residents in Tophane: the culturally privileged former and the culturally subaltern latter. However, although such differences stem from the asymmetry between the class positions occupied in the social field, neither the possession, or deprivation, of cultural capital manifests itself directly as such. Differences in the capital possessed are (mis)read through lifestyle, which is taken for granted and reified.

Take the distinctive *mahalle kulturu* in Tophane for instance: as demonstrated in Chapter Five, it is what local residents proudly refer to when speaking of their lifestyle and residential belonging (e.g., Sabri, 16/07/2017; Ayhan, 16/07/2017; Yavuz, 29/07/2017; Feyyaz, 29/08/2017). It is a common attitude to tell stories of those who have moved out of Tophane yet have not been able to adapt to their recent neighbourhood, which helps local residents to justify what a unique quarter Tophane is. Take Ahmet's relatives for instance: although those people do not live in Tophane anymore, Ahmet narrates that they still come to the neighbourhood on a daily basis (18/08/2017). Given such major components as kinship and possession of high amounts of social capital, *mahalle kulturu* seems like a quasi-lifestyle. However, it has been argued that this lifestyle does not reflect a readily given social capital. It is not a simple socio-spatial form that kinship takes either. Such communal lifestyle has been developed by local inhabitants to maximise their extant social capital – the only way for them to cope with urban life due to their deprivation of formal education. *Mahalle kulturu* as such consists not merely of residential life but also of very social and economic ones, enabling older residents to survive in the city. Yet the newcomers are not inclined to take the local lifestyle [*mahalle kulturu*] this way.

The newcomers' perception and evaluation of *mahalle kulturu* overshadows and distorts the local residents' objective characteristics, generating a deep gulf between the differences and their very subjective articulations. The newcomers call upon the *mahalle kulturu* in Tophane to make sense of those who embrace and maintain that lifestyle. This is exactly where differences become jeopardised and vulnerable to manipulation, because the newcomers are inclined to de-contextualise *mahalle kulturu* and associate it with other (contingent) categories, which do not have internal or necessary relations with the features of local inhabitants:

Tophane is just a stone's throw away from Cihangir, within walking distance. It is a five-minute walk for real, but also 150 years behind Cihangir. For example, you can't find any traditional tea house in Cihangir; however, Tophane is packed full of them [...] It is a shame that there are still such 'tasras' [rural areas] in Istanbul (Seda, 07/09/2017).

Spatial stigmatisation is ‘applied to districts where there is the slightest deviation from some putative (petty bourgeois) norm’ (Wacquant, 1999: 130). The newcomers interpret *mahalle kulturu* as such a deviation and failure of adaptation to urban life, which allows a room for stigmas: despite being an inner-city neighbourhood and its cosmopolitan past, Tophane is considered *tasra* [countryside]. The term ‘*tasra*’ is of particular importance, having moral connotations in the Turkish context. Since Turkish modernisation was premised on urbanisation to a great extent (Mardin, 1973), remote rural places have been conceived of as the major symptom of underdevelopment and backwardness. As such, *tasra* has become the main euphemism for ‘habitat’ of the ignorant, rough and vulgar, who supposedly have no idea, let alone have any respect, for what the requirements of urban and modern life are about.

There is a great hierarchy between the urban and rural [*tasra*] – hierarchy which pre-determines their symbolic meaning: whilst the urban refers to a ‘physical space where the positive poles of all the fields are concentrated along with most of the agents occupying these dominant positions’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 125), the socio-spatial term ‘*tasra*’ signifies the deprived and deprivation in a pejorative manner, setting a so-called cause and effect relationship between the deprivation and certain personality traits that are apparently offensive and injurious.

Tophane is stigmatised as *tasra* because it is believed that the *mahalle kulturu* in this neighbourhood does not fit into the modern, prevailing urban image of Istanbul: laundry hanged across side streets, time-rich elderly crowds in parks or on street corners, groups of lads mucking around the neighbourhood, children playing ball games or hide-and-seek in streets. In the eyes of newcomers, all this make Tophane look low class (e.g., Ege, 23/07/2017; Kenan, 01/08/2017):

In spite of having migrated from Anatolia long time ago, these people are nonetheless still struggling to maintain their *tasra* culture in the heart of the city. What they call *mahalle kulturu* is built upon this, too. I mean, all the acquaintances you have can’t consist of your own kin, right? This would be okay in a village or in a town, but definitely not here! (Gözde, 11/08/2017)

The acquaintanceship concentrated on (and limited by) physical space is an essential part of *mahalle kulturu*, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, this is considered a deliberate ghettoisation and accused by gentrifiers of eradicating urban anonymity. Representational practices revolving around the maximisation of social capital are regarded as signs of weakness, leading the newcomers to infer that the local residents are not self-contained as required, but dependent on each other. The notion of self-sufficiency occupies an important place in the ‘true’ urbanite’s

idealised self- image. Yet Tophane as a neighbourhood appears to be completely vitiating this due to its tight-knit lifestyle, posing a threat to urban life where selfhood is sought:

Anyway, this street is called ‘Bogazkesen’ [Cutthroat] after all. It must have derived its name from something, right? Such a name cannot come out of the blue! You see, there used to be mobs cutting throats here – that’s for sure! (Selma, 21/07/2017)

In addition to the stigma ‘tasra’, the newcomers applied another spatial stigmatisation to Tophane, which often amounted to criminalising the neighbourhood. Selma, a newcomer in her early forties, has been in Tophane for three years; nevertheless, she seems pretty sure that Bogazkesen Street owes its name to the former local gangs that used to commit murders by cutting their victims’ throats. In the Turkish language, however, the term ‘Bogaz’ refers to the Bosphorus as well as throat. So, what the name ‘Bogazkesen’ literally means is the street that reaches all the way to the Bosphorus. And, as a matter of fact, Bogazkesen Street does so, linking Galata Square to the Tophane shore, the latter located alongside the Bosphorus (see Figure 3, in Chapter Five). However, newcomers seemingly overlook the very self-evident geographical and geometrical rationale behind the name ‘Bogazkesen’. Fatih, a local, gave a different interpretation of the area:

Tophane is the safest neighbourhood of Istanbul, no doubt about that! It is a *mahalle* at first; here we all do know and look after each other. You can’t see any fear of burglary or crime among the residents in this neighbourhood. God forbid, even if something bad happens while I’m gone, I am pretty sure my neighbours will tackle it. For instance, this is one of the merits of *mahalle kulturu*. Otherwise, if there were no such culture [tight-knit lifestyle], believe me, Tophane would get into a mess too, like many other areas (Fatih, local, 17/07/2017).

Most of the local informants, like Fatih, frequently talked about how secure they feel in their neighbourhood. They think the older residents all contribute to making Tophane safe. They seem willing to touch on this topic, as they are proud to be part of that which is considered a collective achievement. Newcomers, however, did not share the view that Tophane is a safe place:

I’ve avoided familiarising myself with the neighbourhood on purpose, as the local lads are rumoured to be meddling and I am not looking for trouble. I do

not pass by Bogazkesen Street, for instance [...] I have not experienced anything unpleasant myself, but still believe that Tophane is an area you must watch your back, you know (Ege, newcomer, 23/07/2017).

The very time-rich population in Tophane allows room for neighbourhood watch groups, which most of the local residents partake in without much effort. Whilst this leads them to feel safe, the same neighbourhood watch is nevertheless criminalised and evaluated as a witch-hunt by newcomers, whereby lads are believed to entertain themselves by bullying whosoever seems foreign (Erdem, 17/07/2017; Ege, 23/07/2017; Kenan, 01/09/2017; Cihan, 06/09/2017). This exemplifies how spatial stigmas extend to long-term occupants, in parallel with Bourdieu's argument that 'the stigmatised area symbolically degrades its inhabitants' (Bourdieu, 1999: 129). This will be further elaborated below.

6.3.2 Social Stigmatisations of the Local Community: Pathologisation of Educational Deprivation

Due to the above-mentioned spatial stigmas, newcomers were inclined to believe that trouble always awaits them in Tophane. The expected incident never comes, however, for the newcomers are prepared in advance. Their statements exhibited the ways in which they 'manage' to escape trouble every time they think they are on the verge of it – *i.e.*, when they encounter locals:

You shouldn't enter the alleys that you don't know; they may well be quite uncanny in Istanbul. Further, you'd better think twice if it is Tophane in particular. I've made that mistake a couple of times. Nothing happened thankfully, but it could have... Well, here the thing is, you cannot develop a sense of belonging where you don't feel safe. And I don't feel safe in Tophane, at any time of day (Erdem, owner of Art Gallery 1, 17/07/2017).

The newcomers do not think that they act in a paranoid manner, as it is they who apply those stigmas first and then take them as given. Spotting the local inhabitants as a source of danger, the newcomers take precautions to avoid any trouble. And they usually achieve that for their part by standing clear of the local people, which results in a lack of interaction between these groups:

It has passed nearly a decade since we moved our studio into Tophane. Everyone recognises me now, especially when I'm walking down the neighbourhood. However, when I see two kids standing on the sidewalk, I unintentionally cross

the street. After all this time, I am not ‘new’ at all here in Tophane, but their vibe may somehow scare me (Cihan, performing artist, 06/09/2017).

I stayed in Tophane for four months, throughout the fieldwork. Indeed, the ‘local lads’ did socialise in the neighbourhood, and street corners were places where they usually met up and hung out. Most of them did not leave Tophane and go to another area for entertainment, because, in Bourdieusian terms, ‘they don’t have all the cards necessary to participate in the various social games’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 129). These young men therefore feel more comfortable in Tophane, although it should be acknowledged that such place-attachment is related to their lack of capital and amounts to ‘making virtue out of necessity’ as Bourdieu put it (as argued in Chapter Five). For their part, to gather and socialise in the neighbourhood amounts to eliminating the risk of being morally judged by others because of their educational deprivation. Nevertheless, the attempt to escape from stigmatisation appeared futile:

You know the steps, just behind our gallery, whereby you reach *Galatasaray Lisesi*. Just give it a try and see whether or not you could climb up the stairs. Those sitting over there are very criminal. I’m telling you this because it takes us back to square one again: all this arises out of the lack of education. Having uneducated parents, these youngsters are left with no choice but to get involved in street culture. I am sorry to say, but they are all ‘lost individuals’ [*kayıp bireyler*] who need to be ‘tamed’ in no time (Erdem, owner of Art Gallery 1, 17/07/2017).

As will be argued in the next chapter, it is the lack of formal education that underlies the local residents’ vulnerability and ‘hidden injuries’ (for the term, see Sennett, 1972). As discussed in Chapter Five, there are already social costs that the local residents have been enduring: their daily life has been organised in a specific way to lessen the effects of a lack of education. Even though they seemed proud of residing in Tophane, they don’t think they could live elsewhere because their social capital has no credit outside the neighbourhood. Given their lack of education, they had no resources other than their local networks to make their living, which chains them even further to the neighbourhood.

The majority of newcomers interviewed (Erdem, 17/07/2017; İlhan, 20/07/2017; Selma, 21/07/2017; Ege, 23/07/2017; Kenan, 01/08/2017; Gözde, 11/08/2017; Pınar, 06/09/2017; Cihan, 06/09/2017; Buket, 08/09/2017) tended to manipulate the local’s frustration by seeing the deprivation as a pathological problem that ‘inevitably’ transforms the deprived into criminals who should be avoided.¹⁹ That

¹⁹ While this was the majority view, there were some newcomers who expressed a different viewpoint on the locals, as demonstrated in Chapter 7.

being said, it is essential to clarify that the local people are seen as blameworthy not simply because they are unschooled but because being unschooled is associated with other characteristics which can readily be condemned. This amounts to exercising symbolic power, in Bourdieu's sense, in that objective differences are transformed into recognised distinctions by agents' 'subjective re- making of reality' (Bourdieu, 1991: 238). Education or cultural capital derives its symbolic significance from the examples of what is likely to happen in their absence. As such, their possession becomes not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition of all desired, positive characteristic attributes. This means that education is put to work to naturalise recognised distinctions and render a set of contingent typologies 'necessary', whereby the newcomers symbolically qualify themselves and enhance the symbolic meaning of belonging to a group known for having high levels of cultural capital.

According to Bourdieu, 'agents continually contribute to changing the social world by striving to impose a representation of themselves through strategies of presentation of self' (1987a: 13).²⁰ Without objecting, I nonetheless argue that the 'presentation of self' may also take place through the (re)presentation/perception of the other, especially when there is a third party present. I consider the interviews conducted with the newcomers to be informative in this regard. The ways in which the newcomers defined the local residents during the interviews are inseparable from the ways in which they wanted me, as a researcher, to perceive and treat them. What exemplifies this best is the topic of diversity:

They [Tophane-born residents] want us to respect them. But this is quite unacceptable, as it is actually they who don't want an outsider right here (Gözde, 11/08/2017).

Gözde expresses above how newcomers think that they are not wanted in Tophane by the local residents. However, there appears to be self- victimisation at play here, arguably a strategic part of the newcomers' presentation of self. As education is considered to make all the difference in social stratification, the newcomers crave to put their cultural capital across. The most appealing way to achieve this is to construct recognised distinctions, which help the newcomers differentiate themselves from the locals so that they can claim eminence for their own social identity. Therefore, in this context saying 'we are not wanted here' means 'the locals do not want us here because we are *quite* different from them, well- educated at first'.. Intimating their possession

²⁰ The previous section has expanded upon how distinction mechanisms operate in and around Tophane and how the newcomers compete with each other through 'presentation of self'.

of cultural capital, the newcomers demand tacit approval that they are *also* modern, urbanites and true cosmopolites:

Despite their social stratum, which is low – let’s be honest, they [local inhabitants] can still advance their well-being. But they must receive education, you know... Only this way is it possible to emancipate themselves. This is not one of those cases of too little too late. There should be no barrier ahead of them as long as they want to make it happen and give their best. But after all I myself can’t act like one of them. I can’t just step inside their tea house and start a chat, to be approved. Imagine, don’t you think that’d be ridiculous (Ege, 26/07/2017)?!

Since education is conceived of as a prerequisite to being difference-tolerant, the newcomers overconfidently categorise the local residents as diversity-intolerant. According to them, the local people condition themselves to disapprove of anything or anyone ‘envious’ because of their own deprivation. The newcomers therefore assume that the locals could only welcome them if they similarly had no education or cultural capital.

Significantly, my own participant observations contradicted the newcomers’ evaluations, as will be detailed in the next chapter. That being said, the newcomers’ interpretations are still of particular importance, unveiling not only how symbolic domination operates at the cognitive level, but also a great paradox. Perceiving the local people in these ways - *i.e.*, identifying their lack of education as a pathological problem - the newcomers manifest and perform their very reluctance to ‘admit’ one unless she is educated:

To me, the question is: should I educate them? Or, should I get along with them by pretending everything is okay? I can’t do the first even though such a need does exist, because I am not here to educate them. I can’t act like a pedagogue at this age [laughs]! Yet I don’t want to undertake the second either. That’d be to fool myself before anything else [...] It may sound elitist, but what needs to be done is to offer premium prices to these people [the local] so that they might think of selling their properties and move into other, more suitable districts of Istanbul (İlhan, owner of Art Gallery 2, 20/07/2017).

As argued in Chapter Three, such patronising attitudes towards locals should not cast doubt on the fact that the newcomers own a high amount of cultural capital. That being said, the newcomers clearly invalidate the so-called Bourdieusian positive correlation between possession of cultural capital and being diversity-tolerant (ref this argument).

This is of particular significance, meaning that if education *per se* does not readily equip one with admirable personal traits, its absence should not be associated with *a priori* pejorative identifications either. By means of the stigmas above, the newcomers cognitively transform the local people into a social group with which it is not even worth taking a ‘politically correct’ stance. This is not because the locals are simply seen as unsophisticated, but because they are considered to be ‘provincial’, ‘common’, ‘vulgar’ and ‘troublesome’ due to their lifestyle and educational deprivation (Erdem, 17/07/2017; Selma, 21/07/2017; Kenan, 01/08/2017; Cihan, 06/09/2017; Buket, 08/09/2017). And, for newcomers, all these traits together (*i.e.*, the locals themselves) constitute the main reason why they are not open to engaging with the local community in Tophane.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to explain the lack of social interaction between newcomers and local residents in Tophane, which, it has argued, stems from newcomers’ reluctance to engage with the local community. Newcomers’ pursuit of distinction leads not only to intra-group rivalries over position, but makes it hard for them to interact with locals in everyday life. This is key to making sense of the ongoing social conflict in Tophane.

The chapter distinguished between two different groups of newcomers in Tophane: trend-setters and trend-followers. The former consisted of those who already possess remarkable amounts of cultural capital, whereas the latter is composed of those who endeavour to accumulate cultural capital by making use of their existing economic capital. This is one of the most frequently cited categorisations within gentrification literature (Blasius *et al.*, 2015; Cameron and Coaffee, 2005; Hwang 2006; Ley, 1997; 2003; Mathews, 2010), as argued in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Such a distinction between gentrifiers is therefore not endemic to Tophane. However, the categorisation has been found to only help separate gentrifiers in analytical terms. The empirical examples of cafés and art exhibitions have demonstrated that there is no such conceptual tool which can distinguish a trend-setter from a trend-follower in everyday life. It has been found that gentrifiers are aware, and do mind, that they are not distinguishable. Struggles for distinction as such refer to newcomers’ very practices to become ‘first among equals’ and to overcome the above-mentioned paradox that in practice they all resemble each other.²¹

²¹ What indicates this best is the artificial antagonism between Cihangir and Karaköy. Though there is a great similarity between these two gentrified neighbourhoods, to socialise in the latter is conceived of as a nouveau-riche disposition. As argued, Karaköy has appeared to be such a place not because it has been invaded by trend-followers but because pre-existing clientele have abandoned Karaköy – they could not find any mechanism to distinguish themselves from other consumers. It is therefore worth noting that

The chapter has shown the ways in which these intra-group rivalries - whilst leading newcomers to establish a set of 'don'ts' to accuse some of being wannabes - also forces them to take certain decisions and avoid doing anything that may subject them to similar accusations of lacking cultural capital. As a result, I have argued that newcomers shy away from Tophane-born inhabitants because in the name of their pursuit of distinction they do want to be seen interacting with those who are culturally subaltern because of their class background and lack of formal education. Newcomers are not inclined to acknowledge the role of struggles over distinction in determining their decisions, practices, dispositions and attitudes. According to Bourdieu's theoretical framework (1977, 1984, 1991), as argued in Chapter Three, agents' reluctance to admit their interest is nonetheless to be expected. Those who are after distinction have to present themselves as completely disinterested in their practices so that they can claim to be distinctive by nature and appropriate the 'profit of distinction' (Bourdieu, 1977: 181-182, 197).

The second part of the chapter thus focused upon how newcomers perceived both Tophane and the local community, extracting newcomers' own reasons for eschewing local inhabitants. As established in the previous chapter, Tophane-born residents are mostly deprived of formal education. It has been demonstrated through the fieldwork data that according to the newcomers I spoke to, locals are *also* perceived as 'provincial', 'ignorant', 'rough' and 'criminal' because of their lack of education, and therefore they should be either 'tamed' or encouraged by premium prices to sell their properties and move elsewhere. I have argued that newcomers established a cause-and-effect relationship between deprivation of education and the above-mentioned pejorative identifications (as if the former necessarily had to result in the latter). This legitimised the symbolic worth and meaning of possessing cultural capital - which is essential for newcomers as they base 'the dominant principle of the domination' on cultural capital as it is the type of capital they are equipped with best. It also provided 'convincing' reasons to justify their reluctance to interact with locals in a way that concealed their interest in not doing so. The next chapter will now elaborate on how newcomers' reluctance to interact pressurises local residents in moral terms, and leads them to react in manners that have brought the social conflict in Tophane into view.

there is no such group of trend-followers which symbolically degrades wherever it goes, or whatever it does; it is rather several actions and practices that render some trend-followers.

CHAPTER 7

MAKING SENSE OF THE SOCIAL CONFLICT IN TOPHANE: LOCALS' REACTIONS TO THE LACK OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter makes a distinction between the factors that cause the social conflict between local residents and newcomers in Tophane, and the factors that make it visible. It aims to provide a better understanding of what has been going on in the neighbourhood by taking local residents into consideration. It examines locals' perceptions of newcomers and the reasons why they think they are reluctant to interact. The chapter presents the argument that a lack of interaction has put Tophane-born inhabitants through various moral, emotional and socio-psychological states. It suggests that in order to understand the reaction of locals to the lack of interaction we need to move beyond a Bourdieusian framework and turn to the work of Axel Honneth. The chapter thematises the ways in which locals 'cope with' the moral, emotional and socio-psychological aspects of their treatment by newcomers by utilising Honneth's concept of 'struggle for recognition' (1995).

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part argues that local residents, despite their educational deprivation, have a self-affirmative relation-to-self. This is because - as the data will indicate - they cannot make sense of why newcomers avoid them. Local inhabitants, therefore, do not see themselves in the ways that newcomers do, and reject the stigmas outlined in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, locals do speculate about why newcomers might be shying away from them, and they begin to grasp the negative ways in which they are being perceived. This is why a lack of social interaction jeopardises locals' positive, but fragile, sense of self and pressurises their moral worth. A lack of social interaction gradually casts doubt on locals' positive perspective, distorts the ways in which they conceive of themselves, and results in the need and demand for recognition (Honneth, 1995). I argue that this is of particular significance, as it helps to reveal the root causes of the social conflict in Tophane.

The second part of the chapter expands upon why local inhabitants in some cases take on the stigmas directed towards them, even whilst they believe that they are misidentifications that do not reflect their personality. I argue that in the face of stigma, Tophane-born dwellers begin to act in defiant manners because the lack of social interaction with newcomers leaves them with no choice but to seek respect in their own way in default of mutual recognition. As will be shown, local residents attempt to cope with this situation by refusing the dominant norms and values that see deprivation of education as something shameful and thereby of harm to their relation-to- self. It elaborates on why locals endeavour to fix their self-affirmative ego- ideal by targeting gentrifiers, as well as examining what they do in everyday life to violate those norms. This section will put ‘the Tophane incidents’ in a wider context by arguing that locals’ demeanours are reactions to symbolic domination and should therefore be seen as what bring the social conflict into view, rather than the root cause of the conflict.

The third part of the chapter takes the notion of *Tophanelilik* [being-from-Tophane] into account, which is referred to as a collective group-identity by a number of newcomers. At odds with such accounts, this section argues that *Tophanelilik* is rather a set of countercultures that Tophane-born residents have formed to defy the shame of being uneducated and to preserve their moral well-being. This is exemplified best by the existence of some newcomers who have not endured any hostile or defiant attitudes thus far. Drawing upon their statements, I accordingly claim that these gentrifiers have not undergone anything unpleasant because they simply interact with the local community.

7.1 The Need and Demand for Recognition: Symbolic Meaning of the Lack of Interaction

They [gentrifiers] don’t know the drill first of all – there is a *racon* in bilateral relations, you know. Moving into a new neighbourhood, for any reason, you should be doing your best to get along with your surroundings. This is not something that needs to be reminded or articulated (Fatih, local, 17/07/2017).

As Bourdieu expresses, ‘at the risk of feeling themselves out of place, individuals who move into a new space must fulfil the conditions that that space tacitly requires of its occupants’ (1999: 128). Given the context of gentrification, that is of particular relevance in Tophane. The sort of necessity Bourdieu mentions is called *racon* within the Turkish subculture. *Racon* signifies a set of normative, non-verbal customs to

which subjects are expected to conform in order to make sure that they do not ignore or offend each other. These revolve around on-street greetings, random small talks, and making oneself known to others, notably neighbours. All these may seem like simple exchanges; however, each amounts to a quasi-ceremonial way of giving one due recognition, justified by the notion of *racon*:

Well, you may think you better shy away from one as you get to know him. Nothing to object! But there is no point at all in refusing to talk to your neighbours from the very beginning unless you know who they are. You get what I mean? They [newcomers] don't know any better, that's for sure! Now you tell me, is that too much to ask? What would it cost them to say 'Hi, fancy a tea?' (Murat, local, 27/07/2017).

It is hard to miss either the normative tone or astonishment embedded in the rhetorical questions that Murat poses. Neither is unfounded, though, as Bourdieu argues:

Symbolic rituals, formalities and formalisms [...] "cost nothing" to perform and seem such "natural" things to demand that abstention amounts to a refusal or a challenge (Bourdieu, 1977: 95).

The above is valid for the notion of *racon* as well. In addition to consisting of various behavioural codes that represent and aim at mutual recognition, *racon* also constitutes (and refers to) the very rationale as to why such rituals must be carried out.

Here, it is worth stating that *racon* does not necessitate agents to establish rapport, but instead to refrain from anything that may well bring one's self-esteem into question. And the aforementioned symbolic gestures serve exactly that purpose; they are not simply to initiate communication, but to convince subjects of the latent pact to not overlook each other:

Even a simple 'Hello!' would make a great difference. I mean, salutation has a very special meaning and role especially in such neighbourhoods where *mahalle kulturu* is still prevailing like Tophane. It is of particular significance in daily life; it can be a way to offer an olive branch, if needed, or a prerequisite to get rid of resentment, if any [...] Its lack, for instance, is not simply considered ill-communication here [in Tophane] but rather a very intentional attitude that we immediately ask what gives? Even if it is your relative doing so, you still wonder why he didn't say hi to me – you wonder whether he didn't even deem me worthy of it (Yavuz, local, 29/07/2017).

As argued in Chapter Three, the notion of *I* refers to a pre-linguistic self with positive traits, whereas the *me* amounts to a ‘cognitive image that one forms of oneself as soon as one has learned to perceive oneself from the second- person perspective’ (Honneth, 1995: 76). As such, each treatment received from the interaction partner contributes to the formation of *me*. However, symbolic exchanges or gestures do not always fulfil agents’ demands. The need for recognition arises when one’s expectation to be treated as asked is not met by others. Since the demand derives its *raison d’être* from positive relation-to-self in the first place, its rejection inevitably casts doubt on the affirmative perspective. For example, during my fieldwork I observed a great tendency amongst local residents to take the lack of symbolic exchanges personally. This is exemplified in Yavuz’s statement above, where he admits that it does not take him long to question his self-worth when an acquaintance, let alone a newcomer, forgets to say hello or wave a greeting. As Honneth points out:

the moral crisis in communication is triggered here by the agent being disappointed with regard to the normative expectations that he or she believed could be placed on another’s willingness to respect him or her (Honneth, 1995: 138).

Such gestures are considered to be only humane, and require no expense or effort. Thus, local people do not remain indifferent to their absence. Many locals inferred that gentrifiers begrudged even a simple conversation. In the case of Tophane therefore, it is the *lack* of interaction that gives symbolic domination and stigmatisation away. As Sayer argues, inaction can be just as significant in this respect: ‘while the negative judgments may be verbalised, they can also be signalled intentionally or unintentionally through expressions and compartment [...] *It may be prompted by inaction as well as action*’ (Sayer, 2005: 152- 153, emphasis added). This provides an idea as to why the lack of interaction is so crucial: it is through the absence of such gestures that Tophane-born inhabitants capture the newcomers’ reluctance to interact with them and draw the conclusion that they are despised by newcomers:

Their [newcomers’] gaze has been condemning since day one. You do notice the perception ‘Here is a backward rural area, located in the hearth of the city!’ in their eyes. They have moved into Tophane but nevertheless dislike those residing here. Otherwise, they would neither act in such judgemental manners nor avoid talking to us [...] You know what? We are second-class citizens according to them, degrading this neighbourhood (Ayhan, local, 16/07/2017).

Honneth argues that the reference to suffering is key to accounting for why some groups dissent or rebel. ‘Without a certain noting of suffering’, he states, ‘[one] cannot

describe what is really going on' (Honneth, 2016a: 128). However, for Honneth, the term 'disrespect' counts not only because it refers to 'the specific vulnerability of humans resulting from the internal interdependence of individualisation and recognition', but it is exactly what leads one 'from mere suffering to action' (Honneth, 1995: 131, 135-136).

Even though local inhabitants do not articulate what they endure as 'symbolic domination' and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1991), their interview accounts are nonetheless on the verge of making sense of it in this fashion. Because symbolic gestures have no cost, the locals interpret the lack of interaction on the part of newcomers as a form of disrespect:

There is no such reciprocal salutation at all; I mean, they [gentrifiers] themselves refuse it... I am pretty sure they will deny that, yet we are not fools to 'buy' they are not disregarding us. Go see for yourself whether you will encounter anybody unlike around them. But you really don't need to do so; they socialise just among themselves. It is quite unpleasant, you know, some appear all of a sudden and start looking down on you (İhsan, local, 02/09/2017).

Jeopardising their positive understanding of self, the inference of being patronised leaves local residents with no choice but to find out why newcomers might be belittling them:

Actors continually evaluate the behaviour of others, including that of class others. Although, for the most part, they may take its causes for granted, they sometimes try to explain it (Sayer, 2005: 211).

By putting itself in the normative point of view of its interaction partner, the other subject takes over the partner's moral values and applies them to its practical relation to itself (Honneth, 1995: 77).

Trying to make sense of the potential reasons for the lack of interaction and the apparent belittling, local inhabitants speculated about how newcomers might perceive them. Take the statements below for example:

Well, some [newcomers] use their flat like a hotel room; they go to either work or school in the morning, and they return at night to sleep. So, usually, you hardly notice or see them in daily life. But the rest spend most of their time here [in Tophane], like many of us. They run either art galleries, ateliers or coffee shops

– a number of stores selling vintage clothes has flourished too [...] Anyway, what I am saying, they refuse to take part in social life, although they are making money in this neighbourhood. For example, they have no idea who is running the shop next to theirs. They shut their windows, bringing the curtains down. Their doors are always closed, for instance. You know what I mean? No such a sign of warm welcome! Okay, we may well be two worlds apart... Fair enough! But why do you think you have to bring your curtains down, isolate yourself from your own neighbours? Because we are a bunch of mobs you need to protect yourself against, huh? (Ahmet, 18/08/2017).

Most of them [newcomers] are not even familiar with *mahalle kulturu*, let alone Tophane. This may well be quite understandable, though – I mean, they had been living in more or less wealthy suburbs prior to moving into here. It must be unexpected for them to come across such close and intimate neighbour relationships. Laundries hung out on a line, kids roaming the streets, ladies talking to each other from one window to another... All this are components of *mahalle kulturu*, you know, seeming very normal to us. But newcomers despise all of them, the culture into which we were born, the ways in which we have fun in daily life. I mean it! They are certainly looking down on you. Some even go further; I mean, their attitudes can be like ‘‘What the fuck are you doing here in the middle of Istanbul? Return to your village, to where you belong!’’ [*Hatta bazilari bir adim oteye gidiyor; boyle, davranislariyla sana ‘‘Ne bok yemeye geldin Istanbul’a? Ait oldugun yere git, koyune don sen en iyisi!’’ der gibiler*] Almost all of us were born in Tophane. According to them, however, we are not modern enough, so to say, to deserve to live in this neighbourhood. That’s exactly what they think about us, due to our lifestyle and *mahalle kulturu*. What else could it be, huh? You tell me why they don’t even say hello to us otherwise! I tell you, because they consider us not good, not urban enough to communicate, with whom they wish they wouldn’t have to live together (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).

Reactions like the ones above, demonstrate that local residents have a positive relation-to-self. What I mean by this is that local people perceive the lack of interaction and the lack of symbolic gestures as ill-treatment exactly because their positive sense of self enables them to normatively claim that they deserve respect and kindness, regardless of their class position (see Honneth, 1995: 127-128). The lack of interaction would neither cause anger nor provoke a reaction unless the local residents’ self-image did not rest on positive traits. Instead they would internalise that they are not worth receiving any good gestures.

As the quotes from Ahmet and Sabri above indicate, the lack of interaction leads local residents to speculate about whether they are ‘provincial’, ‘vulgar’ or ‘ignorant’. Both Ahmet and Sabri seem to be sure that those are the ways in which newcomers identify them, for they could not see any other reason why newcomers would shy away from the local community. For those born in Tophane, the absence of interaction is challenging in that newcomers’ determined abstentions confront them with a new portrait of themselves, which evidently does not coincide with their self-image. As such, there appears to be two contradictory senses of self for locals: one is self-affirmative and allows local residents to believe that they have been subjected to ill treatment; the other is acquired through newcomers’ subject position, which reminds locals of their otherness and forces them to doubt their positive sense of self.

All this illuminates how the lack of social interaction endangers positive relations-to-self, and causes suffering on the part of locals. By shying away from interactions, newcomers not only externalise what they think about local residents, but also impose some pejorative (mis)identifications, *i.e.* stigmas, upon them. As such, absence of interaction inevitably results in confronting local inhabitants with their own (stigmatised) image in the eyes of newcomers. It is exactly this type of stigmatised sense of self - acquired in the second-person perspective - that brings the local’s affirmative perspective into question. Out of such a jeopardised positive ego-ideal arises the need and demand for recognition (Honneth, 2012: 207). Even though local residents do not approve of the ways in which newcomers perceive them, or the rationale that newcomers use to eschew interactions, they nonetheless want newcomers to confirm that they are being misidentified. In this way, they can persuade themselves that they are certainly not ‘a bunch of mobs’ who deserve to be avoided, which seems to be the only way for them to fix their relation-to-self.

It may sound paradoxical but nevertheless, the more newcomers shy away from local residents as part of their quest for distinction, the more local residents pin their faith on interaction with newcomers. Because the lack of interaction imposes various pejorative identifications upon the locals, they believe that interaction with any newcomer will *per se* prove the opposite, indicating their positive characteristics to the rest of the newcomers. If newcomers had partaken in social life, there would have been no rationale for local inhabitants to make such an ‘affective investment’ in interaction. This is because symbolic gestures provided by newcomers would have rendered the need for recognition unnecessary in the first place. But now, in its absence, social interaction appears to be the only means by which to overrule the stigmas imposed:

Even foreign tourists wave at, say hi to us here. They smile when they see us sitting on the bench or having some tea in a group. Japanese, for instance... They

have learned a few words; they always come say ‘*merhaba!*’ [hello!] with broken Turkish. Not kidding – it has happened many times. Each time we invited them in, offered tea. Some of us speak a little English so we could chat with them. They were puzzled, you know, hadn’t seen such hospitality before. The same happened yesterday. A friend of mine has recently lost his aunt, so in memory of her he was passing *lokma* [a traditional Turkish dessert] around to everyone. There must have been four or five of them standing on the corner. I don’t remember where they were from, but anyway... We welcomed them in too, for instance. Early on they were shy, you know, seemingly wondering if it was for free or not. We pulled up chairs, made them sit and gave them dessert and some tea... Man, you should have seen their faces! They were all enraptured. Even those who don’t speak in Turkish may well be open to dialogue, but your own neighbour does not give a fuck about you. How do you like that? (Feyyaz, local, 29/07/2017)²²

Despite the ongoing lack of interaction, local residents have occasion to take a risk and chance dialogue with newcomers, for they feel pressurised into confirming that the stigmas do not characterise them. Even the hospitality which Feyyaz seems to be proud of is not separate from that pressure, revolving around recognition and moral worth. And that is quite understandable as ‘the need for recognition is [...] noticed more in its absence than its presence’ (Sayer, 2005: 55; see also Honneth, 1995: 136):

If I were your tenant or neighbour, for example, I would make capital out of your network – to contact the local community and introduce myself. They [newcomers], however, are not even on good terms with either their landlords or own neighbours. So, how come they interact with others? But I don’t understand this, you know. How come you dare pretend to be a socialite and look down on those with whom you stay at the same apartment block? (Ali, local, 12/08/2017).

At this point, it is clear that struggles for distinction does not generate struggles for recognition at once, but over time. What mediates between these two struggles is lack of interaction, which exerts symbolic power by imposing stigmas upon local people. The local’s wish to get rid of those misidentifications within/via interaction, which manifest in the demand for recognition, nevertheless does not come true. Because lack of interaction continues to exist, local residents realise their demand for recognition is destined to remain unreciprocated by newcomers who insist on avoiding them. And this deprives them of the desire to fix their fragile but nonetheless affirmative

²² This quote also disproves the accusation newcomers too often make, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that local people are conservative in the sense that they do not want any outsiders in their neighbourhood.

self-image, out of which a new type of collective struggle arises. Whilst ‘struggle for recognition’ refers to reactions against symbolic domination and denial of the demand for recognition, it also constitutes the motivational and socio-psychological basis whereby we can make sense of why locals start to embrace stigmas and react accordingly in daily life.

7.3 Symbolic Domination in Tophane: Putting ‘the Tophane Incidents’ in a Wider Context

I always say, those who admit their ignorance do not constitute a threat. They may arouse even sympathy because of their great naivety. You can think of those people as *tabula rasa*. I mean, you can educate them easily for they are not resistant to illumination. You can’t undertake the same, however, when it comes to others who lack a sense of shame and are somehow okay with their ignorance. Such people pose the biggest threat in my opinion. Take, for instance, those living here [in Tophane]: they used to buckle under when their lack of culture surfaced. They knew they had to be embarrassed. But now they have no hesitation in glowering at you, holding their head up high like asking ‘Well, any problem with that?’ That is exactly what we have been regrettably witnessing in Tophane. This is the revenge of the ignorant upon the educated, of the provincial upon the urbanite (Erdem, owner of Art Gallery 1, 17/07/2017).

Arguably, there are some contradictory points in Erdem’s evaluation above. According to him, one can minimise, or get rid of, the shame of being ignorant only by admitting one’s own lack of education in advance. However, Erdem also implies that those subjects need not be ashamed of themselves for their deprivation – albeit, on one condition: as long as they know their place and act accordingly, which in practice amounts to acknowledging the cultivated as superior.²³ This means that the shame related to a lack of formal education is part of a complex negotiation in the sense that the ‘ignorant’ can avoid being subjected to moral shame or othering only to the extent that they admit their position and inferiority beforehand. According to Honneth, there are two different types of inferiority:

In the first case, one experiences oneself as inferior because one has violated a moral norm, adherence to which had constituted a principle of one’s ego-ideals.

In the second case, however, one is oppressed by a feeling of low self-esteem

²³ Ignorance does not simply mean lack of education, nor does ignorant signify one who is deprived of cultural capital. These are rather insults whereby ‘an individual, acting in his own name or in the name of a group that is more or less important in terms of its size and social significance, indicates to someone that he possesses such and such property, and indicates to him at the same time that he must conduct himself in accordance with the social essence which is thereby assigned to him’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 105-106).

because one's interaction partners violate moral norms that, when they were adhered to, allowed one to count as the person that, in terms of one's ego-ideals, one wants to be (Honneth, 1995: 137).

As Sabri's statement makes it clear, it is rather the second type of moral shame that predominates in Tophane:

None of us is dumb, okay? The role of education has long been underestimated in Tophane, as I told you. We are all aware of that; we weren't born yesterday! But you know what: although they [newcomers] might believe we need education, as a matter of fact they never want us to get there, reach their level. I mean: even if you decide to accommodate yourself to their norms, I am pretty sure that they will start to accuse you of being a wannabe then. No point in fooling ourselves, right? Even if you start living just as they do, for example, they will be patronising – this time by reminding you of your past. So, what I'm saying basically, you will always be lower according to them. Worse, I don't think it is a contradiction, you know? It is their knee-jerk reaction to cavil at you one way or another (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).

Sabri's expression is of particular significance, helping us to grasp why the formation of compensatory respect is not arbitrary, but shaped by processes of symbolic domination. As implied by the quotation above, local residents are not always-already inclined to harass the educated; on the contrary, they are ready to acknowledge the significance of education as well as their own lack of it. Local inhabitants seek gentrifiers' recognition because of their possession of cultural capital, as this recognition would confirm that their lack of education does not necessarily have to cast doubt on their own self-image. The same locals, however, want the educated newcomers to sacrifice their 'privilege' at the same time. Since this does not happen, local residents are left with no choice but to de-emphasise the importance of formal education themselves. Ayhan, for instance, claims that he has learned more from Tophane than he would have been taught in school (16/07/2017). Another attitude which was common amongst the locals I met, was to regard the neighbourhood itself as the 'university of life' (Ahmet, 18/08/2017; Yavuz, 29/07/2017). For locals, this defensiveness about the lack of formal education, and their shows of defiant pride, help to preserve their sense of self. This sheds light on the dynamics which compel locals to seek respect on their own terms, out of which a set of countercultures arise in the neighbourhood.

Philistinism appeared to be a major component of the counterculture in Tophane. It is worth dwelling on this further, in order to avoid drawing a quick conclusion

about the physical attacks made on art galleries. Philistinism is appealing and seems to have captivated local residents, but it should be conceived as a reaction to and not a cause of social tension. Indeed it is the form that the struggle for recognition takes in Tophane, which brings the dominant values into question. In the case of Tophane, the struggle for recognition finds its expression in philistinism because in no way can local occupants accept the fact that newcomers refuse to interact with them due to their lack of education, as their moral well-being has been anchored in the belief that educational background does not necessarily have to characterise one thoroughly.²⁴ On the other hand, this is not something that gentrifiers can easily approve since they owe their (relatively dominant) position in the social field to their acquisition of cultural capital. As Bourdieu argues, ‘theodicy of privilege’ is ‘what causes the dominant class to feel justified in feeling dominant [and] *essentially* superior’ (1993: 177; original emphasis). This means that philistinism is not a concomitant of being deprived of education, but is what symbolic domination propels in the deprived group over time. This is demonstrated by Fatih:

I wasn’t a person interested in art, to be honest. But I did not have an aversion to it either. I used to be indifferent, let’s say. Since they [art galleries] moved into Tophane, however, I have taken a dislike to art [...] It must have been about seven or eight years ago; I visited one of them located on Bogazkesen Caddesi – just out of curiosity, you know, as there were suddenly plenty of them. I still regret doing it, though. I had never felt so uncomfortable before. They looked me up and down first of all, as if I made a mistake by stepping in. You don’t feel free to ask something especially when you’re gazed on, do you? I was timid as well but nonetheless asked what they were doing. But I wasn’t calling them to account. I was just wondering what brought them here, as we were not accustomed to hosting art galleries in our neighbourhood. What of it, huh? But they were all reckless, you know, very swaggering indeed. They made me feel like I was wasting their time. Because I had no fucking idea what they were doing. Besides, I would probably not understand it anyway even if they explained. That’s why I was a waste of time for them, not so hard to guess. You know what: things could have been different in Tophane... I mean it! But when you undergo something like that at first hand, you willy-nilly find yourself saying “Fuck this shit!” And there appears a massive amount of hatred (Fatih, local, 17/07/2017).

²⁴ Take, Fatih, for instance. In one of his statements, he accuses the newcomers who walk their dogs of not collecting stools unless somebody is around and watching them (17/07/2017). Local residents are inclined to give such counter- examples to invalidate the prevalent, positive correlation between possession of cultural capital and being urbanite.

As apparent in Fatih's statement, there is no distance between moral injury and outburst. Nevertheless, that is not a paradox as 'it is only by regaining the possibility of active conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of humiliation'

(Honneth, 1995: 138). In Tophane, the active conduct Honneth mentions rests predominantly on rejection of the norms and values which are assumed to be supported by gentrifiers.

The importance of gaining recognition from those supposed to be cultivated is understandable, considering the fact that local residents need to confirm that they are of worth in spite of their lack of education. Because local residents look forward to acquiring recognition within/via interaction, they hold newcomers responsible for the decline in their moral well-being insofar as newcomers refrain from conducting a dialogue with them. As a result, local residents begin to act in certain ways to annoy and irritate newcomers on purpose. Tophane-born residents attempted to harass those who they thought ranked among cultivated others, by whom they feel they are denied recognition. That is to say, gentrifiers become the target of locals' intimidation not because they are simply outsiders in the neighbourhood, but because they represent the educated other:

Tophaneli [Tophane-born] knows perfectly well how to annoy those who cheekily ignore or cross our red lines. If you threaten our well-being, let's say, then Tophane gets back at you without missing a beat. Lads go ask what you're staring at, for instance, which is a good reason for coming to blows (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).

Sabri's expression demonstrates that some local residents are no longer concerned with projections of their positive characteristics, or willing to wait for the educated to approve their moral worth. Instead, they compel newcomers to take notice of their physical existence at any cost. As Goffman points out, 'lacking the salutary feedback of daily social intercourse with others, the [isolated] can become suspicious, depressed, hostile, anxious, and bewildered' (1963: 13). And, arguably, that is key to making sense of why the struggle for recognition did not arise *ex nihilo*, but when local occupants came to realise that their demand for recognition would remain unmet by gentrifiers:

Imagine you were a gallery owner in Tophane... Let me tell you what to do: go send them [the locals] invitation, okay? Count them in for exhibitions, at least by courtesy! There is nothing to worry about, as I don't believe they will dare attend.

But they certainly would be honoured. You get what I mean? [...] Let them be aware of your events. Believe me they would display tolerance if they felt they were being recognised. Being ignored, however, they start doing what they are good at: getting others to notice their existence in the neighbourhood, by use of violence mostly (Cihan, newcomer, 06/09/2017).

This supports Honneth's argument that:

The reason why the socially ignored individuals attempt, in response, to damage the others' possessions is not because they want to satisfy their passions, but rather in order to make the others take notice of them (Honneth, 1995: 44).

As discussed in Chapter Three, Honneth conceives of such hostile attitudes as 'destructive reactions' that come to exist when subjects realise 'they are being illegitimately denied social recognition' (ibid: 136):

Do you know what happened in the wake of those incidents? Most of the gallery owners altered their manner completely. I mean, they began to exchange hellos with their neighbours and ask how they are doing. For God's sake! Why didn't you do that when you first moved in, huh? You had been the bee's knees, putting on airs, whereas we had been the nobodies. What changed all of a sudden that you decided to avoid sending us to Coventry? [*Ne oldu da birden bizi adam yerine koymaya basladin?*] (Ayhan, local, 16/07/2017).

Ayhan's narrative of the changes in the aftermath of the physical attacks made upon art galleries is of particular significance. Although the direct causes of the assaults are not the primary focus of the thesis, Ayhan's statement nonetheless helps us to understand the underlying emotional dynamics behind the Tophane incidents, which also sheds light on the wider social conflict prevailing in the neighbourhood.

It is also the case that the ongoing social tensions cannot be reduced to the assaults because Tophane's local inhabitants direct their reactions not solely towards art galleries. Kenan, a newcomer running a shop in the neighbourhood, discussed how a local lad in his early twenties had spat on the floor as he passed by Kenan standing outside the front of his bookshop. To Kenan, such actions are done on purpose: 'I made the mistake of warning him because he was like already waiting for that to strike' (Kenan, 01/08/2017).²⁵

²⁵ Here, it might be worth recalling Sabri's above statement, in which he mentions how 'skilled' local residents are at causing trouble (16/07/2017).

Local inhabitants aimed to settle a score with the cultivated other, by whom they think have been belittled, ill-treated and disrespected, notably by subjecting them to what they may find most unbearable. They attempt to achieve this mostly by resorting to anti-social behaviour, and violating the rules which they assume gentrifiers expect them to conform to. In practice, such wrongdoings are intentional and can be considered major components of the resistance that local residents undertake against the symbolic domination they have been subjected to (see Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 5).

‘Destructive’ reactions based on wrongdoings and harassments can be seen as one of the only ways for local residents to seek respect on their own terms, and to resist symbolic domination by defying the shame of being uneducated that is imposed upon them. Local residents may well take on various pejorative personas such as ‘vulgar’, ‘tough’ and even ‘ignorant’ to this end – i.e. the stigmas they used to deny. That being said, not every newcomer in Tophane has experienced these kinds of reactions from locals. Despite the existence of some open hostilities, like the Tophane incidents, there is also a counterculture of respect among locals.

7.4 The Notion of Tophanelilik [Being-from-Tophane]: Countercultures of Respect

Tophaneli [one-from-Tophane] is raised strong and fearless. He grows up with great passion and he learns how to fight on the street. But he never discomferts one for no reason; he perfectly knows how and to whom to show respect (Ayhan, local, 16/07/2017).

As Ayhan indicates above, it is common amongst local male residents to draw upon an imaginary ‘macho lad’ figure in idealising what it means to be a Tophane-born (Ali, 12/08/2017; Feyyaz, 29/08/2017; Sabri, 16/07/2017). Nevertheless, being-from-Tophane is not simply about place of birth. Locals think one can still become a *Tophaneli* even if not born in the neighbourhood. According to Fatih’s gendered vision, however, ‘he needs to get involved in a fight first’ (17/07/2017). Although his response tells much about the sense of masculinity that prevails amongst male locals and shapes *Tophanelilik*, we nonetheless should avoid taking those statements as given, recalling Bourdieu’s warning that ‘appearances are always in favour of the apparent’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 246). Indeed, *Tophanelilik* – as a longstanding collective identity underpinned by conservative and religious values – clearly has a certain attraction as an explanation for the incidents in Tophane. I suggest, however, that it should be avoided. Certainly not all of the newcomers I met in Tophane had experienced bullying,

harassment or machismo on the part of locals. I observed that some newcomers, including some art gallery owners, had been exempted from enduring *Tophanelilik* in this manner. The field observations casted doubt on the idea that *Tophanelilik* operated as a collective identity that was conservative and religious in nature, and made local residents intolerant to newcomers.

I advocate instead that *Tophanelilik* is in practice nothing other than a name given to the countercultures of compensatory respect local residents have formed among themselves. These countercultures have formed through the refusal of newcomers' dominant values, which revolve around education and the possession of cultural capital, and act to remove the burden of being uneducated. This means that there is no intrinsic relationship between *Tophanelilik* and intolerance of secular lifestyles. Indeed, the potential for mutual respect between locals and newcomers was borne out in some of the interview narratives. For example, Zeynep was a newcomer who talked about the misunderstandings between groups in the neighbourhood:

I find this 'us and them' rhetoric very dangerous in social terms for it keeps widening the gap, which is already almost unbridgeable. 'Are you talking to *them*?', 'How come you bear *them*?' To me, those shouldn't be complaining about becoming 'them' in the eyes of others whom they discriminate against, whilst being part of discrimination as such. Besides, it is not that cool, you know, to speak merely to people like yourself. I think there is a huge misunderstanding in that regard (Zeynep, newcomer, 31/07/2017).

Zeynep is not new to Tophane, as her presence in the neighbourhood dates back to the early 2000s. She had run a coffee shop with her partner on Kumbaraci Ramp from 2002 till 2006, when she handed the café over to concentrate on acting. Three years later she came back to Tophane, this time with her drama group, which decided to relocate their theatre hall in the neighbourhood. Since then Zeynep has been in Tophane; every summer they organise free drama workshops for local kids. She is happy with the attendance, as most of the local parents contacted let their children partake. 'Even they [the parents] come watch our plays from time to time' she says. Zeynep had noticed the possibilities for mutual respect, not intolerance:

When you show respect, they respect you back. On no account do they interfere in your lifestyle. Nobody has warned me so far because I do not dress alike or live as they do, nor have I felt any condemning gaze in this period of time. On the contrary, they become at a loss for words when they see you willing to build rapport with them. They feel encouraged to break the mould and drop the other shoe (Zeynep, 31/07/2017).

Indeed, although their lifestyle can be considered conservative to a certain extent, many of those born in Tophane did not appear to be inclined to take offence at a secular lifestyle, or react in hostile ways against it:

Have you seen the off licence [tekel bayii] at the centre [of Tophane]? There would be none of them if all this resulted from uses of alcohol. Do I myself use it? Well, I don't... But I am not allergic to others' use either. I just can't, you know... That'd be unethical for it is between God and them in the end (Fatih, 17/07/2017).

Some gallery owners thought that a solution to the assaults would be to stop serving alcohol during the exhibitions. Buket, who I interviewed towards the end of fieldwork, is one of them. Her gallery was attacked two years after she moved into Tophane from Cihangir. Her confusion about the incident stemmed largely from the fact they were not serving alcohol but tea and *simit* [Turkish bagel] when they were attacked. This was a conscious decision in order to preclude an attack in the first place (Buket, owner of Art Gallery 5, 08/09/2017). Arguably, Buket and her colleagues misread the reasons for the previous attacks. The on-going social conflict has not been about intolerance of different lifestyles, or uses of alcohol, but about the class-based struggles for distinction and recognition that have taken place between local residents and newcomers amidst the process of gentrification:

I don't believe Tophane has to be a turbulent neighbourhood, given its long history throughout which people of various religious, ethnic and social backgrounds used to live together in peace. Yet, none of those social groups was feeling superior to the rest in the past. Rather than riding the high horse, we were all looking after each other [...] This neighbourhood had undergone no social conflict until these [newcomers] came and settled. Of course, there had been some disputes or street fights. But people were not bearing a grudge against each other. So, I don't see why Tophane shall not become a similar space again unless people keep looking down on each other (Yavuz, local, 29/07/2017).

What local residents considered a mark of disrespect is therefore not to do with any violation of the Islamic rules. Locals did not suggest that they wanted newcomers to conform to those rules, even though they predominantly did. Therefore, avoiding the use of alcohol in and outside of the art gallery did not provide a solution to the social conflict, which was instead grounded upon the lack of interaction:

You know the Italian School on the upper side of Bogazkesen Street, right? On weekdays, for example, here overflows with parents who come to pick their children up. Because streets are quite narrow, it is hard to parallel park a car even if you manage to find a space. Our boys, for example, always help them do so. But still, even those we aid shrug us off. Would you believe! Sorry to say but who the fuck you are, huh? [...] If they attempted to get to know us, everything would be totally different. But as long as you continue to grudge even a thank-you, things happen this way in Tophane (İhsan, local, 02/09/2017).

Local residents feel disrespected and offended because newcomers have so far remained indifferent to their demand for recognition and equal treatment – an indifference which in practice amounts to an absence of interaction. If religious dynamics were dominant, the locals would arguably not strive to gain recognition from gentrifiers, who are mostly secularist, nor would they want the same to treat themselves as equals. However, local people still hoped that newcomers would come to recognise them ‘one day’:

They [newcomers] will pay the price for doing a number on us when a rainy day comes. This is not a threat at all. I mean, they will pay it morally... God forbid but severe incidents may happen at any time. And you know what? We [local residents] are the ones who will come to their aid when they undergo something unpleasant like fire, robbery or quarrel. On that day they will be conscientiously disturbed; they will feel guilty for treating us like dirt (Ayhan, 16/07/2017).

Considering the example Ayhan gives, it is plausible to question how far *Tophanelilik* compensates for the lack of mutual recognition between long-term residents and gentrifiers. As can be inferred from his ‘aspiration’ for a rainy day, recognition to be gained from educated newcomers is still more appealing to local residents than the compensatory respect that they attempt to provide each other with. It can therefore be claimed that *Tophanelilik*, by its nature, is destined to be deficient in the end. And this may provide an explanation as to why local residents are not keen to act like a ‘true’ *Tophaneli* unless they are openly despised:²⁶

There may well be some exceptions, but the majority inwardly want to get to know and talk to you. That’s the impression I’ve been given over the past four

²⁶ Observing social encounters helped me realise the fact that the ways in which they describe a true *Tophaneli* do not necessarily coincide with the ways in which they act in daily life, as discussed in this section.

years. They are just too timid to do so, you know, which is why you shouldn't be waiting for them to come talk to you. You must be the one who takes the initiative, as they are far more inclined to act according to the vibe they receive from you (Leyla, owner of Art Gallery 3, 17/08/2017).

Leyla is a good example of how those of who fulfil local residents' demand for recognition and equal treatment avoid becoming a target of their hostile reactions. Unlike Buket, whose exhibition was attacked despite being an alcohol-free event, Leyla has never experienced such an incident, even though alcohol is served regularly at her exhibition openings (one of which I attended at her invitation in September 2017). She also partakes in the committee which organises Tomtom Design Week, a street festival that takes place in the neighbourhood twice a year. It is worth noting that no attack has been made by local residents on this festival, despite the attendees' use of alcohol.

Although in the minority, Leyla is not the only gallery owner who is on good terms with local inhabitants. Barış of Gallery 4 had been in Tophane for seven years; having worked as art assistant for one of the art galleries attacked, he opened his own in 2016. According to him:

Everyone in society seeks respect and approval in the end, so do they [local residents]. They feel good, respected even if you show you are not looking down on them. I mean, you don't have to establish rapport, drink tea or hang out to make them be kind to you. Just wave or say hi while going by, you know... That's all! You don't really need to put in effort, yet most of the people I've come across do not even do so. Don't know why... Maybe, lest they look like them [local inhabitants]. I, for example, wouldn't make an issue out of it if someone avoided speaking to me for any reason whatsoever. I wouldn't feel offended, you know, nor would I take it personal. Well, these people [the local] do... They can become very aggressive and storm at those who they deem are looking down on them (Barış, owner of Art Gallery 4, 28/08/2017).

What makes Tophane-born inhabitants move between two different moods, as Barış mentions, is also what determines the threshold of their tolerance: whether they are recognised, or not. Both Leyla and Barış thus rank among those whom local inhabitants treat kindly in return for their warm approach. However, it is not only defiant masculinity that begins to dissolve once local residents have been recognised and treated as equals (or at least not despised), but also philistinism:

You don't wonder something you already know, do you? Of course, they [local inhabitants] do wonder what we [art galleries] all are doing here. One of them presumed it was me who had painted all this... It sounds ridiculous indeed, but how far can you blame him for that? You know what: their attitudes change from A to Z when you make them feel comfortable, allowing them to ask whatever they want. Once, for instance, they told me "You are not quite like others [other art gallery owners]" Later on, I invited them to one of the exhibition openings we organised here. Except one or two, they all came (Barış, 28/08/2017).

Here, it is useful to remember the advice Cihan, a performing artist, gave to the art galleries located in Tophane. As mentioned in the previous section, he advised gallery owners to inform the local community of their upcoming events as a gesture of goodwill, and added: 'there is nothing to worry about, as I don't believe they will dare attend' (Cihan, 06/08/2017). However, the above narrative of Barış challenges Cihan's assumption. Although Cihan rightly guesses the positive impact of invitations on local residents, he nonetheless underestimates the possibility that they may be willing to attend an exhibition as long as they are encouraged:

One day when I was walking down the street, I just took a moment to have a look at the display window of an art gallery. No sooner had I stood at the window than a young man appeared from inside and asked whether I'd like to come in. In a minute he impressed, you know. The warm welcome, language, rapport... All this broke the ice. Anyway, he walked me around and showed the other paintings inside. One of them was eye-catching but too abstract to make sense. I told him that I didn't understand anything at all. You know what he did? He brought me to the front of the painting and explained how it could be read in different ways one by one. It was incredible, you know. I listened to him open-mouthed for almost ten minutes. That guy, for example, led me to drop my guard against the art right there on the spot (Sabri, local, 16/07/2017).²⁷

Cihan's prediction that local residents are not likely to dare attend artistic events is not completely inaccurate in that the lack of education makes local people feel less confident. As argued in the previous chapter, art galleries can be quite exclusive places, and a particular embodied performance is required within them. As such, it is not a coincidence that Sabri had been against art by the time he attended. Lack of confidence, caused and intensified by lack of cultural capital, provides an explanation as to why

²⁷ I could not confirm whether it was Barış of Gallery 4 or someone else that Sabri encountered in the gallery.

Sabri intended to look at the works of art through a display window at first, instead of walking into an art gallery. There are good reasons to assume that Sabri would never have stepped in if he had not been invited inside.

So are local residents most afraid of making a mistake, misinterpreting a piece of art, or dropping a clanger? Arguably, they are not afraid of giving their lack of cultural capital away. Otherwise, Sabri would not have felt comfortable enough to say that he did not understand anything about the painting. However, Sabri did not hesitate to do so because he was convinced that he would not be morally judged. I argue instead that what stresses out local inhabitants is the fear of judgement on the basis of their educational background, which is why they do not dare to take the first step, but wait for the cultivated party to make a positive gesture instead.

Needless to say, one who is deprived of education is more likely to become a philistine than anyone else; nevertheless, to bracket them together overshadows the symbolic relations that may transform one from a lowbrow to an anti-intellectual. The notion of *Tophanelilik* therefore should not be taken for granted, even though local residents sometimes favour philistinism in their statements. This means that those born in Tophane are not always-already inclined to be philistines or act in subversive ways; otherwise, they would not respond positively to the gestures that some newcomers make.

Both philistinism and *Tophanelilik*, based on defiant masculinity, appear in the wake of shared negative experiences related to the lack of formal education. As such, they should be considered reactions whose aim is to shrug off the shame that uneducated local inhabitants feel. For local people, there is a fine line between acceptance and refusal of dominant values, just as between exercising and withdrawing aspects of *Tophanelilik*. What exemplifies this best is the difference between Sabri and Fatih in terms of their attitude to art, which also demonstrates the role of symbolic power in making local residents move between a variety of contradictory performances and position-takings. When they are not treated as ignorant, as in Sabri's case, they do not (need to) activate defence mechanisms based on a set of countercultures of respect. If gentrifiers do not approach local residents with a warm attitude, treat them as equals in moral terms, and, by so doing, make them feel less judged, then local inhabitants feel it necessary to perform the 'smugly ignorant' so as to defy the shame of being uneducated, as Fatih's example indicated.²⁸

As mentioned above, a number of the newcomers I interviewed interpret that the social conflict in Tophane stems from local residents being vulgar, tough and philistines - according to them, what being-from-Tophane means is to inherit those

²⁸ His statement, in which he narrates how he has taken a dislike to art, can be found on page 203.

traits unquestioningly - which they think has made local residents intolerant and resistant to anyone who is not like them. If *Tophanelilik* is conceived as a longstanding collective identity comprised of such negative referents, the tension and assaults seem to arise out of local residents' intolerance. This evaluation, however, does not provide an explanation as to why some other newcomers have not undergone such hostility and resentment. Instead, I have argued that *Tophanelilik* is a set of countercultures of respect to which those born in Tophane resort in order to secure their moral well-being in the absence of interaction and thereby recognition. Here, it may be helpful to recall the way Ayhan describes the Tophane-born typology, as demonstrated at the beginning of this section. According to Ayhan, 'he [a Tophane-born] never discomforts one for no reason; he perfectly knows how and to whom to show respect' (16/07/2017). As Goffman points out, 'tolerance [...] is usually part of a bargain' (1963: 121). In the case of Tophane, notably for Tophane-born inhabitants', that bargain is based on how to negotiate educational backgrounds and the theodicy of privilege based on possession of cultural capital. Defiant masculinity and philistinism are practised by local inhabitants when gentrifiers shy away from them because they relate newcomers' reluctance to take part in social interaction with their own educational deprivation.

To be treated morally equal within/via interaction is what sets the locals free from seeking respect on their own terms. Stressors related to lack of education and cultural capital begin to dissolve when/if local residents see newcomers on the verge of an interaction. In such circumstances these people need not act like a 'true' Tophane-born and resort to either defiant masculinity or philistinism since the symbolic gestures newcomers make persuade local residents that they are not going to be judged according to their educational background. As such, they need not preserve their moral well-being at any cost either. It is not accidental that the newcomers who have not been subjected to any harassment are those who are in interaction with local residents. However, when/if they are not granted recognition at odds with their demand, they target not only the norms and values based on acquisition of cultural capital but also their representatives (*i.e.*, gentrifiers, as they symbolise the generalised educated other). This preserves their moral well-being and defies the shame of being uneducated – a shame which exists in the absence of mutual recognition and respect.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the ongoing social conflict in Tophane arises out of a lack of social interaction (as discussed in the previous chapter), and therefore should not be reduced to what has come out of the tension and hereby made it visible: the Tophane incidents. The chapter has focused upon Tophane-born inhabitants' perceptions of gentrifiers and their reluctance to interact with the local community, which has

indicated that despite their educational deprivation and subaltern class position, local residents nonetheless have a positive sense of self because they think that they do not embody any traits that may provide newcomers with a reason to eschew them. The data have demonstrated that lack of social interaction nevertheless challenges locals' relation-to-self, out of which the need and demand for recognition arises.

The chapter then expanded upon locals' destructive reactions towards newcomers, arguing that in practice these are related to their struggle for recognition and therefore should be conceived as reactions against symbolic domination. The occasions when locals are recognised and treated as equals by gentrifiers show that they need not resort to a set of countercultures of respect and act like a 'true' Tophane-born in order to preserve their moral worth. This demonstrates that it is not deprivation of education that inclines locals to become philistines, but in default of the interaction and mutual recognition that they are left wanting. This leaves them with no choice but to seek respect on their own terms and refuse the dominant norms and values that dictate that the possession of cultural capital or being educated is what puts fixes one's worth. Overall, the findings have suggested that the social conflict in Tophane does not stem from hostile reactions whereby locals strive to defy the shame of being uneducated, but rather, from the imposition of educational deprivation as a shame upon Tophane-born residents by the lack of social interaction.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

In this thesis I aimed to provide a class-based understanding of the longstanding tension in Tophane, a gentrified area of Istanbul, which was home to a chain of well-publicised assaults against art galleries, known as the ‘Tophane incidents’, between 2010 and 2016. The thesis addressed the incidents in Tophane on the basis of a wider social conflict, via a four-month period of ethnographic research. Since the objective of this research was to explore everyday social conflicts in the neighbourhood, I operationalised gentrification as the context of the study. This thesis argued however that issues of social class, that some literature on gentrification raised by drawing upon Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, were limited. The thesis argued instead for the need for a new conceptual framework that put the class relationships between different social groups, and the tensions they gave rise to, at the centre of the explanation. This was found in the original combination of Bourdieu and Honneth and the theoretical dovetailing of the struggle for distinction and the struggle for recognition. As such, I sought to answer the following overarching question: *How do struggles for distinction and recognition intertwine in contemporary Tophane, Istanbul?*

To address the main research question stated above, this thesis sought to answer five subsidiary research questions:

- i. In what ways does gentrification generate new forms of social conflict?
- ii. What struggles for distinction predominate in Tophane?
- iii. What struggles for recognition predominate in Tophane?
- iv. Do these struggles aid understanding of the Tophane incidents?
- v. What is the broader relevance of the Tophane case considering such key questions as Turkey’s secular-Islamic cleavage?

This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising its main findings and arguments detailed from Chapter Two to Chapter Seven. I accordingly organise the following five sections in a way as to demonstrate how I have addressed the subsidiary research

questions, which helps to highlight the original contributions the thesis has made. The first section revisits the literature discussed in Chapter Two, and highlights how such key theoretical concepts as struggle for distinction, symbolic domination and struggle for recognition were put to work in a systematic fashion in Chapter Three to generate insights regarding the politics of gentrification. The second and third sections summarise the empirical findings that resulted from the ethnographic research I conducted in Tophane, which were presented and analysed in chapters Five to Seven. The fourth section accordingly enlarges upon what those empirical findings mean for the Tophane incidents. In the fifth section I reflect upon the implications of the Tophane case for wider Turkish society. Finally, I discuss recommendations for future research.

8.2 Answering Research Question 1

In what ways does gentrification generate new forms of social conflict?

Chapter Two and Chapter Three aimed to address the thesis' first subsidiary research question. In Chapter Two, I focused on the concept of gentrification. I accordingly argued that gentrification, whether it results in displacement or not, has a direct impact on social classes. In the early times of this phenomenon, these impacts were studied from the perspective of displacement. The social conflicts in the neighbourhoods that underwent gentrification were, in parallel to the foregoing, associated with the displacement of locals, most of whom were low-income families. As examined in Chapter Two, however, the measures implemented by local authorities, which often aimed at ensuring a social mix between social groups, predominantly resulted in the reduction of the risk of displacement. I suggested that the relative absence of displacement has brought about coexistence of different social classes and has thus led the phenomenon of gentrification, which already had class dimensions, to become even more class-related. Past associations between the tensions in gentrification and the displacement has led to an increase in the number of those who believe gentrification may not result in any social problems, which led to a new conceptual debate about the phenomenon.

Having reviewed the polarisation in the literature on gentrification, I argued that these conceptual discussions have failed to provide a comprehensive understanding of this new form of gentrification (*i.e.*, 'gentrification without displacement') which no longer results in socio-demographic segregation but socio-cultural diversity in a wide sense of the term. As critically analysed in Chapter Two, the first group focuses merely on gentrifiers, without offering an analysis of the lower classes, although they broadly affirm gentrification because of the advantages it offers for these classes (*e.g.*, Caulfield,

1989; 1994; Freeman, 2005; 2006; Freeman and Braconi, 2004). The second group is more critical of the phenomenon and claim that gentrification still has some negative impacts (e.g., Atkinson, 2002; 2015; Davidson, 2008; Davidson and Wyly, 2015; Shaw and Hagemans, 2015; Slater, 2006), but I nevertheless claimed that these scholars' analyses have neglected whether gentrifiers play any role in these transformations.

That being said, I suggested that these conceptual discussions fall short not simply because of what they leave out when drawing those conclusions. The emancipatory aspect of gentrification, according to the first group, is due to the lifestyle and worldview of the groups who collectively move to working class neighbourhoods. As discussed in Chapter Two, urban sociologists in this group base their arguments on Bourdieu's theoretical framework (e.g., Ley, 1994; 1997; 2003; Rose, 1996; 2004). However, I argued that Bourdieu's fundamental theoretical principles have often been overlooked. The most important principle is that Bourdieu's understanding of class contains an element of conflict, because the symbolic meaning of the objective differences between classes is established by the outcome of the struggle of the classes against each other (1985: 735; 1991: 106, 130). As noted, however, the first group isolates such key concepts as 'habitus' and 'capital' from their system and uses these concepts within themselves, thus by-passing the notion of struggle, the latter which is the basis of Bourdieu's thought (Wacquant, 2008: 202).

Utilising Bourdieu's theoretical framework (1984, 1991), together with Honneth's theoretical framework (1995), in Chapter Three I argued that the politics of gentrification (*i.e.*, spatial co-existence of diverse groups) is inherently conflictual. The primary contribution of the analytical approach developed in this thesis to the literature on gentrification is that it offers a relational analysis of the existing low-income inhabitants and those who collectively move to inner-city working-class neighbourhoods, called 'gentrifiers' or 'newcomers'. That being said, the contribution of this analytical approach is not limited to its collective analysis of lower and upper classes. As detailed in Chapter Three, this model illustrates that tensions and conflicts are intrinsic in the coexistence of difference social classes not simply because of economic reasons but also in cultural terms. This means that focusing solely on economic factors is not always necessary to offer a critical, class-based analysis of gentrification. I argued that this was the main weakness of the neo-Marxist camp, which criticises the conclusions suggested by the 'culturalist' group yet does not offer any counter-arguments against the affirmation of gentrification. As such, I aimed to break the dilemma between the neo-Marxist and culturalist groups, which has been a major barrier to the development of a more holistic understanding of gentrification.

8.2.1 Bourdieu against Bourdieusian Urban Sociologists: Struggle for Distinction and an Alternative Understanding of Gentrification

In Chapter Three I began by highlighting that the process of newcomers moving from the suburban areas, where the middle-class lifestyle prevails, to working class neighbourhoods is a statement of their denial of the normalisation of the conventional middle-class lifestyle. At odds with the first group (e.g., Bilasius *et al.*, 2015; Caulfield, 1994; Florida, 2002; Hwang, 2016; Ley, 1997), I argued that gentrification has not emerged as a result of differentiation of the new middle class from the conventional middle class by their cultural capital and their cosmopolitan habitus, and that advocating otherwise amounts to taking for granted the characteristics of the communities moving to working class neighbourhoods. I argued that what makes this group the new middle class is neither its cultural capital nor its habitus. This group has become a separate social class because of their efforts to distinguish themselves from the middle classes. That was to suggest, gentrification has not emerged out of the characteristics of this group but out of their attempts to use these characteristics to ensure their distinction from the traditional middle class.

Making use of Bourdieu's concept of 'struggle for distinction' (1984), I argued that gentrification stems from the newcomers' desire to impose the cultural capital, in which they have more shares, as the symbol of superiority, over other social classes, and determine the dominant principle of domination (see Bourdieu, 1984: 310). This was followed by a discussion as to why cultural can be converted into symbolic capital only if the existing symbolic power of economic capital is eliminated. I accordingly suggested that gentrifiers target the middle-class norms and values because any domination over the middle class by means of cultural capital would make cultural capital as the main type of capital that determines the dominant principle of domination, and would make the gentrifiers, who are the owners of this type of capital, the most privileged group (see *ibid.*: 55). As such, I argued that gentrification is related to the efforts of gentrifiers to impose their claim of superiority, and that this challenge is exactly what has differentiated gentrifiers, most of whom are members of the middle class, as a separate social group.

I argued that gentrification has been turned into a greater phenomenon and extended to other working-class neighbourhoods because gentrifiers succeed in legitimising their alternative urban lifestyle. The distinctive characteristic of this lifestyle is that it is founded on refined pleasures. Although authentication of pleasures and tastes as such requires a certain level of economic capital, more importantly it requires a high level of cultural capital. I claimed however that this is not a coincidence

but part of the struggle for distinction of the new middle class, as this lifestyle is based on the idea that ownership of economic capital alone does not guarantee any privileges. As such, I argued that this new urban lifestyle has been designed in a specific way to subordinate economic capital to cultural capital, whereby gentrifiers attempt to convert their cultural capital into symbolic capital.

I accordingly argued that what has made this group dominant against the middle classes is the growth of the community of gentrifiers. Just as gentrification is an extension of the efforts to transform cultural capital into symbolic capital, the subsequent stages of gentrification demonstrate that cultural capital has been indeed turned into symbolic capital. The best example to support this argument is the social groups who own economic capital but not cultural capital, moving to working-class quarters that undergo gentrification. The increasing tendency among these groups to move to central urban areas is not related to the physical transformation of these neighbourhoods but to the popularisation of this new, urban lifestyle designed by the new middle class. I suggested that these groups, who own economic capital, are so keen to adapt to this new urban lifestyle that is based on cultural capital because they aspire to benefit from the privileges and domination promised by the ownership of cultural capital.

I discussed that the increasing demand for cultural capital among the middle classes has brought about a kind of reflex to maintain the privileges and domination that are brought by ownership of cultural capital. The shift of struggle for distinction from intergroup competition (*i.e.*, gentrifiers versus middle class) to intragroup competition is a result of the growth of this community. That is to suggest, gentrifiers include not only those who own cultural capital and play a role in transformation of cultural capital into symbolic capital, but also the people who do not yet have cultural capital but are willing to acquire it (to benefit from the associated privileges). The best example to this argument is the use of the concepts of ‘pioneers’ and ‘followers’ in the classification of gentrifiers, which demonstrates how this community has expanded in the process. This classification is aimed at categorising the gentrifiers, who are growing in numbers, according to the type of capital they own. As discussed in Chapter Three, the first concept refers to the group which is relatively poor in terms of economic power but rich in terms of cultural capital, and the second concept refers to the group which has significant economic capital but not cultural capital.

Although it is the authenticity of the consumption practices that leads to an increase in the demand for cultural capital, I suggested that the popularisation of these practices undermined the authenticity of ownership of cultural capital. As the distinctive characteristics of the cultural capital is gradually lost due to the rise in demand, the newcomers are forced to prove the authenticity of their cultural capital against each other. This is because, as discussed in Chapter Three, it is not quite possible

to identify who actually owns cultural capital and who seeks it. I argued that this is key to making sense of why gentrification is a conflictual phenomenon, as the struggle no longer revolves around transforming cultural capital into symbolic capital in a way that enables the owners of this capital to feel superior to others, but to maintain the privilege brought by ownership of cultural capital.

To sum up, I argued that the spatial co-existence of different social classes is an inherently conflictual process because the underlying motivation of those who move to working-class neighbourhoods is to determine the dominant principle of domination by developing an alternative lifestyle which aims to subordinate the possession of economic capital to that of cultural capital and, by so doing, convert cultural capital into symbolic capital. As such, I opposed the so-called Bourdieusian affirmation of gentrification, based on the assumption that gentrifiers are diversity-friendly on account of their cultural capital and ‘cosmopolitan’ habitus. Furthermore, by drawing upon the same Bourdieusian theoretical framework (1984, 1991), I argued that gentrification is not emancipatory primarily because it arises out of struggles for distinction. That being said, this is not the only reason that gentrification generates social tensions and conflicts. As analysed in Chapter Three, gentrification generates social tensions and conflicts also because existing subaltern inhabitants may well be subjected to symbolic domination by those who seek to maintain the privilege that they have acquired as a result of questing for distinction.

8.2.2 From Suffering to Reaction: Struggle for Recognition

I argued that since gentrification is part of an endeavour to convert cultural capital into symbolic capital, spatial co-existence of diverse groups results in symbolic domination. In Bourdieu’s sense, as discussed in Chapter Three, symbolic domination is about the subjective re-making of social reality by the upper classes in their favour (Bourdieu, 1977: 164; 1991: 238). However, I argued that symbolic domination as such has devastating impacts on the subaltern because the dominant, as part of their struggles for distinction, pathologise the deprivation of certain types of capital so as to establish a positive correlation between owning those forms of capital and having desirable characteristics. By operationalising Honneth’s theoretical framework (1995), notably his concept ‘struggle for recognition’, I argued that existing subaltern inhabitants may well suffer because of how they are perceived and treated by those who move to their neighbourhood, and that the ways in which the deprived are compelled to cope with this suffering (stemming from symbolic domination and stigmatisation) is what makes the social conflicts visible in the context of gentrification.

Social suffering is a critical notion to understand the tensions between different social classes and why the dominated revolt against certain circumstances (Honneth,

2016a: 128); however, I argued that Bourdieu's theoretical framework falls short of explaining the social tensions involving the dominated, because of how he addresses the issue of the dominated. According to Bourdieu, symbolic domination is highly invisible because of the fact that those who endure symbolic power cannot perceive it (1991: 222). Arguably, however, neither symbolic domination nor symbolic power is invisible in and of themselves; rather, the deficiency of self-respect is what renders each unperceivable (cf., Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 122). In this regard I argued that the epistemological problems relevant to Bourdieu's theoretical understanding of symbolic domination arise out of his ontological assumption that material dispossession and lack of self-esteem are one and the same.

In Chapter Three I argued that the fundamental problem in Bourdieu's theoretical framework is his assumption that the dominated suffer because they do not own capital (see Bourdieu, 1987a: 16). Bourdieu argues that exposure to symbolic domination does not pressurise the dominated because the lower classes already feel inferior due to their class position (1993: 59). Since the lower classes ascribe that being deprived of capital is shameful and channel the rage arising from deprivation of capital to themselves, Bourdieu claims that they cannot construe any ill-treatment against themselves as disrespectful (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 73). As a matter of fact, according to Bourdieu, this is why the lower classes see their situation as legitimate instead of reacting to symbolic domination imposed on them.

Contra Bourdieu, I argued that subaltern subjects can have positive relation-to-self despite their deprivation and lower-class position (Honneth, 1995: 131-136; 2011: 177-178). Since Bourdieu roots the development of relation-to-self in habitus (cf., Bottero, 2009: 406; 2010: 10; Crossley: 2002: 189; Sayer, 2005: 22; 2009: 2), he does not expect the deprived to embody a positive sense of self (Bourdieu, 1977: 77-78, 164). For Honneth, however, the constitution of a very primitive sense of the self takes place prior to any socialisation, notably in the pre-linguistic stage (1995: 75). As discussed in Chapter Three, this kind of relation-to-self is principally affirmative as it develops before subjects become socialised and start to be assessed by others (Honneth, 1995: 76; 2016b: 176-177). By drawing upon Honneth's theoretical framework, I suggested that a sense of self precedes sense of place occupied in the social field, and that the lower classes do not necessarily have to feel inferior or guilty for not owning any types of capital. Contrarily, the deprived can have ego-claims, and therefore, may have normative expectations of others (see Honneth, 1995: 131-136; 2011: 177-178; cf., Bourdieu, 1991: 139).

I accordingly argued that the suffering of the dominated arises out of being subject to moral judgement because they do not own the capital that is held by upper classes, as this judgement directly targets the relation-to-self of the dominated. That

was to suggest, what pressurises the dominated is not deprivation of capital but the realisation of the fact that others' negative treatment towards them is related to their own deprivation of capital. More to the point, as discussed in Chapter Three, deprivation turns into shame among the dominated when they recognise that they are morally judged by others because of their class positions (see Sayer, 2002: 7). This is why the interactions are paramount for them, because the dominated, through these interactions, get an opportunity to see themselves through the eyes of the others (Honneth, 1995: 76; see Bottero, 2009: 417; 2010: 18). I therefore argued that asymmetric interactions in the context of gentrification have the potential to undermine the relation-to-self of the dominated.

I argued that, as a result of being subject to symbolic domination, the dominated have to either accept the feeling of inferiority imposed on them and act accordingly, or reject the very reasons that are used by others to justify their disdain of the dominated. According to Honneth, as examined in Chapter Three, in those cases where one's positive relation-to-self is challenged by the way in which others perceive and treat the subject, one tends to preserve one's own ego-ideal at any cost (1995: 81-82). As such, I suggested that the deprived are compelled to refuse the dominant norms and values, as refusal turns out to be the only way for local residents to secure their moral worth (see Honneth, 1995: 137-138). This was followed by a discussion as to how the morally injured subjects can regain their affirmative sense of self. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Honneth thematises these actions as 'destructive reactions' whose aim is to put across that class position is not something to be ashamed of (1995: 44). I accordingly argued that this is exactly why the dominated act defiantly in rejecting the norms imposed on them, because they feel they have to prove beyond dispute that they are not ashamed of failing to comply with the assumed norms.

Making use of Honneth's concept of 'struggle for recognition', based on Hegel's early intersubjectivism and Mead's (1934) socio-psychological distinction between *I* and *me*, I argued that deprived agents may well adopt the stigmas imposed upon them; however, I refuted Bourdieu's argument that the dominated claim and bear stigmas as part of their identity (1991: 55). I contrarily argued that subaltern subjects perform those stigmas because they are compelled to reject the dominant norms and values, the latter of which is necessary to sustain their affirmative sense of self in the aftermath of symbolic domination (cf., Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 168; Everett, 2002: 60). As such, at odds with Bourdieu, I suggested that the adoption of stigmas does not necessarily have to indicate the fact that the deprived have no positive relation-to-self but always-already feel inferior.

In Chapter Three I argued that although bearing these stamps, for the dominated, is something momentary and part of their struggle for recognition, Bourdieu construes

this behaviour of the dominated as evidence showing that the lower classes assume the categories imposed on them (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 24, 257). Bourdieu claims that the deprived cannot form a positive image of themselves since they are born into a position which is always-already stigmatised (1985: 736; 1987a: 16). As such, the main conclusion Bourdieu comes to is that the dominated cannot resist symbolic domination (1991: 95). Indeed, this is why Bourdieu draws upon such concepts as ‘doxa’ and ‘misrecognition’ to ground his argument that the dominated contribute to their domination (1998: 100). I suggested however that what leads Bourdieu to infer that the dominated do not resist against symbolic domination is in fact the source of resistance of the dominated against symbolic domination.

I argued that what forces the lower classes to struggle for moral equality and recognition is not their deprivation of capital but the struggles for distinction of the upper classes, because it is this second type of struggle that impose the feeling of inferiority and moral shame on those deprived of certain forms of capital. The problem here is that the dominated are forced to seek self-respect in certain circumstances that they have not chosen to be in (Sayer, 2005: 160-161). This is because, as discussed in Chapter Three, in the absence of mutual recognition there is no other way for the lower classes to maintain their moral worth than prove that being deprived of capital is not actually something to be ashamed of (Honneth, 1995: 22, 131). This is arguably one of the formidable aspects of symbolic domination that should be criticised, because although they maintain their moral worth as they reject the arbitrary norms imposed on them, the behaviours they assume to maintain their positive relation-to-self make them even more unworthy and stigmatised in the eyes of the others.

As such, I argued that in the context of gentrification social classes are not parties to the same struggle, and that they are involved in discrete social struggles: struggles for distinction and struggles for recognition. However, these struggles are not isolated from each other. As discussed in Chapter Three, the tension between the lower and upper classes is rather due to the fact that the former type of struggle often leads to the latter. That is to claim, because the dominated are imposed with a feeling of inferiority as a result of symbolic domination, they start to struggle for recognition and moral equality. I suggested that the explanatory power of this theoretical model lies in its ability to enable a relational and processual study of the conflicts between social groups, and its criticality lies in its potential to reveal implicit social sufferings taking place in everyday life.

8.3 Answering Research Question 2

What struggles for distinction predominate in Tophane?

I addressed the second subsidiary question in Chapter Six, whilst attempting to account for the lack of social interaction between newcomers and local residents in Tophane. I distinguished between two different groups of newcomers in Tophane: trend-setters and trend-followers. By drawing upon the empirical examples of cafés and art exhibitions, however, I argued that there is no such conceptual tool that can distinguish a trend-setter from a trend-follower in daily life. As such, I argued that struggles for distinction predominating in Tophane revolve around newcomers' practices to become 'first among equals' and to overcome the paradox that they all resemble each other in practice.

I argued that for the newcomers the way of proving that they are not the same as others is to displace this perception elsewhere. For instance, most of the newcomers interviewed said they do not socialise in Karaköy because of the copycats, which reveals they are willing to prove that they are not copycats. However, as exemplified in Chapter Six, the cafés in Cihangir are very similar to those in Karaköy. I therefore argued that the purpose of the newcomers is to consolidate their positions in the community by using such accusations against each other, and that this demonstrates that the struggle does not rely on the authenticity of the owned cultural capital. The best example to this can be seen among the newcomers, who think they have a cultural capital but stay away from Karaköy for the fear of being seen as copycats.

In Chapter Six, I highlighted that the opening events at art galleries are another good example, demonstrating that being seen as a copycat is not related to ownership of cultural capital and that everyone can be treated as a copycat in this struggle. Considering the opening event policy of the art galleries in Tophane, the participants are clearly art-lovers who possess cultural capital. I nevertheless argued that this does not prevent some of the guests from seeing themselves as first among equals. During these events I observed that some of the guests are annoyed by the other who take pictures or selfies, and express their discontent by shaming them. I argued that this attitude of some guests against those who take pictures is part of their struggle for distinction and essentially aims at demonstrating that they themselves are the 'authentic' art-lovers. By drawing upon these findings that some people who have a certain degree of cultural capital are treated as copycats, I argued that accusations of being a copycat are rather related to how the cultural capital is used than how much cultural capital is owned.

Having indicated the ways in which these intra-group rivalries forces newcomers to take certain decisions and abstain from some certain practices that may subject them

to similar accusations of ranking among those who lack cultural capital yet pursue distinction, I argued that newcomers avoid local residents because they do not want to be seen to be interacting with those who are culturally subaltern due to their class background and lack of formal education, the latter which has been highlighted in Chapter Five. Accordingly, newcomers' reluctance to interact with the local community amounts to subjecting culturally subaltern local inhabitants to symbolic domination. Although newcomers' statements provide an understanding of why they infer they should shy away from long-term residents, with whom they share the same physical space, I nevertheless argued that newcomers, in identifying Tophane-born dwellers in this way, establish a cause-and-effect relationship between deprivation of education and some pejorative identifications such as 'ignorant', 'philistine', 'rough', and 'lost individuals' (as if the former necessarily had to result in the latter). I suggested that these identifications, albeit enabling newcomers to re-legitimise the symbolic worth of owning cultural capital and provide 'persuasive' reasons to justify their reluctance to interact with locals in a way that veils their interest in not doing so, cause social suffering on the part of long-term dwellers.

8.4 Answering Research Question 3

What struggles for recognition predominate in Tophane?

As discussed in Chapter Three, the need for recognition arises out of the absence of mutual recognition. Relying on the fieldwork data, drawn primarily from semi-structured interviews and participant observations, I argued in Chapter Seven that the lack of interaction is the main reason why locals in Tophane infer that they are not recognised by newcomers. As shown in Chapter Five, whilst enlarging upon the tight-knit lifestyle of locals, there is a normative expectation amongst long-term dwellers that dialogue between neighbours is a pre-requisite for living in the same physical space. This was followed by a discussion in Chapter Seven as to why local residents tend to take the lack of interaction personally: because locals think that such symbolic exchanges as greetings, random small talks, and making oneself known to others, amount to a quasi-ceremonial way of giving one due recognition, they conclude that newcomers do not see them as equals in moral terms.

I argued that newcomers' reluctance to interact with the local community inflicts significant damage on locals' positive relation-to-self because Tophane-born inhabitants, whilst speculating on why newcomers might be shying away from them, objectify themselves vis-à-vis newcomers, and realise their own image in the eyes of newcomers. As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, locals state that newcomers would be justifiable to avoid getting in contact with them if they themselves (*i.e.*, locals) were

vulgar people or a group of thugs. This is of particular importance, indicating that local residents, at odds with Bourdieu's view on the dominated, do not see themselves as potential troublemakers who should be avoided.

I argued that the need for recognition, which arises out of a lack of interaction, evolves into a demand for recognition because locals believe this situation is due to a misidentification by newcomers. What locals demand from newcomers is the recognition of moral equality, despite differences, and being treated accordingly. As examined in Chapter Five, the fundamental difference between these two groups is shaped by their educational status and cultural capital. In Chapter Seven I nonetheless argued that the fact that locals problematise newcomers' attitudes towards them demonstrates that they do not feel inferior due to their educational deprivation but have a positive relation-to-self. As a matter of fact, this is why locals see themselves as morally equal to newcomers. However, although locals believe that being deprived of education does not make a person inferior to others, I argued that they need confirmation of this in order to restore their relation-to-self, which has been damaged by the lack of social interaction.

In Chapter Seven I argued that the ongoing lack of interaction, in time, escalates into a moral crisis because newcomers' insistence on staying away from the local community is considered by long-term dwellers as a denial of their demand for recognition and moral equality. The realisation by locals that newcomers abstain from encountering them due to the differences in their educational background is the main reason that locals feel morally hurt, since feeling superior to an uneducated person implies that deprivation of education is morally judged. The differences in the educational levels of the two groups become a barrier to moral equality, due to the association between the educational background and moral characteristics which, as discussed in Chapter Six, stems from struggles for distinction.

I argued that the lack of social interaction turns into rage amongst locals because, although they do not believe their educational status is a reason for being ashamed, newcomers' attitudes nevertheless have evoked the idea that being uneducated is something to be ashamed of. As discussed in Chapter Seven, this forces long-term residents either to internalise or defy what is imposed on them. Drawing upon Honneth, I argued that locals start to violate certain social norms and rules, show anti-social behaviour and assume a defiant attitude because to protect their jeopardised relation-to-self in the absence of mutual recognition, they are left with no choice but seek self-respect and prove they do not feel inferior due to their deprivation of education.

8.5 Answering Research Question 4

Do these struggles aid understanding of the Tophane incidents?

I argued that Bourdieu's concept 'struggle for distinction' and Honneth's concept 'struggle for recognition' enable us to make a distinction between the factors that cause the social conflict between local residents and newcomers in Tophane, and the factors that make it visible. This was of particular importance to avoid reducing the ongoing social conflict in Tophane to what has come out of the tension and hereby made it visible: the Tophane incidents. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the complexity of the tension in Tophane lies in the fact that the locals, when reacting to being excluded by newcomers, act in some ways that justify such exclusion. Some of the newcomers therefore pointed out that this defiant attitude of locals is the main reason for the tensions in Tophane, arguing that it implies a kind of revenge of the ignorant against the cultivated. The fact that the locals behave in such defiant ways may, at first glance, lead to the conclusion that the source of the tension is the local community. Indeed, this brings about various acts of violence: as examined in Chapter Seven, these incidents are not limited to the gallery attacks in Tophane. I nevertheless argued that those defiant attitudes are not the causes of the social conflict but the outcomes.

More to the point, the acts of violence are reactions against the symbolic domination generated by the lack of social interaction in the neighbourhood. To demonstrate this, in Chapter Seven I enlarged upon how newcomers' reluctance to interact with the local community has put Tophane-born inhabitants through various moral, emotional and socio- psychological states. I accordingly argued that the presence of some newcomers who are in some kind of interaction with locals and are not subject to any defiant attitude shows that what has forced long-term inhabitants to be defiant is being forced to resort to self-respect in order to repair their self-esteem, which has been damaged in the absence of mutual recognition. This is because, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the ongoing lack of interaction has led locals to realise that their deprivation of formal education is considered by newcomers as a barrier to moral equality. By drawing upon these findings, I suggested that the social conflict in Tophane does not stem from hostile reactions whereby locals strive to defy the shame of being uneducated, but rather, from the imposition of educational deprivation as a shame upon Tophane-born residents by the lack of social interaction.

I accordingly argued that the lack of interaction as well as its negative impact on culturally subaltern Tophane-born inhabitants have arisen out of the efforts of newcomers to maintain their superiority and privileges obtained through their cultural capital. As discussed in Chapter Seven, for locals, in the absence of mutual recognition, the only

way of maintaining moral worth is to defy the shame of lacking formal education and cultural capital. However, I argued that this shame stems from newcomers' struggles for distinction: for newcomers, seeing locals as morally equals would require them to postulate that either educational status or possession of cultural capital does not imply anything about the characteristics of a person. I suggested that this is not possible for newcomers because, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, they feel dominant exactly because of their possession of cultural capital. However, this superiority has been gained through a collective struggle. I argued that it is this struggle for distinction that has rendered deprivation of formal education and cultural capital as something to be ashamed of. As I discussed in Chapter Six, whilst enlarging upon newcomers' own reasons for their reluctance to interact with locals, the transformation of cultural capital into symbolic capital is not separate from the pathologisation of educational deprivation: newcomers avoid getting in contact with locals not because Tophane-born residents are simply uneducated but because, according to newcomers, being uneducated has made these people 'provincial', 'vulgar' and 'ignorant'. Such a cause-and-effect relationship between deprivation of education and the above-mentioned identifications, albeit enabling newcomers to justify their theodicy of privilege that one must have cultural capital to be the person in one's ideal self, inevitably imposes moral shame on Tophane-born residents who are culturally subaltern. As a result, I suggested that, although the Tophane incidents appear to result from the reaction of locals, the social conflict essentially arises out of newcomers' struggles for distinction. In a way, then, the various acts of violence are almost a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: newcomers abstaining from interaction with locals on the grounds of their supposed primitive characteristics make it more likely that such characteristics will indeed surface as a result.

8.6 Answering Research Question 5

What is the broader relevance of the Tophane case considering such key questions as Turkey's secular-Islamic cleavage?

Using the novel conceptual framework based on the theoretical dovetailing of the struggle for distinction and the struggle for recognition, this thesis has offered a class-based explanation of everyday social conflict in Turkey, thereby displacing the dominance of established explanations in terms of the Islamist-secular cleavage. The thesis has not argued that this cleavage is unimportant for understanding Turkish society, but that it has been over-used as a lens for interpreting everyday social conflicts between social groups. The thesis argued instead for a class-based explanation of the

everyday social tensions between working classes who had migrated to urban areas and the urban middle classes who migrate later on to specific urban spaces. This is because, as the research has found, the cleavage is far more complex than it appears: at odds with the hegemonic views of Tophane, Tophane-born residents, although most of whom are socially conservative, have reacted not because they think newcomers violate the rules of Islamic lifestyle, but because they think they have been disdained by newcomers in moral terms.

This study has revealed that the prevailing social conflict in Tophane is between the ‘cultivated’ and ‘uneducated’, rather than the secularist and Islamist. That is not say that these people – be them locals or newcomers – are neither secularists nor conservatives, but that such politico-cultural identities do not determine the ways in which these groups perceive each other. What demonstrates this best is locals’ demand for recognition: if Tophane-born inhabitants primarily described themselves as conservatives, they arguably would not ask for recognition or moral equality from newcomers, because they would see themselves as superior to newcomers (who are predominantly secularists). However, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven, these people still (despite all the incidents) look forward to the possibility of giving newcomers a helping hand in order to put across that they are actually good people and do not deserve to be avoided. This means that the self-respect that locals are compelled to seek in the absence of mutual recognition does not compensate for the recognition they demand from newcomers. I accordingly argued that this reveals that locals are not a group of people defined on the basis of Islamic values.

Drawing upon these findings, I suggested that reading the secular-Islamist cleavage merely through the AKP, no matter how comprehensive it is in itself, has significant gaps. The most prominent gap lies in the argument that AKP has turned its social base into a political subject by using Islamic values. Although locals are conservative people by their lifestyle, this research has found that they are not political Islamists. This arguably means that to investigate the policies adopted by the AKP does not enable us to gain much knowledge about either conservative segments of the society or how they adjust their everyday life. However, as discussed in Chapter One, this has long been the hegemonic approach when discussing contemporary Turkey. Although the AKP has been resorting to an Islamic tone and rhetoric in order to develop an Islamist base since 2007, the research has found that those attempts are not necessarily reciprocated even by those who may well be regarded conservative by their lifestyle, and thus prime targets for AKP rhetoric.

8.6 Potential Avenues for Future Research

8.6.1 *Gentrification and Everyday Social Conflicts*

Providing a class-based understanding of the politics of gentrification by combining Bourdieu and Honneth, this thesis has elucidated social struggles and tensions in a gentrified working-class neighbourhood of Istanbul, called Tophane. In this regard, the conceptual framework developed in this study has a potential to guide concrete and empirical studies on gentrification. Future studies may well make use the theoretical dovetailing of the struggle for distinction and the struggle for recognition to investigate the relations, interactions and conflicts between diverse social groups co-existing in specific urban spaces. The conceptual framework, for instance, could be deployed for study of a whole range of ‘semi-peripheral’ cities, either major cities in semi-peripheral capitalist states such as Istanbul, Izmir, Beirut or more secondary cities in spatially unequal yet more ‘developed’ states such as Marseille, Naples, Thessaloniki – building on the arguments made by, for example, Robinson (2011). I suggest that the struggle for distinction and recognition, together with the symbolic domination, may well help to seek answers to such key questions as which forms of social struggles take place in those cities, how social differences are built, and what the relevant social sufferings are. That is to suggest utilising this conceptual framework as a ‘modus operandi’ rather than an ultimate analysis, which allows room for an empirical study (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 162)

Vitaly, future studies either on gentrification or social struggles do not necessarily have to choose the areas where tensions are already visible. The fact that no social conflict has surfaced in an area does not necessarily mean that there is no tension at all. Just as the symbolic domination imposed on subaltern groups is implicit, reactions of these collectives against whom they share the same physical space with may as well be implicit. Since those reactions may not turn into collective acts of violence, the neighbourhoods where different social classes co-exist may still be worth studying – even if these areas have not yet become a stage of acts of violence that are covered by the media. This is particularly because, as this research has found, co-existence of diverse groups has the potential of giving rise to implicit tensions and tacit social sufferings in various aspects of daily life.

8.6.2 *The Political Sociology of Turkey*

As discussed in Chapter One, there has long been an affiliation between the AKP and the urban poor. Whilst AKP officials and pro-AKP opinion leaders advocated that the party culturally and morally represents the majority of the population which is believed to always-already embrace Islamic values (e.g., Aköz, 2010; Y. Aktay, 2010;

Bayramoğlu, 2010; Bulaç, 2010; Çiçek, 2010), several scholars have posed certain counter-arguments against this view, and argued that the AKP strives to organise the urban poor to establish a political Islamist social base for the party (e.g., Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012; Oğuz, 2014: 92-93; Yaşlı, 2014: 29; Yücesan-Özdemir and Özdemir, 2008: 39). However, this research has found that notion that the AKP resorts to an Islamic discourse because it has an Islamist base of voters is disputable, since its social base arguably does not consist of political Islamist groups. It is true that the AKP has tried to create a social base for itself; however, it would be too simplistic to infer that the urban poor has now been Islamised. The case of Tophane has demonstrated that AKP's such attempts have not been reciprocated by local residents. This, however, poses new research questions about Turkish politics, amongst which the most crucial is arguably: where might the relationship between the AKP and the urban poor have stemmed from, if not an Islamic affiliation?

Fraser argues that the sufferings revealed by Honneth's struggle for recognition are not only social but also '*pre-political*' (2003: 203-206). Honneth appears to agree with this argument because, according to him, for the groups who are systematically disdained, another way of evading shame is taking political action (1995: 138-139, 164). This means that struggles for recognition have the potential of going beyond daily life and affecting politics. I accordingly suggest that the question should be as follows: does the AKP address lower classes' concerns and complaints about what they have been subjected to in everyday life of urban areas? A comprehensive study of this question is of particular importance, as it may help to examine how far the social cleavage in Turkey stems from long-standing politico-cultural distinctions. If the relationship of lower classes with the AKP is related to subaltern groups' struggles for recognition, this means that the most determinant dynamic in the Turkish politics is not the politics of identity but revolves around class-related issues (cf., Tuğal, 2015). I suggest that future studies on the political sociology of Turkey may further operationalise the concept of struggle for recognition to investigate the extent to which the AKP utilises subaltern urban groups' social sufferings for electoral success. This is of particular importance given the 2019 local government election results, where the AKP retained high levels of support in many parts of Turkey but notably lost control of major urban centres such as Istanbul.

8.7 Conclusion

Has the secular-Islamic cleavage been prevalent in contemporary Turkey? The answer is yes, but in Turkish politics, not in everyday life. In this thesis I aimed to study whether the politico-cultural secular-Islamist cleavage, that has for too long

marked political discussions in Turkey, manifested as readable social symptoms in Tophane, Istanbul. Hence, this thesis argued that everyday life has become the terrain of conflict and tension between different social classes in Turkey, not because of a clash of lifestyles, but due to the symbolic domination that the urban middle classes subject lower classes to as part of their struggle to determine the dominant principle of domination. Symbolic domination stands at the epicentre of social sufferings, because the transformation of arguably neutral class differences into recognised distinctions leads subaltern populations and lower classes to undergo moral judgements and hereby ill-treatments in various aspects of everyday life. The demoralisation and degradation of working classes are pre-political yet nonetheless shape Turkish politics. I therefore suggest that the politics of class is still of particular importance, underlying the social conflicts in Turkey.

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