

EASTERN AND WESTERN ETHICIANS: A CRITICAL COMPARISON



Editors

Prof. Dr. Ali Rafet Özkan

Prof. Dr. Emine Öztürk

Assoc. Prof. Sadagat Abbasova



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Eastern and Western Ethicians: A Critical Comparison

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PREFACE

Morality is one of the most important features that distinguishes humans from other living things, and it is a value that makes humans human beings and makes a difference between all of the people. There are many aspects of morality, be it individual or societal. In human history, this subject has been a constant preoccupation of philosophers, clergy, and scholars. Although there are differences in moral understanding according to geography, culture and religious beliefs, this field has been an area that increases the value of humanity and completes the deficiencies of human beings. Although every scientist, philosopher and clergyman tries to define morality within the framework of his own culture and belief, and to make individual and social morality dominant, it can be said that their paths have crossed at least in common from time to time. Even if there is no definite universal morality for all societies, the universality of morality is an inevitable fact. In particular, it is necessary to mention the existence of the issue of universal morality, which the major universal religions of the world have in common. Not to kill, not to steal, not to harm anyone, not to lie, not to commit adultery, etc. These matters are among the minimum commons of religions. Philosophers have also produced ideas and solutions regarding both these issues and the social dimensions of morality. With the understanding that the way of the mind is one, they have been busy with similar issues even though they live in different geographies, countries and cultures and even at different times. They tried to make life more livable and meaningful by seeking ways to make morality dominant in society. In this work, exactly this subject is discussed in detail and the moral understandings of both Western and Eastern scholars, and the understanding of social morality are discussed in various aspects.

In this work, academics, chapter writers, philosophers and thinkers discussed in the context of social ethics. Some book chapters include more

biographies of scholars. Especially the reason for this; the life stories of Islamic scholars, who are not very well known in the West, are intended to contribute to their being more known.

As one of the editors of this book, I must say that when I was told about this project months ago, I was hesitant to take part in it at first, wondering if it would be possible for us to succeed. However, afterwards, it turned out to be a working process that I was glad to be a part of. First, it should be noted that the idea of this book, that is, the idea of including the views of all the moral theorists of the East and the West in the same book, belongs to my esteemed professor Prof. Dr. Ali Rafet Özkan.

Looking at the table of contents of the book, it will be seen that a work has emerged in which we tried to align the theories of social morality or the views on social morality of a wide range of scholars and moral philosophers extending from Aristotle and Ibn Miskawayh, to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and al-Ghazali, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and the Sufi pioneers of the east, Abu al-Hassan al-Kharaqani, Yunus Emre, Mawlana, Hadji Bairam Wali and Hadji Baktash Wali, from Hadji Baktash Wali to contemporary Muslim sociologists Ziya Gökalp, Erol Güngör, Nurettin Topçu and even Muhammad Iqbal, a Muslim idealist, all of whom I am honored to cite in the book.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all my professors who did not hesitate to contribute to the work, first of all to Prof. Dr. Ali Rafet Özkan, the owner of the idea, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sadagat Abbasova, who contributed in the kitchen of the study, and we would like to thank the esteemed scientists who refereed each section. This book is a peer-reviewed scientific work. Thanks again to everyone who contributed to the study. But no matter how much we thank to Livre de Lyon publishing house, which has presented this book to the scientific world in English. It is our greatest desire that this work makes a modest contribution to the world of science.

Editors
Kars/Turkey-November/2022

CONTENTS

PREFACE	I
CHAPTER I. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL AND MORAL THEORY AND IT'S SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION	1
<i>Emine ÖZTÜRK</i>	
CHAPTER II. IBN MISKAWAYH'S ETHICAL AND MORAL THEORY AND IT'S SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION	13
<i>Emine ÖZTÜRK</i>	
CHAPTER III. HOMO-ETHICUS: THE SOCIO-ETHICAL THEORY OF AL- GHAZALİ	19
<i>Ali Rafet ÖZKAN</i>	
CHAPTER IV. NASIR AL-DIN AL-TÛSÎ'S UNDERSTANDING OF ETHICS	33
<i>Ersin SAVAŞ</i>	
CHAPTER V. HOMO ETHICUS ALPHARABICUM: AL-FARABI'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ETHICS	61
<i>Ali Rafet ÖZKAN & Assem TASTANOVA & Gaukhar ABDURAZAKOVA & Dana MATKERİM & Feride Bolatkyzy KAMALOVA</i>	
CHAPTER VI. AVICENNA'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ETHICS	79
<i>İhsan ÇAPCIOĞLU & Halil YILDIZ</i>	
CHAPTER VII. KINDI'S SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS WORK NAMED 'WAYS TO GET RID OF SADNESS'	93
<i>Aysel ŞAHİN</i>	
CHAPTER VIII. SOCIAL ETHICS APPROACH OF ABU'L-HASAN AL-KHARAQANI	105
<i>Ahmet Emin SEYHAN</i>	
CHAPTER IX. EVIL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AVERROES	117
<i>Mehmet Murat KARAKAYA</i>	
CHAPTER X. THE ETHICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AT YUNUS EMRE	139
<i>Adem BALKAYA</i>	
CHAPTER XI. HADJI BEKTASH WALI'S THEORY OF MORALITY	153
<i>Erkan PERŞEMBE</i>	
CHAPTER XII. SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY IN THE POEMS OF HADJI BAIRAM WALI	165
<i>Ahmet Cahid HAKSEVER</i>	

CHAPTER XIII.	UNDERSTANDING OF MORALITY OF KINALIZADE ALİ ÇELEBİ THE AUTHOR OF THE FIRST BOOK OF ETHICS IN TURKISH	173
	<i>Niyazi AKYÜZ & Rüveyda ÇINAR</i>	
CHAPTER XIV.	KANT'S NON-FORMAL ETHICS: SOCIAL LIFE, POLITICS AND EDUCATION	189
	<i>Necmettin TAN</i>	
CHAPTER XV.	JEREMY BENTHAM'S AND JOHN STUART MILL'S ETHICAL THEORY	215
	<i>Sadagat ABBASOVA</i>	
CHAPTER XVI.	RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN DOSTOEVSKY'S MORAL WORLD	231
	<i>Abdurrahman YALÇI</i>	
CHAPTER XVII	SOCIAL ETHICS AT ZİYA GÖKALP	249
	<i>Özcan GÜNGÖR & Bekir ŞAHİN</i>	
CHAPTER XVIII.	NURETTİN TOPÇU: A DEDICATED LIFE ON SOCIAL ETHICS	273
	<i>Selman YILMAZ</i>	
CHAPTER XIX.	EROL GÜNGÖR'S SOCIAL MORALITY THEORY	295
	<i>Emine ÖZTÜRK & Mehmet BERKTAŞ</i>	
CHAPTER XX.	VOLUNTEERISM IN ABAI'S PHILOSOPHY-A MATTER OF MORALITY	319
	<i>Orhan SÖYLEMEZ & İndira AKHMETOVA</i>	
CHAPTER XXI.	META-POLITICS AND ETHICS	333
	<i>Orhan ALBAYRAK</i>	
CHAPTER XXII.	A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON THE VALUES OF GOOD AND EVIL: THE EXAMPLE OF MAWLANA'S MASNAVI	363
	<i>Fatma SAĞLAM DEMİRKAN</i>	
CHAPTER XXIII.	AWAKENING OF THE ISLAMIC UMMAH: CRITICAL THINKING OF MUHAMMAD IQBAL	383
	<i>Selman YILMAZ</i>	
CHAPTER XXIV.	ON ABAI'S DIVINE 'BEATITUDES'	405
	<i>Orhan SÖYLEMEZ & Lucia GERBINO</i>	

CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL AND MORAL THEORY AND IT'S SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION

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Introduction

In this chart of the book we will research and study about the Aristotle's Ethical and Moral Theory and its sociological dimension according to Aristotle's two books: *Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics*.

Nicomachean Ethics, which is accepted as the most important foreign source affecting Islamic moral thought; It consists of ten books that deal with the subjects of virtue, evil, happiness, pleasure and real good for human beings and what needs to be done in order to gain virtue and live in society. At the beginning of the book, Aristotle states that he explores what is good for man through morality and - depending on it-politics. He states that his work aims to investigate how not only a single person but all people living in the city can achieve the best, and that this purpose and effort is something divine (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:48).

In the first book, first of all Aristotle, expresses how many human typologies there are in a society. First type of people who aims pleasure only in life, second type of people who aims success only in life, and third type of people who aims money only in life. Three of them are non- preferable. According to Aristotle, there must be a fourth choice, this forth type of people must choose or aim the wisdom in life. According to Aristotle, just as Plato said, we can only raise such people with special education, who will choose wisdom in life and the happiness that comes from wisdom.

Aristotle's Ethics of Virtue

According to many philosophers, Aristotle's ethics is the culmination of Greek ethical thought. It can be said that this is true, at least in terms of virtue ethics. Indeed, Aristotle begins this work, where Plato's ethical research ends. He is also aware that he is continuing the ethical research that Socrates and Plato started. As a matter of fact, while Aristotle often gives poets and folk sages as sources of moral views or traditional morality, he almost only refers to Socrates and Plato in the context of views that conflict or agree with her own ethical views. The main work in which his ethics is revealed is *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the work in question, Aristotle continues Plato in his discussion of happiness or *eudaimonia* and virtues. In virtue ethics, the most important innovation of Aristotle, who completely followed Socrates and Plato, consists of defending many Platonic theses in a much better way, placing a much greater emphasis on moral character and emphasizing practice and living in a stronger way. For Aristotle, ethics has a double-sided structure. The aims of morality should be philosophical or normative as well as it should be scientific or descriptive. Indeed, in Aristotle's ethics, moral life from a normative perspective "the meaning of being human and aims", here is a discussion on human nature proceeds from the analysis. According to him, people have some purposes. These purposes are not only short-term or imminent purposes like to miss the bus, to pass the class or like working to get a job; but also, people have an ultimate purpose; which it is suitable for people's nature. Aristotle says, like Socrates and Plato: This purpose is *eudaimonia* (Cevizci, 2014:165).

Eudaimonia, generally expressed, is happiness or is a kind of self-satisfaction as a state of calm or objective. From his point of view, *eudaimonia*, is not that which is brought about or action or it is not something that has a consequence, but rather an end, it is a certain life, which Aristotle called the good or happy life expresses my style. Aristotle wrote his main work on ethics, largely an analysis of the true nature of *eudaimonia* and the basic components of happiness, such as reason and virtue and builds on scrutiny (Cevizci, 2014: 166). In other words, in his work, Aristotle, not only makes do with just researching what *eudaimonia* or happiness is, but also, he researches how people can access it. He does not only aim to give mere knowledge of happiness, but also to make people happy and to lead a well-lived life. According to Aristotle, the secret road to a good and happy life is to be in balance and stay in balance. Aristotle expressed this situation in the following sentences: "Nothing is fixed about actions and useful ones. -as in the case of health-promoting things. Since this

is the basis for the general one; the justification for singles is far less certain. It is neither a subject of an art nor a subject of an instruction. As in medicine and captaincy, those who take action should always look at the situation. But the claim that we are dealing with right now, although it is such a claim, should try to support it. Let us first investigate the claim that 'such things naturally deteriorate by deficiency or excess', as we have seen with regard to strength and health (considering the necessity of using the testimony of the visible for the unseen). As a matter of fact, excessive and incomplete physical education wears out the strength. Likewise, too much or too little drink and food impairs health. When it is in balance, it creates, increases and protects health. The same is true of temperance, valor, and other virtues. The coward who runs away from everything, who is afraid, and who can stand nothing; He who is not afraid of anything in any way, who goes above everything, becomes daring. Likewise, he who tastes every pleasure and does not stay away from any of them, like a hedonist and a savage, who avoids them all becomes emotionless. Moderation and valor are both corrupted by excess and lack and are preserved only by being moderate. However, doing the same things and doing wrong causes the virtues to be created, increased and corrupted, and (future) activities to be made up of the same things. So the virtue of character is about pleasures and pains. As a matter of fact, while people sometimes do ugly things for the sake of pleasure, they stay away from beautiful things in order not to suffer again. For this, as Plato said, we must find a way in this way and be trained in childhood to enjoy the things necessary and to feel pain; That's what right education is all about." (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1104a, 1104b)

According to Aristotle, who said that *eudaimonia*, as the goal of man, must meet all the necessary criteria for the highest good, happiness because of man's realization of himself or something that happens when he lives in accordance with his essence, is a final (*teleiōtaton*) goal, a goal that all people pursue more than anything else; has to be a target. Happiness must also be complete, that is, it must be valued for itself and not as a means to something else. Third, *eudaimonia*, or happiness, being self-sufficient (*autarkes*); that is, it should not be enriched with anything that would make it more valuable. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a-b.) It is within this framework that Aristotle argues that *eudaimonia*, or happiness, is identical with nothing else but living well. He says that a life in which a person fulfills his specific functions and achieves his natural goals is the name of a good or successful life. So what kind of life is the good life? (Cevizci, 2014:166).

At this point, Aristotle brings up the alternative lifestyles suggested for a good or successful life or happiness, based on Plato's three-part soul concept or the understanding of three types of people he developed depending on this vision. Accordingly, some people think that the good life is a life filled with pleasure and pleasure. Aristotle, who strongly opposes this approach and a hedonistic view of life, says that pleasure is good and pain is bad, only when it is limited to an animal level. But he does not refrain from saying that the life spent with pleasure, the realization provided by pleasure, must not be specific to rational and active human beings, but only to animals. Moreover, pleasure is never complete, real, and good in itself; it depends not only on the person himself, but on factors outside himself (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a, 1097a).

In other words, Aristotle says that some pleasures degrade a person, while others harm him. Pleasure lowers the free man to the level of the animal or the slave, while making man the slave of what gives him pleasure. Much more importantly, pleasure has only to be something that accompanies a decent course of action, an all-around satisfying type of activity. In this case, pleasure is never a goal, least of all. It cannot be the ultimate and highest goal. The person lives well and as a result is pleased with himself, he is happy with it. Otherwise, one cannot live well in order to obtain pleasure (Cevizci, 2014:167).

On the other hand, some people argue that the good life is about success, power, or glory. According to Plato's understanding of the soul, the people who advocate such a lifestyle are those who outweigh the parts of anger and pursue glory. Aristotle views those who hold public office, participate in political life and serve the people very positively, especially if they have the necessary virtues, but argues that such a life cannot be equated with a happy life or a good life. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095b, 1096a) Honor seekers depend on others to honor them. In other words, those who pursue glory, honor and success eventually become someone else's toys, according to Aristotle. Therefore, such a life makes one passive and subject to others rather than active. Aristotle argues that those who pursue glory cannot equate happiness with their lives because they depend on luck or even on the whims of others. Because happiness must be a state that is completely based on self-sufficient. (Cevizci, 2014:168)

Finally, Aristotle deals with the alternative that a life based on reason and therefore philosophy can be a happy life. Accordingly, the highest or best form of life must be a life that is dependent on the highest element in man, and which is reasonable as the divine element in him. This is nothing but a life based on

contemplation naturally. However, from Aristotle's discussion in this chapter, a contemplative life that only deals with ideas is not sufficient for happiness. It is understood that he intended to reach the conclusion that it cannot be. Aristotle sought to combine the virtues of Socrates' sage with the wisdom of Plato's philosopher for true happiness (Cevizci, 2014:168).

Aristotle, then, dismisses the alternative conceptions of happiness put forward within this framework on the grounds that they fail to fulfill the formal conditions he has identified. After that, he moves on to reveal his own understanding of happiness. In this context, it can be said that Aristotle uses the function argument because of his teleological world view, which states that nothing is in vain in the universe, and that every being has a certain function to fulfill. From his point of view, the soul it must be the determining teleological factor in man. Thus, the *ergon* or function of man consists of the virtuous activity of the soul, especially of his mental part:

“There seems to be agreement in saying that happiness is the best thing, but beyond that it is desirable to say more clearly what it is. Maybe if we understand what human work is, it can happen. Because just as a flutist, a sculptor and every master has a job to do, the good things they do seem to be related to their work, so it is for human beings can be thought of as such; if he has a job, of course. The carpenter and the shoemaker have certain jobs and deeds, but does not man have a job? So naturally unemployed? Or, when the eye, the hand, the foot, and generally the parts each seem to have a job, can it be argued that man has a job beyond these? What could this be? Living seems to be common to plants, while we seek what is peculiar to man. So let's put aside the life of nutrition and growth. After this comes life with senses, but this too seems to be common to horse, ox, and all animals. So, what remains is a kind of life of action for the person who has reason - as a submissive to reason, and also as having a mind and thinking. Since there are two types of living in action, it should be stated that this is life in action, because it is thought to be called 'more important'. If the work of man is the activity of the soul that is rational or not devoid of reason, and we say that the work of a particular work and the one who is competent in it are the same (for example, if we say that the work of the guitarist is the same as the work of the virtuous guitarist - add to this the superiority of virtue in that work) on condition; because the job of the guitarist is to play the

guitar, and the virtuous guitarist is to play the guitar well); if this is so, [moreover, that man's work is a certain life, that this life is spiritually rational activity and such acts; that what befits a virtuous person is to do them in a good and beautiful way; And we argue that everything is well done if it is done well according to its peculiar virtue], the human good is the virtuous activity of the soul—moreover, its activity until the end of life.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b, 1098a)

The first book, in which the real good is questioned, begins with the statements that *“every action and choice is thought to desire a good: That’s why they aptly expressed the good as (what everything desires)”* and concludes that the ultimate good is the happiness that comes from continuous behavior in accordance with virtue. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a)

The subject of the second book is what is the virtue that will lead to happiness when it is constantly followed. Aristotle refers to this chapter as virtue. He began this chapter to question what was going on. And he actually made his decision right from the start. For this reason, he separates the virtues into two parts. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49) According to Aristotle, *“There are two types of virtues. “One is the virtue of thought and the other is the virtue of character. First of all, the virtue of thought is formed and developed by education, therefore it requires experience and time; the other one is the virtue of character; the virtue of character is acquired by habit.”* (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a)

Aristotle, accepts virtue as being middle, the habits that enable to do the actions that compose them, and the commandments of the right mind, which are acquired voluntarily. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49)

The Virtues, Which are Related to Thoughts or Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle, who finds the essence of man in the mind and the unique function that leads him to happiness in the activity of the intelligent part of the soul, defines *eudaimonia or happiness as the activity of the intelligent part of the spirit in accordance with virtue.* (Barnes, 2002:117) Aristotle also expresses *virtue as the state of fulfilling the function of an entity in the best way.* (Cevizci, 2014:171) According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of virtues that make it possible for man to perform his real function in the best way: *theoretical, intellectual or dianoetic virtues* and *moral or eudaimonic virtues or virtues of character.* (Cevizci, 2014:172)

Aristotle believes that what is “human” is essentially and otherwise more than anything else, that it is thinking (truth-seeking mind). In other words, it is the most determining human being, what makes man human and even brings him closer to God. He thought it was the activity of theoretical reason. That is, human does not just act; open your mind only to himself choosing between alternatives, the irrational part of your soul not used to keep it under control. One for him man, endowed with reason as a pure activity of knowing. At the same time, he thinks and uses, his mind also to discover the truth. Realization or truth of man’s theoretical mind Aristotle, who said that there were different levels that he discovered. Theoretical wisdom comes first among the intellectual virtues. From his point of view, scientific knowledge consists of derivations or inferences made from fundamental principles about nature. In order to make correct inferences, first of all, the basic principles in question must be correct. Aristotle, who says that the basic principles are grasped through intuition, names the combined intellectual virtue, which is the result of intuition, as scientific wisdom or theoretical wisdom, and identifies it with contemplation on the founding principles and ultimate truths that regulate the universe. (Cevizci, 2014:172)

“If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, then its highest virtue it is conceivable that it should be appropriate; and this is our most will be the virtue of the good thing. Now that element, which is thought to be our natural activator and guide, and to receive the thought of noble and divine things, whether mind or something else, divine itself or simply the most divine element in us, its activity in accordance with its particular virtue will be perfect happiness. This activity is a contemplation activity. First, this activity is the best activity (for mind is not only the best thing in us, but the subjects of reason are also the best of knowable subjects); and secondly, it is the most continuous activity, for we can contemplate the truth more constantly than anything we can do. And we think of happiness as a pleasure joined to it, but the activity of philosophical wisdom is considered to be the most pleasurable of virtuous activities. The pursuit of him in all that is happening is thought to give extraordinary pleasures because of their purity and persistence. It will be predicted that those who know will live with more pleasure than those who seek. And said self-efficacy must belong to the most contemplative activity. Thus, among virtuous actions, political and military actions are privileged in

terms of nobility and greatness, but not desirable in their own right. On the other hand, the activity of the mind, which is based on contemplation, is both superior in terms of seriousness and beyond itself. It does not aim at any purpose. All the other attributes ascribed to the happiest man, both if he seems to have a peculiar zest and self-sufficiency, idleness, indefatigability, are all obviously related to this activity. From this it follows that (the act of thinking) is the only action that (provides) the complete happiness of man, on condition that it extends over a lifetime.”
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a, 1177b)

He who realizes man at the highest level, gives him the greatest an activity of absolute contemplation of human existence that provides happiness. These virtues, which bring the closest to God in far superior to the virtues. For (1) these virtues are as reason disciplines the irrational part of the soul, they do not contain anything sensory, physical, material, potential. (2) The highest part of man, constituting the essence of man. theoretical activity, which is the highest and most important kind of activity of the mind, contemplation or contemplation that brings the human being closer to God. (3) What is involved in dianoetic or intellectual virtues theoretical activity, complete and it is a self-contained mode of activity. (4) The most, the most stable to human and they provide the most lasting satisfaction and serve the ultimate purpose of happiness the most. They are for nothing else, but for themselves. They are wanted for themselves and for happiness. Aristotle, among intellectual or intellectual virtues, or theoretical wisdom alongside *phronesis*, that is, practical wisdom. also includes art. (Cevizci, 2014:174) *Phronesis* is the most fundamental virtue from Aristotle’s point of view. This is because moral virtues or virtues of character cannot exist, or rather cannot be practiced, when there is no virtue of thought or practical wisdom involved. (Cevizci, 2014:175)

Character Virtues

That is, the virtues that make up or shape a happy life in Aristotle do not only consist of intellectual virtues. In it, moral virtues, or virtues of character, as a second type of virtue that contribute to this process, differ from the virtues of thought primarily in that they are a product of practical reason, not of theoretical reason. These virtues depend on the practical mind’s controlling and guiding the irrational part of the soul, or the animalistic level of the soul, which is determined by desire, desire, and appetite. Moral virtues, express in Aristotle; who considers

the goal of the full realization of holistic human nature in his ethics, requires the development of oneself as a responsible being rather than an intellectual, as in intellectual virtues. In other words, these virtues serve to realize oneself in a second aspect, to complete one's nature in another aspect. (Cevizci, 2014:176)

Now the virtue of character is about the pleasant and the painful, that's clear. Since character is habit-formed, as the name [in Greek] indicates and habituation is an unnatural process, often created by moving in a certain way, that is to say, work in it, there is something that carries action (we don't see it in the inanimate, as even if you throw a stone up a thousand times, the stone can't move without difficulty. time will not go up). So let's assume that: Character is the part of the soul that does not share the mind, but the commanding mind and it is a quality of the side that can follow the mind according to its side. (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics: 1220b)

According to Aristotle, moral virtue consists of finding the "golden middle" between the two extremes, not being trifled with, both on a holistic level and when it comes to individual virtues such as courage, justice and temperance. Accordingly, intellectual virtues are acquired through education. On the other hand, moral virtues are virtues acquired by habit. While we transform our naturally given inclinations or abilities into moral virtues at the beginning, we also begin to use these inclinations and abilities according to common sense. In other words, reason makes the decisive distinction between natural disposition and the corresponding virtue. The exercise of practical reason then inevitably entails the existence of moral virtues. Otherwise, practical reason becomes corrupted by becoming a tool or a capacity for cunning. The use of practical reason without character virtues turns it into a mere instrumental reason. Practical reason, correct thinking in the character virtues in question and judgment, the truth between man's excess and deficiency. It helps you find the middle. Through habit, one's self through testing in various life situations, medium, correct moral character becomes something that emerges almost spontaneously from moral character, or that moral virtue flows almost naturally from the conduct of the responsible agent. (Cevizci, 2014:177)

In the third book, the evil done because of compulsion or ignorance. It is discussed whether vice or goodness done in this way can be counted as virtuous, and the virtues of valor and temperance. According to Aristotle, 'it is a forced construction whose beginning is outside the doer or the subject, and as such is done without any involvement of the doer or the subject.' (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49)

In the fourth book; justice in the fifth book and virtues of righteousness. According to him, all virtues are one in justice, is in between. Justice is the virtue that carries its own purpose the most. Justice is not a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue; the opposite of injustice, on the other hand, is not a part of evil, but the whole of evil (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49).

The sixth book is separated to the right mind, where virtue is realized by self-selection devoted to questioning what it is basic thinking virtues sanity and wisdom are also discussed under this title. Therefore, by making decisions with common sense and wisdom, the right mind that leads to virtue is acquired. Three vices to be avoided in book seven: vice, self-non-dominance, monstrosity, and the concepts of pleasure and pain; The eighth and ninth books deal with the subject of friendship. Good people and virtue, the friendship of suitably similar persons is perfect. They want mutual good things for each other because they are good; they are fine on their own. Those who want good things for their friends only for them. They are the friendliest. It is natural that friendships are rare, because such people are not many. It also takes time and habit. According to the proverb, it is impossible to know each other without ‘consuming salt together’. The desire for friendship is born quickly, but friendship is not like that (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49-50).

The tenth book deals with the issue of pleasure and the education of young people and the perpetuation of the effects of education through laws. In this section, politics is presented as a science of accustoming citizens to virtuous behavior, but as a complementary but essential science (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014:49-50).

Conclusion

According to Aristotle, who carries Ancient Greek wisdom to today, there are four virtues in the social life. These are virtue of thought, virtue of character, virtue of knowledge and virtue of justice. A person gains virtue of thought only by habit in a society. And also a person gains virtue of character only by education. An also virtue of justice contains all the virtues in it. Because virtue of justice is the mother of all virtues.

And also Aristotle, tells about friendship and about politics and he defines politics to train people to be virtuous citizen in a country. So his ethical and moral theory at the same is a social theory. And he also emphasizes that friendship is earned only over time. And Aristotle’s these thoughts are the thoughts which they will never loose their importance in any time till the doomsday come.

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CHAPTER II

IBN MISKAWAYH'S ETHICAL AND MORAL THEORY AND IT'S SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION

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Ibn Miskawayh's Life, Works, Worldview and His Philosophy of Life

Ibn Miskawayh, Abu Ali Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Yaquub, was born in Rey, Iran, which raised many scholars, in approximately 951, and received his education here. Although the sources refer to him only as Miskawayh, this word, which is a mistake, is thought to be the name of one of his grandfathers, so the great author became famous in many scientific circles as Ibn Miskawayh. As the exact date of birth of Ibn Miskawayh is not known, there is not much information about his life. It is only known that he was the clerk of Vizier Hasan bin Muhammad al-Muhallabi and the library clerk of Vizier Ibn Amid Muhammad bin al-Husayn. Miskawayh had a great influence in the city of Rey alongside the aforementioned vizier Ibn al-Amid and his son Abu'l Fath (d. 976) during the reign of Adududdawla (d.983) and Samsaiddawla (d.998), one of the Buveyhi Sultans. Ibn Miskawayh, who was his treasurer for a while, participated in scientific negotiations and had scientific discussions with the commentators, hadithists, jurists, theologians, writers, historians, engineers and doctors, who were highly respected in Adududdawla 's palace, and thus managed to mature himself with the science and culture of his age. Miskawayh died in Isfahan on 9 Safar 421 (1030) (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 9-10).

The author, Ibn Miskawayh, who initially dealt with philosophy, medicine and alchemy, later also interested in literature and history. Ibn Miskawayh,

who was affiliated with the famous Turkish-Islamic philosopher Farabi school, Yahya bin Adiy (d. 974), one of Farabi's most distinguished students, Ibn Zura (d.1008), one of the leading philosophers and scientists of his time, and the sufi-philosopher Abu Hayyan at-Tawhidi (d.1009) and exchanged information with them. Having the encyclopedic knowledge of his age, Ibn Miskawayh has more than thirty books and treatises on ethics, medicine, literature and history. The history book *Tacaribu'l Umam ve Ta'akubu'l Himam*, written by Ibn Miskawayh while he was in Adududdawla's palace, is a very important and famous work. However, our author's philosophical aspect is superior to his historiography (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 10).

It seems that Ibn Miskawayh was interested in all fields of knowledge of his age and wanted to have all encyclopedic knowledge from natural sciences to literature. Among his works, it is possible to come across various copyrights from a treatise on arithmetic to a book on medicine, from an essay on alchemy to a collection of stories containing advices, from a moral book to a voluminous history book. Unfortunately, not all of Miskawayh's works have reached us. It is an important issue that Miskawayh tried to rationalize the moral principles of Islam and explained his thoughts by being inspired by philosophers such as Aristotle in a time when the rules of religion dominated society. Miskawayh is a philosopher who tried to combine the philosophical moral understanding of some Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, with the mystical Islamic morality by melting them in the crucible of Islamic philosophy (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 11).

The Scope and The Basic Features of Tahzibu'l Ahlak, the First Ethics Book of Islam and Miskawayh's Ethical Theory

Tahzibu'l Ahlak (Embellishment of Morality) is the first moral book in the field of Islamic mysticism and philosophy. Tahzibu'l Ahlak (Embellishment of Morality) is to Muslims what Aristotle's *Ethics* to Nikhomakos is to the Greeks. In this work, Miskawayh put a broad theory of morality on Islamic and philosophical foundations in an appropriate volume and expressed his views in a very candid language. (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 12)

The brief plan and analysis of Tahzibu'l Ahlak is as follows.

- a. The idea of happiness includes an anthropology.
- b. The activities of the soul (spirit) are handled as follows, depending on the body.

1. Intellectual realm
 2. The intellectual path of justice and wise man
 3. The spiritual path that love and the wise man will take
 4. Diseases of the soul and interruptions in the work of the mind
- c. General Conclusion: Man is a spirit, mind, intelligence, morality and aptitude (predisposition). The main purpose of man is to reach eternal happiness. (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 12-13)

In this study, the Turkish copy published by Büyüken Ay publishing house translated by Abdülkadir Şener and his friends, who translated the above lines into English based on the Beirut copy prepared for publication by Hasan Temim, was used. (Abdülkadir Şener, İsmet Kayaoğlu & Cihat Tunç, 2018: 13-14)

“He became famous as the *Tehzibü'l Ahlak* (Beautifying Morals) of Ibn Miskeveyh (d. 1030), who was called “the greatest author of morality in Islam” by Macit Fahri and is considered to be the author of the first morality book in Islamic thought. In this work, which was written in Arabic, the author referred to another moral work of his own called *Tertibü's Sa'ade* although he wrote many different works in many different fields from history to philosophy. *Tehzibü'l Ahlak*, who has a very important place in the shaping of moral thought. It is an iconic work.” (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 50)

Tezhibü'l Ahlak, the first work that comes to mind when morality is mentioned in Islam, is the first systematic work in the history of Islamic thought in which the main subjects of morality are covered. The author greatly benefited from ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but adhered to Islamic thought on basic issues such as the nature of man, the relationship between religion and morality, the education of children and the highest purpose of morality. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 50-51)

In the work, while emphasizing the importance of the mind in discovering the virtues and overcoming the tricks of the soul, there is a mystical point of view on the ways of making the virtue a habit and purifying the soul. In one aspect, he; He tried to combine the philosophical moral understanding of some Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, with the morality of Sufi Islam by melting them in the pot of Islamic philosophy. There are those who attribute the wide impact of the work to the success of Ibn Miskawayh in presenting the views of ancient Greek philosophers in harmony with the moral understanding of the main sources of Islam. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 51)

The author explains the purpose of writing the book as reaching a character that will ensure that all our behaviors are good, but easy, simple and effortless,

and to find the method that will lead to this morality. Ibn Miskawayh expresses the purpose of writing the Book as follows. “Our aim in writing this book is to reach a morality that will ensure that all our behaviors are good, yet easy, simple and effortless. So much so that this morality comes about through an art and an instructive arrangement. The way to do this is to first know what our souls are and what they are like and why they were created. In other words, it is knowing the perfection and purpose of ourselves, the powers and faculties that enable us to reach this high level if we use it properly, the things that prevent us from reaching this level, what will cleanse ourselves for salvation, what will cause them harm by covering them with evil.” (Ibn Miskawayh, 2018: 17-18) At this very point of the word, Miskawayh, Shams Surah verse 7 to 10. It refers to the verses between verses. Let’s take a look at what issues are mentioned in the relevant verses. “By the soul and the One who molded it, and then gave it the ability to do good and evil, the one who purifies his soul and attains salvation, and the one who covers it with evil, has also lost.” (91/ Shams/7-10)

Author Ibn Miskawayh describes the purpose of writing the book as follows. “Therefore, the aim of our research is to acquire superior morality. This brings real and real honor, not a fleeting, groundless honor obtained through property, possessions, wealth, power, struggle for domination over others, or peace and treaty. Here, with the help of God we will explain that we have neither an object, nor a part of an object, nor an accident, nor a substance that cannot be perceived by the senses, which needs a material power in its existence. Then we will state the purpose of our creation and orientation.” (Ibn Miskawayh, 2018: 18)

In the first chapter of *Tahzibu’l Ahlak*, the human soul is described in detail; in the second part, the concepts of morality and temperament are discussed; in the third part, the difference between goodness and happiness is discussed; In the fourth chapter, under the title of human actions, basic virtues are examined in terms of actions that are similar to virtue in appearance but are not virtues; in the fifth chapter, types of love, divine love and friendship; In the sixth chapter, the diseases of the nafs and in the seventh chapter the ways of treatment of nafs diseases are discussed. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 51)

Stating that the human soul consists of the abilities of thinking, desire and anger, the author is of the opinion that in order to reach the moral character, the thinking faculty of these three faculties of the nafs must dominate the others. If the desiring or angered faculties do not obey the thinking faculty, there is no difference in the outcome between knowing the truth and succumbing to the

self and knowingly doing wrong. In the words of the author, “A blind person who falls into a well and a person who sees - although the former is excused in his situation compared to the second - are the same in terms of being in danger. Such is the situation of the person who deliberately makes a mistake, and the person who knows the truth but cannot afford it.” (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 51-52)

A person should not let his desire and angry soul overpower his thinking self; he should be strong when he feels such a struggle within himself. Laziness, slackness and not taking the trouble should not fall into trouble, if he is defeated and regrets, he should follow his regret. Ibn Miskawayh's grounding and classification of virtues is based on the triple division of the soul, which comes from the Ancient Greek thinker Plato. In this division, Miskawayh, who made the subject concise and understandable in a way that each of the three states of the soul corresponds to a virtue, has based the virtues in such a way that the virtue of wisdom corresponds to the ability of thought or reason, the virtue of bravery to the ability of anger, that is anger, and the virtue of chastity to the ability of desire and will. When these abilities act in harmony, the fourth virtue, justice, emerges. The main virtues that come to these three abilities also have sub-virtues. The lower virtues of wisdom are intelligence, remembering, reasoning, quick understanding, clarity of mind, correct judgment, and easy learning; the lower virtues of courage are generosity, boldness, fortitude, perseverance, gentleness, self-confidence, courage, and endurance in adversity. the lower virtues of chastity are shyness, calmness, patience, generosity, freedom, self-righteousness, gentleness, orderliness, good manners, peace-loving, solemnity, and avoidance of evil. The lower virtues of justice are friendship, kindness, maintaining relations with close ones, rewarding, treating well, doing something well, graciousness and piety. (Ibn Miskawayh, 2018: 35-42)

According to the author, the first emotion that emerges in the child is the feeling of shame (the fear of a bad situation or behavior). The appearance of this emotion indicates the presence of his mind. The soul in which this feeling arises is the trainable soul. The love of honor, which comes from not following the religion, should be given to such a soul first. Good people should be praised next to him, and he should be praised when he behaves well. They should be made to feel that their evil deeds will be condemned and should not be accustomed to pleasure and enjoyment. If the child behaves badly on purpose, he should be condemned and should not be condemned in any case and in the presence of others. The child should be taught the rules about eating first, it should be

reminded that eating is for health, not pleasure, and the child should not be taken to drinking councils. His clothes should not be in a way that gives him superiority over his friends and should not be in a way that gives his heart to gold and silver ornaments. He should be counseled to be obedient to his parents and teachers. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 52-53)

CONCLUSION

A large part of Tahzib is the beautification of temperaments; It is about upbringing by which the different parts and faculties of the soul will be harmonized and directed towards the main goal of human actions, namely happiness. This training is called the virtual of protecting the health of the soul in relation to medicine. In order to protect one's moral health, one should be careful not to think about the pleasurable things one tastes and arouse lust, account for his own faults carefully, find friends who will tell him openly about his faults, and fight to purge his soul of traits that are considered disgraceful in comparison to virtues, and evils such as anger and cowardice. The author richly deals with the subject of recognizing one's own faults with friendship and quoting Galinos; After the expressions of Socrates emphasizing that it is necessary not to value worldly goods in order to reach serenity and joy, he ends his work with praise and salawat. (Kaymakcan & Meydan, 2014: 53)

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CHAPTER III

HOMO-ETHICUS: THE SOCIO-ETHICAL THEORY OF AL- GHAZALĪ

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Introduction

Ethics is one of the basic subject matters in all religions across the world. It has been an issue about which many scholars, philosophers, and clergymen have been busy with, and written about.

The most important virtue of human beings is undoubtedly ethics. Similar to scholars of many religions, Islamic scholars have also focused on ethics and tried to understand and express the matter. In Islamic faith, human nature is created on the basis of ethics. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is introduced as the most almighty representative of ethics in the surah of Al-Qalam in Koran, the Holy Book of Islam and he is presented as an exemplar to all believers (Al-Ahzaab (33): 21). Moreover, in one of his Hadiths, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) prays to Allah as follows: “My God! Just as Thou hast beautified my Creation, beautify my ethics as well!” (Ibn Hanbal, 1995: I,403). A sincere believer and a lover of the Prophet, al Ghazali attributed major importance to the issue of ethics as an embodiment of the impact of the mystic tradition on which his views are based, and he focused on ethics comprehensively in his works. He took his place he deserved among Islamic scholars, thanks to his knowledge and works. Most Islamic scholars after him were influenced by his works.

The full name of al Ghazali is Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad, his tag is Abu Hamid and his title is Hujjat al-Islam. Relative to his place of birth, he was called as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali at Tus. al Ghazali was born

in Tus (currently known as Mashhad) in Khorasan Province of Iran in 450 AD (1058 in Hijri Calendar). He first took fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) courses from Ahmad bin Muhammad ar Razqani. Then, he went to Gorgan and took courses from Abul Qasim al-Isma'ili. He took courses from a famous Kalam scholar, Dhia' ul-Dīn 'Abd al-Malik ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (died in 1058) (Uyanık-Akyol 2013: 153). Later on, he went by the Seljuk Vizier, Nizam al-Mulk. Attracting Nizam al-Mulk's attention with his scholarly studies, al Ghazali was appointed as a professor in Nezamiyeh in Baghdad. Due to his lifelong efforts to prove Islam's superiority over other religions, al Ghazali was granted the honourable title "Hujjat al-Islam". He passed away in 111 (Şeyh 1997: 156-157; ; Adıgüzel 2018:142). Al Ghazali stated that he studied kalam, philosophy, and Batiniyya and their ideas and methodology as well as sufism classics (Al Ghazali 1990a: 36,56-57) and based on his discourses, it is understood that Sufism is the most appropriate path. With his contributions to the development of Sufism with his discourses and ideas, al Ghazali has a significant role in the legitimatisation of Sufism.

Al Ghazali's work related to ethics are accepted to have significant impact upon the wide variety of social groups to gain access to works published about the issue of ethics in Islamic world. Considered an authority about the movements of thought in Islamic world, as well as combining Kalam tradition with Koranic view of ethics, al Ghazali also benefited from the rational view of ethics claimed by the philosophers he criticised. While he established his own view of ethics, he inevitably reflected the Sufism, of which he was also a part (Cevizci 2014 :108; Özturan 2014: 15). His works and view of ethics turned out to become one of the fundamental resources for the Islamic scholars following him. Al Ghazali is the person mostly cited in *Good Manners* (originally named as *Ahlak-i Alai*) by Qınālızāde 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī Celebi, with no reference to any work. al Ghazali's reference for 36 times in this work embodies al Ghazali as one of the main sources of Qınālızāde (Unan, 2014: xxvi).

Al Ghazali makes distinctions among three different kinds of ethics. Accordingly, he makes a reference to religious ethics and depicts it as a religious science in *Ihya' u Ulumiddin* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), his work written to provide a comprehensive guidance for Muslims in their daily practices (Al Ghazali 1974: 174). However, in the upcoming chapters of the work, while focusing on the inner aspects of human soul as well as various dimensions of Nafs, he describes ethics as a rational discipline, i.e. ethics as a philosophical morality, whilst discussing the inner aspects of human soul. Whereas he deals with the issue of ethics in terms of sources of knowledge in *Mi'yar al-'Ilm*, he

combines religious and rational ethics with a mystical and Sufist approach. In this sense, al Ghazali argues that knowledge comes up in humans either through education or by itself, without need for any such active reception process (Sherif 1975:15).

Al Ghazali names the first kind of ethics as a sort of contemplation, the second one as wahy (revelation) if its source of origin is known, ilham (inspiration) if its source of origin is not known. Thus, a wise person acquires knowledge by means of his observation of physical phenomena. However, a mystic person deals with the purification of human soul and the perfection of his personality, so that knowledge brightens up in his heart through inspiration. So, the third kind of ethics is the mystical ethics coming up as a result of mystical approach to knowledge. In this sense, emphasising the dependence of the readiness of human soul to get the inspiration, which the prophets and saints did, on its purification for once, Al Ghazali suggests that man's basic duty is purify his Nafs (Fahri 2004: 272).

Al-Ghazali's View of Ethics

Al Ghazali's basic work on ethics is *Mizan al-' Amal* (Criterion of Action). He also dwells on the issue of ethics in *Jawahir Al-Quran, Kimya-yi Saadat* (The Alchemy of Happiness), and *Mishkat Al-Anwar*. In *Mizan al-' Amal*, he starts discussing the issue of ethics, claiming that happiness, which humankind has done significant efforts to acquire since ancient times, can only be reached by knowledge and deeds. He also states that a person in quest of happiness should be aware of this fact as well as the extent to which he can acquire happiness. According to al Ghazali, man should be able to make a distinction between knowledge contributing to happiness and knowledge that does not, between a deed bringing happiness and a deed causing sorrow and disappointment. In relation to his way of discussing the issues in *Mizan*, it is possible to argue that al Ghazali has similarity with philosophers. Despite Koran and Sunnah as the basic sources, al Ghazali borrowed from Islamic ethics, which borrowed its viewpoints about soul, ration, happiness, politics and benevolence from Greek philosophers. He proves the philosophically concluded ideals on the basis of Hadiths and Koranic verses. Attributing major significance to Sufism ethics as well, al Ghazali states that man is ready to accept all sorts of ethics to help him to acquire know God (Adıgüzel 2018: 145).

In *Ihya'u Ulumiddin*, consisting of four volumes, each of which has ten books containing four chapters, he makes his arguments about mystical ethics. In the first part of the book, he focuses on religious duties, while he deals with

social traditions and habits. Discussing the deeds causing man's downfall and hence necessary to be avoided in the third part, al Ghazali elaborates on the deeds contributing to salvation and hence necessary to be practised in the fourth part of the work. In fact, in all parts of the work, he criticises harshly the indulgence in the material world, and the greediness for the properties in this world. He warns his readers that life in this world is like an exam and that there is a path taking man to either prize or punishment in relation to his deeds in this world in the "Day of Judgment". For him, man's ultimate aim is towards life after death and the eternal bliss derives from unlimited wealth, non-decreasing proficiencies and eternal benevolence in spiritual sense (Fahri 2004: 75). From al Ghazali's perspective, life in this material world does not have any significance, compared with the eternal life and bliss in the life after death (Cevizci 2014: 114). al Ghazali makes the following four recommendations for those in quest of ultimate truth:

- 1) Possession of an unwavering faith. This is the faith which does not have any Bid'ah (heretical innovation)
- 2) Nasuh (Sincere repentance). This is a sincere repentance that prevents man from temptation to the commission of sinful deeds
- 3) An effort so strong as to make all beneficiaries satisfied and leave no beneficiaries behind
- 4) Learning religious knowledge to the extent of performing religious duties, learning material knowledge to be sufficient to oneself

One of the most productive and effective consequences of al Ghazali's superior and multifaceted scholarly personality is his success in the keen observation of the ethical problems in Islamic society and his production of rich ethical thought able to come up solutions for these problems. *Ihya'u Ulumiddin* is his most important work of ethics. However, as understood from its name, the work covers the issues of Sufism, Kalam and fiqh, in addition to the focus on ethics, and brings innovative approaches to these subject matters (Cevizci 2014: 109).

Al Ghazali's role model for his view of ethics is Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). For him, he is the unique person whom every Muslim should imitate. The verse (33): 21 in Sura of Al-Ahzaab in Koran is its proof: "Allah the Almighty's Apostle is an exemplar for Thee, for those hoping to meet Allah and life after death and for those mentioning Allah many times" (Al-Ahzaab 33:21).

For al Ghazali, it is necessary to discipline Nafs. Mystical upbringing is thus inevitable. Al Ghazali argues that man is born deficient but has a nature eligible for both merits and vices and follies. For this reason, Al Ghazali claims that struggle and asceticism help people to develop personality based on merits. In other words, man obeys a set of practical norms to keep the devilish tendencies of his Nafs by means of struggle and asceticism, as, for al Ghazali, these are the basics of the path Sufism, an inseparable part of ethical life (Fahri 2004: 274; Cevizci 2014:111).

According to Aristotle's view of *entelecheia*, also accepted by Al Ghazali, man has potential to develop intellectuality and rationality and he can have a virtuous character by putting this potential into practice. Believing that religion and education can help man to put this potential into practice, al Ghazali familiarised for the first time with the ethical approach elaborating on the development of virtuous human character thanks to the works by such Islamic scholars as Ibn Miskawayh and Ragip al-Isfahani. However, Al Ghazali thinks that man should not show extremity and infringement for his feelings like lechery and wrath. The avoidance from extremity and infringement brings merit and virtues. These are already the three major powers of Nafs, i.e. wrath, lechery and reason. The extremity or infringement of these three powers cause vices and follies, their moderate use bring merits. For him, these feelings and powers are inherent in human nature and none of them can be terminated. Moreover, it is not wrong to terminate these feelings and powers. Instead of this, Al Ghazali puts emphasis on the significance of disciplining the soul and controlling the dangerous tendencies by means of reason (Gazzâli 1990a:14-15). However, man's exhibition of extremity for these three powers and reaching the level of hedonism decreases man's level lower than animals. Within the framework of the view of ethics, al Ghazali also concentrated on the issue of free will and freedom, one of the major problems in human history. He defines free will as "the ability to determine what is suitable for the ultimate purpose and to differentiate one thing from its counterparts" (Gazzâli 1990a:57-58).

The Basics of al-Ghazali's View of Ethics

Al Ghazali combined wahy-based ethics with philosophical and mystical ethics. Koran and Sunnah are the bases of al Ghazali's view of ethics. Especially at the beginning of each chapter in *Ihya' u Ulumiddin*, Hadiths and Koranic verses are presented about the subject discussed, and later words from Islamic scholars are quoted. On the other hand, al Ghazali benefited from Plato, Aristotle and

Neo-Platonism in terms of soul, rationality, happiness, politics and especially virtues (Kahraman 2013: 182). Knowledge and belief are the two major qualities that make man more honourable and distinctive than other species. The most advanced knowledge and the ultimate purpose of all other types of knowledge is to know Allah (marifetullah). Man should first know himself, and then set out to continuous ethical purification to achieve this purpose. The issue of self-knowledge is a subject matter in which philosophers have been interested since Socrates. al Ghazali confirms the significance of the issue with reference to Hadiths and Koranic verses. Man's self-knowledge means knowledge of the soul as well as its ethical and transcendent dimensions rather than knowledge of his physical presence. After all, man is a value superior to Nature, with his spiritual aspect. As a matter of fact, in Koran, Allah the Almighty has drawn attention to this transcendent nature of man by attributing the body to Nature and the soul to the Divine Presence. In general, the Sufis, and particularly al Ghazali views the directly acquired knowledge with no other means, termed as knowledge of al-Ghaib, view superior to knowledge acquired by means of sensory organs and reason. For him, the true knowledge is the knowledge of Divine Being acquired by discovery. Truth can only be reached by means of an inspiration brought to human heart by Allah the Almighty. The path to divine knowledge is to pass through a process of ethical purification necessary for purifying the heart. Purification from vices and follies and acquisition of ethical virtues are the direct results of various struggles and combatting within human self. In order to reveal humane characteristics more accurately, al Ghazali states that soul, Nafs, heart and reason have the same meaning in psychological, ethical and epistemological senses in the chapter "Acaib'ul Kalb" (Mysteries of Heart) in *Ihya'u Ulumiddin*, in which he focuses on the meaning of the term "soul" and its relation with heart, Nafs, and reason. For him, reason, heart, Nafs and and soul are similar in terms of their status as "knowing and understanding" entities. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes seen that the other concepts are used to signify the soul. The variety of concepts does not mean differences in meaning in ethical sense because it is the aspect that makes a human being unique, makes him superior to other beings and becomes the basis of his responsibility. The most important aspect which al Ghazali dwells on in his analysis of human beings is this spiritual dimension of mankind. His status as a spiritual being enables him to experience some privileges such as responsibility for divine duties, possession of reason and knowledge, the power to contemplate the supernatural universe. According to Sufism, if man does not know his soul appropriately

and is unaware of the traps causing his downfall, his struggles will become in vain. For this reason, the subject matters of topmost importance for Sufism are the knowledge and questioning of Nafs. For al Ghazali, if man does not know his Nafs, it is impossible for him to reach eternal bliss. For al Ghazali, the term “Nafs” does not refer to the power motivating lechery and wrath, distributing power of feelings to human organs. In his literature, this term is labelled as “animalistic soul”, which is present in humans and all animals. The body is the servant to this soul. It is possible to suggest that al Ghazali is a dualistic scholar, considering his perception of the body and soul as parts of human beings and realities of humankind, as well as his argument that body needs to be valued in daily life. Moreover, al Ghazali dwelt upon the role of human body in ethical context. Accordingly, man is sent to this world for examination and the subject matter of this exam is undoubtedly the human soul. However, if the soul had been separated from the body, there would have been no such entity as “evil”. The exam is present where there is a conflict between the good and evil, i.e. ethical life. In this sense, the ethical life is a result of the soul-body presence of human beings. In line with the view which is compatible with the Koranic doctrine, and which is approved by Islamic scholars on the basis of Plato, al Ghazali thinks that the soul comes to human body from Allah and that it will return to Allah again (Fahri, 2004: 268-270; Çağrıçı, 2014: 249-250; Adıgüzel 2018:145, 152-153).

As stated above, in his works *Mizan al-' Amal* and *Mi'yar al-'Ilm*, al Ghazali puts emphasis on the balance between knowledge and deeds. In *Mizan al-' Amal*, he argues that happiness, which humankind has sought since ancient times, can only be reached by means of knowledge and deeds and he guides people in quest for it. For him, in order to reach happiness, one should have the capability to differ the deed bringing happiness from the deed that does not bring bliss (Adıgüzel 2018: 145).

Al Ghazali's *Ihya'ul Ulumiddin* not only presents religious and ethical issues with the use of an innovative language, but it also contributes to man's internalisation of these issues with his real-life experiences. According to al Ghazali, existence signifies a balance with its theoretical and practical dimensions. People unable to manage their Nafs will have problems in managing others' practices. In this sense, individual ethics is a necessity for the application of social ethics. A person obeying ethical norms individually will somehow contribute to the improvement of ethics in social area as well. The basic characteristic coming to the foreground in al Ghazali's philosophy of ethics is the cohesion between

theory and practice, i.e. the union of knowledge and deeds. Knowledge requires a measurement. Deeds require criteria that determine the kinds of action that bring bliss or cause downfall. Analysing the balance between knowledge and deeds in *Mizan al-'Amal*, al Ghazali views happiness, which he defines as man's joy as a result of his freedom from vices and follies thanks to knowledge about both concrete world and metaphysical world, as a psychological situation with a metaphysical dimension. He emphasises that as a source of this metaphysical dimension, and as a result of the enlightenment of Nafs, knowledge turns into deed and helps man to reach ethical maturity. The issue of self-knowledge establishes the basis of al Ghazali's view of ethics. Either in the physical world or in our own existence, Allah the Almighty has shown the proofs of its divinity. For this reason, man's knowledge of his Creator depends on his self-knowledge. Man's self-knowledge refers to his recognition of his soul and its ethical and transcendent dimensions, beyond his knowledge of his physical body. Viewing the possession of reason as not sufficient for ethical life, al Ghazali states that "if Allah the Omnipotent had not created free will, which gets the organs to take actions, viewed appropriate by reason, in combination with reason, which enables man to know the consequences of our deeds, then in that case, the reason's logic would not have reached a conclusion" and claims that this is only possible by means of another free will, to which reason is subservient. Ethical life is in a way man's war against his own Nafs. Life in this world is a struggle to get rid of the deeds which are not decent to human beings during the war between our humane emotions and our reason and free will (Çağrıçı 2014: 25).

In relation to his view of ethics, al Ghazali also attributed major significance to the issue of virtues. He maintained his traditional approach to both the definition of "virtue" and four basic virtues. However, different from the philosophers, he based his views about basic virtues, as well as the methods of education of ethics on Koranic verses, Hadiths and the Islamic scholars. Hence, he used an Islamic language and aimed to raise awareness of Islam in the society. Another important point is that he largely discussed religious and mystical as well as ethical virtues more often than the other scholars focusing on the issue of ethics. Nearly all of the third volume in *Ihya'u Ulumiddin* focuses on vices and follies in ethical sense. After an introductory part on an analysis of the extraordinary qualities, and abilities of heart, enabling man to recognise his inner self, the issues about the improvement of ethics and the discipline of Nafs are elaborated on. Following various definitions and explanations concerning ethics as well as some basic virtues and vices and follies, he deals with the issue

of man's recognition of his own vices and follies. al Ghazali's views in this subject matter remind one of the views of Abu Bakr al-Razi and Ibn Miskawayh (Karaman 2013: 180). Next, the vices and follies, which are also the spiritual diseases, are widely discussed. These are such vices and follies as gluttony, lechery, verbal evils, wrath, greediness, thriftiness, passion for power, and pride. The fourth volume of the work dwells on mystical and ethical virtues. Al Ghazali analysed them in ten titles as repentance, patience/gratitude, fear/hope, asceticism, tawhid/reliance on Allah, encouragement, pure intention, loyalty, self-accounting, contemplation, consciousness of death/thinking about life after death. These issues were not handled for the first time by al Ghazali. There is a rich literature, starting with Koran and Hadiths, until Al Ghazali's works. al Ghazali benefited largely from this rich literature (Fahri, 2004: 271-276; Coşar 2018: 67-68). However, in his works, he benefited from ethics to treat the vices and flies such as greediness, thriftiness, pride and passion for power and he showed ways to recover from them (Çağrıçı 1981: 144-147).

Al Ghazali accepts that divine knowledge is the basic ethical value that motivates man to do good deeds. For him, reason, knowledge and wahy are each the embodiment of divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is the essence of good manners (Al Ghazali, 1974: 190- 191). Man reaches divine knowledge by contemplation as well as the purification of his thoughts. Divine knowledge purifies man from evil feelings and emotions and glorifies him (Durakoğlu 2014: 213). For Al Ghazali, there are ethical virtues other than divine knowledge to balance destructive and extreme ideas and emotions. Chastity, bravery and justice are among them. Similar to justice, chastity is one of the basic sources of ethics and establishes the basis of man's decency towards his neighbourhood, his self and Creator. When balanced appropriately, chastity brings generosity, sense of shame, patience, tolerance, peace and grace (Durakoğlu 2014: 216).

Ethical Responsibility and the Source of Ethical Values

As a scribe and Kalam thinker, Al Ghazali attributed much more significance to the issue of responsibility, when compared with other philosophers of ethics. al Ghazali criticises the extreme Sufists for not recognising responsibility. Another movement which al Ghazali views dangerous is Jahmi movement. Although this movement did not aim to neglect responsibility, al Ghazali was anxious about the tendency of an ultimate obligation approach to bring consequences that could possibly remove ethical responsibilities. In case the obligatory view of Jahmi movement get approved, it is inevitable that people do every kind

of injustice to each other and base this upon the excuse that it is an inevitable consequence of destiny. In the dispute between Mu'tazila and Sunni Islam about whether reason is authorised to determine values to be responsible for, al Ghazali supported Sunni Islam approach. It is seen that he based his argument for the inability of reason to become a source of responsibility on the following two views:

- 1) The obligation to render values absolute: If ethical values are not dependent on a transhuman authority, they lose the quality to become absolute. Human beings, as an embodiment of their egoist nature, judge their and others' deeds in terms of their interests. In this case, because the interests are subjective, the values also get relative.
- 2) The obligation for an authority: If ethical values are not dependent on a transhuman authority, they lose the quality to become absolute. If the authority for judgment is not provided to a transcendent authority, in this case, people give duties to each other just for their own interests, as no person is superior to others. Thus, if ethical values are not dependent on a transcendent authority, they lose their quality to become absolute. Although such authorities as prophets, state, and parents give duties, they are obeyed because of the rules by the superior authority, i.e. Allah the Almighty (Coşar 2018: 66-67).

Al Ghazali believes that although reason has a consciousness of duty, it acquires this power as a result of wahy. So, the authority giving the duties is Allah the Almighty, the Prophet is the messenger, and the reason is the ability to recognise and comprehend the duty. Man's direction towards ethical values instead of indulgence in emotions and passions depends on the appropriate guidance of reason. Children are not responsible as they are devoid of this guidance of reason. As a principle, al Ghazali does not accept worldly benefits as the purpose of ethics; on the other hand, eternal bliss will not be a direct result of a life in this world based on ethical values, but a divine grace by Allah the Almighty. Al Ghazali thinks that divine order, rather than purpose, establishes the basis of religion-based ethics. Accordingly, a conflict between orders and norms is possible in the context of ethics. Al Ghazali discussed ethical values, which he also termed as "good" and "evil", with major significance as they are the qualities of the deeds. Al Ghazali rejected the Mu'tazila argument that "ethical values are the ontological qualities of the deeds and reason has the power to comprehend them with no religious support" and supported the idea

that ethics independent from religion cannot recover from egoism, pragmatism and hence relativity. Al Ghazali examined whether ethical values are the fixed qualities of the deeds in case of dishonesty. If dishonesty were evil in itself, this quality would not change according to different circumstances. However, in case there is a necessity for protecting a Prophet's life against an oppressor, dishonesty can be a merit and even a duty. For him, good and evil does not come up directly from the deeds, but they depend on the real intention. This intention cannot be worldly; people have miscellaneous worldly intentions and they can reach these worldly intentions by unethical means as well. So, ethics' intention should be otherworldly. It is impossible to know this intention with experience because life after death can only be known by the prophetic inspiration. However, because Allah the Almighty is not obliged to reward man, the basis of ethics is divine orders and prohibitions. The good and evil quality of deeds come up after the (dis)obedience of these divine orders and prohibitions. Al Ghazali elaborates on all possibilities and situations that are meaningful for man in physical, psychological, worldly, otherworldly, individual, familial and social senses. His focal point in discussing these issues is man, his intentions, aims, religious and ethical consciousness. For this reason, criticism/flattery, fear/hope, marriage/celebrity, wealth/poverty, extravagance/thriftiness, isolation from/integration with the society, possibilities and impossibilities are neither good nor evil in themselves. The intention and free will makes them either good or evil. Al Ghazali focused on the concept of "happiness" in different aspects and he benefited from Sufism and philosophy to develop his arguments about happiness, on the basis of Islamic principles. For instance, he benefited from Aristotle to express that the taste of everything is suitable for its nature. There are also traces of philosophy in his view of ultimate competency as the power to acquire knowledge about transcendent beings and the freedom from servitude to passions and power to acquire this knowledge. Al Ghazali becomes elevated to mysticism with his enrichment of his mature views with Islamic principles as well as by arguing that the highest level of happiness is to know Allah the Almighty and that the ultimate purpose is to love and become closer to Allah the Almighty. For him, all worldly, physical, psychological, social situations are the means to contribute to this ultimate purpose. He shows that possession of knowledge, merits, gracefulness, mercy, fairness can help to reach this highest level of happiness. Al Ghazali's views about benefits, tastes and beauty issues in his philosophy of happiness can be considered among the most outstanding products of Islamic culture of ethics (Çağrıç, 2014: 269-275; Adıgüzel 2018: 145; Coşar 2018: 69-70).

Although he used Koran and Sunnah as the basic sources, al Ghazali largely benefited from Islamic philosophy of ethics, inspired by ancient Greek philosophy as a source, in relation to his approach to soul, reason, happiness, politics, and virtues. He confirms the philosophically concluded arguments by proving them from Hadiths and Koranic verses. Moreover, attributing major significance to mystical ethics, al Ghazali claims that man is ready to acknowledge all sorts of ethical development to help him reach the divine knowledge.

Conclusion

As understood from this study, al Ghazali insistently emphasised that the domination of individual ethics can contribute to the awareness of ethics in social context.

The basis of al Ghazali's view of ethics is the issue of man's knowledge of himself. For this reason, knowledge of Creator depends on self-knowledge. Man's self-knowledge means knowing the soul, and its ethical and transcendent qualities. Ethical life is, in a sense, man's conflict against his Nafs.

Al Ghazali accepts Aristotle and Ibn Sina-wise classification in terms of the competencies and merits of Nafs. Nafs is divided into three parts: animalistic, spiritual, humane. While the animalistic Nafs has the power for action, desire and will, humane Nafs contains such abilities as knowledge and deeds. For al Ghazali, the ultimate source of knowledge is Allah the Almighty, who gives us benevolence by various means (Saruhan 2012: 88). For this reason, our only duty is to purify our Nafs and get ready for the knowledge from Allah the Almighty. Theoretical and practical unity for the realisation of happiness establishes the basis of al Ghazali's view of ethics.

Al Ghazali opposes the extreme Sufists such as Bistami and Mansur al-Hallaj in terms of the thought of closeness to Allah the Almighty. The highest point which the Nafs can reach is its closeness to Allah the Almighty. It is not the unification with Allah, as some Sufists claimed. Al Ghazali makes references to absolute and divine knowledge on the basis of the following Koranic verse: "The real believers are those who have faith only to Allah and the Prophet, who do not feel suspicion about it, who makes efforts with their lives and properties. These are the only true believers" (Al-Hujuraat, 49:15). With the expression "making effort with properties", al Ghazali attributed to generosity and chastity as opposed to the power of lechery. Making efforts with lives means bravery as a merit. Al Ghazali accepted the former scholars' approach to the classification

of merits. For him, there are four merits: knowledge, bravery, chastity and justice. Man should always be guided to Allah the Almighty because no one can protect himself from the risks of evil in this world without Allah the Almighty's mercy and guidance. He also claims that ethical maturity can be reached by the unification of reason and wahy (Fahri 2004: 277-278).

The divine knowledge, protecting man from evil emotions and ideas, is also among the subject matters in which al Ghazali was interested. Man can reach divine knowledge by means of contemplation and the purification of ideas in human heart.

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CHAPTER IV

NASIR AL-DIN AL-TÛSÎ'S UNDERSTANDING OF ETHICS

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Introduction

Life and works

Before explaining Nasir al-Din al-Tûsî's understanding of ethics, it would be appropriate to briefly mention his life. As a matter of fact, it is a known truth that biographies of individuals considerably form their ideas (Türkdoğan, 2012: 39-41).

His full name was Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tûsî (Gafarov, 2017: 19), born in 1201 in the city of Tus (Dabaşı, 2011: 185) near Mashhad (Kurtuluş, 2012: 431), which is today Iran. The nickname "*Hâce Nasîrüddin*" is often used in relation to him (Şirinov, 2012: 437). It is stated that the nickname "*Nasîrüddin*" came from a dialogue he had with his mother (Feyyaz, 2003: 9). Tûsî, who worked in many different disciplines from philosophy to Kalam science, from astronomy to ethics, was also given the nickname "*Üstâdü'l-Beşer*" (Çağrı, 2000: 88).

Tûsî received his primary education from his father (Demirkol, 2011: 27). Then, at the age of fifteen, he embarked on a journey of knowledge. He learned fiqh from Muîn al-Dîn Salim b. Bedrân al-Mâzinî al-Misrî and philosophy from Abu Muhammad Hasan b. Muhammad al-Farîmüdî. Al-Farîmüdî, from whom he read Ibn Sina's *al-Ishârât wa't-tanbîhât*, had a significant influence and

contribution to al-Ṭūsī's interest in philosophy (Şirinov, 2012: 437). Al-Ṭūsī's comments on Ibn Sina are cited in the sources (Fahri, 2008: 160). The names of a total of ten scholars that al-Ṭūsī took lessons from are also included in the sources (Demirkol, 2007: 10).

Ṭūsī's life can be broadly categorized into two parts. The section described above covers the first part of al-Ṭūsī's life. The remaining part can be summarized in four main parts. Two of these four main parts were mentioned together with the Ismailis. In other parts, al-Ṭūsī lived with the Mongols (Shamel, 2017: 153). It is planned to briefly mention these periods and to move on to the section of ethics, which is the main purpose of the study.

In the 13th century, Khorasan was a place where well-known figures of the Isma'ili sect gathered. For this reason, al-Ṭūsī was invited to Kuhistan due to the curiosity of Nasîruddin Muhteşem who was the governor of Kuhistan and interested in sciences such as philosophy and logic (Gafarov, 2017: 21-22). It is known that al-Ṭūsī stayed here for more than twenty-five years long (Shamel, 2017: 153). As a matter of fact, some of the works he wrote while he was among the Ismailis here have also been translated into Turkish as well (Ṭūsī, 2019). Afterwards, according to some sources, al-Ṭūsī earned a position as a vizier under the Mongol ruler Hulagu, who came to the region (Şirinov, 2012: 437). In fact, with the help of the Mongol ruler Hulagu, al-Ṭūsī established the Maragheh Observatory, which was completed in 1259 (Şirinov, 2009: 12). Hulagu Khan gathered many scholars from Damascus to Mosul, from Andalusia to China in this observatory at the request of al-Ṭūsī. It is also known that some of the instruments used in the observatory were invented by al-Ṭūsī (Göker, 1977: 67-68). There is also a large library in the observatory consisting of works collected by al-Ṭūsī from Baghdad and different places (Şirinov, 2012: 439). Later, when Hulagu Khan entered Baghdad, al-Ṭūsī was also in Baghdad. It is stated that al-Ṭūsī played an important role in saving the lives of many scholars (Dabaşı, 2011: 190-191). al-Ṭūsī, who received support during the Hulagu period, was also in an important position in the Abaqa Khan period that succeeded. al-Ṭūsī died in Baghdad in 1274 (Taştan 2001: 3).

It is seen that al-Ṭūsī has 169 works listed in some sources (Demirkol, 2007:18-28). It is stated that 25% of his works are in Persian (Dabaşı, 2011: 197). It is understood that al-Ṭūsī, known for his good conduct during his lifetime (Şirinov, 2012: 437), had 19 scholars with whom he corresponded on philosophical subjects (Ṭūsī, 2015: 20-30). al-Ṭūsī has also been highly criticized by some scholars. Among them are al-Asam, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim

al-Jawziyya (Algur, 2021: 98). Finally, some scholars have stated that al-Tûsî was a Turk (Dilgan, 1968: 5, Olguner, 1985: 13, Keklik, 1986: 74, Keklik, 1996: 96). We think so, too.

Before moving on to Nasir al-Din al-Tûsî's understanding of ethics, it is necessary to explain how he classified the sciences. In this context, al-Tûsî defines the concept of "*Philosophy (Wisdom)*" as "*knowing things as they are and performing things as necessary to the extent that it is able to bring the human soul to the competence to which it is directed.*" According to al-Tûsî, philosophy is divided into two parts: the theoretical part and the practical part. al-Tûsî also describes Nazari (Practical) philosophy; It is classified as "*Moral Education (Tehzîbu'l-Ahlak)*", "*Home Administration (Tedbîr-i Menazil, Economy)*" and "*State Administration (Politics-i Mûdûn, Politika)*" (Tûsî, 2007: 14-17).

In the light of the points pointed out above, in this study, only "*Moral Education (Tehzîbu'l-Ahlak)*" will be emphasized from the issues that al-Tûsî refers to as "*Practical Philosophy*". Because the "*Home Administration (Tedbîr-i Menazil, Economy)*" section falls into the field of family sociology and "*State Administration (Siyaset-i Mûdûn, Politika)*" falls into the subjects of political philosophy. For this reason, this study will focus on al-Tûsî's understanding of ethics. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî defines "*Practical Philosophy*" as the conscious appreciation of what is right for one's world and the hereafter. al-Tûsî categorizes this point as individual and social (Tûsî, 2007: 17).

Tûsî states that the works that benefit man are either in the nature of man or in the customs of human societies. In this context, the goodness inherent in human nature are the unchanging virtues that exist without being registered with the understandings of individuals and time and space. Moreover, according to al-Tûsî, they are in the domain of practical philosophy. The goodness that have their roots in customs are divided into two.. The goodness, which is rooted in customs, is divided into two. The good that takes its essence from the society is defined as "*manners*" and the good that takes its basis from religious followers is defined as "*divine laws (nevâmîs-i ilahî)*". Religious goodness is also of three classes; worship can be thought of as provisions covering daily affairs and administration and punishment that concern the family. al-Tûsî defines these three classes of precepts as "*Fiqh*". Again, since these provisions do not have a source of man and nature, they are outside the scope of philosophy since they will change according to time and conditions. Because, according to al-Tûsî, philosophy should turn to universal things that do not undergo changes (Tûsî, 2007: 17-18).

According to al- Tûsî, the science of ethics is of a nature that trains the human soul to do the desired and praised deeds. Therefore, the science of ethics deals with the human soul. Thus, the science of ethics aims to educate the soul and lead human beings to happiness (Akşit, 2021: 191).

Al-Tûsî's Understanding of Ethics

Al-Tûsî dealt with the subject of ethics in a single article in his work titled *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî*. The said article has been discussed in two parts (Şahinoğlu, 1989: 18). In the first part, “*Principles*” is emphasized and in a total of seven chapters, information is given about the concept that he calls “*Thinking Soul*” and (Tûsî, 2007: 25-79) which actually represents the concept of “*Spirit*” (Çağrıçı, 2000:89).

In the second part, al-Tûsî, in a total of ten chapters, examined the definition of ethics, the good and beautiful characteristics, whether ethics will change and how to get rid of bad habits (Tûsî, 2007: 81-184). In this context, while the issues are discussed in the study, this narrative order of al-Tûsî will be followed.

The first point that al-Tûsî touches on in his understanding of ethics is the problem of the subject of science of ethics. al-Tûsî positions the concept of “*human soul*” as the subject of science of ethics. The reason for this situation is that the starting point of the deeds that are commendable or cause criticism is the concept of “*human soul*”. Therefore, in order to know the reason for which good and bad deeds are caused by the person, the concept of “*human soul*” must first be known. It is also seen that he cites verses 7-10 of Surat al-Shams as evidence in order to prove the understanding revealed by al-Tûsî (Tûsî, 2007: 25-26). At this point, it is understood that al-Tûsî considers the concept of “*human soul*” as neutral rather than good or bad by taking inspiration from the relevant verses. For the individual either positions himself as good by virtues of virtues or he loses it by unchaste deeds. The key role at this point is the person himself.

In the second chapter, al-Tûsî points out the characteristics of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) and the proof of these characteristics. In this context, according to al-Tûsî, the characteristics of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) are as follows:

- The proof of existence of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul),
- The characteristic of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) as an “*essence*”,
- The characteristic of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) to be “*simple*”,
- The characteristic of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) to be non-“*corporeal*”,

- The ability of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) to perceive things perceived with itself and to use the organs of the body in movement,
- The inability of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul) to be perceived by human senses (Tûsî, 2007: 27).

In the third chapter, al-Tûsî focuses on the types of the concept of “*nafs*” (soul). al-Tûsî speaks of three different types of “*nafs*”. These are the “*vegetable soul*”, the “*animal soul*” and the “*human soul*”. The “*vegetable soul*” affects the species of plants, animals and human beings in terms of their consequences. “*animal soul*” is limited to animal species. Finally, the “*human soul*” is the concept that completes the quality of being human and makes it different from animal species (Tûsî, 2007: 35).

According to al-Tûsî, every type of soul has certain “*faculties*” and these are the reasons for the deeds. Therefore, it is not possible to understand the causes of deeds without knowing these properties. In this context, the “*vegetative soul*”, which is the first type of *nafs*, has three “*faculties*”, namely feeding, growing and reproduction (Tûsî, 2007: 35).

The “*faculties*” of the “*animal soul*” are two. The first “*faculty*” is related to perception, while the second is related to movement. The concept of “*organic perception*”, which is the first “*faculty*”, is divided into five sense perceptions and five internal perceptions (“*common sense, imagination, idea, revelation and recall*”). The second “*faculty*” related to the movement is of two kinds: “*sensual*” and “*wrathful*”. While a benefit is obtained with “*sensual faculty*”, “*wrathful faculty*” allows a harm to be removed (Tûsî, 2007: 35-36).

The most important characteristic of the “*human soul*” is thinking. In this context, human beings are distinguished from other living things by their thinking characteristics. In terms of “*sensual faculty*”, which directs food and beverage and sexual desires, and “*wrathful faculty*”, which forms feelings such as courage and authority, human beings have similar characteristics with animals. For this reason, in order for man to be different from animals, he needs to emphasize the quality of thinking (Tûsî, 2007: 36-37).

Al-Tûsî reveals that every “*faculty*” has a place in the body. In this context, the center of ideas is the brain, the center of lust is the liver, and finally the center of “*wrathful faculty*” is the heart (Tûsî, 2007: 37).

In the fourth chapter, al-Tûsî focuses on the hypothesis that the human being is the most perfect being among living beings. In this chapter, al-Tûsî starts with inanimate objects. Then the transition to the plant world is completed.

According to al-Ṭūsī, this transition begins with bodies that accept change more easily in their own structure. Then, from there, the transformation to the animal world comes into question. Al-Ṭūsī considers the last point in the vegetative stage as the “*date palm*”. After that, the boundary of the animal world emerges. After this point, al-Ṭūsī begins the human world. The first criteria here are reason and intuition. After this point, those who have received revelation come, and finally, there is no existence other than the essence of God. This is how al-Ṭūsī positions existence. It is understood that while making these evaluations, al-Ṭūsī gives some religious references and then interprets them (Tûsî, 2007: 38-42).

Al-Ṭūsī attributes the human being’s being the most valuable being to the condition of turning towards goodness in his own nature. Therefore, the individual who performs virtuous deeds acts in accordance with his nature and receives the most valuable quality among all existing beings. But for those who do not act in this way, al-Ṭūsī gives the example of a stone falling from a high altitude. In this context, the non-virtuous individual, just like a stone falling from a high altitude, will continuously move downward and ultimately lead to his own destruction. From this point of view, according to al-Ṭūsī, human beings are inclined to travel a distance between the highest direction and the lowest direction. As a result, the rank of the individual is shaped according to his virtue (Tûsî, 2007: 43).

In the fifth chapter, al-Ṭūsī focuses on what the human soul can and cannot do. In this chapter, al-Ṭūsī briefly touches upon what he has explained in the previous chapter and points to other points. In this framework, al-Ṭūsī again touches upon the rank of the human being in the spectrum of virtue and vice and focuses on the failure of the individual when he or she performs acts unbecoming of a human being. Therefore, according to al-Ṭūsī, if human beings engage in tendencies that reduce them to the level of animals, they will not be equal to animals. This is because animals are stronger than humans within the framework of lust/wrath. As a matter of fact, al-Ṭūsī says, “How can the intellect consent to (human beings) running on a path that a dog cannot catch up with, even if it makes the utmost effort!” (Tûsî, 2007: 45-47).

The sixth chapter details how to make the soul positive. In other words, it seeks an answer to the question of how to activate one’s soul to do the acts that make oneself human. Al-Ṭūsī mentions two points in activating the soul for good things. While the first of these is related to the theoretical view, the second is related to the actual situation. In this framework, human beings reach “*unity*” through knowing the truths that need to be known in their entirety. The human

being who is aware of the essence of the truths completes the theoretical part. At the practical point, if the individual sorts and “reconciles” the “*faculties*” he possesses in the right way, his work here will also be complete. With this result, beautiful morality is achieved (Tûsî, 2007: 49-50).

Man must struggle to activate the “*meleki nafs (angelic soul)*” among the lowest “*behîmî (animalistic) nafs*”, the middle “*predatory (seb’î) nafs*” and the highest “*meleki nafs*”. This is how al-Tûsî perceives the types of *nafs* mentioned in the Qur’an “*commanding (emmâre)*” (Yusuf, 12/53), “*condemning (levwâme)*” (Kıyame, 75/2) and “*satisfied (mutmaine)*” (Fecr, 89/27) types of *nafs*. As a matter of fact, “the *commanding (emmâre)*” is associated with lust, “*condemning (levwâme)*” is associated with regret, and finally “the *satisfied (mutmaine)*” is associated with virtue (Tûsî, 2007: 56-57).

According to al-Tûsî, the point to which man must reach is the “*angelic soul*”. In this context, the main issue is how to guide the other two types of souls. Again, according to al-Tûsî, the “*predatory (sab’î) naf*” is the soul that knows the ideal point and keeps itself open to education because it is not at the ideal point, although it is not the ideal one. “*Behîmî (animalistic) nafs*” is the opposite of this. Therefore, one should use the “*gadabi faculty*” to defeat the “*sensual faculty*” (Tûsî, 2007: 57).

Referring to the “*ancient philosophers,*” al-Tûsî analogizes the human condition in relation to the above-mentioned faculties to a person riding a strong mount and accompanied by a dog or a tiger going hunting. As a result, whoever has the authority is the judge (Tûsî, 2007: 58).

In the seventh and final chapter, al-Tûsî focuses on the nature of the bliss achieved by the soul endowed with good deeds. This chapter in question draws attention as the widest by volume among the seven chapters of the first part of the first article in which al-Tûsî describes ethics in his work *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî*. For in the aforementioned chapter, al-Tûsî focuses on the reason why human beings activate their souls, that is, their spirits, to good deeds. At the last point, al-Tûsî shows “*happiness*” as the reason. Because “*happiness*” can also be attributed to “*goodness*” (Tûsî, 2007: 60).

Quoting Aristotle, al-Tûsî starts with the motto “*the beginning of the idea is the end of the action, and the end of the idea is the beginning of the action*”. al-Tûsî gives an example of a carpenter with this words. In other words, the carpenter cannot put it into action without envisioning the work he will do in his head and calculating the good result of the work you will do. Therefore, al-Tûsî places the precedence of the act in which man knows what is good and right and

understands the good he will obtain. In other words, the individual must have a kind of conviction of his righteousness before the act he will do and perform that action as such (Tûsî, 2007: 60).

Afterwards, al-Tûsî mentions Ibn Miskeweih's aim to see the path and process that leads to goodness and happiness as the reason for putting the section about happiness in his own book and to revive in them the desire to take part in this adventure (Tûsî, 2007: 60-61).

Al-Tûsî points out that there is also a difference between "*happiness*" and "*goodness*". In this context, "*good*" consists of two parts: "*absolute*" and "*relative*". The "*absolute good*" is the point that is related to the being itself and lies at the heart of the goal. The "*relative good*" can be thought of as anything that helps to achieve the "*absolute good*." Whereas the concept of "*happiness*" is a concept that may vary from one individual to another and can also be attributed to "*goodness*". As a result, while the concept of "*good*" is the same for every individual, the concept of "*happiness*" can vary. Al-Ṭūsī points out that Porphyrius' concept of "*good*" also includes the concepts of "*reason*" and "*wisdom*" based on Aristotle (Tûsî, 2007: 61-62).

As for the components of the concept of "*happiness*", al-Tûsî says that philosophers such as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato only linked the concept of "*happiness*" with the soul and kept the body free from it. Happiness, on the other hand, is shaped on the following four basic virtues:

- "*Wisdom*"
- "*Valor*"
- "*Chastity*"
- "*Justice*"

In fact, he devoted the second part of his article on moral values to commenting on these virtues. Individuals who have achieved these virtues no longer need any further impeachment (Tûsî, 2007: 63-64).

It is possible to categorize the situations corresponding to the concept of "*happiness*" in five different ways. In this context, it is possible to list it as;

- A healthy body and perception,
- The generosity that comes with financial balance,
- Virtuous status and dignity among people,
- Success at the point intended by the determination of the individual,

- trust that comes with faith based on good intentions and a healthy world of thought (Tûsî, 2007: 65).

The determination and perseverance efforts of the person to be virtuous in order to be happy were also one of the points that al-Tûsî attaches importance to. al-Tûsî describes this situation with a quote from Aristotle: "*A swallow that appears does not herald the spring season; the fact that a day is moderate is not evidence that the season will be moderate.*" (Tûsî, 2007: 72-73).

In the second part of al-Tûsî's article on ethics, it was already pointed out that there were ten chapters. The first of these ten chapters deals with the definition of the concept of "*huy (hulk) -temper-*" and the possibility of change in the ethics of the individual. In this context, it is seen that al-Tûsî defines the concept of "*huy (hulk)*" as "*the faculty that allows the deed to be easily valid from the soul without the need for ideas and thoughts (reviyyet)*" (Tûsî, 2007: 81).

In theoretical philosophy, al-Tûsî meets the situations that can be changed quickly in the soul of the individual with the concept of "*state*" and the established situations that do not change quickly with the concept of "*meleke-expertise-*". According to al-Tûsî, the concept of "*meleke*" also shapes the structure of the soul. The term "*meleke*" also influences the soul from two points, one of which is "*nature*" and the other is "*custom*". "*Nature*" is one's tendency to react to a situation when faced with it. That is, how one reacts. This is how a person immediately becomes pessimistic when they hear something they don't like (Tûsî, 2007: 81).

The concept of "*custom*" can be thought of as a person's reflection and subsequent reaction to what he encounters. If the person thinks about the things encountered in time and reacts in the same way, this situation will start to happen after a certain period of time without the need to think about it. At such a point, this situation can now be called "*temperament*" (Tûsî, 2007: 82).

As for whether the ethics of the individual should change or not, al-Tûsî reveals his own opinion along with the existing understandings. In this context, al-Tûsî says that the reactions of individuals to events, that is, their ethics, can be categorized in three different ways. They are as follows:

- According to the first category, some of the habits of the individuals are naturally based and some of them are added to the individual later but become established.

- According to the second category, all the habits of individuals are natural and cannot be changed.
- According to the third category, which is the approach supported by al-Tūsī, the temperaments of individuals are not natural, but nature is not reversed. Each individual obtains some habits easily and others by effort. So what everyone is struggling with or getting easily is different (Tūsī, 2007: 82).

Al-Ṭūsī explains the invalidity of the first two categories of approaches with the concept of religion. For if a person's morality does not change through thinking or education, then what is the point of religion coming to change people? Then, if there is no change in people, then everyone follows a method that suits his own structure, and as a result, there is no consensus and order. For these reasons, according to al-Ṭūsī, the ideas in the first two categories cannot be accepted (Tūsī, 2007: 82-83).

In the second chapter, al-Ṭūsī establishes a connection between the individual's aim to improve his own morality and the concept of art. In addition, al-Ṭūsī positions such an art as *"the most honorable of the arts"*. As a matter of fact, this point can be better explained by al-Ṭūsī's own laconic statement: *"Accordingly, can there be an art more honorable than an art that makes the most vulgar of creatures the most honorable of creatures?"* (Tūsī, 2007: 87-88).

In the third chapter, al-Tūsī focuses on the number of virtues that are the component of good ethics. Here again al-Tūsī speaks of the three faculties of the human soul. These are as follows:

- The training of the mind, that is, thinking,
- Anger
- Lust (Tūsī, 2007: 89).

According to al-Tūsī, if the individual's intellect is in balance, the virtues of *"knowledge"* and *"wisdom"* emerge therefrom. When the faculty of anger in the individual is in balance; The longings of *"hilm"* and *"valor"* appear. Finally, when the faculty of lust is in balance; The virtues of *"chastity"* and *"generosity"* are manifested in the person. The virtues of *"knowledge"*, *"hilm"* and *"chastity"* together reveal the virtue of *"justice"*. For this reason, according to al-Tūsī, the previous philosophers considered virtue; They have been discussed in four

categories: “*wisdom*”, “*valor*”, “*chastity*” and “*justice*”. If any of these virtues are missing, one is not complete and is not worthy of praise (Tûsî, 2007: 89-90).

In the fourth chapter, al-Tûsî refers to other virtues that are inherent in the virtues pointed out above. In this context, al-Tûsî first refers to the branches of the virtue of “*wisdom*”. According to al-Tûsî, these are seven and can be listed as follows:

- “*Intelligence*”, which develops with spending too much time on the concept of “*proposition*”, which is one of the important parts of the science of logic, and which is distinguished by the direction of rapid judgment. He likened the intelligence to the lightning bolt and called it “*angelic*”.
- The “*rapid understanding*” that develops when the soul finds the balance between the “*requiring*” and the “*required*” and is also “*angelic*”.
- “*Clarity of mind*,” which is the ability to immediately reveal what is being asked of oneself.
- “*Ease of learning*”, which is the state of easily achieving what one wants to learn without being distracted from the mind.
- “*Beautiful reasoning*,” which is the state of keeping in those who are related to what is meant to be learned and leaving out those who are unrelated.
- “*Keeping in memory*”, which is the state of keeping in memory the information obtained through imagination along with what is obtained by thinking.
- “*Recalling*”, which is the ability to reveal situations related to the things learned at any time (Tûsî, 2007: 93).

The branches of the virtue of “*valor*,” which al-Tûsî mentions as the second virtue, are eleven and can be expressed as follows:

- The “*greatness of the soul*,” which is the state of the soul turning to the right thing without being deceived by wealth or poverty.
- “*Courage*”, which is the state of self-reliance of the soul in the situation where it is needed.
- “*Supreme purposefulness*”, which is the state of the soul not being interested in the sorrows and joys of the world and not even fearing death.
- “*Perseverance*,” which is a state of resistance in the soul to sadness and hardship.

- “*Hilm*”, which is a state of maintaining calm when confronted with a situation that is not captive to the feeling of wrath and is not befitting of it.
- “*Calmness*”, which is a state of not lacking in defending the notions of religion and rape without alarm.
- “*Boldness*”, which is the determination to achieve important issues.
- “*Endurance*”, which is the state of the use of the body apparatus to obtain good deeds of the soul and training in this way.
- “*Humility*,” which is the individual’s disregard for those who are inferior to him.
- “*Patronage*”, which is the state of not showing a deficiency in protecting the nation and rape to which the person belongs.
- “*Subtlety*,” which is a situation in which one is concerned with the distress of someone who is sad (Tûsî, 2007: 93-94).

The branches of the virtue of “*chastity*”, which al-Tûsî mentions as the third virtue, are twelve and can be explained as follows:

- “*Modesty*”, which is the stopping of the soul when it realizes that it is committing an evil act.
- “*Amiability*”, which is the state of the soul’s inability to react excessively to the situations it faces.
- “*Beautiful course*”, which is the state of the soul taking a true path in self-cultivation.
- “*Being at peace with oneself*,” which is the situation in which the soul dissolves this situation in silence if there is a tenuousness in itself at the points of faculty and ability.
- “*Stillness*”, which is the state in which the soul does not rise to lust.
- “*Patience*,” which is the state in which the soul is resilient not to surrender to bad things.
- “*Conviction*,” which is the state of the soul’s indiscriminate contentment in meeting basic needs.
- “*Solemnity (solemnity)*”, which is the state of calm of the soul except for failing to get what it wants.
- “*Avoidance*,” which is the state of the soul insisting on what is praised and locking itself into what is condemned.
- “*Orderliness*,” which is the soul’s habit of making it his habit to move in a way that is in accordance with what is necessary to do any work.

- “*Freedom*”, which is the state in which the soul earns its wealth in the right ways and distances itself from what is wrong, and spends what it earns in the works that are praised.
- “*Generosity*,” which is the state of spending what one has without hesitation on things that are praised. al-Tûsî declares that the virtue of “*generosity*” also has its branches. These could be listed as “” *open-handedness (kerem), altruism (isâr), forgiveness, humanity, nobility, benevolence, beneficence, and remission*” “. “*Open-handedness (kerem)*” is the situation in which it is not difficult for one’s soul to spend a lot of belongings in good deeds. “*Altruism (isâr)*” is the state in which one does not have difficulty in giving something to another person who deserves what one needs. “*Forgiveness*” is the faculty to punish evil, but it is easy for a person to give up and reward good. “*Humanity*” is when a person tries too hard to want what is good for him. “*Nobility*” is the state of willingly wanting and doing what is good for oneself. “*Benevolence*” is when a person helps those around him to provide for their basic needs. “*Benevolence*” helping those around one to provide for the basic needs of those around them. Finally, “*remission*” can be characterized as the voluntary refusal to do what is not commanded not to be done (Tûsî, 2007: 94-96).

The branches of the virtue of “*justice*”, which al-Tûsî mentions as the fourth and last virtue, are twelve and can be listed as follows:

- “*Friendship*,” The potential within oneself to do good to those with whom one has affection.
- The state of being in agreement in the context of the daily needs of different people is “*unity (ulfat)*”.
- It is “*loyalty*” when a person adopts the principle of not leaving the praised work.
- The state of helping the individual to get rid of the suffering suffered by another person is “*compassion*”.
- The tendency of the person to work praised in kinship relations is “*taking care of the relative*”.
- It is a “*reward*” when a person reacts to the good done to him with the same or more and responds to the evil done to him not with multiple but with a lesser amount.

- Maintaining balance in one's communication with other people is a "good relationship."
- It is "good judgment" when other builders give them what they deserve without insulting them.
- It is "tenderness" when one expects smiles and derivative things from virtuous people.
- A person's consent to what comes from Allah and that he does not want is "surrender."
- It is "tawekkul" when a person strives not to act contrary to Allah's will in works that exceed his own will.
- "Ibadah worship" is the veneration of Allah, the angels and the prophets, and being mindful of Allah's commands and prohibitions (Tûsî, 2007: 96-97).

In the fifth chapter, al-Tûsî focuses on the unvirtuous deeds that are reviled. In this context, since al-Tûsî examines virtuous acts in four categories, he is of the opinion that the actions contrary to these acts are also unvirtuous. Therefore; The opposite of the virtue of "wisdom" is "ignorance", the opposite of the virtue of "valor" is "cowardice (*cübn*)", the opposite of the virtue of "chastity" is "fondness for pleasures (*evil*)", and finally the opposite of "justice" is "oppression (*javr*)" (Tûsî, 2007: 98).

Al-Tûsî, just like the philosophers who lived before him, attaches great importance to being gentle, that is, to adopting *the "middle"*. As a matter of fact, regarding this issue, al-Tûsî quotes the saying that "virtue is in the middle and vices are in the extremes". Therefore, al-Tûsî is of the understanding that if the middle is abandoned, two vices occur, namely "*ifrat- extremism*" and "*tefrit-understatement*". It is possible that these reviled deeds, which are eight in total, can be summarized as follows:

- Contrary to the virtue of "*hikmah -wisdom*" are "*cunningness (sefeh)*" and "*stupidity (beleh)*". "*cunningness (sefeh)*" is the condition of using one's mind more than desired and is considered *ifrat*. "*Stupidity (beleh)*" is the state of using one's mind less than necessary in terms of one's own choice and refers to the state of *tefrit*.
- In contrast to the virtue of "valor" are "*Temerariousness (tehevür)*" and "*cowardice (robe)*". "*Temerariousness (tehevür)*" It is a state of engaging in something that should not be done without thinking about

it, and it is a form of *ifrat*. "*Cowardice (cübn)*" is the state of fear and avoidance of something that should not be avoided, and is *tefrit*.

- The inverse of the longing for "*chastity*" is called "*indulgence in pleasures (shereh)*" and "*reluctance (humud'sh-shahwa)*". "*Indulgence in pleasures (shereh)*" is the state of showing more demand than necessary for what the soul wants, and it is considered *ifrat*. "*reluctance (humud'sh-shahwa)*". *refers to* not doing things that can be done in terms of reason and religion and that the soul wants not because of a deficiency, but by its own consent. This situation is in terms of *tefrit*.
- *The opposite of the virtue of "justice"* is the deeds of "*persecution*" and "*submission to oppression (inzilam)*". "*Persecution*" is the state of gaining one's majesty through a degraded way and style and is considered *ifrat*. "*Submission to oppression (inzilam)*" is the state of not standing against anyone who exploits and steals his own labor and rights. This deed is in terms of "*tefrit*" (Tûsî, 2007: 98-100)

It has already been stated that the virtue of "wisdom" has seven subheadings. In this context, unvirtuous behaviors arise at the point of violation of these in terms of *ifrat* and *tefrit*. Therefore, the ranking is as follows:

- "*Intelligence*" refers to the balance between "*cunningness (hubs)*" and "*stupidity (bilâdat)*". "*Cunningness*" is the *ifrat*, while "*stupidity*" is the *tefrit*.
- "*Quick understanding*" represents the balance between "*imagination*" and "*slowness*".
- "*Clarity of mind*" is related to the balance between "*darkness (zulmat, closedness)*" and "*burning (inflammation)*".
- "*Ease of learning*" represents a balance between "*prematurity (mubâdere)*" and "*difficulty*".
- "*The beauty of reasoning*" can be attributed to the balance between "*too much thought*" and "*imperfect thought*".
- "*Retention (tehaffuz)*" is the balance between the excessive desire to load the mind with unnecessary information and the avoidance of information that should be loaded into the mind.
- "*Recall*" can be attributed to the balance between wasting time and "*forgetfulness*".. (Tûsî, 2007: 101-102).

The neglect of certain virtues also leads to two types of unvirtuous acts. These can be listed as follows:

- The neglect of the virtue of “*Haya*” results in “*arrogance (vekahat)*” or “*timidity (hurk)*”.
- The abandonment of the virtue of “*generosity*” results in “*waste*” or “*stinginess.*”
- Failure to fulfill the longing for “*tawâzu*” results in “*grandiosity (tekabbür)*” or “*self-despise (tazellül)*”.
- The abandonment of the virtue of “*worship*” results in “*sinfulness (fisk)*” or “*indifference (teharuj)*” (Tûsî, 2007: 102).

In chapter six, al-Tûsî focuses on the difference between virtues and situations that are similar to them. Of the virtues, al-Tûsî places the virtue of “*wisdom*” as theoretical and the other virtues such as “*chastity*”, “*valor*” and “*justice*” as practical. Therefore, the effects of the theoretical ones are found in the soul, and the effects of the practical ones are found in the human body. For this reason, since the deeds of those who have virtue and those who are not are similar to each other, it is necessary to reveal the difference between them. The most important difference between the actions of virtuous people and virtuous types is the absence of doubt. Because while virtuous people are confident in themselves and are about to “*cool down*” in the words of al-Tûsî, this does not happen in those without virtue (Tûsî, 2007: 103).

Another point in this regard is that the person does not do the wrong behavior even though he is capable of doing it. In other words, if a person does not do an act because of impossibility, it makes no sense. Here, al-Tûsî gives an example of a bodily malfunction and living in a deserted place regarding the virtue of “*chastity*”. In other words, if a person does not commit any act that is denounced because of a bodily malfunction or living in a deserted place, this behavior is similar to a virtuous behavior in appearance because the person avoids evil, but this avoidance has no moral value. The reason for this can be shown that one’s avoidance of evil is not due to free will but due to impossibility (Tûsî, 2007: 104).

When the virtue of “*valor*” is discussed, al-Ṭūsî speaks of a person’s risking death rather than committing an evil. As a matter of fact, al-Ṭūsî quotes the following sentences from the Hz. ‘Ali, whom he mentions as the most valiant person: “*Even if you are not killed by someone, you will die. I swear by Him*

in whose hand is the soul of Ibn Abi Talib that it is easier to be killed with a thousand sword blows to the head than to die in bed!" (Tûsî, 2007: 108).

It is seen that al-Tûsî attaches special importance to the virtue of "*wisdom*" among the virtues. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî; It attributes the virtues of "*chastity*", "*generosity*" and "*valor*" to having "*wisdom*". Therefore, he said, "Accordingly, every chaste and valiant *person is a man of wisdom, and every wise man is chaste and valiant.*" (Tûsî, 2007: 110).

Finally, in this chapter, al-Tûsî stipulates that virtue should not be beneficial through the virtue of "*justice*". In other words, a fair person should aim to be fair himself, not to show off and praise others. Otherwise, even if there is an act that seems to be justice from itself, this situation cannot be identified with the virtue of "*justice*" (Tûsî, 2007: 110-111).

In the seventh chapter, al-Tûsî elaborates on why the virtue of "*justice*" is superior to other virtues. In this chapter, which is quite long, al-Tûsî first sets out in the definition of the concept of "*justice*". In this context, according to al-Tûsî, justice is identical with the concept of "*equality*". It is impossible to understand the concept of "*equality*" without the notion of "*unity*". Since the concept of "*unity*" itself is very valuable relative to Allah Himself, things that are close to it also gain value. As a matter of fact, the value of the concept of "*equality*" comes from here. al-Tûsî also associates the concept of "*justice*" with "*middle*". As a result, al-Tûsî argues that divisions have become regular thanks to "*justice*" and "*equality*" and gives the example of music science in this regard (Tûsî, 2007: 112-113).

Tûsî mentions that justice has three different types of reflections in daily life. It is possible that these can be listed as follows:

- Those related to what one possesses and what one donates from them,
- Those related to business affairs,
- Work with a social dimension, such as education and administration (Tûsî, 2007: 113).

Tûsî states that due to the fact that man is a social being due to his structure, some necessary relationships are born and the notion of "*money*" has emerged in order for them to progress healthily. In this regard, al-Tûsî gives the example of a carpenter and a painter. As a matter of fact, when these two professional groups enter into a commercial transaction related to their work, reciprocity is essential. But when there is a surplus in favor of anyone, "*money*" brings the

work into balance. In the words of al-Tûsî, “*Therefore, money is just (balancer) and intermediary among people; but money is silently fair.*” In this context, according to al-Tûsî, there are three elements that ensure justice among people. These can be listed as follows:

- The sublime order determined by Allah,
- Judges of men,
- Money with its commercial dimension (Tûsî, 2007: 114-115).

Another of the points that al-Tûsî touches upon is what happens when the justice providers mentioned above are not complied with. In this regard, according to al-Tûsî, those who do not comply with the order determined by Allah are attributed to the greatest injustice, that is, to oppression. Then come those who do not conform to the one who rules among the people. Such people can be described as “*moderately cruel*”. The “*smallest oppressor*” can be defined as those who oppose “*money*”(Tûsî, 2007: 116).

The negative consequences of doing what is condemned can be grouped into four different categories. These are as follows:

- “*Lust*” related to not staying on the straight and narrow,
- “*Evilness (şerâret)*” related to injustice,
- “*Mistake*” related to “*sadness*”,
- “*Unfortunateness (şeka)*” about grief and “*bewilderment*” close to sordidness (Tûsî, 2007: 117).

Referring to Aristotle, al-Tûsî states that there are three components in the practical dimension of “*justice*”. These can be expressed in order as follows:

- Fulfilling one’s obligations to Allah,
- Fulfilling one’s duties to other people,
- Fulfilling one’s responsibilities to one’s relatives in the past, that is, to one’s ancestors (Tûsî, 2007: 118-119).

In the eighth chapter, al-Ṭūsî talks about the order of acquiring virtues. In this framework, al-Ṭūsî relates the effort to acquire virtue to art. Here al-Ṭūsî gives the example of a child. In other words, as a child develops from birth, it should follow the same process in acquiring virtues. The child first strives for food,

which is one of his basic needs, and is dependent on his mother for this. Then the child's imagination develops. Afterwards, the “*wrathful faculty*” strengthens in the child in order to drive away harmful things and turn towards beneficial things. Subsequently, with the physical development, the trait of “apprehension” takes place in the child. As a result, the sense of shame develops in the child (Tûsî, 2007: 131).

Within the framework of the faculties mentioned above, al-Ṭûsî argues that “*nourishment (taghziyya)*” and “*nurturing (tenmiyya)*” occur with the first faculty. Thus, “*lust*”, which ensures the continuation of life, is placed in the right channel. The second force, the “*wrathful faculty*”, also finds its place on the right ground by performing the task of removing harmful things. Because vitality is preserved. The third faculty, “apprehension”, acquires the right ground for itself by coming to the point of perceiving singular and plural things as they are. Thus, maturation is completed. In this respect, al-Ṣûsî recommends that first lust, then wrath, and then appeal be placed on the right ground. Again, al-Ṭûsî says, “It should be known that no one is created virtuous. As a matter of fact, *no one is a carpenter, a scribe or an artisan by birth. One starts moral upbringing from birth.*” (Tûsî, 2007: 131-133).

Al-Ṭûsî categorizes the types of happiness that emerge as a result of virtues into three categories. Accordingly, they can be listed as follows:

- The first is spiritual happiness, which takes five forms. They are, in order, moral education, logical education, mathematical education, natural science education, and finally, transphysical, or metaphysical education.
- The second is bodily happiness. This is through medical and health education.
- The third and last is social happiness. This happiness is realized through the proper organization of social life and the state (Tûsî, 2007: 134-135).

In the ninth chapter, al-Ṭûsî addresses the issue of the preservation of mental health through the continuation of virtues. The first issue al-Ṭûsî addresses in this chapter is the choice of friends. Using the science of medicine as an example, al-Ṭûsî suggests that those who want to take care of their health should consume what is suitable for their own constitution, and those who want to take care of their souls should be friends with those who do praiseworthy deeds. Al-Ṭûsî explains this situation by saying, “*Because nothing can affect the soul more than the effect of sitting and talking and friendship.*” Therefore, according to

al-Ṭūsī, staying away from those who commit the acts that are condemned is one of the most effective ways to protect the soul and mental health. At this point, al-Ṭūsī refers to almost everything related to these people. In other words, from conversation to poetry, from discussion to being in the same environment, all ties with these people should be severed. Otherwise, this will lead to becoming similar to them, which is undesirable (Tûsî, 2007: 136-137). Al-Ṭūsī also attaches great importance to the choice of friends when acquiring knowledge (Tûsî, 2018: 31).

Al-Ṭūsī is not a thinker who completely rejects fun and joking around. But according to him, such amusements should be under the control of reason and wisdom. Al-Ṭūsī considers fun and happiness at three points. In this context, these can be expressed as follows:

- The first state is the state of “*clownishness (mucûn)*”, “*immorality (halâet)*” and “*sinfulness (fisq)*”, which can be attributed to *ifrat*.
- The second state is the temperament of “*dullness (fedâmat)*”, “*sullenness (ubûset)*” and “*harshness (tondhûyi)*”, which can be attributed to *nafs*.
- The third state can be attributed to the “*balanced*” and “*middle*” reasonable level of these two faulty states, which is “*joy (haşâşet)*”, “*freedom (talâkat)*” and “*good life (hüsni işret)*” (Tûsî, 2007: 137).

Another point that al-Tûsî points out is that a person does not need anything very much. For al-Tûsî said, “*Then he who needs the goods of the world very much will be as many poor; and he who has little need of worldly goods is just as rich.*” He points out that wealth is also the reduction of need. He cites Allah as evidence for this. Therefore, Allah has everything because He does not need anything. In the continuation of this mention, al-Tûsî quotes from Hazrat Abubakr by praying to him. In this context, Hz. Abubakr’s words are: “*The most troublesome of the people in this world and the hereafter are the kings.*” al-Tûsî adopts this saying as his own basis (Tûsî, 2007: 140-141). At the same time, this situation shows what a gentle scholar al-Tûsî was. Because, although he himself has adopted the Shia interpretation of Islam (Sıddikî, 2014: 709) and the Shia’s views on the issue of Abu Bakr are also clear (Fığlalı, 1984: 209, 222, Üzüm, 2010: 118), he adopts a very moderate approach to this issue.

Another of the points that al-Tûsî touches upon is the principle that man should rely on reason and logic in his actions. If any other act contrary to this situation occurs, a person should discipline himself with worship such as fasting

and take him under control. If there is a food that causes the act to be eaten, it should be avoided. At this point, al-Tûsî gives the example of the knowledge he refers to by saying "*Oklides, who are the owners of geometry (his book)*", and when he makes mistakes, he keeps those who condemn him in society with money (Tûsî, 2007: 144-145). By the way, al-Tûsî also has a Geometry book (Tûsî, 2020) and he is known as *the "Turkish Euclides"* (Dilgan, 1968: 5).

It is seen that al-Tûsî attached great importance to ethics at a young age. As a matter of fact, he attaches great importance to the fact that man dominates his lust at an early age and can remain calm in the moment of anger. Because if a person can achieve these states, it will be easier for him to perform other praised deeds. Since a person will reach maturity in this way, he will reach a position of forgiving and educating even those who make mistakes for himself. Therefore, one should take precautions against lust and anger like a ruler who prepares for those who mean his country in the words of al-Tûsî (Tûsî, 2007: 145-146).

In this chapter, al-Tûsî finally deals with the issue of friendship as at the beginning. In this context, one should make friends of those who can say their own mistakes to their face. This is followed by a quote from al-Tûsî Galen: "*He should strengthen his connection with his friend in this matter and should not consent to it when he says, 'I have not seen any of your shame.'*" says. However, al-Tûsî complains about the scarcity of such people. Therefore, people who are not like this should be avoided. In this context, al-Tûsî considers those who do not say one's shame to one's face more dangerous than the enemy. Here again a Galenan attribute draws attention: "*Good men take advantage of their enemies.*" Referring to Kindî, al-Tûsî then advises his friends to take a *mikyas* to him in order to be virtuous (Tûsî, 2007: 146-148).

In the tenth and final chapter, the Tus focuses on how to heal the vices of the soul. As it is known, al-Tûsî counts four virtues and eight of them, namely ifrat and tefrit, as non-virtue. As a spiritual method, it proposes to reach equilibrium by first determining the disease that causes imethics and then determining the things that cause it, and then by the isolation of what causes the disease. In this context, in this chapter, the al-Tûsî focuses on how to combat these vices in order for the soul to be peaceful (Tûsî, 2007: 149).

Tûsî is in man, as mentioned before; it speaks of the potentials *for "discernment", "repulsion", and finally "pulling"*. These are; There are three different forms of swerving in terms of departure from the balance: ifrat, tefrit and "*deviation (redâet)*". In addition, there are two reasons for a person's error (Tûsî calls this situation "*going astray*"), spiritual and physical. In this context,

these reasons affect each other. Because al-Tûsî states that the soul has an important interaction with the body. As an example of this issue, he gives the physical suffering and weakening of a person who has excessive anger in his soul (Tûsî, 2007: 149-151).

It proposes treatment according to the places of appearance of the tusûsî diseases. Therefore, if the disease is in the body, the requirements of medical science should be made. If the deviation is in the soul, then the methods of upbringing of science of ethics must come into play. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî said, “*Thus, when the cause is eliminated, the disease is necessarily eliminated.*” says (Tûsî, 2007: 151).

Tûsî states that “*theoretical faculty*” deviates from three different balances. These and their treatments can be expressed as follows:

- The first denounced act is “*astonishment.*” This error arises from the inaccuracy of the sources used to find the truth of the person. According to al-Tûsî, the rules of the science of logic should be operated here. In other words, whichever of the two things that contradict the person is wrong, must be found and disabled.
- The second denounced act is “*simple ignorance (jahl-i basît)*”. The reason for this error is that the person does not have information about what he needs. It is not necessary because the person does not know it at the beginning. But then he must complete whatever he lacks.
- The third and final error is “*compound ignorance*”. This mistake can be defined as not knowing what one does not know, that is, thinking oneself to be a scholar when one is actually an ignorant person. al-Tûsî recommends that these people engage in the science of Geometry (Tûsî, 2007: 153-156).

Tûsî points out that the “*faculty of expulsion*” also has three different diseases. These and their treatments can be listed as follows:

- The first disease is “*anger.*” At its core is a sense of revenge. al-Tûsî always uses the metaphor of “*fire*” in this denounced act. For example, al-Tûsî compares those who are angry quickly to “*dry wood*” and those who are angry late to “*wet wood*”. In addition, al-Tûsî identified the situation in which the advice and similar things given to the person who is angry cause the person to be more angry at that moment with the situation of causing him to be harnessed more when trying to extinguish the fire. According

to al-Tûsî, there are ten reasons for anger; “*arrogance (ucb), arrogance (pride), strife (mirâ) and stubbornness (lecâc), joke (humor), grandiosity (takabbur), sarcasm (istihzâ), disloyalty (gadr), injustice (daym)*” and finally “*the desire for valuable things that give rise to competition and jealousy*”. In particular, the last clause covering individuals being in competition can be called the basis of the feeling of revenge. Undesirable situations caused by anger are; the grief of realizing that he made a mistake from his decision is the seven consequences: punishment in two worlds, abandonment of mercy by the immediate environment, ridicule of reviled people, contempt for enemies, change of personality, and finally momentary suffering. Ultimately, if these reviled actions are prevented, anger is reined in and *the “faculty of expulsion”* will align.

- The second disease is “*cowardice*”. This is the opposite of anger. That is, it is the renunciation of a justified state of revenge. There are ten states to which this condition depends. These are: the fact that one’s soul has no value, the life lived with wrong choices, the family life full of wrong choices, the inability to be constant in your choices, being since hard work, not opposing the oppressor, not interfering in the affairs of the family and his close environment, insisting on hearing disgusting words, losing the sense of shame and finally not caring about the work that needs to be done. After all, just as in the treatment of anger, if the person eliminates these causes, the “*faculty of expulsion*” finds balance.
- The third and final disease is “*cowardice*.” It is based on *vehem*. In other words, the person is worried about an event that he believes he will not be able to cope with and will happen soon. al-Tûsî divides fear into “*heavy*” and “*easy*” jobs. It classifies its results as “*necessary*” or “*possible*”. There is no need to be mentally feared of what is “*possible*.” Because what is feared is either its own deed or someone else’s deed. This can be solved by avoiding it if it is his own business. If it is someone else’s act, there are two possibilities; it will either happen or it won’t. In this case, the person should keep his intentions clear and turn to good luck. Because worrying about something that hasn’t happened yet is unnecessary. Fear of the “*necessary*” is the loss of the world and the hereafter. Because if a person is worried about what he cannot afford, this unjustified anxiety will bring nothing but more trouble. Finally, al-Tûsî refers to *the “fear of death”*. al-Tûsî describes this fear as “*the most general and terrible fear*”. He bases his reason on ignorance, that is, on not knowing what death really is. In addition, the feeling of revelation is also at the root of

this fear. For example, the concern one has about one's own commodities and children after one's own death. In this context, the death of al-Tûsî; "... *the body of the soul consists of not making use of organs (tools).*" as follows. Therefore, the body that dies is not the soul. In this context, it is understood that al-Tûsî stated that a person who lives by doing good and praised deeds does not need to be afraid of death because death is a kind of dimension change (Tûsî, 2007: 156-174). Regarding fear, there is another concept that al-Tûsî distinguishes from "*hashyet*" and the "*havf*" he uses. This concept is a term that will evoke positive meaning. al-Tûsî uses this term to describe scholars who fear Allah. Therefore, by the way, this point has also been mentioned. For this approach of al-Tûsî, "*Against Allah only; those who are wise among their servants have deep respect.*" (Fâtır, 35/28) verse as evidence (Tûsî, 2009: 79). In the above verse, the concept of "*hashyet*" is met with the translation of "*deep respect*".

The diseases of the "faculty of attraction" are three types: "lust, love of laziness" and finally "sadness and envy". "Shehvet", ifrat, "love of laziness" are from tefrit kabul. "Sadness and envy" can be characterized as direct deviation. The treatment methods of these are as follows:

- It is possible that the first disease, "*lust*", can be defined as the desire to overeat and excessive sexual desire. al-Tûsî summarizes the consequences of the sexual dimension of this reviled act as the weakening of devotion to religion, the damage to the body, the loss of the commodity possessed, the destruction of the mind, and finally the destruction of dignity. al-Tûsî quotes Ghazali as attributing the "*faculty of lust*" to the "*cruel worker who collects tribute.*" al-Tûsî recommends that one should be satisfied with one's family and not to go beyond the limit. In addition, al-Tûsî describes love as "*the most dangerous of the ifrat species*". This is the case when a woman spends all her efforts to achieve it, and it expresses being surprised by the truth. The antidote is the sublime deeds of trying to keep the mind away from this feeling and engaging in knowledge. If these cannot be achieved, al-Tûsî proposes solutions such as traveling to distant places and dealing with heavy work that faculties the body.
- According to al-Tûsî, the second disease, "*laziness*", is the cause of the destruction of the world and the hereafter. Therefore, this reprimanded action should be avoided.

- The third and final disease is “*sadness and envy*.” al-Tûsî defines “*sadness*” as the inability to get what is liked and what is desired cannot be taken. al-Tûsî denounces this situation with the following couplet:

*“He who rejoices in not seeing what touches him with evil,
Let him not acquire anything that he fears of loss!”*

It is understood that this kind of reviled action stems from the idea that the taste of the world is unchanging and that what is in man’s hands will never be zail. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî said, “*Every group rejoices with what is in itself.*” (Mü’minûn, 23/53) verse as evidence. But he who adopts the right path does not forget the one who so relies on the blessings of the world and gives them. al-Tûsî said about them, “*You should know that there is no fear for the friends of Allah. They won’t be upset.*” (Yunus, 10/62) verse as evidence. In the sequel, it is seen that al-Tûsî *quoted from Kindî’s work The Elimination of Sorrows* . Here it is understood that Kindî points out that “*sadness*” is a spiritual state in one’s own volitional field. *On the subject of “sadness,”* al-Tûsî finally asked Socrates, “*I don’t want things that will upset me when I’m lost.*” is seen to have conveyed his word. The second aspect of the third disease, “*envy*”, can be defined as the “*ambition*” of being ahead of one’s peers in terms of useful deeds and commodities. It is understood that al-Tûsî emphasized that “*envy*” is one of the most denounced features based on Kindî. In this regard, it is seen that al-Tûsî gave the example of the limited blessings of the world to the action in question. In this context, al-Tûsî said about the philosophers’ blessings of the world: “*Philosophers have likened the world to a short blanket wrapped around a tall person.*” is seen to have conveyed his word. al-Tûsî shows that the worst type of envy is the envy of the learned people to each other. Referring to the concept of “*envy*”, al-Tûsî mentions that there are two types of this concept, good and evil. It is possible that what is good is relative to virtues, that is, good deeds, and what is bad to “*lust*” (Tûsî, 2007: 175-183).

Conclusion

In this part of the study, the distinctive qualities of al-Tûsî will be touched upon and the study will be finalized. Judging from the life story of al-Tûsî, the points to be touched will become even clearer. In this context, the first aspect of al-Tûsî to be mentioned is “*patience*”. It is a very important issue that he was with the Ismaili’s for more than twenty years and then lived a life of imprisonment in

Alamut castle, but he did not give up on all this and at the same time continued his scientific life.

Another remarkable aspect of al-Tûsî is his ability to turn crises into opportunities. In this context, while he was imprisoned in Alamut castle, he persuaded the castle commander to surrender against Hulagu Khan, who had damaged the castle. As a result, Hulagu, who obtained the castle without resistance, will reward this success of al-Tûsî.

Another striking point in al-Tûsî is that *he was a "gentlemanly" scholar*. Although he adopted the Shia interpretation of Islam, it is seen that he used very respectful expressions about Hazrat Abu Bakr. It can also be read from this cabi that Hazrat Ali used the narration from Salman-i Farisi in his work *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî* about being the fourth caliph due to his playfulness.

One of the distinctive qualities of al-Tûsî is the direction of science. al-Tûsî takes the intellectual and transplant sciences together. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî established one of the important observatories of history in the city of Meraga. There is also a very important library in this science center, which is called "*Meraga Observatory*".

Another distinctive aspect of al-Tûsî is the aspect of reducing the severity of unfortunate events. In this context, it can be read from this cablet that al-Tûsî came to Baghdad with the army of Hulagu Khan during the Mongol invasion and saved many scholars and books from there. As a matter of fact, it is known that scholars and books from Baghdad were employed in *the "Meraga Observatory"*.

In terms of science of ethics, it is seen that al-Tûsî had a very clear head and style. As a matter of fact, it is understood that al-Tûsî reveals the points he wants to explain quite clearly and clearly with a concise writing technique.

Another remarkable aspect of al-Tûsî is his mastery of philosophy. As a matter of fact, al-Tûsî, in his work titled *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî*; He refers a lot to many philosophers such as Socrates, Galen, Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Miskeweh, Kindî. This method shows that he dominated the past philosophical corpus and built his ideas on this accumulation.

In al-Tûsî's *work titled Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî*, it is seen that he examines ethics in a single article. This article consists of two parts. In the first part, the soul, the nature of the soul, the characteristics of the soul, the deficiencies of the soul and the parts where it is strong and happiness are focused on. This first part consists of a total of seven chapters. This section sheds light on *the "principles"*.

In the second part of al-Tûsî; The concept of "*huy*" (*hulk*) and the phenomenon of changing or not touching on issues such as the fact that educating

ethics is the most praised art, virtues and their numbers, subheadings of virtues, denounced deeds and their characteristics, the superiority of the virtue of justice over other virtues and the treatment methods of unvirtuous acts. This section is a total of ten chapters and refers to the issue of “*purposes*”.

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CHAPTER V

HOMO ETHICUS ALPHARABICUM: AL-FARABI'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ETHICS

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Introduction

Plato and Aristotle's views on morality were represented in the Islamic world, especially by al Fârâbî (d. 950), İbn Miskeveyh (d. 1030), İbn Sînâ (d. 22 June 1037), İkhwan al-Safa (10th Century), al Ghazali (d. 1111), Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi (d. 1274) and Qınâlîzâde 'Alâ' al-Dîn 'Alî Efendi (d. 1572) (Adıgüzel 2018: 48). It is possible to say that social morality comes to the fore rather than individual morality in al Farabi's moral understanding. He thought that it would be possible to make total morality dominant in society with the understanding of political morality, and he tried to establish a political morality system for this. Here it is useful to give brief information about his life.

Abu Nasr Muhammed b. Tarhan b. Uzlug al-Fârâbî is one of the most famous figures in the history of Islamic and Turkish thought. He was born in 871 in Vesic town of Farab city (Otrar located near Turkestan city of today's Kazakhstan), which was founded on Seyhun (Siriderya) river. He had his first education in Fârâb. He went to Baghdad on the advice of his father, who was the castle commander in Vesic. He learned Arabic, while taking Nahiv lessons from Ibn Sarraj, he also taught logic to him. Ebû Bishr Metta b. Yunus, philosophical sciences from Yuhanna b. He learned (learned) from Haylan. After political turmoil broke out in Baghdad, he left that place and went to Damascus, and after a short while he went to Aleppo and from there to Seyfûddeve, Emir of Hamdani. He met Emir and was hosted in the palace. (Gâlib, 1998: 12). The fact that some Arabic words are translated into Greek, Syriac, Persian and Sogdian in his works shows that he knows at least five or six languages. He has a personality that does not value wealth and enjoys fame and ostentation. He believes that the most valuable treasure is moral superiority. Although the Hamdani ruler Seyfûddeve Abu'l-Hasan Ali bin Abdullah bin Hamdan wanted to help al Farabi financially, he was content with only four dirhams to meet his daily needs. (Adıgüzel 2018: 102-104). He has never been married or owned any property. He went to Egypt two years before his death and died here in 950 after returning to Damascus (Kaya, 2005: 107-108).

Al Fârâbî wrote criticism against parts of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which was translated into Arabic by Hunayn b. Isaac. Although this criticism has not reached us, it is known that thinkers such as Ibn Bace (d. 887) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) referred to this work. In the works named *Fusûlü 'l-Müntezea*, *Tahsilü's Saadah* (Achieving Happiness), *et Tenbih Ala sabil's Saade* (Directing to the Path of Happiness) and *İhsau'l İlim* (Counting the Sciences), it is seen that Fârâbî deals with moral issues (Saruhan 2012: 81-82).

While establishing the relationship between ethics and knowledge in Islamic moral thought, attention was drawn not only to the theoretical side of the mind, but also to the practical side. It has been stated that being moral is basically the function of practical reason. Because our behaviour is chosen by the practical mind. From this point of view, we can say that will is an activity of practical reason. Of course, in a right choice, the practical mind has to act in accordance with the general principles of the theoretical mind. Practical reason succeeds in achieving morality; It depends on balancing emotions such as desire, anger and fear and subordinating them to reason (Cengiz 2018: 27.28).

In terms of Islamic ethics, the subject of morality is human actions, and its purpose is to make his attitude towards objects and individuals compatible with reason and religion. This attitude, which means the construction of the self, is possible by transcending one's self. This means that one has to plan one's behavior towards another. Since positive attitudes and behaviours towards others will eliminate the sense of selfishness, it may be possible to make a significant contribution to one's self-construction. We can also see self-transcendence, in a way, as overcoming selfishness. In this case, the state of selfishness in the character of a person can be eliminated by providing unrequited benefits to others. This attitude is called altruism in Islamic terminology. This concept is used in the sense of giving up and making sacrifices for the good and benefit of others. According to the Turkish Language Association, the word altruism is explained as altruism. People who are described as altruistic is a concept used for people who try to meet the needs of others despite their own needs, who are not selfish and can want the good things they want for themselves. When it comes to the interests of society, the most important aspect of transcending one's self is to renounce one's own interests in favor of society. Thus, it is concluded that the construction of a self and a person's self-transcendence can only be possible with someone else. This result reveals the need for sociology, which deals with the ground of encountering others.

We cannot say that the individual-society relationship is sufficiently taken into account in the works of classical Islamic moral thought. Although the

effect of the social environment on the individual has rarely been the subject of discussions, we can say that these discussions mostly remain at the theoretical level (Cengiz 2018: 35-36).

In the field of morality, thought cannot be produced without considering social relations. Fârâbî is one of those who produce ideas by considering social relations. Duty of man as a social being al Farabi believes in the necessity of substituting social morality rather than individual morality in morality. For this reason, he was interested in the morality of the people living in the state. According to him, thanks to politics, people can acquire the competence, which is the purpose of creation, and learn virtues and vices.

According to al Farabi, politics is science, art and wisdom. Fârâbî explains politics, whose dictionary meaning we frequently use today is “to manage”, “to put in order”, “to manage”, “to put everything in order by seeing and taking care of it” (Kars 2006: 22); “all voluntary (voluntary) behavior based on human achievement; It is impossible for all good qualities, dispositions, temperaments and talents to be found in a single person and to use them. However, these happen in the community and become behavior. The purpose targeted through voluntary work, behavior and skills is ultimately achieved in the community. In full communities, which we will explain below, it can be one thing to place jobs and talents that need to be distributed for common use, and to try to maintain their continuity in them. This is the profession of the presidency. It is a profession that one can call by any name instead of being a melik, that is, the presidency. Politics is doing this job. Doing this profession means; It is to do the behaviours that place the mentioned qualities and abilities in the province, ensure their continuity and protect them. This profession is achieved with the knowledge of all behaviours that provide first placement and then protection, provided by the presidency. (Fârâbî 1986:54-55). The presidency, which places, predisposes and protects these qualities and abilities in them, believes that political science is also a moral science with a profession, an art, a talent and a talent. In this study, al Farabi’s understanding of social ethics will be discussed in detail.

Ethica Al-Pharabica: al Farabi’s View of Ethics

In the tradition of classical moral philosophy, starting with Socrates and continuing with Plato, Aristotle, Farabi, İbni Sina and Kinalizade, “the principle of evaluating behavior according to its consequences” is dominant. According to this principle, the moral goodness or badness of a behavior is

decided by looking at whether the intended goal is achieved or not. In other words, the moral value of the behavior is determined by the result of that behavior. (Kilic 2012: 13)

Some of the sources related to al Farabi's ethical philosophy are works that have been influenced by a certain approach to the philosopher's view of politics. This approach interprets al Farabi's thought according to the esoteric reading style developed by Leo Strauss and continued by his students. Strauss, in his *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, published in 1952, argues that some important writers adopted a special style of writing both to protect themselves from the attack of the people or the government-centred opposition power in their time, and to preserve philosophy as an elite activity by keeping it away from the mischief of the said sections. . In this style of writing, a dual method is adopted, and truth is expressed in two ways: for the public and for the philosophers. In the first, the truth is in the interior, it is covered with ideas that can be accepted in order not to cause reaction, only those who are aware of the method of reading the interior can see the truth behind it. Strauss argues that al Farabi, like Plato, adopted such a writing style. (Strauss 2013; Özturan 016: 10).

According to Fârâbî, ethics is the thing through which good and bad actions occur in man. According to our philosopher, just as logic examines the principles of knowledge, ethics deals with the fundamental principles of attitudes and actions. (Fârâbî, 1993, 33).

According to Fârâbî's thought, while psychology enables us to comprehend the nature of human beings, theoretical philosophy leads people to mental and intellectual competence. Besides, morality also leads people to practical virtues. In his work called Fârâbî et Tenbih, he divided civil philosophy into two parts and stated that the first is moral science, which provides information about good deeds and morality, and the second is "political philosophy", which provides to reach the good situations that the people of the city need. Fârâbî, like Aristotle, sees morality as a preparation for politics or, in his own words, for the establishment of the virtuous city. The moral understanding that Fârâbî put forth in his work titled "Count of Sciences" includes partly Aristotelian and personally Platonic political point of view. In this work, political science is defined as a branch of science that examines voluntary acts and types of government, and the customs, habits (morality), qualifications and abilities that make up these acts and methods. One of the issues Fârâbî deals with is the issue of evil. According to Fârâbî, there is no ontological evil. Everything that exists in the world and is independent of human will is good. If we accept the First Cause and the other

beings that exist accordingly, then the other beings will be good as well, since the First Cause is good. Because everything exists in accordance with the order and competence it possesses. It is the wilful evil that arises from the absence of happiness or the committing of voluntary acts that lead to this misery. Because it can be good or bad. As soon as the will is excluded, evil is also excluded. (Fahri 2004:115; Aydınlı 2008:37,77,111).

As can be seen, al Farabi has established the basis of his moral understanding on happiness. When the purpose of human existence is to achieve happiness and happiness is the last competence that possible beings can accept; a person learns the knowledge that this happiness is his own competence (that is, the knowledge of which direction he should move for his competence) and the method of obtaining this competence from the active mind (Pırıldar 2016: 90). The silvery work *Tahsilü's Sade* (Achieving Happiness) shows the relationship between knowledge and morality. An important part of this work, which was written on morality, deals with the principles of correct and consistent thinking. In this work, al Farabi tried to reveal that morality cannot be realised without constructing theoretical knowledge. (See al Farabi 1999).

Happiness in Islamic moral philosophy has been seen as dependent on the use of human thinking ability at the highest level. The relationship between the competence of thought and morality clearly reveals the relationship between epistemology and morality. Because the characterisation of a person as morally good depends on knowing the virtues. Fârâbî's work titled *The Acquisition of Happiness* shows the relationship between knowledge and morality. In this work written on morality, the principles of correct and consistent thinking are handled. Thus, it is shown that morality cannot be acquired without establishing a correct theoretical knowledge. (Cengiz 2018: 27).

Al Farabi argues that the way that leads to happiness is possible by knowing the soul and its powers and establishing a good balance between these powers. According to al Farabi, the soul is the form of the body and the basis of its existence. It helps the body to become clear and mature. While doing these, Nefs uses two kinds of tools, one physical and the other non-corporeal. Therefore, the soul has three qualities. These are: strength, image and competence. (Gâlib, 1998: 69; Adıgüzel 2018: 104).

Al Fârâbî, in his work named *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla*, consists of five powers of the human soul: nourishing (gâziye), sensing, that is, feeling (hâsse), producing desire-unwillingness (nüüiyye), hiding sense perceptions (tahayyile) and thinking (nutk). speaks. Fârâbî, who also deals with their functions and

their relations with the human soul, calls these powers “emotional powers (or spiritual powers)”. (al Fârâbî, 1983: 84-85).

According to Fârâbî, the heart is in a managerial position in the body. After the heart comes the brain, which is the second head of the brain. For he is subject to the rule of the heart. The brain uses and manages all other organs in order to serve the purpose that the heart naturally seeks to achieve. (Gâlib, 1998: 72-73; Adıgüzel 2018: 106).

Fârâbî also makes a distinction between the will and the elder. According to him, when a desire or unwillingness towards an object arises due to the power of nourishment, sense and imagination under the influence of the power of *nüzuiyya*, this is called “will”. If the desire-unwillingness about an object is realised through deliberation, that is, if it arises depending on the power of speech, it is also called the elder. While the will is found in all animals, the old man is found only in man. (Fârâbî, 1983: 100). According to Fârâbî, the formation of the first reasonables in man as a result of the activities of the power of speech is the first competence of man. They are used as tools to reach the second and final competence. In other words, happiness is the transition of the human soul (spirit) from perfection in existence to a perfection in which it can exist on its own without the need for matter. As a matter of fact, this is only possible if it is included among the ores that are far from the body and free from matter and remains in this state continuously. But in degree it remains inferior to the active mind. (al Fârâbî, 1983: 100-101).

In order to achieve happiness, man needs voluntary actions. Some of them are intellectual and some of them are physical. Happiness cannot be achieved by any random act of will. Therefore, these behaviours are specific and limited. As a matter of fact, some voluntary behaviours prevent human happiness. Happiness is the good that is demanded in itself. The good that is demanded to achieve something else cannot be called happiness. Behaviours that help people reach happiness are good behaviours. The original aspects of the character (*hey'et*) and habits (*meleke*) that enable a person to perform these behaviours and which are in his soul form the virtues. The reason why virtues are good is not in themselves, but because they lead people to happiness. Behaviours that prevent happiness are bad. These are also ugly behaviours. In this case, the structure and habits that cause the behaviours that prevent people from reaching happiness are also described as fault, disgrace and meanness. (al Fârâbî, 1983: 101). Nutritional power serves the body. The powers of feeling and imagination serve both the body and the power of speech. But in the final analysis, all three

forces serve the power of speech. Speech power can be practical or theoretical. The practical serves the theoretical. The theoretical power of speech only helps to achieve happiness. All of these depend on the power of *nüzuiyya*. Because none of the powers that depend on the power of comprehension can perform their behavior without the power of *nüzuiyya*. (al Fârâbî, 1983: 101).

Metapolitics: Metaphysics-Politics Relation in al Farabi's View of Ethics

According to Fârâbî, the way to reach the highest good and the most advanced perfection is the virtuous city. Proper development and maturation cannot be completed without the formation of a virtuous city. Accordingly, the attainment of happiness in the world depends on the benevolent activities of individuals in the society involving a large number of people. In this thought, the political leader has to be a moral model for the whole society. Since the main purpose of human beings is happiness and this purpose can only be achieved in society, the person who takes the leadership of people should direct them towards this goal and make the necessary preparations for it (Çağrıç, 2006, 178).

In his works, Fârâbî established a close connection between psychology, theoretical philosophy, morality, politics and metaphysics. The nature of man, his mental competence, his virtuous behavior, politics, etc. are intertwined with each other and there is a close relationship between them. All kinds of social activities and behaviours of people can only be healthy with virtuous management. (Çağrıç, 2006: 171; Adıgüzel 2018: 109). In *el Medînetü'l-Fâzıla*, Fârâbî designs a social order that takes the order created by Allah as an example. Unless a similar hierarchical structure in its ontological order is established in the state, a virtuous society cannot be created. The rationalist character of his philosophy also manifests itself in his understanding of morality. Because attaining moral virtues is not possible with bodily behaviours alone. At the same time, physical behavior should be supported through the mind. (Çağrıç, 2006: 172). Fârâbî's mental virtues are metaphysical knowledge that must be obtained in essence. The knowledge of Allah as the supreme being is important. Because all other beings have received their virtues and competencies from Allah. Knowing how and what kinds of virtues and competencies other beings receive from Allah is also a mental virtue. (Çağrıç, 2006: 172). According to al Farabi, man also receives his virtues and competencies from Him. In this case, mental virtue also includes the knowledge of one's own competence and virtue. This is what is called wisdom. Wisdom breeds happiness, and understanding is the path that leads to happiness. By walking on this path, man becomes the

highest and most valuable of the beings in the world (Çağrıç, 2006: 172). According to Fârâbî, a relationship between the active mind and the human can be established, by reaching the superior knowledge through the mind. Establishing a relationship with the active mind is the highest goal. Because in this way, unchanging and superior information is obtained. On the other hand, man can attain intellectual and moral virtues only in a society. But at the same time, a political system must be established, just like the unity of harmony and aptitudes in a body. (Adıgüzel 2018: 110) al Farabi believes in the integrity of metaphysics, politics and morality.

The concept of “politics” is one of the key concepts in Fârâbî’s system of thought. There is a parallelism between God governing the universe and the head of state governing his country and people, or the spirit governing the entire existence of man. As a matter of fact, the philosopher dealt with morality as a part of the science of politics and mentioned the metaphysical hierarchical order before the state administration in his work called *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla*. Al Farabi also stipulated that in order to achieve happiness other than mental and philosophical competence, one should get rid of his passions. (Çağrıç, 2006: 173). According to Fârâbî, human is a social being. Therefore, the morality of the people living in the society is his primary goal. Because he was interested in the morality of the people living in the state. According to him, thanks to politics, people can acquire the competence, which is the purpose of creation, and learn virtues and vices. Politics deals with what they are, their sources, how they come about and how they can be known, etc. provides. Therefore, the science of politics, which Fârâbî considers political, humane and civilised, is also a moral science. (Çağrıç, 2006: 174-175).

According to Fârâbî, societies are divided into two as competent and non-competent in terms of their common values. Those who are competent are again divided into three parts among themselves.

- 1) The greatest (Competent) unity: It is the unity of all communities, or the universal unity.
- 2) The union formed by a nation, which is the middle political union.
- 3) They are small associations formed by people living in cities or similar settlements.

Al-Farabi, who divided the incompetent communities into three groups, stated that they were the people of the town, the people of the neighbourhood and

the people of the house. According to Fârâbî, good and evil are optional. Man achieves happiness by his own will. But for this, there is also a need for a large political union to create the appropriate and necessary conditions. The smallest political union necessary to achieve happiness is the city. Societies that have not achieved this unity cannot become competent and cannot develop. (Çağrı, 2006: 177). Al-Farabi states that the values adopted at the universal level are the highest virtues. Then the virtues are ranked according to the level they are adopted in a hierarchical order. (Adıgüzel 2018: 111).

We should also mention the existence of Confucius, who lived 1400 years before al Farabi, and the thought that society would improve with political morality. According to him, a state led by ideal people should have a well-organised structure in order to be able to follow the people. In order for such a state to emerge, a moral and political unity must be established. (Kalkir 2018: 100).

Virtus et Felicitas, or the Virtue-Happiness Dichotomy in al Farabi's View of Ethics: Path to Virtue and Happiness

Education and habits play a major role in Fârâbî's understanding of morality, since human beings are created at an equal distance from good and evil. First of all, since morality is a science about behavior, it is learned by doing and living. In order to be moral, it is necessary to adopt good and beautiful behaviours, that is, virtues, and make them a habit. In this way, human happiness can be in question. It is necessary to make serious efforts to acquire virtuous behaviours that will lead to happiness and to protect them after gaining them. In line with Aristotle's thought system, Fârâbî defines virtue as a moderate, balanced behavior that is far from the two extremes called excess. Al-Farabi considers these virtues in four categories, i.e. theoretical, intellectual, moral and practical:

1. Theoretical virtues consist of all the theoretical branches of science, starting from the innate and explicit types of knowledge that are innate in man, and knowledge about Allah, the last and highest principle of existence, and other beings. Al-Farabi defines the opposite of a virtuous society as an ignorant society, since it takes correct knowledge as the basis of theoretical virtues. In other words, knowledge is a fundamental factor for the happiness of both the individual and the society. However, Al-Farabi does not see theoretical virtues alone as sufficient to achieve true

happiness. Real happiness is possible with other virtues besides theoretical virtues, namely intellectual, moral and practical virtues.

2. Intellectual virtues are the effort of thinking power to search for what is most beneficial for the individual and the nation. Accordingly, qualities such as wisdom, intelligence, and understanding are virtues of ideas. In addition, the activities of researching and revealing the useful and beautiful in art and practical life are always the product of intellectual virtues. Without intellectual virtues, theoretical virtues and their aims are meaningless. Since the emergence and development of intellectual virtue is through education, they need experience and time. According to him, intellectual virtues should be found especially in politicians and moralists. Al-Farabi does not think that intellectual virtues are sufficient to reach real happiness as well as theoretical virtues. In order for a person to realize moral qualities, he must have moral virtues as well as theoretical and intellectual virtues. Accordingly, the intellectual virtues of a person who does not have moral virtues are not right intellectual virtues.
3. Moral virtues are people's aiming at the good, the right and the beautiful in their wilful behavior, away from all kinds of extremes. Virtues related to desire, such as valor, chastity, generosity, and justice, fall into this category. The effect of custom and habit is great in the formation of these virtues. For this reason, moral virtues, like intellectual virtues, are acquired through education and training, that is, through human effort. In other words, if the habits acquired by repetition of behaviours together with education and training in a person are in a good direction, virtues emerge, and if they are in a bad direction, disgraces emerge.
4. Artistic virtues mean that people grow up well in that field by developing their tendencies towards various arts and professions. Fârâbî says that encouragement, competition and coercion are necessary for the development of virtues in this field. The reason he thinks so is that he sees practical virtues as a kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge and the virtue corresponding to it make people happy. According to Fârâbî, the source of the practical virtues is the practical mind. The practical mind, which is related to action and art, brings the field of art and its virtues. Theoretical and practical virtues are the source of happiness for both the individual and the society. Fârâbî establishes a close connection between the virtues that he classifies as theoretical, intellectual, moral and practical, and observes an organization and hierarchy within themselves. According

to this, intellectual virtues are subject to theoretical virtues, moral acts and actions cannot be performed by the individual and society without knowing the ontological structures of beings. Moral and practical virtues also depend on intellectual and theoretical virtues. Because the determination of good and evil, the acquisition of skills and dexterity related to action and art is possible with knowledge. (Coşar 2018: 55-56).

Man has been created in need of many things for perfection and attaining the highest perfection. It is impossible for man alone to procure all these things. In order to reach Kemal, the human has been given the potential. The use of this potential is possible only when other individuals come together and do some of the things that are needed. Unless people help each other and help and solidarity become social and organised, there can be no human perfection and happiness. For this reason, people have kept different parts of the earth as a place and established a nation and a state, which differ in their degree of perfection. Fârâbî divides societies into three as large, medium and small in terms of the degree of perfection.

If the existence occurs in a hierarchical order starting from God, the first Principle, and continuing with the metaphysical entities that emerge from it, up to the substance at the bottom, it emerges in a similar structure in societies. Accordingly, there is a structuring in the form of a principle that is first, then other principles that follow, the citizens of the city that follow them, and then the people of the city who are at a lower level. As al Farabi says the first principle, he also says the first chief, the first president, the real philosopher, the prophet, the imam, the legislator and the king. According to him, this person is the person who is at the highest level of humanity and at the highest level of happiness. Considering the human being, the greatest good and the ultimate perfection can only be achieved through city life. His ideal city, hence the ideal administration and society, is called *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla*, that is, the “Virtue City” (Fahri, 2004: 115-123; Çağrıçı, 2014: 187-198).

According to Fârâbî, our abilities that lead to moral virtues are acquired through practice. For example, if a person has a tendency to waste due to his nature, he can learn not to waste by acting sparingly. But this time, it is necessary to act with reason and thought in order not to fall into stinginess. One should not confuse aggression with bravery, waste with generosity, ridicule with humour, flattery with love, and hypocrisy with humility. Because human nature likes things that give pleasure and can see it as a goal. (Çağrıçı, 2006:

181). Al-Farabi thinks that human faculties, which are the source of good and bad behaviours, can be trained but cannot be completely eliminated. There is also a difference between people's predisposition to moral education. Also, the virtuous person is not the same as the person who suppresses his ego. A virtuous person is one who does good because he loves it and takes pleasure in it. The one who suppresses his ego does not take pleasure in it, even if he does good. (Adıgüzel 2018: 111). In order for virtuous behaviours to make people happy, Al-al Farabi stipulates that these behaviours should be done willingly, willingly and constantly. Behaviours that a person does by chance and because of coercion, and sometimes do and sometimes do not do, are good for him, but they cannot lead to happiness. (Adıgüzel 2018: 112). Al-Farabi thinks that people's ability to act, the spiritual abilities on which these actions are based, and the power of appeal in the human mind are innately given to them. But man has the ability to use them with his own will and choice. According to him, no human being can be created only with the ability to perform certain behaviours. Every person has the power and ability to do opposite behaviours. Therefore, moral virtues are acquired through acquisition. In other words, it is possible for a person to use his ability that enables him to do good behavior to bad behavior by his own will, and vice versa. Just as arts and professions can be acquired through education, moral virtues can be acquired through education. (Çağrııcı, 2006: 184).

Al Fârâbî states that people need a teacher and trainer for moral education. While theoretical virtues can be acquired through teaching, practical virtues and arts are acquired through education. Teaching uses persuasion and is verbal, while training is both verbal and practical. Fârâbî states that it is necessary to adopt persuasion, love and gentleness as a principle in education, but the method of coercion can also be used for people who have difficulty in directing their disposition to virtuous behavior. According to Fârâbî, there are three types of educators. These are the head of state, the head of the family, and the teacher or trainer. (Çağrııcı, 2006: 186; Adıgüzel 2018: 112).

Conclusion

The realisation of philosophical knowledge in Islamic thought is dependent on the adequate level of moral equipment. Therefore, it has been accepted that the wisdom for the truth of things can be bestowed on virtuous people. Accordingly, it is not possible for a person to be wise unless he has a pure morality and does not want wisdom for the sake of rank, fame, fame and wealth, but because of wisdom itself. (Cengiz 2018: 28).

The main idea of Fârâbî's philosophy is based on metaphysics, ethics and politics. Al Farabi's moral theory is not independent of metaphysics and politics. Fârâbî's main aim is the happiness of man. Happiness, on the other hand, is the good that is demanded for itself and not for anything else. Politics, then, aims to investigate how people can be happy and to realize it. Because, according to Fârâbî, human is a social being by nature. Living in family and community life is not only an inherent result of its existence, but also a necessity of happiness towards which it naturally turns (Coşar 2018: 52).

Al Fârâbî took into account the social relations in morality and revealed that social substitution of morality would be possible in societies that pursued clean politics. As such, the way to reach the highest good and the most advanced competence passes through the virtuous city. Proper development and maturation cannot be possible without the formation of a virtuous city. Accordingly, attaining happiness in the world depends on the benevolent activities of individuals in the society, which involve a large number of people. In this thought, the political leader is a moral model for the whole society.

Al Farabi, like Confucius, argued that morality is a guide to politics and the public. Although each of them lived in different times and geographies, according to both philosophers, morality is the guiding principle about how both rulers and people should behave. If this principle is not adhered to, neither the rulers nor the people can find the right way. When the rulers adopt the moral principles and rule the country accordingly, the people will follow their path by taking them as an example. Thus, virtuous cities will be formed.

Al Fârâbî insisted that the abilities that lead to moral virtues would be acquired through practice. For this, he underlines the awe that education is a must.

To sum up, in the tradition of classical moral philosophy, starting with Socrates and continuing with Plato, Aristotle, al Farabi, Avicenna and Kinalizade, "the principle of evaluating behavior according to its consequences" dominates. According to this principle, the moral value of the behavior is determined by the result of that behavior. The way of the mind is one and it is possible to say that these thinkers met at a common point, even though they lived in different geographies at different times. It is possible to argue that the main point that distinguishes a significant part of Islamic philosophers from others is that the center of morality is in the heart, and it is possible to say that they were also under the influence of the lore (spiritual / mystical) tradition of the religion they belonged to.

Al Farabi's work named *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla* is accepted as the basis of political philosophy. It is possible to evaluate this valuable work, which he has shaped with a fine mental work by adhering to the main character of Islam, as a social moral book. He directed his heart to God, his mind and mind to knowledge and the world. In other words, with the approach of philosophers, Al Farabi was not only under the influence of Greek philosophy, on the contrary, he turned his mind to the whole world at that point of knowledge. This is just the point where Confucius's philosophy of politics merged with social ethics.

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CHAPTER VI

AVICENNA'S THEORY OF SOCIAL ETHICS

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Introduction

Ethics has been an important phenomenon in both individual and social reality throughout history. Due to its importance in organizing interpersonal relations, it maintains its characteristic of being a need in social life. Ethics, with both its universal and local dimensions, is also the subject of sociological research. Because ethics has always existed with its individual as well as social dimensions. In the history of philosophy from antiquity to the present day, moral philosophy (ethics) has tried to understand moral action by focusing on the good or the highest good, right action and freedom of will. Moral philosophy has been formed around the questions of what will, action and choice are (Özlem 2004, 33). Such questions continue to be topical today.

Ethics in the social sense comes to the fore especially in interpersonal relations. Since the existence of the other determines the existence of ethics, it is important how ethics positions its value-centered relationship with the other. The way it emphasizes being moral in terms of objective and instrumental aspects is very important for human beings, who are moral beings, to live ethics (Karaköse

2012, 169). In this sense, a number of differences have been encountered in texts on ethics throughout history. The Islamic philosophical tradition has also dealt with ethics in parallel to the ancient Greek philosophy it inherited. Although there are opinions about the scarcity of detached works on ethics, Muslims, when writing works in any field of Islamic sciences, have always mentioned the relationship between this science and ethics (Deniz 2014, 20). Similarly, Avicenna, one of the most important figures of Islamic philosophy, did not write a separate book on ethics, but he touched upon ethical issues in different works and developed an ethical philosophy. Although his understanding of ethics seems to be a continuation of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and al-Farabi, his views on the practical dimensions of ethics reveal a social understanding of ethics. In this sense, this study, which deals with Avicenna's views on ethics, aims to evaluate both his views on society and his theory of virtues on a social level.

Avicenna's Understanding of Ethics

Throughout his life of fifty-seven years, which was full of adventure, excitement, and extremely serious dangers, Avicenna, as the most important philosopher and scientist who grew up in the classical period of the Islamic world, wrote numerous works in fields such as logic, natural philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, theology, and music. While his works carry the tradition of his predecessors, they also contain his own original ideas. In this respect, he is a system philosopher who succeeded in creating more comprehensive works than any other Muslim thinker before him, and who managed to have a justified impact on Eastern and Western thought (Carney, 1983: 167-169). First of all, he had a holistic perspective that dealt with and contributed to all philosophical problems of his time. For he not only worked in the fields of ontology, epistemology and ethics, which are the basic subjects of philosophy, but also conducted research on politics, psychology, logic, motion, light and music. When his works are evaluated within this versatility, it is seen that a significant part of Avicenna's philosophical works are related to Aristotle's teaching (Topdemir 2009, 19-20). However, he reevaluated the philosophical heritage he inherited from an Islamic perspective and brought it to the agenda of the world of thought. Although Islamic philosophers' treatment of ethical issues was significantly influenced by Greek philosophy, this does not mean that the problems that Greek and Islamic thinkers, who grew up in two different traditions, dealt with were the same. A major difference is Avicenna's view that belief in a single and absolute creator is

necessary for the realization of theoretical and practical perfection as an ethical goal (M. S. Aydın 1984, 117).

Although he wrote detached works in many fields of philosophy, he did not write detached works on ethics (except for one or two small treatises) (Durusoy 2022). Avicenna mostly expressed his views on ethics by referring to the relationship of this science with ethics while writing in any field. In this sense, Avicenna tried to treat the subject of ethics piece by piece within his entire system rather than creating a separate moral philosophy (Saruhan 2009, 122; Davis, 2008: 375-404). Avicenna's understanding of ethics is basically goal-oriented (teleological). According to this view, the theory of value is established first, and the theory of moral obligation is built upon it (M. S. Aydın 1984, 118). In this sense, ethics in Avicenna is primarily a metaphysical subject. For this reason, he sees moral philosophy as related to and complementary to metaphysics, and therefore ethics comes after metaphysics (Durusoy 2022).

In Avicenna's goal-driven ethics, the goal is happiness both in this world and in the hereafter. While true happiness is the happiness in the hereafter, there is also the vulgar happiness that belongs to this world, which is the happiness that arises from the pleasures obtained by the submission of the practical intellect to the desires arising from the animal soul. However, according to him, true happiness is to get rid of the mental and behavioral contradictions of this worldly life as much as possible. Mental and behavioral contradictions are possible only by eliminating the excesses in one's soul and actions (Deniz 2014, 21). For true happiness, the practical sphere of the soul must be reformed and the forces in the animal soul must submit to the practical intellect (Metaphysics, Theology, 142). Because, while the practical intellect forms the basis of Avicenna's moral philosophy, if this intellect dominates the other forces of the body, good ethics emerges, otherwise bad ethics emerges.

The faculties of the human soul have their own pleasure and goodness, and their own pain and evil. For example, the pleasure and goodness of lust is that an appropriate affective quality from the five senses reaches it; the pleasure of anger is victory; the pleasure of estimation is hope; and the pleasure of the faculty of memory is remembering the appropriate things of the past. The torment of each of these faculties is that which is contrary to it. All the faculties are in some way united in the fact that being conscious of its conformity and harmony is its inherent goodness and pleasure. What is compatible with each of them is the occurrence of perfection according to it (Avicenna 2016, 139-40).

According to Avicenna, who states that the faculty of reason can realize its full perfection when the soul is separated from the body, this perfection is the elimination of unconsciousness and the tasting of a type of pleasure that is not sensory or animal. This pleasure is a pleasure that in any way resembles the pleasant state characteristic of purely living substances. It is superior and more honorable than any kind of pleasure. According to Avicenna, this is true happiness, and the other is misery. This misery will not be realized for each and every one of the imperfect human beings. On the contrary, it is realized for those who have given the faculty of reason “the desire for its perfection”. This is when it is proved to them that the soul’s characteristic is the acquisition of the unknown from the known and the realization of the essence of everything by becoming actually perfected (Avicenna 2016, 141).

According to Avicenna, moral philosophy only gives the form of moral knowledge; when it comes to content, the existence of a religion based on revelation is necessary (Durusoy 2022). The most important among his dichotomic conceptualizations of ethics are the concepts of good and evil. According to him, evil is necessary and a necessity of the lack of contingent beings. In this sense, it is impossible to envision a world without evil. However, he considers the incidental as evil, not good. Absolute evil is out of the question, because if there were absolute evil, it would encompass the whole being, and non-existence would be realized (Durusoy 2022).

Virtues as a Source of Social Ethics

In Avicenna’s thought, ethics is considered together with politics and family management within the framework of practical sciences. Avicenna points to the difference between theoretical and practical: *The theoretical sciences are the sciences in which we demand to perfect the theoretical power of the soul through the emergence of the actual intellect. This is realized through the formation of knowledge of concepts and propositions about things that are not our deeds and states in terms of their own being. Therefore, the goal of theoretical knowledge is the formation of a thought and belief that is not related to the nature of an action or the nature of the principle of an action in terms of being the principle of an action. Practical science, on the other hand, is the science in which, firstly, the perfection of the theoretical power is demanded through the formation of knowledge of concepts and propositions about the things that are our deeds in themselves, and secondly, the perfection of the practical power through ethics* (Avicenna 2016, 4), and thus deals with ethics at the practical level rather than

at the theoretical level, as mentioned earlier. In this respect, practical wisdom reveals the social level of Avicenna's moral thought.

Avicenna, like Plato, Aristotle and al-Farabi, believes that ethics is acquired later. According to him, human beings perform good or bad actions because of their inherent characteristics. If a person cannot acquire an ethics, he can acquire ethics with this power in his nature. If this person has bad morals, he can improve his morals with this power. If he has good morals, he can worsen his morals with this power (Doğan 2009, 117). In this sense, the natural structure of human beings is created in a way that allows them to do good and evil. In this sense, he considers ethics as changeable through education and environmental influences. The view that ethics can be acquired and changed through education and environment opens an important space for social reality in Avicenna's understanding of ethics. Although he does not elaborate on his views on the social origins of ethics, the importance of education and environment in Avicenna's understanding of ethics appears in his understanding of "custom". According to him, both good and bad morals can be acquired through custom. Therefore, the good or bad morals we acquire are the customs we acquire from other people. For this reason, if we take the behaviors of people with good morals from the beginning and turn them into customs, we will gain good morals. Similarly, the social environment is also seen as an important factor in moral development with the example of political figures (Doğan 2009, 118).

Avicenna put forward his views on social life by observing the society in which he lived. In this respect, he developed an approach that envisaged practice rather than being purely theoretical. Especially his duties in state administration must have played a role in following this path. His practical experiences differed from the theoretical thoughts of philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and al-Farabi (Dodurgalı 1994, 124). Considering the pessimistic interpretations that the social order was disordered, moral problems were widespread, and the social structure was crumbling (Dodurgalı 1994, 124), Avicenna's emphasis on the development of individual virtues can also be evaluated as aimed at the establishment of social order. For he tried to build his philosophy on the human being and his soul, its nature and working mechanism, rather than on the problems of nature and the universe. Here, he considered the social reality in which he lived as a determining factor in his education, since he saw the individual as a being in social life rather than a psychological being alone.

Avicenna considers the necessity of social life primarily on the basis of meeting basic human needs and the social division of labor:

Now we say that, as is well known, man differs from other living beings in not being able to make a good living when he is a solitary individual who undertakes to run his business without a partner to help him with his necessities. He has to become sufficient with another fellow human being, and his fellow human being has to become sufficient with him and his like. Thus, one produces wheat for the other, the other makes sieves for the other, one sews for the other, the other produces needles for the other. Thus, when they come together, their work becomes sufficient. This is why people have to form cities and societies (Avicenna 2016, 146).

Thus, the individuals who make up the division of labor need both to build a social life together and to become the same by establishing different ties between each other:

Those who do not act wisely in establishing their city in accordance with the conditions of the city and are content with merely forming a community with their fellow human beings give the impression that they are a genus that resembles humans from afar and lacks the competencies of humans. Nevertheless, such people should live together and resemble the city dwellers (Avicenna 2016, 146).

The division of labor, which is completed by the establishment of social relations, must be realized in such a way as to prevent the members of society from being idle. In his social order, all individuals must be connected to each other in some way and contribute to the continuity of society. Avicenna, who emphasizes that people must cooperate in order to live together, sees the concepts of law and justice as necessary for the continuity of social relations. This requires a legislator and a just ruler. Otherwise, he states that people will disagree and begin to accept what is in favor of each as justice and what is against each as oppression (Avicenna 2016, 146).

He thinks that the social world should be established and protected within the framework of certain laws and rules. In order to ensure this and to create a common idea of justice, he considers the existence of a prophet to convey the divine rules to people necessary. For this reason, he considers the prophet,

who establishes laws regulating social life, as the authority to determine social values. Social life after the prophet can only continue with the existence of certain values (virtues); otherwise, one cannot speak of a civilized and social way of life (Dodurgalı 1994, 127). In this sense, for Avicenna, social virtues are seen as essential needs. Avicenna's ethical system also prioritizes individual and social virtues. These virtues express a set of practices that are considered as the equivalent of practical wisdom and at the same time correspond to both individual and social reality. Before moving on to these virtues, it is necessary to take a brief look at the institutions of politics and family, which appear as other dimensions of Avicenna's understanding of social ethics.

Avicenna constructs society as an organized and regular structure. In his thought, the individuals of society must contribute to its continuity through work, labor, and art. According to him, idleness and trying to provide social benefit without doing any work when one has the power should be prohibited. At the same time, obtaining property or transferring property and benefits to others in violation of the social order (such as gambling, interest, theft, pickpocketing) or practicing arts and professions that have these characteristics should also be prohibited (Dodurgalı 1994, 129-30). These are considered to be attitudes that disrupt social order because they undermine the division of labor and social relations. Therefore, in a society, earnings should be made through *work*, *labor* or *art*, and thus the individual should be a useful member of society. This is an outcome that must be achieved not only through individual moral development, but also through the preventive laws of the legislator. In addition, the political institution, as the legislator, should establish deterrent punishments to prevent those who break the law. These punishments should be deterrent, especially for unlawful acts such as adultery, theft, and betrayal of society, which lead to the disruption of social order (Avicenna 2016, 151). According to Avicenna, the political institution, as a legislator, should determine laws that basically lead to justice in morals and customs. Justice, in the sense of being in the middle (*tavassut*), should be applied in morals and customs in two ways:

- (a) The laws in which the dominance of the powers is broken are especially for the purification of the soul, its gaining a sovereign structure (over the animal powers), and its being freed from the body in a pure way; (b) The laws involving the use of these powers are for worldly benefits; the use of pleasures is for the survival of the body and progeny; and bravery is for the survival of the city (Avicenna 2016, 151).

Avicenna argues that social institutions should be protected and all attitudes and behaviors that harm these institutions should be prevented. Developing a similar attitude towards the family as the basic social institution, Avicenna is of the view that any act that undermines the foundation of the family should be prohibited. With his words,

“Acts such as adultery and homosexuality, which, if permitted, would lead to the opposite of the principles that form the basis of the city’s structure, should be prohibited. Because homosexuality leads to the abandonment of marriage, which is the most important constitutive element of the city.” (Avicenna 2016, 151).

he expresses the sociological truth that homosexuality and adultery fundamentally shake first the institution of the family and then the life of society as a whole. Thus, he also expresses the sociological truth that the family is the constitutive element of social reality. Avicenna, like al-Farabi and other Islamic philosophers, sees politics as the application of moral rules at the social level (M. Aydın 2014, 553). Avicenna, who defends the view that both the development of certain moral attitudes and the balanced construction of legal regulations are necessary for the healthy establishment and continuation of social life, also argues that crimes committed against society should be effectively combated.

Like Aristotle, he defines ethics as “*a faculty that enables certain actions to emerge easily from the soul without the precedence of an idea*” (M. Aydın 2014, 152). In this sense, the moral person first imitates the moral principles prevalent in the life of the society in which he was born and raised, and then, as his knowledge and experience increase, he thinks about these principles and consciously puts them into practice in his life. These principles *become “internalized”* in his being, a term frequently used in moral philosophy (M. Aydın 2014, 552). To put it sociologically, moral virtues, which are objectified in social reality, continue to be internalized and reproduced by individuals over time after they take place in the individual’s world through socialization.

Avicenna’s understanding of the moral virtues was to some extent informed by both Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato and Islamic philosophers such as al-Kindi and al-Farabi (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 7). At this point, Avicenna, continuing the Aristotelian tradition, defines virtue as the middle between *ifrat* (excess) and *tefrit* (understatement). Only with the realization of this middle path can one commit good acts without difficulty. Avicenna divides virtues into

four: *chastity*, *chivalry*, (*practical*) *wisdom*, and *justice*. Chastity arises from the moderation of the power of desire, chivalry from the moderation of the power of anger, and practical wisdom from the proper use of these two powers. Justice is realized when these three virtues exist together (M. Aydın 2014, 553). It is possible to find these virtues in the basic sources of Islam. These virtues are mentioned in various ways both in the Holy Qur'an and in the Prophet's hadiths. As a result of this emphasis, these virtues have gained general acceptance in the understanding of ethics and have always been included in the works on the subject (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 8).

These four virtues, which Avicenna takes as the basis of his ethics, also have dimensions that concern both the individual and social life. Depending on these virtues, other virtues are also mentioned in Avicenna's various works that include the practical dimension of his ethical philosophy in an uncluttered structure. In this framework, in Avicenna's treatises, there are also examples of good morals such as contentment, generosity, valor, patience, humility, truthfulness, resourcefulness, fidelity, mercy, compassion, courage, ambition, keeping good covenants, and modesty. At the same time, some immoral attitudes such as worry, revenge, envy, shame and disgrace, immorality, cowardice, and *rezilet* (demerit) are also mentioned (Doğan 2009). In this sense, he framed practical wisdom on the axis of *fazilet* (virtue) and *rezilet* (demerit) within the ethical system.

Among the four basic virtues, chastity is considered as a moral virtue that provides self-control of the individual in order not to indulge in sensual pleasures more than necessary (İ. H. Aydın, 2008, 10.) According to Avicenna, chastity is a virtue that will be formed by finding the middle way by balancing correctly and experiencing these pleasures as much as necessary and finding the middle way and with the right thinking, not to go excessive in things such as eating, drinking, having sexual intercourse, which are among the sensual lusts. The virtues of "generosity" and "austerity" emerge with the determined reflection of this virtue in life (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 11).

On the other hand, bravery is the moderation of the power of anger (wrath) of the soul, and it is accepted as the perfection of the moral struggle against the vicious desires of the soul, showing the virtue of courage when necessary (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 14). Avicenna similarly evaluated courage and defined it as a virtue and anger, as the opposite of courage, as a vice (disgrace) (Avicenna 2016, 96). In general, the virtue of chivalry, which can be considered as courage and valor for the survival of society, has sub-virtues such as fortitude, gentleness, patience,

and endurance. The logical consequence of this virtue, which is of central importance among the virtues envisioned by Avicenna in his ethical thought, is to think of the good of other people, to approach them with love and respect, to prevent vices, and to show oneself sincerely in actions aimed at reforming them (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 15). From this perspective, the virtue of chivalry is not only an individual moral act. At the same time, it is a reflection of the responsibility that must be shown for the survival of the society in which one lives. In his thought, chivalry, like the virtue of chastity, constitutes a dimension of practical wisdom to ensure the continuity of the social structure. As a legislator, the political institution should strive to establish this ethics in individuals and to achieve worldly benefits, but only with the spread of chastity and chivalry in society will the social order be able to survive. His words

“... The laws involving the use of these powers are for the worldly good; the use of pleasures is for the survival of the body and progeny; and valor is for the survival of the city.” (Avicenna 2016, 151).

express this fact. On the other hand, Avicenna, while emphasizing the need to balance sensual pleasures, does not take his attitude to the point of a strict asceticism. Because, as a human reality, it is against the human nature to give up pleasure and pain completely. In this case, the best attitude in terms of human moral life is to prevent the excesses of lust and anger. According to him, when the powers of lust and anger are used in a balanced way, they become good and useful along with the virtues of chastity and chivalry. Because in the realm of becoming and decay, as seen in his statement above, the continuity of species, not individuals, is essential, and divine grace has made the power of lust necessary for the continuation of the individual and the generation through reproduction and nutrition, and anger for the protection of the individual and society through defense (Durusoy 2022).

In his thought, practical wisdom emerges with the balanced use of these two virtues in their proper places. Avicenna, who defines wisdom as “*the perfection of the soul by conceiving and affirming the theoretical and practical truths to the extent of human power*” considers politics, household management, and ethics as the parts of practical wisdom (M. Aydın 2014, 543). Considered as a virtue of the power of thinking, “wisdom” is defined as the virtue of distinguishing between good and evil. The more comprehensive meaning of this concept is closely related to virtuous living. Wisdom requires people

to live a life in harmony with the world and society in which they live and to perform their actions with the determination of knowledge. In this sense, wisdom is a combination of knowledge and action (İ. H. Aydın 2008, 15). It involves balancing and managing sensory-based virtues such as chastity and chivalry with the power of reason. For Avicenna, who emphasizes that chastity and chivalry must be acquired for the realization of practical wisdom on the human plane, these virtues must become a habit and gain continuity.

Avicenna states that “*the head of virtues is chastity, wisdom, and chivalry. The sum of these is justice*” (Avicenna 2016, 152), indicating that the virtue of “justice” will come into being with the integration of chastity, chivalry, and wisdom as the basic virtues. Justice, which is realized with all these virtues, ensures the realization of happiness at both individual and social levels. From Plato and Aristotle to the present day, justice has been generally accepted as a main virtue in the sense of giving everyone what is appropriate and what they deserve. Both in terms of individual ethics and social aspects, Avicenna used justice in the sense of being balanced/moderate (*tawassut*). In this sense, justice is the soul’s being in the middle between opposite dispositions (*ethics*). In other words, it is the middle point (balance) between what the soul desires and what it does not desire, what it wraths and what it does not wrath, what it wants and what it does not want (Deniz 2014, 234). According to Avicenna, achieving a balance between opposite dispositions to ensure justice will ensure justice as a basic virtue and ensure happiness in this world in the individual sense. In social terms, justice appears as an indispensable virtue for the continuity of social life. Just as finding the middle way in the individual moral plane is accepted as a means of achieving moral virtues and thus happiness, social ethics is evaluated for the purpose of creating a balanced structure in the social plane where justice is manifested.

Conclusion

Avicenna, who evaluates human reasoning in the context of the theoretical (*nazari*) and practical (*ameli*) dichotomy, emphasizes that theoretical thought can be achieved through certain intellectual activities, whereas he considers practical reason and practical wisdom as the result of its competence as necessary for ensuring happiness in the world. Although he is of the view that true happiness cannot be fully achieved in this world, he sees the construction and continuity of social order as a kind of worldly happiness. In this respect, the moral system that we encounter as practical wisdom in Avicenna’s thought contains a systematic

that corresponds to the social world. Considering Avicenna's emphasis on the necessity of practical competence along with theoretical competence, which he sees as the advanced stage of human development, the continuity of the social moral system is seen as very important in terms of ensuring human development.

In his thought, ethics is largely acquired later, that is, in social reality. Therefore, society has a duty to develop its individuals morally. As the authority of the laws necessary for the fulfillment of this duty, the prophet, and thus religion, occupies a central position in his understanding of ethics. He is of the view that an understanding of ethics centered on the principles laid down by God is the source of happiness both in this world and in the hereafter. With these views, Avicenna became the carrier of Islamic culture along with the philosophical tradition he followed. As a philosopher, Avicenna, who dealt with ethics within the framework of a number of virtues, exhibited a social constructivist perspective while evaluating the virtues of chastity, chivalry, wisdom, and justice in the practical dimension, and related the practical dimensions of ethics to social life in many respects. Along with these central virtues, many of the virtues he mentioned and his explanations about social life support the view that his views on ethics are based on society. As mentioned earlier, although he did not write an independent work of ethics, his idea of practical wisdom, which he expressed as a part of human development/competence, was largely aimed at the construction and continuity of social institutions and the ordering of interpersonal relations.

Avicenna not only summarized almost the entire history of thought with his moral theory, but also became the carrier of Islamic thought. He reminded how important the relationship between the individual-ethics-society is with his stance defending the society while drawing attention to attitudes and behaviors that contain non-virtue encountered in all ages, including his own era. In this respect, Avicenna's understanding of ethics preserves its relevance in terms of both drawing attention to the attitudes that shake the foundation of social institutions and linking the continuation of society to the existence of common moral values.

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CHAPTER VII

KINDI'S SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS WORK NAMED 'WAYS TO GET RID OF SADNESS'

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There is little information in the sources about the life of Abu Yusuf Yakup Ishaq al-Kindi. The information is almost the same. According to this information, as can be understood from his tag, he was born in Kufa, about the year 185/796, in a family of aristocrats from the famous Kinde tribe of South Arabia. Kindi lost her father when she was young. Considering the period where he lived in, it is given that he took lessons such as basic religious knowledge, language and literature, arithmetic and the Quran.

He started his education life in Basra and completed it in Baghdad, which was the scientific and cultural center of his time. Especially in Kufe and Basra, where he spent his childhood years, the institutionalization of nahiv schools enabled him to mature in the field of language and literature. In the same period, due to the independent formation of the science of theology in the hands of Mutezile, we can say that he gained his first mental discipline in the field of dialectics in Basra.

He studied medicine, logic, calculus, philosophy, geometry, music, astronomy and other sciences from the famous scholars of the time in Baghdad. Due to his competence in science and philosophy, he was invited to the palace by the Caliph Mu'tasim-Billah, and a library was opened in his name and he was assigned for the special education of his son Ahmet. Kindi, who has a good command of Greek and Persian languages, has made many translations from these languages too. During the reign of Khalifa Me'mun (813-833), he took an active role in the translation activities carried out with the support of the state.

Kindi, who witnessed the period of Khalifa Mutawakkil Al'lah, was not respected like the previous khalifas. The previous khalifas have formalized the views of the Mutezile, but the Khalifah Mutawakkil Al'lah adopted the view of Ahl as-Sunnah as a policy. This caused Kindi to fall out of favor and leave the palace. Although there is no any definite information about the Kindi in classical sources, according to the accepted view, he died in 866 due to chronic rheumatic diseases. (Mahmut Kaya, "Kindi, Yakub b. Isaac":41).

The most notable of the few information about Kindi's personality is a rumor that he is a stingy person. In addition, Kindi is mostly known for his scientific identity too. In the sources, Kindi is referred to as "Feylesufu'l-Arab". Transplantation and mental sciences are systematized in Islamic societies, the translations has made into Arabic from the science, thought and cultural products of foreign nations reached the most productive level in Beytu'l-Hikme. Kindi, who lived in the III (XI) century, when the speculations in the field of theology and philosophy continued, and the struggles between various religions and sects continued, was the first Islamic philosopher who participated in the studies and discussions in this field at the highest level and made the transition from theology to philosophy with the method he applied and the terminology he used. Kindi also was known as Alchindus in Medieval Europe and has translated many works into Latin language too.

Kindi is the first philosopher in the history of Islamic thought who philosophically investigated and substantiated the nature and functions of the soul, methods and methods of purification, and its state after death. He was also the first Peripatetic(Meşşai) philosopher to discuss morality as a philosophical problem by going beyond religious understanding. Kindi wrote and presented 4 books about morality, as "Risale Fi'l Ahlak", "Et-Tenbih Ala'l Fedail", "Risale Fi Teshili Fi Subuli'l Feza'il" and "Risale Fi'l Hile Def'il Ahzan" in his life. The book of Def'il Ahzan, which is our subject, has reached the present day. (Osman Aldemir: 16-17).

Morality occupies an important place both in religious texts and in Islamic culture and civilization. The science of morality deals with finding happiness and getting rid of unhappiness by eliminating the causes that interfere with happiness. Morality (ethics/value) is one of the basic concepts that exists only for humans in the realm of beings. (Hamdi Kiziler, 3).

Social life is a great necessity for a human. Because man is a social being, he must live in society. We can say that social morality is a set of contracts necessary for the survival of society. (Ahmet Chaglayan:16).

Within the framework of social morality, Islamic moralists explained the need for life as a society as a whole, the need for a political order, the elements of an ideal government, the characteristics of rulers, their virtues, the characteristics of the governed and their duties. According to Islamic morality, people base society on moral perfection only by their ability to live with other people. Each person needs each other, and people should establish good relations with each other. Human nature is based on other people. (Recep Kaymakcan, Hasan Meydan:133).

Sadness is a condition that people do not want and wears out. It is most reasonable to try to keep the sadness short. Everything in the world is temporary. Sadness will come to an end somehow. When a person thinks that sadness is somehow temporary, he will find peace and be relieved. According to Kindi, one way to get rid of sadness is to remember how we got rid of things that caused sadness in the past, how others saved us from this sadness, we compare the sadness and comforting moments of each situation in the new sadness that we fall into and we learn a lesson from this and console ourselves. In addition, sadness becomes a blessing for us as an experience.

There is no cure for pain whose causes are unknown. In order for remedies to be discovered and used easily, it is necessary to clarify what sadness is and its causes. Sadness (el-hüzn) is a mental (emotional) pain arising from the loss of loved ones or failure to fulfill one's plans. Thus, the cause of the sadness is revealed. After Kindi describes the sadness, he divides the sadness into two. It happens either because of what we do ourselves, or because of the work done by someone other than us. If sadness occurs as a result of our actions, then we should not avoid these behaviors. If we do not do this, we will be cruel to ourselves. The second of the reasons that make us sad, if we are saddened by the actions of others, let's think in two ways:

- Firstly, it may be in our power to prevent and not give in to someone's sad behavior;
- Secondly, we may not have such an opportunity. If we cannot influence it and somehow get rid of it, we can get rid of sadness by making an effort. If it is not in our hands, then we need not be sad before the sad event happened.

Because such an event may never happen. It is possible that such an event will not occur. Or what we think will upset us may not upset us. If we fall into error

before sadness comes to us, we will be sad in vain. Many negative thoughts, delusions and obsessions created by people in their minds make people's lives unbearable. People with delusions commit the greatest cruelty to themselves with their own hands and complicate the life of those around them. They transmit these negative thoughts to the people who around them. When delusions are prevented, a healthy person and a healthy society are formed.(Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:50-51). According to Kindi, happiness is not what is loved and desired emotionally, but what is loved and desired mentally. According to him, real pleasure is spiritual pleasure, which is achieved not by temporary worldly feelings, but by the purification of the soul from desires. (Cengiz Maden:110).

Kindi talks about the need to comprehend the facts of life with the help of the mind. It says that a person is not able to realize all his desires, and if he succeeds, he will not be able to keep him in his hands all the time. Because, together with the universe, man is also in a constant change. Therefore, it is in a constant state of formation and decay. By using their mind well, the human should acquire good habits that do not change and make them a habit. Sense feelings and pleasures are transitory, and what we can achieve by using our mental faculties belongs only to us. We don't get frustrated when we don't get just what we need and what no one can touch, what really belongs to us, or when it's not there. Sometimes, no matter what a person does, people can get upset for reasons beyond of their control. Thinking that everything in the world is temporary, one should remember that sadness is also temporary. If anyone is addicted to sadness, he/she will have wronged at himself/herself. One should be careful that this is not permanent, and make an effort to get rid of it. Kindi paid attention to individual turmoil in society, and wanted people to help each other improve and has wanted to stress the moral solidarity.

As another way of overcoming the kind of sadness, he says that people in the world are not only sad but it should be kept in mind that everyone is sad in some way. As an example, he mentions the letter that King Alexander of Macedon, Philipus' son, sent to his mother at the time of his death:

He asks his mother, to organize a party as soon as when she receives the news about his death in a letter. He wants people who have never experienced sadness or grief in their lives to come to this entertainment as a condition. However, no one participates in this entertainment. Then it becomes clear that everyone in the world has experienced distress and sorrow in one way or another. Sadness is not unique to a person or to itself. He is relieved when he thinks that every person living in the world is disturbed in one way or another, and they try

to cope with their problems. It also shows how socially people can be united in adversity. Sadness will go away in anyway.

If we want to not be in trouble, then we don't want to exist. Troubles or troubles come from spoiling things that are perishable. Nature exists in continuous creation and is in a state of flux of becoming and decay. As a necessity of nature, formation and deterioration are afflicted by human beings. Taking all these into consideration, the human is prepared for anything with this awareness. The spirit of people and the psychology of society become stronger and stronger with this pre-acceptance.

In all desires that lead to loss, there is unhappiness, in temporary ones there is pain and sadness, in the hope of the impossible there is sadness and longing, and at the end of all security there is fear. The person who feels fear is confused and incapable of being rational. If a person keeps his soul busy with things that do not belong to his own existence, his eternal life will be destroyed and his life in this world will be a problem for him. Kindi gives the following example to explain this situation in the best way:

A group of people embark on a cruise to go to their hometown. As the voyage continues, the captain of the ship stops on an island to meet the needs of the passengers. Everyone on the ship goes out to satisfy their needs, some people return to the ship after meeting their needs, but not interested in anything, and they sit in the most beautiful, comfortable and spacious parts of the ship. The second group of people admired the beauties of the island, which appeared in all its glory, and, knowing that nothing could be bought except for their needs, and that is why, they returned to the ship and settled themselves in wide and convenient places. When they returned to the ship as the servants of the things they had brought, they had to take shelter in a narrow and troublesome place because the ship's wide parts were full. In addition, the situation became even more troublesome, as the materials they brought with them were spoiled and took up a lot of space. The deterioration in the quality of the things they bought made them anxious, and they became even more upset when they disappeared.

Another group plunged into the beauty of the island, forgetting to satisfy their needs, and since they did not reach the ship in the allotted time, the ship sailed away, and these people remained on the island. These people, completely cut off from their homeland, faced terrible and deadly dangers in their place, almost many of them lost their lives, and the rest were ruined by their sadness.

In fact, this example is human life on earth. Humanity must not forget that this world is only a temporary stop. He must make an effort to return to

his homeland. Everything that people greedily desire to have in this world is a burden for a person. Their disappearance hurts people, and that's why people should only get what they need in this world. Anything too much hurts people in one way or another. From a social point of view, when everyone gets what he needs, many quarrels in society are prevented, people learn to respect each other and live in peace.

A person who wants to have less misfortune must reduce his external needs. (Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:83). The less a person has, the less attachment he has. According to Islam, being attached to nothing but Allah gives one happiness, peace and security. Kindi at that time, saw the reducing ties as salvation from sadness and wanted to prevent society from battering each other by clinging to something. Devotion to the property brings to the people a social catastrophe. And again, blind devotion to people draws society into imperceptible turmoil. When the mind is closed and attachments increase, it is possible that people will take advantage of each other in every way and sorrows will arise. These gets depressed in society.

Moral science is the characteristics that examine good and evil, determine and explain the behavior of people in relation to each other. Personal integrity is very necessary in moral characters.

Morality as a word means temperament, character and habit. In the conceptual dimension, this is behavior that a person with reason and will performs consciously, of his own free will, without coercion by others. Morality is habits that settle in the soul of a person, if good habits are established in a person, then his thoughts and actions will be good and good morals will be established in him. What a man sows with his habits, that he reaps. (Ahmet Çağlayan:32).

Ethics, which has an important place in values education, if it is ignored and abandoned, it causes depression in the society and creates moral defects. Moral education is the job of removing these flaws and replacing them with moral responsibilities. Kindi argues that the acquisition of good habits, even if it is difficult, shapes a person's character. Happiness is achieved with good morals. People who rejoice in such pleasures as food, drink, and marriage see their shortcomings as a disaster. For example, even if a gambler loses all of his property and is in great distress, he takes pleasure and joy from gambling. Everything that goes against this situation is trouble and deficiency according to him.

As an another example, even if a bandit knows that big trouble will befall him, he takes pleasure in hurting people. There are many such examples available.

In the same way, various groups of people welcome relationships that are in line with their own traditions, and consider as a scourge those that are contrary to their traditions. Thus it becomes clear that sensual likes and dislikes are not an integral part of nature, but are strongly dependent on practice. We should train our souls in the best way, so that this consolation and joy can become a habit and a character (Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:57). Our souls are our personality. Self-care is one of the most important elements for us. To heal our body, we use disturbing methods such as bitter medicines, diet, moxibustion. In order to heal our souls as well as our bodies, we must show that we can endure adversity and hardship. His soul must first become accustomed to work that is easy for him to do. Then, by getting used to something heavier and gradually training the soul, good habits are obtained. Thus, it will be easier to endure trouble.(Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:59-60).

For Kindi communities to live in peace and security, he explained very well that people can be disciplined through education. Gradualism in education, that is, to progress slowly and gradually, in other words, from concrete to abstract, from simple to complex and from easy to difficult, are the most important elements. Societies establish their own rules and then prepare the individual for life in society through gradual education. People who do not accept this education or become radicalized will be exposed to many difficulties. In addition, these wrong habits create wrong behavior patterns and judgments in us. Today, when individuality comes to the fore, social peace is achieved through moral education.

Kindi divides moral virtues into two, one belonging to the spirit and the other to behavior. He divided the virtues of the spirit into four parts: wisdom, will find, chastity and sobriety. These forces are very important in determining whether a person is happy or sad. According to Kindi, wisdom is a virtue resulting from the correct use of the power of thought. Unsystematic and unmanaged information is stacked and useless. However, when a wise person maintains a balance and order among this information, good results will be obtained. In order for the soul to mature, it is necessary to develop the faculty of reasoning and insight. As the ability to reason and discern develops, one achieves happiness and gains wisdom through wisdom.

Anger is a fundamental force for human survival and survival. However, when the power of anger is used carelessly, it causes great destruction. Controlling the emotion of anger is one of the doors that opens people to happiness. Kindi argues that the virtue of courage is formed by controlling the power of anger.

This virtue is also called bravery, valor and courage. If a person does not have courage, he will not be able to adequately respond to attacks on himself and his dignity and will fall into a position that damages his honor and dignity. If he abuses his anger, he will become a cruel or jealous person.

One of the most important elements of a person's life is to bring his own life into balance. This is done with the virtue of justice. The virtue of chastity arises from the use of lust, another power of the soul, through the faculty of the mind. Take what you need to take to train the body, is defined as their defense, acceptance and application, and not the commission of actions contrary to this. However, Kindi considered the virtue of chastity to be necessary for physical and mental health, and meant that people should be of excellent structure in terms of eating and drinking, physical health, and moral character. Thinking in this way, chastity protects a person from immorality. A society of chaste people will be happy and peaceful. When the soul leaves the body, it knows everything in the world. Nothing will be hidden from him. Efforts should be made to bring the human body to a perfect level for the Sufi demands of the body to be fulfilled in order to achieve perfection (Elif Akyol: 54-55).

Kindi attributes the moral (characteristic) difference of people to the movement of the planets and climate change. Planets are the direct cause of all kinds of destruction and extinction under the Moon. The nearness and distance of the celestial bodies from men are factors that change morality according to their ups and downs, their quick and slow movements, their assembly and separation, and the temperament that the body acquires at the time of fertilization. (Fatma Zehra Pattabanoğlu: 191). If the people's temperaments are taken into account when evaluating people, more productive results will be obtained. When it is desired to create good things in human morality, not every action will produce the same result for everyone. People should be treated according to their nature. It can be said that Kindi is one of the first philosophers who, for the first time in the Islamic world, philosophically approached the problem of sadness and fear of death and proposed psychological and moral ways to deal with these feelings. (Elif Akyol: 98).

Kindi also says that it is wrong for us to hate what is not bad and we should only hate what is bad. He gives as an example the fear of death and death. "It is generally thought that there is nothing worse than death. However, death is not bad, on the contrary, the fear of death is bad. Death is only a complement to our nature. Because if there were no death, there would certainly be no human beings." Man is defined as a rational and mortal being. The reason for this is

human ignorance of death and life. Kindi, who gave the example of sperm, would be upset if the food in the liver had a mind and was transferred to another place. If the food got to the cells and turned into sperm there, it would still be upset if it was thrown out of here into the uterus. If was asked to return to its old self after being placed in the womb, it would feel sorry for that too. Because the sperm will not want to return when it gets closer to the person. In the same way, he will be sad when he is taken out of the womb and born. But when it sees the comforts and beauties of the world, if it is again asked to return to the womb, it will not want this and this time will be more upset than all of them. This is what causes such pain and fear in those who are separated from him in the world. This is how the nafs, who are weak-minded and captivated by emotions, err. (Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları: 93,94).

When the fear of death is dealt with logically, people's lives become more normal and beautiful. Since people will be responsible for believing in a future life, they shape their behavior in accordance with the moral rules of society. It is explained that belief in the afterlife is the main factor in building a quality society. Kindi mentions that with the victory over the fear of death, people will live without worry and that the world will easily become a place of transition.

Kindi explains people's fear of death as passions arising from lack of intelligence, uncontrollable lust and anger. It is these feelings that enslave kings. These feelings are the most dangerous diseases of the soul. (Üzüntüden Kurtulmann Yolları: 101). The main task of man is to overcome these feelings and try to achieve real freedom and achieve the happiness of the two worlds. Today, people's problems with anger control and the inability to control their emotions are causing social frenzy. Kindi explained that one must restrain oneself and that this is the source of peace for the two worlds. When we grieve over a loss or financial loss, the following should come to mind: when we get that thing, we will be in sorrow when we lose it. When we think this way, the cause of our sorrow will be lessened, and when the distress is lessened, it will be the most beautiful blessing for man. A person who has lost what he has and is deprived of it must keep his mind from being preoccupied with losses, thinking about the mental and emotional benefits he has left behind. Thinking about what's left is a good consolation. (Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:70). A person who is not afraid of loss will also be calm. It is enough to be content with what you have and take comfort in what is left to be happy.

Everything that is in our hands, which is of common interest, is the trust of a Rightholder. The Rightholder (Owner) can take away his trust at any time

and give it to anyone. Even if he does not give it to whomever he wishes, that blessing does not have to be given to us again. This is what must happen. For this reason, we show disrespect and ingratitude for trust when we act as if we are grumbling or upset. Because, when we think of a blessing given as a trust as our own property, we would be unthankful to the creator. Another point to keep in mind is that Allah does not take the most valuable blessings He gives us, but rather the worthless ones. We should rejoice in the precious relics (nafs) and good habits which given us by him.(Üzüntüden Kurtulma Yolları:75). No one has the right to ask if the trustee gives the reward he wants to the one he wants. When a person acting with this thought thinks that some people in society have more certain things, or feels jealous, he decides that this is at the discretion of the *Creator*. Social anarchy is prevented when everyone agrees to be who he is.

In general, Kindi has explained the basic principles very well in order to protect the mood of the individual and the society accompanying him in his work. As far as we can see, it is clear that the prescriptions that were valid for society 1000 years ago are still valid today. The human's attachment to the world and exhausting himself for its sake is the greatest source of sadness. The deterioration of societies also depends on it. Kindi says that the virtues should be taken as the basis of human life. When we make virtue the center of our lives, fears and anxieties must be released, and its main purpose must not be forgotten. When a person gets to know himself better and uses his traits correctly, he or she will find their happiness. People seek happiness in temporary pleasures and for the sake of these pleasures they destroy themselves and society. However, we can say that happiness is an emotion that a person can achieve this with the mind and heart. More beneficial results will be obtained when awareness of the transience of happiness sought in pleasure is included in the educational system of our society. It can be said that this is the solution to the biggest problems with which our new generation, especially in recent times, distinguishes the difference between the virtual environment and the real environment and realizes the reality of life.

Kindi's basic moral vision philosophy is to draw the soul away from bodily desires and reach a level of perfection. The human mind has been created to understand this. This moral thought will affect a person's happiness and sadness. Achieving the moral maturity of a person is the correct use of the forces of his soul. When what is given to us is appreciated in the best way, a person gets rid of sadness and finds happiness and peace.

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CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL ETHICS APPROACH OF ABU'L-HASAN AL-KHARAQANI

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Introduction

Abu'l-Hasan al-Kharaqānî (d. 425/1033) took Bayezid-i Bistâmî (d. 234/848) as his model, who was born in Khorasan, grew up there and spent the rest of his life in Anatolia. Al-Kharaqānî, who dedicates his life to gaining Allah's approval, is a competent mystic who influenced those who came after him with his ideas. (Attâr, 2007: 30-150; Çiftçi, 2004: 29-49; Uludağ, 1997: 16/94; Kartal, 2015: 161-175). As a matter of fact, Sultans of heart, such as Yusuf Hemedânî (d. 535/1140), Ahmet Yesevî (d. 562/1166), Şems-i Tebrîzî (d. 645/1247), Mevlânâ Celaleddin er-Rûmî (d. 670/1271), Hacı Bektashi Veli (d. 670/1271) and Hacı Bayram-ı Veli (d. 833/1429) followed his teaching.

Al-Kharaqānî, he is an Islamic scholar who takes the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Quran as a reference, contributes to the introduction of Islam to Anatolia, the Balkans and India with his thoughts. And also, he has given advice to his students to do community-oriented studies, and attaches great importance to social ethics.

As a matter of fact, al-Kharaqānî's heart was full of God's love and people; "Whoever comes to this door, give his bread and do not ask for his name/belief. Because everyone who is worthy of carrying a soul in the lodge of Almighty God is certainly worthy of eating bread at the table of Abu'l-Hasan." (Çiftçi, 2004: 21). Ebu'l-Hasan al-Kharaqānî is also a religious scholar, who embraces all people with love, compassion and mercy, regardless of language, religion, race, color and other sects.

In this study, al-Kharaqānī's understanding of social ethics is discussed. As a result of our research, it has been determined that there has been no other study on al-Kharaqānī's "social moral understanding" before, and this book chapter has been prepared in order to introduce this model personality to the country and world public opinion.

Morality is defined as the whole of innate or acquired good or bad attitudes and behaviors. Morality is also a person's willingness to do good deeds for a purpose and to stay away from evil. In other words, morality is all of the "willed behaviors" that cause people to be qualified as moral or immoral.

The source of morality is not "reason" but religion. As a matter of fact, Mehmet Akif Ersoy criticizes those who seek a source for morality other than religion and rejects the secular moral conception. Also Akif Ersoy says that, it is inevitable for societies where there is no belief in Allah to experience moral collapse in the long run. Muhyiddin İbnü'l-Arabî (d. 638/1240) also likens religion and morality to "twin brothers suckling milk from the same breast". According to him, religion and morality are so intertwined that it is impossible to consider them separately (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2008: 98). According to Ibn Arabî, "morality is the reflected religion in practice" (İbnü'l-Arabî, ts. 37).

Social morality, on the other hand, is the set of rules that regulate people's behavior in society and their relations with each other. The areas in which social moral principles are valid include "dimensions of social morality". For example, "family ethics, social ethics, political ethics, duty ethics, professional ethics, business ethics, science ethics, discussion ethics, environmental ethics, media ethics, sports ethics, corporate ethics, etc." are some of the dimensions of social morality. Social morality exists in every society as a necessity of social life. But, the moral understanding of societies is different from each other. Which behaviors are good and which are bad are learned in the family environment, educational institutions or social environment. The aim of social ethics is to establish an environment of trust in human relations, to ensure that people live in peace and tranquility, to increase the number of honest, reliable, fair, virtuous, merciful, faithful, hardworking, self-sacrificing, respectful and harmonious individuals in society. Because individuals and societies can only survive and make long-term plans by relying on each other. Living together can be possible by "complying with social moral rules". Societies where there is no any social morality are always in danger of corruption, decay and civil war. In this respect, social morality is the insurance of societies. In other words, social morality is like the cement that holds the individuals in the society together.

The source of Islamic morality is the Qur'an and its prophetic interpretation, the sound sunnah. The morality of the Prophet is the morality of the Qur'an. The principles of these two sources are pious (who is aware of their responsibilities), muhsin (who does what he does perfectly), muslih (who has a fighting spirit), salih (who displays honest and virtuous behavior), muhlis (who is sincere in his servitude), mu'min (who has the unhesitating Supreme Almighty) forms the basis of al-Harakani's understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, he emphasized the importance of social morality while educating his minions, raised them as beneficial individuals to the society, and set an example for his environment by acting in accordance with what he said.

In this study, al-Kharaqānî's understanding of social ethics has been examined under ten different titles, giving examples of his wise words he said to both his students and those who came to his lodge.

Al-Harakāni was the Owner of Taqwa

One of the dimensions of social ethics is undoubtedly duty ethics. Taqwa has an important place in al-Kharaqānî's understanding of social ethics. For, taqwa means "to be conscious of his responsibilities to God, to himself, to all people and to all creatures, and to do all the duties ordered by Islam". Al-Kharaqānî, as a believer who is always aware of these duties and responsibilities, and who has awareness, sensitivity and sensitivity, adhered to the orders of God and said, "In Paradise, under a thorn tree in this place called the world, rather than being unaware of God under the Tuba tree. (But) I desire much more to be with him (to feel him in all my soul, to follow and obey his orders, to do deeds that will win his approval!)" (Attar, 2007: 603-604) said. Apart from this, al-Kharaqānî has always drawn attention to the importance of knowing Him in the worldly life, being conscious of your responsibilities towards Him, fulfilling His orders and prohibitions, in short, doing His servitude properly.

Al-Kharaqānî; "Taking one breath with God (thinking about His majesty) is better (beneficial) than everything in the whole earth and sky" (Attar, 2007: 627), "When you think you cannot understand, talk to the Truth (the God), not with the people. Read the Quran! Pray to Him and remember Him constantly.). Because The God is worthy of being seen, loved, admired, addressed, and listened to" (Attar, 2007: 620). Al-Kharaqānî also emphasized the importance of reading the last holy book sent by Almighty Allah, trying to understand it, and acting in accordance with its principles throughout life. Al-Kharaqānî, to those who came to his lodge; "You must die and be resurrected a thousand times a day

in order to attain an immortal life!” (Attar, 2007: 627), he drew up the attention to taqwa. For this reason, he recommended that every believer consciously know God, himself, other people and all living things (environment, plants and animals), adorn his morals, engage in his own self-criticism, and continue his active struggle in the world and also obtain the approval of God. In short, al-Kharaqānī fulfilled the requirements of taqwa, one of the most mentioned concepts in the Qur’an, made an effort to deepen in servitude, was aware of his social responsibilities, and tried to train students who would be beneficial to all humanity.

Al-Harakāni was Honest and Trustworthy in his Human Relationships

Another dimension of social morality is to be honest and reliable in social relations. Honesty and honesty are extremely important in al-Kharaqānī’s understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, “There are many who have a dress. However, the heart requires truth. What’s the use of the dress? If one could be a man by wearing sackcloth and eating barley, donkeys would have to be human too” (Attâr, 2007: 628), and drew attention to the fact that a moral believer should be truthful and reliable. Al-Kharaqānī; “Allah has not bestowed anything on His servant greater than a pure heart (which has succeeded in purification) and a correct tongue (who always speaks the truth and remembers Almighty God)” (Attar, 2007: 628) while saying the following, al-Kharaqānī emphasized the importance of honesty and truthfulness.

Al-Harakāni was Far from Insincerity and Showing Off

One of the dimensions of social morality is to be sincere in human relations and to abandon hypocrisy and showing off. There is no place for showing off in al-Kharaqānī’s understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, the first condition of being a servant to Almighty God is sincerity, and worship done to show off to others has no value in the eyes of God. In this respect, murshids especially emphasize sincerity while they raising of their followers. Al-Kharaqānī also told his followers about performing worship sincerely: “Continue to work so that sincerity will emerge. And continue with sincerity so that the light (ihsan/ serving God as if you see) will emerge. When the light appears, you worship as if you are seeing Allah” (Çiftçi, 2004: 136).

Al-Kharaqānī; “I did not see my deeds as sincere, unless I saw myself as a creature on my own” (Attar, 2007: 603). And also, he stated that he worshiped

more sincerely when he did not pay attention to the praise of those around him, that he avoided showing off and hypocrisy, that he had no expectations from anyone, and that he did not need people's praise. As a matter of fact, al-Kharaqānī; "Everything you do for the sake of Allah (for the sake of Allah) is sincere, everything you do for the people (to see and know) is hypocrisy" (Attar, 2007: 627), "The best thing is the heart in which there is no evil (hypocrisy, showing off, etc.)." (Attar, 2007: 635). al-Kharaqānī here drew the main attention to the importance of abandoning the show. Because those who do what they do for the applause of people, not with the intention of gaining Gods approval, are hypocrites. The cure for hypocrisy is sincerity; Sincerity, on the other hand, is to demand only Allah's consent in every word and deed done. In short, al-Kharaqānī wanted a moral believer to stay away from showing off, not to expect praise from people, and to be honest, virtuous, fair and just towards everyone.

Al-Harakāni was Compassionate and Compassionate to the Creatures

Another dimension of social morality is to be compassionate and compassionate towards people. The importance of love, compassion and mercy is great in al-Kharaqānī's understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, he by saying; "A person who does not have mercy towards beings (all creatures) cannot carry the love of God in his heart" (Harakani, 2004: 247), he advised to love every creature in the universe without expecting anything in return and to treat them well. Because an individual who truly internalizes empathy values people of different beliefs and views, abandons discrimination, bigotry and bigotry, and conquers people's hearts by exhibiting behaviors that will be taken as an example by everyone. With this word, al-Kharaqānī has showed the value which he gave to people and asked his students to be like that.

Another time, al-Kharaqānī revealed the immense compassion and mercy he had for the creatures with the following words: "The Great Allah gave me such an idea (a vast tolerance and empathy/sympathy ability achieved as a result of solid and unshakable faith and surrender) that I saw all of his creatures in it; (thanks to this thought now I looked upon all creatures with a sense of compassion); his preoccupation engulfed me day and night, (I got deep into this idea) and this idea (over time) turned into prudence; (Later) it has turned into arrogance (to an extreme, almost worshipful love for The great God and all humanity) and affection; (Later) it turned into majesty and dignity; with that idea, I grasped in His oneness (much better) and reached such a level that (this)

idea turned into wisdom (the ability to deepen in the method of drawing correct judgments from the Qur'an and Sunnah/the ability to analyze events with their causes and consequences). And (then) it turned into a straight path (being on the right path) and a state of compassion for the people (unrequited love). (On top of that) I have never seen anyone more compassionate than myself towards his people (all creatures he created)." (Attâr, 2007: 606), "I wish I had died instead of all the people, so that the people did not have to taste the pain of death. I wish all the people (The God) would ask me to account so that the people would not have to give an account on the Day of Judgment. (Attâr, 2007: 606; Çiftçi, 2004: 21).

With his sincere wishes and wishes, al-Kharaqānî has revealed that he has compassion and mercy for all people in the world, regardless of language, religion, race or color. It is a fact that what makes al-Kharaqānî so full of love, compassion and mercy is his sincere devotion to the principles of the Qur'an and the authentic Sunnah, his understanding and assimilation of these two sources, and his application in his life by waiting for his reward from Almighty God.

Al-Harakāni was Modest and Tolerant

One of the dimensions of social morality is to be humble and tolerant towards people. Humility and tolerance are of great importance in al-Kharaqānî's understanding of social ethics. As reported: while al-Kharaqānî was sending the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud (d. 421/1030), who had completed his visit to him, he got up and sent him off to the door, and Mahmud, who was very surprised by this situation, said: 'You didn't compliment when you first came, but now you stand up So what was it? What is this treat?' But al-Kharaqānî says: When you came first, for the pride of the sultanate and to test us, now you are leaving with a state of discontent and a dervish state, and the sun of the dervish state began to shine on you. But now I stand up because you are a dervish (recognizing your weakness in front of Allah, deciding to be humble and starting to behave like that" (Attâr, 2007: 599). With this word of al-Kharaqānî; "The special servants of Rahman, they walk on the earth with humility and dignity, and whenever malicious, narrow-minded people insult them (only) salute-salam they say" (el-Furkân 25/63) and he referred to his verse by saying, and advised his students to be modest and dignified, and to walk with humility while walking. As a matter of fact, al-Kharaqānî behaved in accordance with this verse throughout his life, was smiling, humble and tolerant towards people, and never gave up his kindness.

Al-Harakāni was Far from Envy, Arrogance and Self-Conceit

One of the dimensions of social morality is not to look down on people and not to belittle them. For this reason, there is no place for bad traits such as despising others, ostracizing, self-admiration, envy, and jealousy in al-Kharaqānī's understanding of social ethics. Indeed, he once said: "(O human!) If a fire splashes on your clothes from your tandoor, you immediately try to extinguish it. (It is) how can you find a fire that will burn your religion (deeds), that is, the fire of arrogance, envy and hypocrisy in your heart (and you do not make any effort to extinguish this fire? Is this what will happen?)" (Kharaqānī, 1997: 42-43); "The best thing is the heart in which there is no evil (arrogance, envy, grudge, jealousy, etc.)" (Attār, 2007: 635), he drew attention to the bad features in question. As can be seen, al-Kharaqānī said that a moral believer should avoid bad traits such as arrogance, arrogance, envy, jealousy, grudge, selfishness.

Al-Harakāni Never Hurt Anyone

One of the dimensions of social morality is not to offend or upset people and to get along with them. As a matter of fact, there is no room for upsetting and hurting others in al-Kharaqānī's understanding of social ethics. Al-Kharaqānī; "A person who goes from morning to evening without hurting a believer will be as if he lived with the Prophet that day until the evening. If it hurts a believer, God does not accept his worship that day" (Attar, 2007: 628), and drew attention to the importance of establishing good relations with people, not breaking anyone's heart, and treating everyone well. Another time al-Kharaqānī; "People are three groups. One gets hurt when you don't hurt, the other hurts if you hurt. Third, it doesn't hurt even if it hurts" (Attār, 2007: 631), he advised a moral believer to forgive the mistakes of both his religious brothers and other people, to endure the troubles that may come from them, not to hurt them even if they are hurt, and to ignore their small faults.

Al-Harakāni Encouraged Working and Producing

Another dimension of social morality is not to be a burden to people by being lazy, to work and produce, to eat the labor of your hands. Working and not being a burden to others is the greatest virtue in al-Kharaqānī's understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, he stated that a moral believer should work and pursue halal earnings as follows: "Take as much of the knowledge as you

need. Do as much as the Shariah asks of you from worship. But what you really need is this: Be in a duty that people are pleased with from morning to night! (Do things that benefit people and pursue halal earnings! Be hardworking and honest! Give justice to your work!)” (Attâr, 2007: 625-626), “The most halal of blessings, with your own effort (with your sweat) is what you earn” (Çiftçi, 2004: 35).

Al-Kharaqānî; He also advised his students to work and produce, and not to be a burden to anyone, by saying, “Unless the work takes away from them (until death comes to them), the gentry will never relinquish their work (duties and responsibilities)” (Attâr, 2007: 629). As can be seen, with these words, al-Kharaqānî has criticized ignorant devotees and ascetics who were sluggish, consuming without producing, advocating the understanding of “one bite, one cardigan”, and making a living off people’s backs by making “poor prophetic literature”. Because al-Kharaqānî, never found it right to wrap a turban, to wear a robe, to suffice with certain evrâd-ü ezkar, to engage in individual vain prayers, and to withdraw from the world. Thus, al-Kharaqānî vehemently rejected the crippled understanding of Sufism (monachism/myticism) and struggled with such false Sufis and pretentious religious people throughout his life.

Al-Harakāni Would Make Unrequited Sacrifice

One of the dimensions of social morality is to help people financially and morally without expecting anything in return. For this reason, generosity and self-sacrifice are of great importance in al-Kharaqānî’s understanding of social ethics. As a matter of fact, al-Kharaqānî responded to the advice request of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, who came to visit him, as follows: “Pay attention to these four things: Beware of sins, pray in congregation, be generous, and show compassion to God’s creations!” (Attâr, 2007: 598-599). With these words, al-Kharaqānî has reminded Sultan Mahmud of generosity, which is a very important advice of the Qur’an (Yusuf 12/88; en-Nahl 16/90; al-Hadid 57/11, 18). As a matter of fact, generosity and benevolence are among the most important moral values advocated by al-Kharaqānî.

On the other hand, al-Kharaqānî narrated the following story to explain to his students in which deeds the consent of God is and the importance of helping the needy: “There were two brothers and their mother. Every night (on watch), one of the brothers would be busy with the service of the mother and the other in the service of God (in vain worship). The brother, who was busy in the service of God, was pleased to serve his Lord: ‘Tonight, too, renounce my right to serve

God for me (you take care of our mother, I will continue to worship)” he said. His brother also accepted this offer. The brother, who loves to worship very much, put his head in prostration in the way of serving God that night and had a dream. A voice (in his dream): “We forgave your brother, and we forgave you also for his sake.” He: “But I was in the service of God, but he in the service of the mother; are you forgiving me because of his deed?”, he said. Sound: “Yes like that; Because we don’t need the job you do, but your mother definitely needs the service your brother does.” (Attâr, 2007: 600). Al-Kharaqānî, while accepting the importance of worship, he considered helping needy people without expecting anything in return, more important than worships such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and Umrah.

This situation shows how he understands altruism, one of the dimensions of social morality. As can be seen, al-Kharaqānî trained and raised awareness of his students and followers about serving people in need. In this respect, al-Kharaqānî did not consider only individual worship to be sufficient, he was in favor of individual and society-oriented studies, and suggested that rooted, permanent and sustainable activities should be carried out to solve the problems of society and humanity.

Al-Harakāni Sought Solutions to Social Problems

Another dimension of social morality is to seek solutions to social and global problems faced by people. It is important to find solutions to people’s problems in al-Kharaqānî’s understanding of social ethics.

As a matter of fact, al-Kharaqānî; “For two years my mind was stuck on an idea (a difficult issue) (I kept contemplating it.). Before that idea disappeared from me (without finding a solution for it), not a drop of sleep entered my eyes. Do you think this road is easy?” (Attâr, 2007: 607), he revealed that he worries about the problems of Muslims, spends sleepless nights, and seeks solutions to these problems. Al-Kharaqānî asked his students to be conscious and sensitive towards Allah at every moment of their lives, to place Islam at the center of their lives and to seek solutions to social problems, and he set an example for his followers by acting in accordance with what he said.

As a result, al-Kharaqānî always sought the consent of Allah in all his words and actions, gave importance to social morality, and trained his devotees as moral believers. He also advised his students to represent and convey the religion of Allah, Islam, correctly, and to struggle with their lives and property for this cause.

Conclusion

Ebu'l-Hasan al-Kharaqānî is a great Turkish-Islamic scholar who takes the principles of the Quran and authentic sunnah as his guide.

As a believer with responsibility, awareness, sensitivity and sensitivity, al-Kharaqānî set an example for his environment and instilled honesty and honesty in his students.

al-Kharaqānî was conscious of his duties towards God, himself, all people and creatures, and he tried to do justice to these duties throughout his life.

al-Kharaqānî never broke away from social life, was not engaged in purely vain worship, and continued to deal with people's problems.

al-Kharaqānî the human being created by the God, treated plants, animals and the environment with love, compassion and mercy and never mistreated any living thing.

al-Kharaqānî did good to everyone and advised his students to do good not only to believers but also to all people and to win their hearts.

al-Kharaqānî kept his promises, he instilled confidence around him in his human relations, so much so that even members of other religions and beliefs appreciated his honesty.

al-Kharaqānî has always been sincere, well-intentioned and tolerant towards people, got on well with everyone, did not break, upset or hurt anyone's heart.

al-Kharaqānî expecting his reward from the God, provided material and moral assistance to the needy.

al-Kharaqānî has avoided bad traits such as hatred, envy, pride, arrogance, envy, selfishness, self-conceit and hypocrisy.

al-Kharaqānî has advised those around him to work and produce, to pursue halal earnings and not to be a burden to anyone.

As a result, people both in Turkey and all over the world they have a lot to learn from al-Kharaqānî's ideas and understanding of social ethics. The most important of these are undoubtedly reliability, truthfulness, honesty, compassion and self-sacrifice.

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CHAPTER IX

EVIL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AVERROESⁱ

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Introduction

Averroes evaluates the issue of evil with different techniques and methods according to the context of his works. In this sense, in his works *al-Kashf*[’] and *al-Darūrī fi al-Siyāsa*, he discusses the issue on the theological level and tries to construct his philosophical arguments about evil on the basis of the views of theologians, especially Ash’arite theologians; in his *Commentary on Metaphysics*, he emphasizes the philosophical level, albeit for a small part according to the content of the book, and in his work *al-Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, he discusses the issue in a few passages. Although Averroes’ confrontation with Ash’arite theologians in his discussion of the issue -due to his ignorance of the views of the Mu’tazilite theologians-(Averroes, 2012: 158, 258)ⁱⁱ; brings with it some awkwardness as a philosopher, the fact that the Ash’arite theological movement, which expresses controversial views on many issues in terms of the arguments it puts forward, was dominant in the Islamic world at that time in a way that affected the whole philosophical thought, is enough to justify Averroes (Hourani, 2015: 109).ⁱⁱⁱ

In this sense, Averroes’ handling of the issue at the theological level and his struggle with al-Ghazālī, the representative of Ash’arite thought, as seen in his work *al-Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, can be considered as an indicator of his desire to eliminate the dominance of Ash’arite thought in general. As a result, Averroes evaluated the issue on a religious-philosophical level through the Ash’arites in general terms.

In terms of methodology, our study will follow a method from the religious/theological level to the philosophical level. Because Averroes' evaluations in the religious/scholarly-philosophical framework have a certain complexity and ambiguity since they are not handled in a holistic approach in the context of his works. In this context, in the first place, Averroes' views on evil will be analyzed within the framework of the concepts of good, evil, and relativism with a synthesizing approach in the religious/scholarly-philosophical context. This is because theoretical evaluations without identifying Averroes' basic approaches to the concepts of good and evil will be incomplete and inadequate.

Averroes' way of positing good and evil in terms of the sensible cosmos is important in this context and reveals his philosophical notion of the subject beyond the religious/theological-philosophical level. In our study, the issues of *hidāyah* and misguidance in relation to evil in the religious/theological context will be discussed, and then the issue will be discussed in the philosophical context within the framework of ontology, phenomenology, *ināyah*, and matter. This is because a conceptual study seems to be a more consistent method in terms of appealing to Ibn Rushd's views on evil.

The independent studies we have identified on the subject are Fatih Algül's master's thesis titled "The Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Averroes" (Algül, 2013) and George Fadlo Hourani's article titled "Averroes' Views on Good and Evil" translated into Turkish by Müfit Selim Saruhan (Hourani, 2015). While Algül discusses Averroes' views on evil in the context of types of evil and theodicy within the discipline of philosophy of religion, Hourani evaluates them within the framework of value and moral theories.

Positioning of the Concepts of Good and Evil in the Philosophy of Averroes

Since evil is valid in the realm of the sensible cosmos, Averroes did not mention beings that are "inherently good" and "inherently evil" in the realms of rational existence beyond the sensible cosmos. In his work *al-Kashf*, Averroes evaluated the issue of evil on the axis of the concepts of oppression and justice and harshly criticized those who interpreted the issue outside the texts of the Shari'ah and those who made him say what the Shari'ah did not say, especially the Ash'arites. According to him, the Ash'arites have made explanations on this issue that are contrary to reason and the Shari'ah. One of the main points that Ibn Rushd criticizes the Ash'arites for regarding oppression and justice is the justification based on the comparison of the absentee-witness (God-human) (Averroes, 2012:

247, 248)^{iv} which the scholars of Andalusia, including Ibn Hazm himself, have generally rejected since Ibn Hazm.

(Câbirî, 2000: 329, 330; Câbirî, 1999: 665). Accordingly, it is not an acceptable approach that, in the dialectic of the *gaib-shahid*, the *gaib* is fully characterized by justice while the *shahid* is potentially characterized by justice and injustice. Averroes objected to the following proposition emerging from this theoretical approach:

The fact that the *shahid* is characterized by justice and injustice is due to the state of restraint (*hajr*) imposed by the *Shari'ah* on its actions. In this case, an act that can be called justice and injustice cannot be mentioned about the One (God) who is neither liable nor restricted in the *Shari'ah*. In fact, all of His actions are just (Averroes, 2012: 249).

Averroes, opposing the positioning of justice and oppression, and even good and evil, with such an argument, also opposed the statement, “There is no such thing as good in this world, nor is there anything that is evil.” He said that if such a view is taken, there would be no such thing as “good per se” and “evil per se” in this world, and that this view is absurd. For, according to Averroes, it is self-evident that justice is good in this world, just as it is self-evident that injustice is evil. Accordingly, in the phenomenological world, there is a concept of “good” that is exclusive to itself, as well as a concept of “evil” that is exclusive to itself. Good is good because it has the quality of good, and evil is evil because it has the quality of evil (Averroes, 2012: 249). To summarize, according to Averroes, everything that leads to the goal is good and beautiful, and everything that prevents the goal from being achieved is evil and ugly. This is what is understood from the *Sharī'ah*, especially the Islamic *Sharī'ah* (Averroes, 2011: 139).

As Averroes expressed in his *ad-Darūri fi's-Siyāse*, the attributes that exist in the sensible cosmos, such as good and evil, beneficial and harmful, and beautiful and ugly, are not subjective attributes that are determined after the fact (*bi'l-wad'*). They are objective qualifications determined naturally (*bi't-tab'*) (Averroes, 2011: 139; Leaman, 1998: 154; Hourani, 2015: 108). For example, justice is good in all cases and oppression is evil in all cases. It is not possible for justice to be evil and oppression to be good. Likewise, polytheism is intrinsically evil; it is not bad in the sense that the text of the *Shari'ah/shari'ah nāṣa* makes it ugly. However, when we look at the Ash'arite approach from Averroes' perspective, if the text of the *Sharia* had characterized *shirk* as good, then *shirk*, which is bad, would have been acknowledged as good. Such an approach, on

the other hand, is contrary to the essence of the Sharia text, reason, and logic (Averroes, 2012: 249, 250). This is because shirk is inherently and essentially evil. Therefore, in Averroes' philosophy, although the criteria set by the Shari'ah are taken as a measure, especially in the matter of evil, it is seen that the issue is interpreted in a holistic sense within the general purposes of the Shari'ah and the balance of reason and revelation, and only in this way can the truth be revealed (Averroes, 2017: 149)^v.

From this point of view, it is understood that in Ash'arite thought, which Averroes positions himself in opposition to, there is no judgment on whether something is intrinsically good or bad in both ontological and phenomenological frameworks. The subject and authority that determines good and evil and forms the sentence of judgment in this regard is the text of the Shari'ah itself. What the text considers good is good and what it considers ugly is evil. The basic motto of this approach is to evaluate things within the framework of the meaning attributed to them by the text rather than subjecting them to an intrinsic evaluation (Averroes, 2012: 249). Since God has no relation with things whose nature is intrinsic, the possibility of everything being good or bad is determined by His will. Therefore, there is no good in itself and no evil in itself; therefore, everything is determined not *bi't-tab'* but *bi'l-wad'* (Averroes, 2011: 139).

In fact, for Averroes, what the text of the Shari'ah says is good is good and what it says is bad is bad. However, the Shari'ah text considers what is good to be good because it is itself good, and what is bad to be ugly because it is itself bad. In this sense, there is no tension between the text/nass and the reasonable. Both complement each other. On the other hand, in the Ash'arite approach, as mentioned above, there is always the possibility of evaluating what is theoretically good in the text as bad and what is bad as good. This cannot be objected to. In fact, when good is made bad and bad is made good in the context of the text, this is not outside of justice. This is where Averroes objects. According to him, something is considered good by the Shari'ah because it is intrinsically good, and something is considered bad by the Shari'ah because it is intrinsically bad (Averroes, 2012: 158).^{vi}

This approach of the Ash'arite school is problematic in many respects, as well as in terms of ontology, and it brings with it many philosophical problems in establishing God's goodness. For example, the above-mentioned statement "...In this case, there cannot be an act that can be called justice or cruelty about the One (God) who is neither liable nor limited in terms of evil. Rather, all his actions are justice" (Averroes, 2012: 249). In terms of this sentence, it is

possible to infer from this statement that “God’s being good is not because he is good in itself, but because he is not in a position that requires limitation due to his being the sender of the text.” Accordingly, God’s being purely just and free from injustice is due to the fact that He is purely just in essence and does not say anything about justice and injustice in order to limit them. In another sense, this approach also means - albeit controversially - that God is completely just (Averroes, 2012: 254)^{vii}. Human beings, on the other hand, are characterized by justice and cruelty because they are subject to limitation (Averroes, 2012: 249). To summarize, within the semantic meaning of the passage, limitation corresponds to goodness and evil, whereas unrestricting corresponds to goodness and justice in its entirety.

Good, Evil and Relativism

In his work *al-Darūri fi al-Siyāsa*, Averroes states that there are generally two views on the cause of evil. One of them is the view that “God is the cause of both good and evil” and the other is the view that “and the other view is that “God is the Absolute Good; He cannot be the cause of evil in any state of affairs.” While making such explanations, Averroes, in the continuation of the passage - without emphasizing the name *al-Ash’arī* - also mentioned the theologians’ view that “Nothing good or evil can be conceived of Allah (swt); on the contrary, all His actions are good” and stated that this view is an absurd statement similar to the Sophists’ statement (Averroes, 2011: 54, 55). For if this were the case, there would be no such thing as good and evil in and of themselves; everything would have become good and evil *bi’l-wad’* in a post-determined way. However, as far as can be understood from the passage, Averroes’ main emphasis is that both good and evil have a nature of their own. Good is good because it is good, and evil is evil because it is evil. This is because the first view, which Averroes prefers, necessitates such an approach.

In his *Commentary on Metaphysics*, Averroes evaluated the issue from a different perspective and strongly opposed the statement “His (God’s) actions cannot be characterized by cruelty; on the contrary, the connection of good and evil with Him is one.” He said that this view is similar to Protagoras’ view. (Averroes, 2017: 148, 149). Although Averroes emphasizes the Sophistaeans in general in *al-Darūri fi’ al-Siyāsa* and Protagoras in particular in his *Commentary on Metaphysics*, he does not give detailed coverage to the views of both Protagoras and the Sophistaeans in his works and does not provide much explanatory information on how the issue should be understood on a philosophical level in

terms of demonstration (Cengiz, 2006: 107)^{viii}. In this respect, it is important to present the views of Protagoras and the Sophists in general terms in order to understand Averroes' intentions.

Although Robin Waterfield states that there is no philosophical movement that can be evaluated with a holistic approach due to the diversity of the philosophers of the Sophists, who have an important place in the history of philosophy as a movement, and that the philosophers who are evaluated under the name of Sophists are essentially thinkers who do individual philosophy (Waterfield, 2000: xxix), it is possible to count thinkers such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus among the first period Sophists. The most important representative of the Sophists is Protagoras, whose theory of knowledge is relativism and solipsism/egoism (Bolay, 1990: 248)^{ix}. According to his theoretical approach, it is impossible for humans to make objective judgments about things and situations. In this framework, according to the theory, also referred to as *homo mensura*, there is no absolute truth and man is the measure of all things. (Waterfield, 2000: 211). In Aristotle's words,

This philosopher^x argued that man is the measure of all things. This is to say that what appears to each human being is the truth itself. The conclusion would be that the same thing both exists and does not exist, that it is both good and bad at the same time, and that all other affirmations are equally true. For often a certain thing appears beautiful to some and the opposite of beautiful to others, and what appears to each person is the measure of things (Aristotle, 1996: 1062b 15).

Protagoras made man the center of everything by saying that man is the measure of what exists because it exists and of what does not exist because it does not exist, and as a result, he paved the way for Agnosticism and Septicism by saying "I have no knowledge about whether God exists or not" (Plato, 2014: 167d; Koç, 1994: 236; Uçak, 2006: 70). Agnosticism and Septicism, on the other hand, gave rise to relativism. Relativism is a philosophical view that argues that there is no truth that everyone can unanimously accept, that one person's opinion is as true as another person's opinion, and that truth or rightness changes from society to society and from age to age (Taşkın, 2003: 202, 203; Öçal, 2015: 126, 127). The counterpart of this approach in Protagoras and the Sophists is the point of view that "Everything is as it seems to me." (Kiriş Yılmaz, 2012: 172).

As can be seen, the epistemological attitudes of Protagoras and the Sophists in general allow for a relative understanding of knowledge that both Plato and Aristotle seriously oppose^{xi}.

Since it is not possible to speak of an objective and absolute knowledge of existing things, what needs to be done is to find the one that is relatively more useful and appropriate among various options and to endeavor to pursue it. It is seen that this relative attitude of the Sophists yields similar results in the moral field. In this sense, it is meaningless to talk about absolute good and absolute evil (Uçak, 2006: 73). According to Nurten Kiriş Yılmaz, when we look at the views of the Sophists, it is especially stated that good and evil can change. Accordingly, good cannot be good for everyone, at every moment and in every situation, and bad cannot be bad at every moment and in every situation (Kiriş Yılmaz, 2012: 174). As a result, Protagoras in particular and the Sophists in general expressed that norms are relative by saying that it is possible to say two opposing words about everything.

Based on the Sophists' approach, Averroes wanted to emphasize, albeit indirectly, that when "intrinsically good" and "intrinsically evil" are not determined in the theoretical framework of existence and situations, or when they are considered "one" and "the same", the transitivity between opposing concepts such as good and evil would be easy, and this approach would weaken the foundations of religion. With this concern in mind, he put forth views in his works that opposed the relativism and subjectivism-like views of the Ash'arites (Hourani, 2015: 110). In this sense, the main point that Averroes wants to explain and oppose within the framework of Sophists and Protagoras is that the Ash'arite theological current and similar views are prone to relativism and subjectivism. Otherwise, the arguments of Ash'arite theology have no resemblance to either Protagoras or the Sophists. This is because the Ash'arites did not adopt a human-centered approach to good and evil, nor did they adopt an arbitrary attitude. However, according to Averroes, the argument that the Ash'arites put forward as "There is no good in essence and no evil in essence" on the subject of good and evil by taking the text of the Shari'ah as an authority leads to a result similar to the Sophists in the end, if not in the beginning, and this argument eliminates the essence and truth in qualifications such as good-bad, beautiful-ugly, since it accepts *bi'l-waz* as the basic principle, not *bi't-tab'i*.

As a matter of fact, when the issue of good and evil is considered within the framework of the principle of non-contradiction that Aristotle writes against Protagoras' views in his *Metaphysics*, it is impossible for the same quality to both belong and not belong to the same subject, at the same time, in the same respect (Aristotle, 1996: 1005b-15-20).

In this context, not saying anything positive or negative about “one and the same thing” or saying everything about something means that anything can be said about everything. This is a serious inconsistency. According to Aristotle, the greatest harm that those who hold this view do to the field of ma’kūlāt is that they eliminate substance and essence. When substance and essence are eliminated, it will be possible to say anything to anything. For example, in this approach, it is always possible for a man to be a ship or a ship to be a man (Aristotle, 1996: 1007a-20, 1007b-20). For in things, there is a principle whose truth must always be accepted. This is the principle that it is not possible for the same thing to both exist and not exist at one and the same time. (Aristotle, 1996: 1061b 35).

According to Plato, the definitions of concepts such as virtue, goodness and moderation are not vague and changeable from person to person. On the contrary, unless correct answers are given to these concepts that reveal their nature and arbitrariness and distinguish them from other terms, philosophy will turn into a process that is far from its own nature and whose aim is only persuasion (Plato, 2014: 349a-350b; Uçak, 2006: 70). Based on these, it can be said that the Ash’arite view eliminates the truth, reality, and essence on the axis of the Shari’ah text and paves the way for subjective evaluations of good and evil. Henceforth, good can always be bad and bad can always be good. In Ash’arite thought, there is neither good nor evil for actions before the explanation of religion (Özdemir, 2014: 315); they are all one in the beginning.

Evil in terms of Guidance and Misguidance

Averroes takes a different approach when he deals with the issue of evil on the axis of the concepts of guidance and misguidance and evaluates this issue within the framework of divine wisdom. According to Averroes, who tries to justify the issue in the light of verses, Allah is just. However, when considered within the framework of the verses “ In this way Allah leaves whoever He wills to stray and guides whoever He wills. “ (Muddessir, 74/31) and “Had We willed, We could have easily imposed guidance on every soul “ (Sajda, 32/13), the issue becomes complicated and, at first, seems to be in contradiction with justice. Averroes, on the other hand, bases his justification on the impossibility of literal understanding of these verses.

Based on the qur’anic verse “He liketh not ingratitude from His servants” (al-Zumar, 39:7) and the verses stating that Allah has excluded injustice from Himself, he says Allah will not cause His servants to fall into misguidance. So

far, there is no problem with this part. In Islamic thought, it is unthinkable that Allah would ever oppress His servants. As stated, Allah is al-‘Adl (the Utterly Just) and AL-Hakeem (the All-Wise). However, Averroes’ following approach to composing the disparity between the Qur’anic texts deepens the issue and perhaps unites it with the Ash’arite view, which he criticizes:

Let us take the verse that says, “Whomsoever Allah wills, He causes to fall into misguidance, and whomsoever He wills, He guides.” The *mashiyat* in this verse, which means ‘to will’, is the constant and eternal *mashiyat* that necessitates the existence of a group of beings who are in misguidance among the genera of beings. In other words, this group is prepared for misguidance by their nature, and they are led astray by reasons that surround them from within and without (Averroes, 2012: 249).

When evaluated in the context of these statements, two judgments about “wishing-willing” come to the fore: (i) The existence of a group of misguided people among the genera of beings is a necessity of eternal wishing. (ii) This group is prepared for misguidance by nature and driven to it by the influence of internal and external causes. According to the first sentence, the fact that the existence of people who remain in misguidance is a necessity of eternal will carry misguidance beyond the phenomenological plane and, in a sense, gives it an ontological ground. The second sentence, which begins with “so”, has a confirming meaning as another expression of the first sentence, but this confirming meaning evokes other meanings within itself. Accordingly, the group of misguided people who are subjected to the influence of internal and external forces are driven to misguidance not for any other reason, but because their nature necessitates being driven to misguidance. The fact that nature makes it necessary to fall into misguidance implies an ontological evaluation, not a phenomenological evaluation as in the first sentence. Therefore, both sentences essentially have an argument that affects the whole metaphysics. Accordingly, while the first sentence ontologically necessitates the existence of people who are in misguidance in the existing order, the second sentence ontologically necessitates the existence of people whose nature is suited to misguidance. It is as if it emphasizes Allah’s intervention in the misguidance of servants.

(Cengiz, 2006: 148). When the verse “If We had willed, We could have given everyone his guidance” is approached with Averroes’ interpretation, it is clear that if Allah Ta’ala had wished not to create a group ready to be subjected to misguidance outside of the structure in which nature, external cause, or both are active, He could have done so. However, this was not the case, and the

difference in the creation of the natures brought about the state of being in guidance as well as the state of being in misguidance. In the end, the verses of the Qur'an have been incidental misleaders for those natures prone to evil, as in the verse, "your Lord's revelation to you will only cause many of them to increase in wickedness and disbelief." (al-Ma'idah, 5/68). This situation is similar to the fact that beneficial food is harmful to some people (Averroes, 2012:251). In that case, the fact that beneficial food harms people is not primary but incidental. However, in any case, this harmful situation that leads to *idlāl* needs to be clarified.

Ontological and Phenomenological Aspects of Evil

In order to support his arguments, Averroes expanded the subject and in response to the question, "Why was it necessary to have a group of creatures prepared for misguidance by nature? Isn't this the greatest injustice?" In response to the question, he stated that the existence of a group among human beings who are prepared for misguidance by nature is a necessity of divine wisdom and justice, and that it would not be possible otherwise; in fact, if it were otherwise, true injustice would emerge (Averroes, 2012: 252). While this statement, in its context, points to the necessity and necessity of misguidance for justice, it also shows that ontological evaluations are made on phenomenological grounds. In other words, the existence of a group prepared for misguidance in the sensible cosmos (phenomenology) emphasizes justice and the necessity of divine wisdom (ontology). However, what should be done is to first determine the ontological argument and then interpret the phenomenological approach within the framework of this ontological argument.

Although Averroes initially constructed his answer in a framework that goes from phenomenology to ontology, in the following process, he also went to the direction of explaining this answer on philosophical grounds, first determining ontology and then explaining the phenomenological situation arising from ontology.

Accordingly, human beings are created from a common nature and composition. This nature and composition is inherently inclined to both good and evil; however, the majority is manifested in the direction of goodness. In this respect, the majority of people who have a common nature and composition are good. However, although the majority of human beings are good, the nature and composition that constitute the basis of human creation have necessitated a small minority to be evil. It is this nature and composition that is the necessity

of wisdom and the basis for ontological justification. This is because it is not possible for nature and composition to make people completely fixed on goodness. Therefore, nature and composition, on the one hand, reveal the existence of human beings in the sensible cosmos and, on the other hand, pave the way for guidance (good) and misguidance (bad). In this context, since human existence in the sensible cosmos would not be possible in the absence of nature and composition, there is no harm in the emergence of a little evil (misguidance/bad) for the realization of much good (guidance/good) (Averroes, 2012: 252). This view also reminds us of Avicenna, Averroes' predecessor. According to Avicenna, "The existence of evil in things is a necessity subject to the need for goodness. For if these elements did not exist in opposition to each other and in a state of being affected by the victorious one, these valuable species would not have come into existence from them" (Avicenna, 2011: 351). Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd, one of these two things is necessary and inevitable: Either the types of existence in which there is evil in the few and good in the many will never be created, or the evil in the few and the good in the many will have existed together. According to the first proposition, all good will have disappeared because of a little evil. However, it is better to have much good together with little evil than to have much good disappear because of little evil (Averroes, 1986: 97). "Remember' when your Lord said to the angels, "I am going to place a successive 'human' authority on earth." They asked 'Allah', "Will You place in it someone who will spread corruption there and shed blood while we glorify Your praises and proclaim Your holiness? Allah responded, 'I know what you do not know.'" (al-Baqarah, 2/30). Accordingly, if the existence of a thing is directed towards both good and evil, and the good aspect of it is found to be more dominant, wisdom requires its existence, not its destruction (Averroes, 2012: 252). According to Ibn Sina, the overflow of goodness (ifaza) does not require abandoning the general good because of a rare evil. In such a case, abandoning the good would be a greater evil than that evil.

For the absence of what can be found in the nature of matter is a greater evil than a single absence when there are two absences (Avicenna, 2011: 351). As can be seen, in this respect, Averroes' approach bears great similarities with that of Avicenna.

With these explanations, Averroes has made great progress on the ontological ground. However, there is still one more issue that needs to be clarified: And that is the explanation of the factor that necessitates the occurrence of evil, even if only to a small extent. As a matter of fact, in al-Kashf, Averroes

emphasized the concepts of “nature” and “composition” to explain the cause of evil, but he did not explain the content of nature and composition and what they consist of (Averroes, 2016: 810; Adigüzel, 2002: 46, 47)^{xii}. However, in his work *al-Darūrī fi al-Siyāsa*, he takes a different approach to the issue and states that although evil can in principle be associated with Iblis or demons, or represented by oppression and non-existence, it is more preferable to represent it with matter (Averroes, 1998: 89)^{xiii}. From this point of view, it is possible to say that matter is the source of evil because of its imperfection. However, this approach is not enough to solve the problem completely. For matter, as a created being, has a creator, and ultimately this creator is Allah (swt), even if there are mutual beings in between (Averroes, 2017: 124; Averroes, 2012: 244, 245)^{xiv}.

As a matter of fact, when we look at the question of the existence and eternity of the universe, according to Averroes, there are two aspects of the universe: ancient in the sense that time precedes it and that it was not created from any being that would be its source, and hadith in the sense that it was brought into existence by another agent (God) (Yıldırım, 2012: 273, 274). In this context, based on Averroes’ argument that every created being has an originator (Averroes, 2012: 160), and since God created matter as well as all beings, there is no harm in attributing evil to God through matter as a requirement of divine wisdom (Averroes, 1998: 89; Averroes, 2012: 239, 243, 247; Deniz, 2017: 173-176).

As a result, Averroes attributes evil to God and emphasizes God’s intervention in the misguidance of servants (Cengiz, 2006: 148). In his own words, “Since there is no Creator of misguidance, which is evil, other than God, it is necessary to attribute misguidance to Him, just as the creation of evil is attributed to God” (Averroes, 2012: 253). However, these points should not be taken to mean that Ibn Rushd holds similar views with the Ash’arite theological movement, which he frequently criticizes. Ibn Rushd’s evaluation of “*istitāat*,” which is the conceptual expression of the power of doing, as a force inherent in human nature, unlike the Ash’arites, who consider it as an accident that is not inherent in human nature, and his statement that being cautious against evil and defending against *mazarrat* would be meaningless in the absence of human acquisition show that he has a different approach to human will and freedom from the Ash’arite thought (Averroes, 2012: 240; Algül, 2013: 93; Deniz, 2017: 191, 192).

Therefore, even if the issue of evil and *idlāl* is attributed to God, the question is whether the attribution of evil to the divine is essential or incidental. In other words, should the attribution of evil to God in this form be evaluated

in the framework of absoluteness or in the framework of contingency? This question needs to be explained. For attributing evil and idolatry to God in an absolute sense would bring about many philosophical dilemmas. According to Ibn Rushd, although attributing evil and *idlāl* directly to God indicates that evil comes from the supreme from an ontological point of view, this cannot be considered within the concept of absoluteness (Averroes, 2012: 252, 253). This is because the attribution of evil to the divine is not because evil itself is evil, but because evil, which is immanent in the reflection of good, is manifested together with good. In this case, evil has no ontological status outside the realm of sensible existence (Deniz, 2017: 175). This is an important approach. Because, as mentioned above, the evaluation of evil in the context of contingency determines an entire philosophical paradigm, confirming that the essential is good and evil exists only as a terrain. To summarize, although evil does not have an ontological position in Averroes' philosophy, it has a phenomenological position in order to avoid relativism.

In this case, the ontological actual position and the phenomenological actual position of evil are different.

From another perspective, the attribution of evil and *idlāl* to God is also related to the theory of creation. As a matter of fact, although there are different interpretations on the subject, Averroes' not looking at the creation event within the framework of the theory of emanation (Fahri, 1992: 256, 257) necessitates the direct attribution of evil to God in terms of matter as the source of evil and misguidance as the opposite of guidance. As in the framework of the theory of emanation, it is not a big problem to associate evil with the sublunar realm, and especially with matter, since matter is the object in which the power of existence is least reflected due to the fact that it is the last overflowing field of existence, and therefore it is characterized by evil. This is because beings overflow each other by decreasing the degree of perfection from the most perfect being downwards, and the being that exists at the lowest level is the being with the least perfection (Plotinus, 2018: 160, 161). Thus, matter is in the position of being characterized by evil. For this reason, the association of evil with matter on the axis of the theory of emanation eliminates the direct attribution of evil to God and renders evil meaningful only by associating it with matter in a certain consistency.

However, apart from the theory of emanation, attributing evil to God would somehow embody absoluteness unless a conditional state is determined. For the attribution to God is the attribution to the truth unless an exception is made. Therefore, although Averroes attributes evil and wrongdoing to God, he states that this is not absolute. He attributed this to the fact that God created

good for the sake of good itself. Since Allah Ta'ala created evil not because it is evil in itself but because of its coexistence with good, the attribution of evil to Allah is not an absolute attribution. In this case, since evil is not evil in itself, it does not have an ontological equivalence with good and is not an obstacle to the manifestation of good. Averroes also tried to explain this point through the metaphor of fire. Accordingly, the existence of fire is a necessity for the things that come into being through it. For if there were no fire, the things that should come into existence through it would not exist, and even if they did, they would not be healthy. Therefore, fire is a good being in its universal dimension. However, considering some of the negativities caused by fire among beings, it can be judged that fire is an evil sphere of existence. However, despite all these negativities, the benefits of fire far outweigh its harms. Therefore, since fire is not an intrinsically harmful sphere of existence, any negativity (mischief) arising from fire in existence is not due to the essential characteristic of fire, but to its attributive characteristic. In this sense, the harm to beings through fire is correlational (Averroes, 1986: 97). Therefore, since the manifestation of good from fire is better than the incidental manifestation of evil, the existence of fire is better than its absence.

Furthermore, Averroes, in his book *al-Tahafut-et-Tahafut*, states that some good will only exist in this world mixed with evil. Therefore, divine wisdom necessitates the presence of a large amount of good even if it is mixed with a small amount of evil, because the presence of a large amount of good with a small amount of evil is preferred to the absence of this large amount of good due to the presence of a small amount of evil (Averroes, 1986: 97). This is also necessary in order to prevent the existence of evil from opening the door to a two-principled ontological dualism. For associating evil, which exists in the sensible cosmos, with another primordial being in order not to associate it with God would lead to more grave philosophical consequences. This would call into question the unitary existence of the First Principle and necessitate a two-principled approach. Therefore, it seems to be the most consistent way to relate the good itself and the evil that occurs with the good to the First Principle (Averroes, 1986: 97).^{xv}

Grace, Matter and Evil

Up to this point, Averroes did not emphasize *ināyah* at all in *al-Kashf*, *al-Darūri fi al-Siyāsa*, and *al-Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* when dealing with the subject of evil (Averroes, 2012: 158-163)^{xvi}. In his *Commentary on Metaphysics*, on the other

hand, he dealt with the emphasis on “matter” in a broader way together with the subject of *ināyāt*, and this time he directly associated evil with matter without attributing it to God. From this point of view, according to Averroes, the reason for life on earth is grace. This is because in this realm, beings are preserved thanks to the order and organization created by the Creator based on the movements of celestial bodies (Averroes, 2017: 147; Averroes, 2012: 245). In this framework, the movements of all the planets in the celestial realm, including the moon and the sun, are essentially a grace to the sphere of existence under the lunar orb. According to Averroes, without this grace and divine protection (Averroes, 2012: 244)^{xvii}, it would not be possible for any being on earth to come to life and sustain this life. Therefore, everything that exists in the earth that has the quality of absolute good is due to God’s will (Averroes, 2017: 145, 146; Averroes, 2012: 243, 244)^{xviii}. These statements attribute all the good events that exist on earth to God’s will and, in a sense, eliminate the attribution and attribution of evil to God. As a matter of fact, Averroes goes on to explicitly mention evil, stating that the existence of corruption, aging, and similar evils arises from the necessities of the *hayūlān* (matter) (Averroes, 2017: 147). Accordingly, evil, which is reflected along with good, does not originate from Allah, but from the structure of matter.

As for the presence of evil in the structure of matter, this is due to the impossibility of its existence in any other way. According to Averroes, in the sensible cosmos, either things that have some kind of evil added to their existence will not exist, and this absence is a greater evil, or they will exist as they are. This is because it is not possible to have more evil than this in the existence of matter (Averroes, 2017: 147). From this perspective, Averroes, who attributes evil to God in *al-Kashf*, relates it ontologically directly to matter in his *Commentary on Metaphysics* and says that it is manifested due to necessity. However, the evil that occurs due to matter should not make one uneasy or cause anxiety. This is because, according to Averroes, even though the fact that matter necessarily causes evil makes life in this world impossible, life here continues thanks to grace. Therefore, in return for the presence of evil in this world, sensible beings are provided with the opportunity to preserve their existence. In this way, beings continue their lives. An example of this is that human beings maintain their lives thanks to reason (Averroes, 2017: 127, 147, 148). According to Ibn Rushd, the beings in the sensible cosmos are protected by rational beings; the Principles active under the lunar celestial orb know the evils in this world through cognition and give them the properties that will preserve their existence through *ināyāt* (Averroes, 2017: 147). Therefore, the material world is kept under

control in this way through ināyāt, allowing the majority of good to be realized despite the emergence of evil originating from matter and the destruction of existence with this evil.

Conclusion

As a result of the study, it is possible to summarize the conclusions reached regarding Averroes' views on evil as follows.

- (i) According to Averroes, what the text of the Shari'ah characterizes as good and evil are not, as the Ash'arites say, things that are good and evil because of the text of the Shari'ah, but things that are intrinsically good and evil. There is no good and evil determined afterwards. In this framework, in the text-value relation, while the Ash'arites prioritized going from text to value, Averroes prioritized going from value to text. Going from text to value was criticized by Averroes for opening the door to relativism and subjectivism, the approach of Protagoras in particular and the Sophists in general.
- (ii) According to Averroes, it is not a consistent approach to keep evil away from God with an argument such as "All of God's actions are good." In his arguments against Ash'arī, Averroes made room for evil in the sensible cosmos in opposition to good, and argued that evil exists in the sensible cosmos absolutely and necessarily. For in this cosmos, the lesser evil is a necessity for the reflection of the greater good. However, the existence of evil in the sensible cosmos should not be taken to mean that it exists as an essential and substantial being. In Averroes' philosophy, evil has no ontological status in the realm of rational existence. In this respect, its existence in the sensible cosmos is accidental.
- (iii) Averroes wanted to point out that the explanations that attempt to eliminate the attribution of evil to God are inconsistent in themselves and that there is no harm in attributing good and evil to God. This is because attributing good to God and evil to another being paves the way for the search for a principle (mabda) of evil and requires the substitution of a principle of evil in the face of good. To avoid this, the most consistent way is to attribute both good and evil to God. Therefore, in Averroes' philosophy, the positioning of evil in the sensible cosmos and the dimensions and extensions of this positioning are two different things. Accordingly, there are things in the

sensible cosmos that are naturally characterized as evil. However, they exist not as pure evil but for the realization of good as required by divine wisdom..

- (iv) In Averroes' philosophy, evil exists, is necessary and inevitable through the nature, composition and matter from which human beings come into existence. However, this evil is not in a position that prevents the realization of good and bringing it to life. In particular, although the possibility of evil in matter carries within it the meaning that all things will already be destroyed, this world is protected by the beings on the lunar celestial orb with the grace and protection of God. Therefore, even if there is some evil in this world, it is not possible for it to completely dominate the good.

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- i This current study, was published as a research article in Turkish language, in the 9th issue of *Beytulhikme International Journal of Philosophy* in 2019, between pages 493-514, with the number Doi:10.18491/beytulhikme.1461.
- ii Although Averroes says that he was not privy to the ideas of the Mu'tazilites in writing, he says that they are basically the same as the Ash'arites. However, such a comparison indirectly implies that Averroes was aware of the views of the Mu'tazilites.
- iii According to G. F. Hourani, at the time of Averroes, Ash'arism had not yet become a generally accepted belief in Western Islamic schools, and Averroes was struggling to prevent such an outcome.
- iv The gāib-shahid syllogism is something that Averroes opposed as a method. At that time, the way of acquiring knowledge in the Islamic geography outside Andalusia was based on the method called "qiyasū al-gāib ale al-shahid", that is, "the comparison of the unknown to the known". In this method, there is a "certain known", which is "shahid", and the unknown "gaib" (uncertain thing) is known by comparing it to this witness (determined thing). According to Şimşek, the comparison of the unknown to the witness is either the comparison of a particular to a particular or the comparison of a universal to a particular. However, both syllogisms are incomplete inductive methods. In order for an inductive method to be used as a scientific method, the researcher must ground it on solid foundations and fully justify it. Averroes strongly criticized this method that Avicenna, al-Ghazali and other Islamic scholars used in common (Şimşek, 2007: 47, 48). However, there are issues that Averroes himself makes evaluations through the dialectic of gaib-shahid and makes deductions through this method.
- v According to Averroes, truth will not emerge when good and evil are determined bi'l-wad', that is, when something is not intrinsically good and intrinsically evil.
- vi Although this approach brings Averroes closer to the Mu'tazilites among the theological sects, when his arguments on the subject are considered holistically, it is impossible to consider him as a philosopher close to the Mu'tazilites. In fact, as mentioned earlier, he himself says that he is not aware of Mu'tazilite thought since their works did not reach him.
- vii Averroes makes detailed evaluations on this issue in *al-Kashf*.

- viii Although it is not directly related to this topic, we think it would be useful to include here a criticism of Averroes' treatment of theological issues: According to Lüftü Cengiz, who studied Averroes' understanding of divinity, Averroes developed a rather religious perspective in explaining theological problems. That is to say, he made interpretations based on the evidence and focused on the fact that it was not possible for the people to understand more than that. In any case, he did not adopt the method of *jadal*, thinking that it would not lead to the truth, and emphasized the demonstrative method. However, according to Cengiz, although Averroes wanted to address the issues with the demonstrative method, it is necessary to question to what extent he did so. It is possible to say that his method rather developed in the form of criticizing other methods. Because, when he presents the issues, let's say he is discussing the issue of *jihad*, after stating how the issue of *jihad* is mentioned in the scriptures and how the issue should be presented accordingly, he ends the issue by emphasizing that the public will not understand more than that. Although Averroes insists that the same issue should be discussed differently by scholars using the demonstrative method, he does not say anything about how the issue should be presented demonstratively. Or, when he questions the opinions of some thinkers who express an opinion on the same issue, he merely states that their arguments are not demonstrative and that their methods are faulty. For example, while he accuses theologians of using closed and incomprehensible expressions, his own approaches on the same subject may be closed and ambiguous. In fact, it is very clear that these difficulties stem from the difficulty of the subjects.
- ix According to Solipsism, which is expressed as solipsism/egoism, there is no reality other than the thinking subject itself.
- x Protagoras.
- xi As mentioned, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* and Plato especially in his *Protagoras* and *Theaitetos* opposed these views.
- xii Averroes, in his *Great Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (*Tafsīru mā-ba'de al-Tabī'a*), mentions many different uses of the word "nature" in terms of its meaning. However, among the definitions, it is understood that what is meant by the word "nature" here is "the elements that make up the composition of things". The use of the name "nature" for substances other than form (i.e., matter and the composite entity consisting of matter and form) is a secondary use.
- xiii According to Averroes, there are many important aspects in the attribution of evil to God that are not hidden for thinking people. See *ibid*.
- xiv According to Averroes, the universe has many principles. Some of them are the causes of others and all of them end in one Principle.
- xv In this regard, Averroes gives the verse "If there were gods other than Allah in the heavens and the earth, both would have been destroyed" (*Anbiya*, 21/22) as an example. Averroes gives the example of the ruler and the people to explain this verse. Philosophers believed that since there is good in every being, evil arises

- in relation to it, such as the punishments imposed by the virtuous rulers of cities. This is because these punishments are evils that were imposed in order to ensure goodness, not according to the original purpose.
- xvi There are passages in *al-Kashf*, for example, where Ibn Rushd discusses the issue of *ināyah*. However, in these passages, he evaluates the issue not in the context of evil, but in the context of *isbat al-wājib*.
- xvii In addition to *ināyāt*, Averroes also uses the concept of “*al-hifḍ al-ilāhī*” in *al-Kashf*. In his eloquent expression, it is Allah who protects the efficient causes and their effectors after they act.
- xviii According to Averroes, the movements of celestial bodies bring about the creation and preservation of beings under the lunar celestial orb. For example, if the sun had been larger in size and closer to the earth in terms of distance, all living things would have perished. Likewise, if the moon were positioned differently from its current position, none of the actions performed through it would be realized.

CHAPTER X

THE ETHICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AT YUNUS EMRE

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Introduction –Individual and Morality-

Ever since the society accepted the fact that people have to live together, it has tried to provide this obligation with the rules that everyone has to follow. At first glance, order, cosmos, harmony, respect, freedom, etc. can be increased even more. Acceptances such as law, custom, tradition, which are the main guideline of words, do not connect in general terms a collective consisting of individuals. These concepts exist only for the individual. Therefore, the focus of almost everything is based on the individual. Society avoids an illegal, unconventional practice, but the individual does it persistently. In this case, society forces one to turn to a certain side of the personality for its improvement. However, it is clear that the principles sought in the individual must also be accepted by society. In other words, although the individual is put in the center, it is the value judgments of the society that decide whether the behavior or the word is moral or not. In fact, if we add the dimension of belief to this, on the other hand, he is also a god. Here it is, religion, law, custom or tradition has such a function here.

This awareness has directed different sciences such as philosophy, religion and sociology to the behavior, education and follow-up of the individual. Everything that happens around us consists of the desire to direct the individual towards good. Here, right, virtuous, legal and acceptable behaviors emerge, and the concept of morality is roughly shaped on these details. There are have

been made different definitions of the concept of morality. The words “folk” are used for the physical existence of man, and the words “huluk or hulk”(moral behavior) are used for their spiritual existence. Morality is the plural of hulk or huluk. (Çağrıçı, 1989, 2-9).

However, in other definitions, “the rule that is accepted and adopted in the society and regulating in people’s behavior (Guriz, 1999, 13)”; “value judgments aimed at ensuring the harmony and balance between the emotional and thought powers of people (İzveren, 1980, 97)”, generally people the word morality is tried to be explained with revealing concepts such as a collection of principles, a collection of rules (Arslan, 1998, 119). Almost every branch of science has tried to make sense of the concept of morality around its own data and references. For example, while philosophy looks from the perspective of virtue and goodness, law aims to explain law-based evaluation in the context of economy, business, sales and behavior. Theology too, tries to attribute almost all of its knowledge to the individual through being moral. The effort of so many different fields to create order on the same concept at every opportunity brings morality to an extremely important focus.

Human nature, it is based on his own choice of good or evil by nature. It can be argued whether this is a desired situation by man or whether it is a mission of nature. However, what is available is the desire of the “good” or “evil”. For, it is clearly mentioned in the Qur’an, which is the absolute text that he was created as both the esref-i safilin and creation. In other words, being good or bad is in the hands of people.

Human freedom can be mentioned in terms of behavior and use of words. Directing this freedom for the better is possible with morality, where individual education, social orientation and legal obligations come into play. Whether morality is unique to humans or not, whether morality is sought in other beings or not, also ends with the above-mentioned nature of creation. Man is endowed with reason. In other words, the one who gives freedom has given the mind the chance to choose. Therefore, it would be futile to seek morality in other beings as in humans. While this exalts the person, it also puts him under responsibility. The discussion can be taken more further. While Kierkegaard talks about Adam’s sin, he explains that this sin is actually important in making sense of Adam’s existence or explaining the purpose of his creation. ”Adam is not the inventor of sin. He sinned only, because he wanted to attain the forbidden thing. After committing this sin, he becomes self-conscious. From this point of view, it can be said that sin exists for the person who aims to exist. A person who does not sin can never exist. (Manav ve Gürdal, 2013, 97).” This existence is actually

an important point for man who to understand the wisdom in his creation. Something is known for its opposite. Therefore, it cannot be understood well without sinning and without seeing the bad. It is immoral things that make morality meaningful. This is decided by society, religion and God. Yunus Emre explains this situation in his poem as follows;

I wrote a lot of sins, I was walking in the world, I was nice

Let me give you the feeling of what I hurt I'm out of the moment (210/6) (Tatçı, 2013, 287).

What is sin and as a result, he (God) says that he will endure it by a decision of God. And also tries to prepare himself for this situation. This is an explanation that he has attained the secret of existence and that the distinction between good and evil is known. In another poem, he says that committing sin cannot be done by reason, but by some kind of mistake or reason:

“Don't you see, I was crazy, I was wrong, I was broken. (256/5) (Tatçı, 2013, 256).”

Society and religion are among the basic elements that force the individual to be moral. The society demands some obligations from the individuals who are connected to it with the bond of belonging within its own dynamics. These are often things related to what that society values. Then, the concepts called morality, tradition and morality come into play here. People, who living together keep the legacy left to them from their ancestors as they are. They expect those who will come after them to continue this. These behavioral or speech features are also references that help keep people together. Going beyond these is generally not accepted by the society. Every individual must comply with them. If there is an insistence and continuity in going beyond these, then the law/law accepted by the society in general comes into play. In other words, their behavior that cannot be dealt with by social pressure can be dealt with by force. Laws become binding for the individual with the writing down of what is in the background of the mind. Bergson is the society that draws the program of the daily life of the individual for an ordinary human life. A person cannot live in the family, do his shopping, walk on the street, or even stay at home, without obeying orders and submitting to obligations. Every moment we have to choose, to decide. Of course, we choose the one that fits the rule. We are not even aware

that we have chosen; the society has drawn a path; we find it open before us, we follow it (Bergson, 1949, 18-19)”.

Therefore, although it may seem like our choices as individuals, it is actually society that determines our behavior. In that case, the morality expected from the individual is a prerequisite for his acceptance into society. As an individual, our acceptance in society is directly proportional to our morality.

Another source that pushes an individual to be moral is religion. Faithful societies necessitate the behaviors they expect from the individual – being moral – through religion. In fact, at this source, the society is almost completely out of the loop and the relationship between the individual and the creator becomes decisive. The individual turns into a servant in this area, and what the servant does or does not do in the world turns into a punishment or reward waiting for him in the future. Although man was left free by the creator, he also reminded us where his choices would take him. In this case, the individual/servant should practice morality in almost every area of his life and choose his words and behaviors around this teaching.

Whatever the source, moral individuals create moral societies. This is something that both the creator and society want and expect. Therefore, being moral, which is initially seen as a necessity for the individual, is actually for himself and his society. Therefore, being moral is not a choice, but rather a necessity for the individual’s religion and society.

The Morality of the Individual in Yunus Emre’s Poems

Yunus Emre gives moral advice by putting the individual, himself/herself in the center in his poems. Although the suggestions in his poems by turning to his own soul are seen as subjective, in fact, this is a cry to the collective through itself.

To whom do you say your word, Yunus?

You give advice to the people, what do you not hold on to yourself (235/9), (Tatcı, 2013, 314).

It is inappropriate for a person who has not been able to teach morality to himself or who has not done the duties that a moral individual/servant has to fulfill, to suggest others. Yunus is aware of this, even far beyond, he has reduced the

advice to the individual more specifically to the soul. Being aware of what and how to say when choosing your words;

Either say what you know or hear from a scholar

Hold the tip of surrender, don't break the promise – he is a thinker who speaks without prolonging his word and knowingly. (57/2), (Tatçı, 2013, 93).

Saying a lot of poetry after saying this is also a proof that Yunus said it on purpose. The expression “surrender” in the poem is also a situation that needs attention. Because with this expression, it is emphasized that the boundaries are actually drawn and determined by God and that the servant must comply with them. This situation does not open human freedom back into discussion. Because by surrendering, that is, staying within the limits set by God, man will have already completed his morality.

Mustafa Tatçı, who wrote very valuable works on Yunus Emre, in one of his studies, under the title of “Moral” elements in Yunus, generosity, humility, virtue, manners of speaking, arrogance, stinginess, lying, slyness, anxiety, greed, adultery, malice, dignity, haram, such as being ungrateful and heartbreaking (Tatçı, 2013, 475-483).

Using such different concepts about morality is also very valuable in terms of showing the importance Yunus attaches to morality. When these concepts are considered, it is seen that there are elements that take the individual/soul to the center but will benefit the society if they are used in a good way. Yunus Emre's advice in his poems, especially starting from himself/herself, can be matched with humility, which is one of the moral elements.

Miskin Yunus, don't be a part of the blessed, be the ground.

It ends in the soil, the rosy land is for me (10/5), (Tatçı, 2013, 34).

Whatever ends, ends in the soil, but it is not seen that the soil is arrogant against anyone. So, as a human being, don't be arrogant to anyone, be like the soil so that there is an opportunity for other things to grow in your bosom.

Yunus is a poet who takes references from hadiths in his poems. Evidence of how bad arrogance is, “Anyone with an iota of arrogance in his heart cannot enter heaven (Afşar et al. 2020, 327).” the hadith corresponds to the above poem in Yunus.

Morality can actually be considered in two separate categories. One of them is society, law, belief, family, etc. they are the rules that are set and determined by the commanding, sword, punishing or rewarding people. In other words, it is sometimes written and sometimes verbal things that are asked to (not) be done. Another category is the application areas of prohibitions or freedoms of these rules and their implementation. The collective or religion are the main determinants in the first category. However, in the second category, that is, the behavior of the individual and the individual are decisive in the realization of the things that are (not) done verbally or in writing. The individual has fulfilled or violated the rules of morality with the things has done. Therefore, the act of the individual is fundamental to the concept of morality. Yunus Emre makes morality visible, measurable and evaluable in his poems, especially by putting the individual in the center or choosing the individual as the target of what he says.

For Yunus, morality turns into a concept that can be realized or lived rather than being something that is said, desired or expected. The hadith “God only accepts deeds done in a sincere manner and for his sake” and the hadith “God does not look at your outward appearance and property, but looks at your hearts and deeds (Afşar et al. 2020, 23)” are actually the reasons and also an indicator why behavior is centered in Yunus.

Is morality an individual’s choice or an obligation? When there is a choice, there should be freedom of choice in this regard. Being moral makes the individual valuable both in the society and in the dimension of belief. In this way, the individual also achieves satisfaction from his own perspective. Here, it makes sense whether the individual has freedom or obligation. The individual chooses his own behavior. There is a freedom here. However, if the behavior he chooses brings reward or punishment for him, since it would not be right to ask for the punishment, it becomes compulsory to choose the behavior that leads to the reward. The following verse of Yunus is important in this regard:

Whoever says what to whom if good if bad

God punished it, the road was thin (124/4) (Tatçı, 2013, 170).

The determinant is God. In that case, the individual/human/servant is obliged to do what God has determined. Freedom is only about choosing what will be given to the individual. Therefore, being moral is a kind of obligation for the

individual. Good and evil is not according to what the person says, but according to God's acceptance.

The language Yunus Emre uses while composing his poems also gives important clues about morality. In general, Yunus addresses people, especially himself/nafs, with sentences consisting of imperative moods in his poems. "Let it be, let it be, let it find it, leave it, ask etc." Yunus sees people directly in the center of his poems. However, it is necessary to open a parenthesis for Yunus here, as Yunus says most of his words to himself first, as stated above. This is more valuable in that it shows what Yunus's morality is. In other words, the moral understanding of Yunus it is a morality that starts with the person/individual himself and must begin. However, Yunus is well aware of the power of the "Word":

There is a word that cuts the war, there is a word that ends the head

There is a promise, a promise to lubricate with honey

Even a person can't say the word.

A word to fly through this world's hell (102/2,5) (Tatçı, 2013, 146).

Yunus Emre's Expectations from Moral Individuals

Yunus's morality also indicates in his poems what morality should be in an individual or what the servant/nafs should pay attention to in his poems. One of the most important moral elements that Yunus expects from the individual is humility. He also carries humility in his poems with the metaphor of the soil, and he asks people to be like soil in general.

Make Earth your face to the poor, hey Yunus

A confession is needed more than a sentence. (142/6) (Tatçı, 2013, 196).

One of the important moral elements that Yunus expects in the individual is not to be cruel and to treat everyone well. According to Yunus, the soul must be away from haram, otherwise those who are cruel and mistreat others will not be comfortable in the hereafter and their faces will be dark.

Who acts so cruelly in this one who gathers souls with harâm

Their faces turn black, their souls are not at ease

Their faces turn black, their souls are not at ease (154/4) (Tatçı, 2013, 211).

Persecute is to infringe on the rights of others. For, a Muslim must be someone whose hand and tongue is not harmed by anyone. This situation is clearly stated in the Qur'an: "The reward for an evil is an evil equivalent to it; but whoever forgives and follows the path of correction, God will reward him. There is no doubt that He (God) does not like the wrongdoers. (<https://kuran.diyinet.gov.tr>, *Er. Tar.* 10.09.2022)" And it is stated in this verse: "...a Muslim is the brother of a Muslim. He does not persecute him, does not leave him helpless, and does not despise him (Afşar et al. 2020, 611)".

From this point of view, a society in which no one oppresses another will also improve sociologically. In other words, what starts with the individual will actually turn into the collective. The struggle of the individual with his soul it is among the subjects that Yunus gives the most advice to people, especially to his own soul. Man actually makes his choices or behaviors according to the desires of his soul. In this situation, one has to be very careful and direct his soul to the good and moral. In all his poems, Yunus has always been in a very serious war against the soul. The real reference of morality is the human soul. Being moral or not is about doing whatever the soul wants. This is actually a sign that the nafs generally desires bad things. Man has to restrain his desires in a way that does not harm others and his own body. Otherwise, their behavior will be interpreted as being immoral.

Let me shoot and burn the house of his soul, let me set fire to my ambition and my vain desires

Let me fight with my soul from now on with all my might. (197/4) (Tatçı, 2013, 270).

The destruction of the soul by considering it as a house is an element that needs to be considered. The home is the epitome of privacy. Its existence is known from the outside, but what is going on inside is full of secrets that only those who live in that house will know. Yunus Emre actually makes a reference to this privacy by reading the soul over the house. Demolition of your home is the last thing anyone would want. The ruin actually leads to the destruction of these secrets in a sense. From this point of view, it is also an explanation of what Yunus can convey with "words". Throwing into fire/burning and turning it into a ruin is also aimed at eliminating the existence of existence. existence ceases to exist, existence will have no meaning anymore. Yunus wants in a moral person will destroy the house of his soul and desires

a burning state. The battle of the soul that Yunus spoke of nor is it an ordinary war:

The power has taken the sword, it has stolen the neck of your soul

His self-defeating hands are covered in blood (Tatçı, 2013, 390).

Be careful, open your eyes, choose the trap of your soul, see that it is trapping you.

Go to your friend's council, where is a better stop? (37/5) (Tatçı, 2013, 67)

The dragon of my soul has returned to me

If the view was not violated, it is the real now.(383/3) (Tatçı, 2013, 494)

The struggle with the soul is bloody and mortal. The only thing that will kill him is the sword of might. He is the one who can set a delicious trap and is strong like a dragon. Therefore, it will not be easy to fight him. Only moral individuals can make their swords mighty.

Another moral characteristic Yunus Emre seeks in an individual is to have conviction as well as humility. Opinion is defined as contentment with what one has. In the mystical sense, consenting to what is given is interpreted as not seeking more. Not wanting to multiply also removes the greed that the soul desires most.

Ambition inevitably forces a person to enter the right of slavery. Avoiding this is among the basic elements of being moral. Because Saint. The Prophet also insisted on the opinion. "I will not hide from you any of my possessions. Whoever wishes to be chaste, God makes him chaste. Whoever is self-sufficient (who is content with few and does not want anything from people), God will make him rich. Whoever is patient, God will grant him patience. No one has been given a better and broader treat than patience. (Afşar vd. 2020, 227)." Yunus in the poem:

If you wish, whoever you want is within the range of waiver

There is opinion hang from the throat of your soul (119/3) (Tatçı, 2013, 165).

You split the opinion do not comply with the wish of the soul

Iresin is true to the truth, you found it, the tour has landed

If you don't hold your opinion

If you obey your soul, become ser-gerdân, there is now (383/3-4) (Tatçı, 2013, 494)

The way to destroy/strangle the soul is to hang it from the gallows of opinion. Only those who do such a thing will be able to reach the range of renunciation. Moreover being able to destroy the soul reveals the value of opinion, which only moral people can have. Thanks to the opinion, the wishes of the soul can be abandoned, otherwise the person will be in loss. With these sharp warnings, Yunus brings opinion to the fore in human beings.

Patient is another moral element that Yunus expects in man. Risaletü'n-Nushiyye includes the following lines in the chapter of Dâstân-ı Sabr:

Say listen to your patience

Your patience, the world is your property

For this patience is the father of the state

It destroys all the corrupte

It's good if there's patience in the blood

Always sets your mind free

The patient state will always be

Those who have patience will exalt

You need patience in any case

Anyone who is impatient stays inside (Tatçı, 2013, 6036-606).

Yunus also opened a separate section in the work for patience and what he said about patience, Saint. he told the story of Yusuf as an example. As it is known, St. Yusuf is one of the most exemplary prophets in terms of morality, along with his beauty, patience and interpretation of dreams. Yunus combined morality and patience with the specificity of Yusuf, and advised people that just like Yusuf, all desires can be reached with patience.

Again, in the verse “I swear by the Century that Man is truly in loss. However, people who believe and do good works for the world and the hereafter, advise each other to the truth and advise patience are different.<https://kuran.diyamet.gov.tr>; Er. Tar. 10.09.2022)” And in the hadiths, “Whoever is patient, Allah gives them the strength to endure”. No one has been given a better and broader treat than patience. (Afşar vd. 2020, 205).” As emphasized above, one of the most beautiful elements that makes a person moral is patience.

Again in Risaletü'n-Nushiyye, in the chapter of Dâstân-Arrogance, it is reminded to stay away from arrogance and that arrogance will eventually harm people. Arrogance, which we can define as contempt for others and holding oneself above everyone and everything, is the last characteristic to be found in a moral person. All in all, especially for someone like Yunus, who constantly advises himself and warns himself before others, arrogance appears as an element to be avoided.

They call it arrogance, they know it

A rebel leaves a person without faith.

He does not like anyone but himself.

It stays in the high place, it doesn't come down

Those who sit on many thrones fell to the ground

The fly reached those who said it was too much for me.

Don't be a friend with arrogance.

If arrogance is in the blood, fight it

The people of takabbur have no evil eye

For him, there is no light in the heart. (Tatcı, 2013, 576-578).

According to Yunus, faith leaves the person who is arrogant. Even he accuses that “can” of being a rebel. By emphasizing that the owners of arrogance are destroyed he says that arrogance should never be a comrade and war should be waged against arrogance. It reminds us that there will be no light in the hearts

of those who do not fight arrogance. And in this way, he gives very serious warnings to people.

Instead of Conclusion

As Yunus Emre's poems are read, it is actually possible to come across an element of morality or something related to it in almost every line. Since it will exceed the volume of the study to deal with almost every element in detail, these few moral elements, which are considered important, have been tried to be contented. As it can be understood from the poems, it is understood that Yunus combined what he said with awareness of morality with the sanctity of the word. By using the language consciously, it makes what he says more meaningful and more effective.

If we pay attention to Yunus Emre's view of morality and ethical issues, we see that Yunus puts the human/individual at the center above all else. By further customizing the individual or human, he addresses his own self and calls out to other people through it. According to Yunus, morality begins with a struggle with one's own self. Therefore, the morality of the individual rather than the morality of society is more prominent. Moral societies consist of moral individuals. Therefore, with some references, especially religion, the individual can realize his own existence with morality both against the creator and against the society to which he is connected with the bond of belonging.

According to Yunus, the existence of a person actually begins with becoming conscious of his own existence. We can understand this from the poems he constantly sings by targeting/addressing his own self. Man completes his consciousness of worship with his morality. He reminds people in his different poems that if he does not do this, he will be punished.

When viewed from the perspective of religion the human being, who was created as an entity, can only exist by living religion and knowing its creator. Yunus Emre constantly emphasizes this. On the other hand, the existence of the individual, who is viewed not only from the point of view of religion but also from the point of society, is possible in relation to other people. Therefore, the acceptance of the individual is only possible with morality. Again, Yunus reminds us that those who are arrogant are demolished and that they are not accepted not only by the creator but also by the society.

Yunus also expects the individual to be humble, self-struggle, not oppressing anyone, be patient, avoid arrogance, and be content after putting the individual in the center. However, as can be understood from Yunus's

poems, Yunus accepts that all these things are a duty/duty given to man instead of freedom of choice. Because according to his poems, God will punish the individual according to what he does or does not do. If the individual is acting negatively, - it is not a choice, it is a necessity. In fact - he will be black and will not be respected by society.

It is possible to find references from verses and hadiths for everything that Yunus said. In other words, while Yunus deals with morality in his poems, he roughly keeps the verses and hadiths as religious sources. This is very important in terms of showing the mission that Yunus sets for the individual in his poems or his view of morality.

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CHAPTER XI

HADJI BEKTASH WALI'S THEORY OF MORALITY

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Hadji Bektash Wali, just like Ahmad Yasawi, Mawlānā and Yunus Emre, shaped the world of mind and culture by influencing the religious and cultural life of Anatolian people for centuries (Yıldız, 2019, 7). He is a hero and spiritual leader who played an important role in the Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia. Hadji Bektash Wali tried to appeal to a wide social environment extending to the following centuries with the “theory of behaviors” based on divine love and practices based on peace and tolerance, which he determined for the realization of the ideal of “perfect human being and virtuous society” (Gündoğdu, 2007, 162). Although Hadji Bektash Wali’s real name is mentioned as “Muhammed” in the sources, he became famous as “Bektash”. Although it is said that he received the title “Hadji” at the beginning of his name because he went on pilgrimage (Gölpınarlı, 1958, 16), the nickname “Wali” is another indicator of his identity due to his Sufi aspect (Yılmaz, 2010, 13). Hajj was at the center of Hadji Bektash’s long journey that started in Khorasan and ended in Anatolia. However, in the Bektashi tradition, there are also claims that he never went to Hijaz, that he saw the pilgrimage as a spiritual act, and that overcoming the ego was a greater virtue (Turay, 2021).

Hadji Bektash Wali is portrayed as a Sufi who keep harping on Allah and the Prophet, constantly praises Allah, has the morals and virtues to the extent that he does not point out anyone’s faults and flaws, and does not walk around without ablution even for a moment (Üzüm, 2002, 36).

In this context, we will try to evaluate the theory of morality in the system of human upbringing, which has an important place in the life of Hadji Bektash Wali.

The Life of Hadji Bektash Wali

Although the exact birth date of Hadji Bektash Wali is unknown, it is known that he was born in Nishapur in the early XIIIth century. In the introduction of the *Velâyetnâme* edition of the Turkish Religious Foundation, it is emphasized that he was born in 1209 and died in 1270 (Velâyetnâme, 2007, 28). Nishapur, one of the great and important cities of Khorasan geography, was a center of knowledge where many scholars and thinkers were located with its educational institutions, especially the Nizâmîye madrasah (Yıldız, 2021, 16). Hadji Bektash Wali learned Arabic and Persian through a good education process and educated himself in many important branches of science within the framework of Yasawi and Haydarî understanding and traditions (Yıldız, 2021, 16). Hadji Bektash Wali learned the the spiritual and subtle sciences under the tutelage of Lokman Perende, one of Yasawi's caliphs, and grew up with Sufi culture and upbringing by staying in the dervish lodge for three years without interruption, and thus internalized the concept of asceticism (Gölpınarlı, 1995, 8).

According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, the period from the time Hadji Bektash Wali passed through the guidance and education of Lokman Perende in Nishapur until he came to Anatolia and settled in Sulucakarahöyük can be considered as his spiritual formation period. In this period, which can be called the first period of his life, Hadji Bektash Wali passed all the stages of becoming a human being (Ülken, 1924, 528).

When we look at the XIIIth century, in which Hadji Bektash Wali spent his life, it is seen that the foundations of Anatolia's religious and social history, social, cultural and religious fabric were laid in this century. This century is a period of time in which great social, cultural and religious transformations such as the Turkification and Islamization of this geography were seriously experienced and the foundations of our national culture were laid in this geography. Along with these developments, the first manifestations of religious and cultural movements such as Mevleviism, Bektashism, Babaism and Ahilik emerged in this century (Yıldız, 2021, 15)

Hadji Bektash Wali kept his relations with Sufis and rulers who were his contemporaries alive and even met with some of them frequently to exchange ideas. Akçakoca Sultan, Seyyid Mahmud Hayrânî, Ahi Evran, and the emir of Kırşehir, Nureddin Caca, are important examples of this. The presence of Ahi

Evran among these names is especially meaningful in terms of showing that Hadji Bektash Wali had a close connection with the futüvvet organization and the Ahi tradition (Yıldız, 2021, 28).

It is known that after the death of Hadji Bektash Wali, Khatun Ana, to whom he had transferred his spiritual secrets and relics, handed over these secrets to Abdal Musa. Abdal Musa then played a decisive role in the transformation of Hadji Bektash Wali from a historical/real person and identity into a mythical and even mythological identity, thus into a cult, and became sacred in Bektashi circles (Yıldız, 2019, 138). In *Velâyetnâme*, it is mentioned that Hünkâr was a perfect murshid in every aspect and that he gave caliphate to many people and sent them to various regions for guidance (Yıldırım,2019,108). Among these caliphs, information is given about names such as Receb Şeydi, Saru Kadu, Menteşe Baba, Ali Baba, Mucur Seydi, Barak Baba, Hızır Samit, Bahaddin Atlaspuş, Dost-ı Hûda, Şeyh-i Cerdiğin (Taşğın, 2021,82). The origin of Bektashism is based on the path of Sufism lived and taught by Hadji Bektash Wali. However, the transformation of his understanding of Sufism into a full-fledged tariqa was realized two hundred years later by Balım Sultan, who is called the second founding murshid (Yıldırım,2019,109).

The Works of Hadji Bektash Wali

The most important work of Hadji Bektash-i Wali is *Makâlât*. *Makâlât*, *Kitâbu'l-Fawâid*, *Tafsir of Sûrah Fâtiha*, *Hadji Bektash Wali's Sermons*, *Besmele Commentary*, *Shathiyye*, *Makâlâtı-Gaybiyye ve Kelimât-ı Ayniyye* (*Velâyetnâme*, 2007,42). There are different opinions and claims about whether these works, including *Makâlât*, belong to Hadji Bektash-ı Wali (Coşan, 2019,49-52). *Velâyetnâme* is referred to as a legend attributed to Hadji Bektash-ı Wali, but after his death, it describes the miracles of him and other Sufis of the period (*Velâyetnâme*,2007,16-18).

The most important work attributed to Hadji Bektash Wali, *Makâlât*, was originally written in Arabic and we have a small part of the original copy. The work was translated into Turkish in verse by an Ottoman Mevlevi poet named Hatiboğlu Muhammed in the early XVth century (Kutlu, 2006, 156).

Hadji Bektash Wali's Moral Theory

In Hadji Bektash Wali's understanding of ethics, issues are explained according to the Qur'an and Sunnah, along with love for humanity. It is possible to see this approach in his ethics-based understanding of religion in all his works.

In the Besmele Commentary, in which he deals with subjects such as God's grace, mercy, forgiveness and generosity, Hadji Bektash Wali emphasizes that the Prophet was sent to people as a prophet of mercy and draws attention to the need to base the relations between people on this theme of mercy, and states that God's mercy will reach those who are in humility, compassion, servitude, consent and submission (Duman, 2005).

In his Makâlât, Hadji Bektash Wali says that man was created from three kinds of darkness and illuminated by three kinds of objects: "Man was created from the darkness of Çar anâsır (four elements) and illuminated with the light of reason. He was created from the darkness of ignorance and illuminated with the light of knowledge. He was created from the darkness of the nafs and illuminated with the light of knowledge (Öztürk, 1989, 90).

Hadji Bektash Wali explains that the ultimate goal of moral actions is to be a muhib and that the greatest gain belongs to muhibs (Makâlât, 2007, 52-59). According to him, Çalab God created human beings from four kinds of objects, namely wind, fire, water and earth, and human communities worship Çalab God in four kinds of worship: abides, zahids, arifs and muhibs. These four groups have four kinds of states and four kinds of desires (Makâlât, 2007, 44).

Hadji Bektash Wali wrote his teachings in his work called "Makâlât". The purpose of Makâlât, the most important work in which he reveals his understanding of religion, ethics and Sufism, is to teach the doctrines of faith, worship and ethics that people must fulfill in order to become a worthy servant of God, that is, "human being". In other words, it aims to teach the ways of strengthening one's faith with deeds and becoming a pious person, and of disciplining the soul and becoming equipped with good morals.

Makâlât is a Sufi work; it was written to explain the "four gates" and "forty maqams". The "four gates" refer to the concepts of "sharia", "tariqa", "ma'rifat" and "hakikat". The "forty maqams" are the forty steps of stairs to be traveled by entering through these gates. Here, Hadji Bektash-ı Wali opens these doors and explains what the ten maqams are in each of them and what needs to be done to reach the next maqam from each maqam (Makâlât, 2007,27). Those who successfully complete the "Forty Maqams" listed in the "Four Doors" have attained the secrets of truth. The four gates, listed as Sharia, Tariqat, Ma'rifat and Truth, include achievements that become increasingly difficult. Regarding the importance attached to knowledge, it is seen that the second makam of the door of Sharia is "learning knowledge" and the seventh makam of the door of ma'rifet is "having knowledge" (Coşan, 1996,11).

In Hadji Bektash Wali's Makâlât, four of the ten stations mentioned in Shari'a, one of the Four Gates, are values such as (learning knowledge, earning halâl, being compassionate, eating and dressing clean, commanding good and forbidding evil). Three of the ten stations mentioned in Tariqa (maturing the soul, being hopeful, having love); six of the ten stations mentioned in Ma'rifat (knowing oneself, patience, shame, generosity, having knowledge, passing from sloth and selfishness); Five of the ten maqams mentioned in Truth (being humble and fertile like the earth, looking at everyone with the same eyes and not condemning them, doing every good deed you can, not harming the creatures, conversing) are the maxims that lead to moral exaltation (Kaya, 2021, 516).

According to Hadji Bektash Wali, the heart is a great city and whatever God Almighty has created up to the Throne is found in and fits into that city. There are two sultans in the heart, one of whom is a priestly sultan and the other a demonic sultan. "The name of the merciful sultan is reason, his deputy is faith, and his commander is sloth. The guardians of faith are: knowledge, generosity, shame, patience, abstinence, fear and decency" (Coşan, 1996,21).

When we consider the stations in the Four Gates in order, it is seen that the most important principle in the path that begins with the Shari'ah is the consciousness of faith, and that moral principles and values such as learning knowledge, performing worship, the importance of halal earnings, manners for family life, measures to be followed in social interaction, glorifying goodness, and fighting evil are explained in connection with each other (Makâlât, 2007, 29).

The basic acts of worship that Allah wants us to fulfill are for us. Like Ahmet Yasawi, Hadji Bektash Wali is aware of the importance of worship for human beings. According to him, the levels of tariqa, Ma'rifat and truth remain closed to anyone whose adherence to Sharia is not perfect (Onat, 1997, 42).

Hadji Bektash Wali mentions the importance of earning halal income and staying away from haram as the fourth authority in the Shari'ah. According to Hadji Bektash Wali, who says that harams are seven seas that drown people, not staying away from haram is like drowning in the sea, "if a drop of alcohol drips into a well, if they drain the water of that well, if grass grows where that water is poured, and if sheep eat that grass, according to the word of the people of piety, the meat of that sheep is haram. The reason why it is haram is because it contains the act of the devil" (Makâlât, 2007, 98) What is meant here is to emphasize that haram makes what is edible and drinkable inedible and undrinkable, and therefore people should seek halal earnings and stay away from haram. Today,

the main reason for the deterioration of the economic balance and the poverty of societies is the people who have haram earnings and have moral weaknesses. Undoubtedly, economic problems can trigger many moral problems in social life.

Hadji Bektash Wali explains being compassionate as the eighth makam in the Shari'ah and being merciful towards creatures as a reflection of faith (Makâlât, 2007,30)

Hadji Bektash Wali mentioned cleanliness as the ninth makam. "The ninth makam is to wear bee clothes and eat bee food" (Makâlât, 2007, 30), and he cited the verses "Eat from the pure of the sustenance we have given you" (Surat al-Baqara, 172) and "keep your clothes clean" (Surat al-Muddatessir, 4) as evidence (Makâlât, 2007, 75).

After the explanation of the principles of the path of tariqa, the stations of the gate of ma'rifat (knowledge) come next. "The first station of ma'rifat is decency. The second is fear, the third is limiting excessive desires and avoiding what is forbidden. The fourth is patience, the fifth is shame, the sixth is generosity, the seventh is knowledge, giving oneself to Allah, the eighth is detaching oneself from the self and giving oneself to Allah, the ninth is having knowledge and knowing Allah, and the tenth is knowing oneself." (Makâlât, 2007, 17). As can be seen, all of these stations aim to build the human being with moral values.

Hadji Bektash Wali (Makâlât, 2007,31), who emphasizes the first station of the path of knowledge as an important moral principle, explains it with the couplet "Master, know that what is life in the human body is decency, the light of people's eyes and hearts is decency" (Kitâbü'l-Fawâid, 2010,55). In connection with the concept of adab, he also mentions the sense of shame (hayaa) as the fifth makam. The Prophet states that "hayaa is one of the pillars of faith" (Bukhari, Iman, 16). The owners of hayaa fear God by refraining from committing sins with a sense of shame. In Makâlât, Hadji Bektash Wali explains the place of shame and the importance of the sense of shame in a narrative about Hz. Adam in a mythical manner (Makâlât, 2007, 85, 118). As a moral value and beauty, decency and sense of shame are very important.

Havf (fear), the second station of the path of Ma'rifat (knowledge), is a whip that God uses to drive people to worship and good deeds. Therefore, Hadji Bektash Wali sees fear as an important step in reaching perfection (Makâlât, 2007, 34).

The third stage of the gate of knowledge is self-training, hunger and austerity. According to Hadji Bektash Wali, "Hunger is like thunder and

contentment is like a cloud; just as thunder and clouds cause rain, contentment and hunger cause deep and subtle thinking (wisdom) and intuition” (Makâlât, 2007, 119). Contentment is the phenomenon of being content with what one has. It is when the soul does not incline to other things and does not covet what others have: Anyone who brings himself to this point is considered to have reached a certain degree on the path of Ma’rifat.

Hadji Bektash Wali explains patience as the fourth makam, supporting the third makam of being contented. He emphasized the importance of patience by saying “The first protection of the mind is patience”. Regarding those who are patient, he explains that it is from us to be grateful and from Allah to increase the blessings; “And of course! If you are grateful, I will certainly increase My blessings upon you” (Surah Ibrahim, 7) and “Those who are patient will certainly be rewarded without calculation” (Surah Zumar, 10) (Makâlât, 2007,76).

Indeed, patience is important as an attitude that educators, behavioral scientists, psychologists and doctors frequently emphasize to people today. The most important cause of verbal or physical violence between people is impatient attitudes and behaviors. In this respect, patience is an important moral virtue.

According to Hadji Bektash Wali, who expresses generosity as an important virtue and virtuousness as the sixth ma’rifat of knowledge, “generosity is to want others to enjoy more than one’s own self, not to hurt even those who deserve to be hurt (Kitâbü’l-Fevâid, 2010, 69). According to Hadji Bektash Wali’s categorization of generosity; “generosity is of four types: generosity in property, body, soul and heart. The first is generosity of wealth, belonging to the rich. The second is generosity of body, belonging to the veterans. The third is generosity of soul, belonging to the lovers. The fourth is the generosity of the heart, the generosity of the ârifs.”(Makâlât ,2007,60).

Generosity, as a moral virtue, strengthens trusted communication and cooperation between people and increases social solidarity.

The seventh station of the door of knowledge is knowledge. Hadji Bektash Wali explains that the Prophet said, “Everything is something; ignorance is nothing. “ and “People of knowledge are those who are useful to the people and enlightened people.” About the importance of knowledge and scholars, Hadji Bektash Wali mentions that “People of knowledge are beneficial to all people, havas and commons, and while parents protect their children from the troubles of the world, scholars protect Muslims from the troubles and fires of the hereafter.” (Makâlât, 2007, 105, 133) Elsewhere in Makâlât, “Allah Almighty has made three darknesses bright with three things. First, He illuminated the darkness of the world with the light of the moon, day and stars. And again, He

created man out of three darknesses and made him luminous with three objects. First, with the light of intellect, second with the light of knowledge, and third with the light of knowledge.” (Makâlât,2007,129).

The ninth station of the door of Ma’rifat is to make hearts and hearts content (Makâlât, 2007, 30).

The tenth station in Ma’rifat is explained as knowing oneself. One needs to know and remember oneself. If a person does not know the difference between Rahman and Satan, he does not know himself. Those who cannot understand this saying do not know themselves, even if they are in human form, they are not at the human level. The worship of the zahid is doing work without knowing its origin. The contemplation of the arif is to perceive the divine art of Allah (Makâlât, 2007, 64). Self-knowledge means to know oneself, to recognize oneself, to act according to one’s sense of responsibility towards one’s Lord and oneself, and to care about taking the right actions.

The stations in the Truth explained by Hadji Bektash Wali in the Four Gates are; “the first is to be humble and fertile like the earth, the second is to look at everyone with the same eyes and not to condemn them, the third is to do every good deed you can, the fourth is to make sure that everything and everyone in the world is safe and secure from him, the fifth is to be obedient to Allah and to show his love for Him. “ It is intertwined with moral values (Makâlât, 2007, 31).

The first station of the door of Hadji Bektash Wali’s Truth is to be humble. The source of being arrogant is the devil. The devil leads one away from obedience and humility and encourages one to be arrogant. In contrast, the source of humility is the Most Merciful. Therefore, whenever arrogance comes, it is necessary to refer humility to him and remove the state of arrogance, and hearts cannot be won without humility (Makâlât, 2007, 133-134).

Allah criticizes those who are arrogant in the Qur’an with the verse “Do not walk proudly on the earth, for you can neither pierce the earth nor reach the mountains in height” (Surat al-Isra, 111). Other verses in the Qur’an also emphasize the evil of arrogance and the moral virtue of humility: “O you who believe! Whoever of you turns back from his religion, He will bring a people whom Allah loves and they love Allah, humble towards the believers, strong against the disbelievers, striving in the way of Allah and not fearing the condemnation of those who condemn.”(Surat al-Ma’ida, 54); “Allah does not love the arrogant”(Surat al-Nahl, 23).

To be just, not to oppress, to observe justice, not to treat all people differently but to treat them equally, to look at everyone with the same eyes is

the second of the authorities mentioned by Hadji Bektash-i Wali in the Truth from the Four Gates (Makâlât, 2007, 31). His advice to “look at the seventy-two nations with one eye and serve them equally” is the second of the authorities mentioned in the Four Gates of Truth (Makâlât, 2007,31). “ (Nahl, 16/90), “Surely Allah commands you to entrust the trusts to their rightful owners and to judge with justice when you judge between people.” (Nisa, 4/58), “Say: “My Lord has commanded me to do justice” (A’raf 7/29) and “... be people who uphold justice scrupulously” (Nisa, 4/135).

Observing justice and being just is an important value. Because oppression is the cause of chaos, turmoil and anarchy. Justice is the foundation of property and civilization, the source of stability and peace (Kaya (2021,522).

Hadji Bektash Wali, as the fourth of the ten authorities in the Truth, emphasizes that everything and everyone in the world should be safe from him and the importance of being a safe person. In terms of moral principles, it is very important to gain the awareness of empathy and to apply it in life. The Prophet’s hadiths “A Muslim is one from whose hand and tongue Muslims are safe” (Bukhari, Imân 4-5) and “What you tolerate for yourself, love for all people; what you do not tolerate for yourself, do not tolerate for others” (Bukhari, Imân 7) are excellent examples in this regard.

Hadji Bektash Wali expressed truthfulness and honesty as indicators of one’s goodness and beauty, and said that “a man’s beauty is in the beauty of his words, and his maturity is in the righteousness of his work and morals”. In order to emphasize that what a person does and how he behaves is more important than what he says, with the saying “we do not look at words, but inwardly and in deed”, he stated that one should be sincere in everything and that insincerity is a kind of deception.

Truthfulness, honesty, being trustworthy, and not stooping to lies are among the most important moral norms and values. According to Hadji Bektash-i Wali, lying and deceitfulness are important factors that lead people astray from the right path. According to him, “the first of the great enemies is egoistic wishes and desires, the second is arrogance and perversion, and the third is deceit and falsehood. These three acts are partners with Satan and are the most important enemies that lead those who say they are believers astray” (Makâlât, 2007, 134).

Doing good, helping people, working for the well-being of all creation is mentioned by Hadji Bektash Wali in both Sharia, Truth and Tarikat. The tenth of the stations in the Shari’ah, one of the Four Gates, is to command good and avoid evil. The third of the stations in the Truth, one of the Four Gates, is to do

every good deed you can. The ninth of the stations in the Tariqa, one of the Four Gates, is to recommend goodness and encourage people to do good (Makâlât, 2007, 31-32).

Truthfulness, honesty, directing to good and preventing from evil, which Hadji Bektash Wali emphasizes in the Four Gates, are among the important principles and values recommended to Muslims in the Qur'an: "Let there be among you a people who call to good, enjoining good and forbidding evil." (Surah Al-Imran, 104); "You are the best nation that has been created for mankind. You enjoin good and forbid evil." (Surah Al-Imran, 110); "Believing men and women are each other's guardians. They enjoin good and forbid evil" (Surat al-Tawbah, 71)

Hadji Bektash Wali recommended looking at beings with love and being a person of love. According to Hadji Bektash Wali, who mentions cleaning the body, mind, heart and soul from visible and invisible dirt and purifying them from bad feelings and thoughts as a value, even cleaning the stones on the road is an important approach. Just as water is clean and cleansing, humans, like water, should be both clean and cleansing. Hadji Bektash Wali, who believes that a person who has evil acts such as hatred, envy, stinginess, greed, anger, backbiting, and shamelessness inside cannot be cleansed even if he washes the outside with water, advised that cleaning should start from oneself by saying that those who cannot clean themselves cannot clean others (Kaya, 2021, 524)

It is very important for the spread of beauty and peace in the society that human beings are clean both materially and spiritually in their interactions with other people with whom they live together, and that they are a monument of morality inside and out.

Conclusion

According to Hadji Bektash Wali, a man of heart who played an important role in the process of Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia and left lasting traces, a perfect human being is a model of a human being who has purified his inner world and is perfect with his moral virtues. When we look at these thoughts of Hadji Bektash Wali, we can see that he was a Sufi, a man of heart, who knew the structure of human existence and spiritual qualities of human beings well and assimilated them.

In his work "Makâlât", Hadji Bektash Wali, by taking into account the model of piety presented by the Qur'an and Sunnah with the teachings of the

“Four Gates” and “forty maqams” together with both Shari’ah and Sufi realities, aimed to provide the doctrines of belief, worship and ethics that people should fulfill in order to become a servant worthy of Allah, that is, “human being”. This model of piety, as a reflection of the Tawhidi faith in life, contains the maxims that will ensure that religious and worldly deeds will enable people to live peacefully in love and peace in their lives. This moralized test of people in this worldly life will enable them to easily achieve the eternal life promised by Allah. This reality is the main goal of the “ethical theory” of Hadji Bektash-ı Wali, who pursues the depth of servitude and aims to build a “virtuous human and society model” with this consciousness.

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CHAPTER XII

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY IN THE POEMS OF HADJI BAIRAM WALI

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The rapid and uncontrolled social transformation in the process of modernization over the last two hundred years has brought about social convulsions. Moral integrity has also degenerated in these convulsions. Western intellectuals recognized this and realized the need for a social morality based on spirituality. In the adoption of social morality by society, the help of sociology was mostly used. The approach of sufis in the Muslim world, which is based on the maturation of human beings, has an aspect that reflects not only on the individual but also on society. In this sense, the sufi understanding of morality based on religion has the potential to stand against the spiritual division caused by secularization and capitalism while paving the way for progress. In this study, the role of the perfect human being as an individual in the adoption of social morality will be evaluated based on the poetry of Hadji Bairam Wali.

Morality is defined as the rules created to regulate the behaviour of human beings in society or their relationship with other people (Erdem, 2009). For a behaviour to be considered moral, it must be voluntarily internalized by the individual within a human community (Tusi, 2007). This is because, although morality is directly related to reason and will for its origin and purpose of existence, it emerges and is shaped within a social and political environment. Therefore, morality is a concept with individual and social aspects (Özturan, 2013). For although the nature of man gives him some opportunities, it alone cannot be the source of morality. Because in the process, he develops his abilities and creates his moral profile by adding something of his nature. Therefore, morality is the process of bringing the individual into society by directing

actions. In this respect, morality is defined as a system of values or a traditional way of life that sustains individual and social existence (Gazali, 1998).

Tasawwuf/Sufism is a science that deals with morality. One of the important transformations in the history of tasawwuf took place with Ibn ‘Arabi. Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 638/1240) establishes a relationship between man and the country/state/city in his first work, *al-Tadbirat al-Ilahiyya fi Islah Mamlakat al-Insaniyya*, which he wrote before leaving Andalusia (598/1202). The title of the work can be translated as “Divine Measures for the Improvement of the Human Homeland”. In this work, Ibn ‘Arabi uses the city as a metaphor to emphasize the similarity between man and the city. He describes *al-Tadbirat al-Ilahiyya* as a commentary on “Hakîm’s” work called *Sirr al-Asrar*. It is reported that the person Ibn ‘Arabi referred to as “Hakîm” was Aristotle. According to the rumour, when Alexander the Great went on a campaign for war, Aristotle could not accompany him due to health problems. Thereupon, he wrote the *Sirr al-Asrar*, which contains the issues that the ruler should pay attention to when managing the state. Considering the allegory of the macro-cosmos and micro-cosmos, and the theories of temperament in the relationship between the waters of the universe and human beings, it is seen that the works of political treatise date back to Pythagoras even before Aristotle. What makes Ibn ‘Arabi unique in his analogies between the city and the human being is that he uses the infrastructure of these sciences by reconceptualizing them with tasawwuf. Ibn ‘Arabi, who likens the human being to a city, touches upon the principles of the movement of the human being, who is a multifaceted entity, following the purpose of his existence, just like the management of a city.

Ibn ‘Arabi’s emphasis on the relationship between the city and man was accepted by the sufis in the later period. One of these names is Hadji Bairam Wali. His poem begins with the line “My *Çalab* (God) has created a city amid two worlds” about the relationship between the city and perfected human being (*insan-ı kâmil*), is also suitable for interpretation in terms of the individual and social moral issues. Many annotations have been made to this poem of the poet (Erdoğan, Sağlam 2018).

What is meant by the city in the poem is the heart of the perfect believer. The starting point here is the saying, “...I fit into the heart of my faithful servant...” (Ajluni, udt). A believer purifies his heart from the evil that takes him away from Allah. When we turn towards the Truth at every moment, the evils disappear and Allah and His Messenger take their place in the heart. The hadith “Allah does not look at your outward appearance, but at your hearts and

intentions” (Müslim, Birr, 33; İbn Mâce, Zühd, 9; Ahmed b. Hanbel, 2/285, 539) is in this context. In the establishment of social morality today, Hadji Bairam’s poem tells us that the starting point is primarily the heart of the individual (Sahafi, 2013; Nazik 2016).

The acquisition of this virtue, which is also called the refined heart (*al-qalbu’s-salim*) in sufi terminology, takes place through voluntary death. In other words, it is not to follow the things that the commanding self (*nafs*) desires and not to give a place in the heart to anyone other than Allah. The word gnostic (*arif*) is used for the person with such a heart. *Arif* hears, sees, talks holds, and walks with the Real (*Haqq*). Because he is characterized by the attributes of *Haqq* (Sahafi, 2013). The Real (*Haqq*) is that he makes him hear, shows him, makes him speak, and makes him walk.

“Suddenly I arrived at the city and saw the city being made.”

In this verse, Hadji Bairam draws attention to distancing oneself from the desires of the commanding self (*nafs*), and sacrificing one’s love of authority and presidency. Because the last evil trait that leaves a human being is the greed of administration. This is not an easy process. However, as a result, there are sublime manifestations of *Haqq* (*tajalli*), intuition (*waridat*) and inspiration (*ilham*). This level is reached by broken and sad hearts. Allah The Almighty says, “I am with those whose hearts are broken.” As the servant gets to know himself, he realizes how imperfect his worships and deeds are. His heart would be sad. For this reason, the phrase “He who knows his self (*nafs*) knows his Lord” (Sahafi, 2013) is often quoted in sufi literature.

“I was even made between stone and earth.”

He who knows himself is purified from evil. This is also called *fana* (annihilation) in tasawwuf. He who gives up the temporary flavours of this world reaches the spiritual station (*maqam*) of real wealth. The stone has more than one symbolic meaning. One of them is perseverance and determination. The earth, on the other hand, is humility, obedience and selflessness (*mahwiyah*). The way to perseverance and stabilization in a high station is through humility, obedience and selflessness. This is done by those who want Mawla’s consent (*rida*) and beauty (*jamal*) with love. Eventually, they become solid as stone. Another symbolic meaning of the stone is sincerity (*ikhlas*).” However, they were commanded to worship Him only as those who turn to the truth, making religion peculiar to Allah” (Surah Bayyina, 5), the sincerity in the verse is symbolized with a stone in the poem (Sahafi, 2013). The stone also symbolizes the tranquil self (*nafs mutmainnah*). The earth is the divine spirit (Sahafi, 2013)... For this

reason, Sahavî gives the example of Hadji Bairam Wali's lifetime of patience in the face of persecution. While earth represents the capable, clean, good-natured heart, in any case, the stone is also used in negative meanings such as gloom, hard-heartedness, and rudeness. As in the verses "...Those whose hearts are hardened..." (Surah Hajj 53), "If you had been rude and hard-hearted (like a stone), they would have scattered around you" (Surah Al Imran, 159), "Speak to him a gentle word (like earth)" (Surah Taha 44) (Sahafi, 2013). Here, attention is also drawn to the Prophet's treatment of people. It is pointed out how a person, like a stone heart or a soil, finds a response in society.

"They (the students) dress stones and present them to the master."

Just like the extraction of the hidden ore in the stone by carving, the spiritual master (*sheikh*) trains his disciples (*murid*) to achieve Divine manifestations, progress, discovery, and reveal the ore inside them. The Prophet said, "There is a piece of flesh in man. If it is reformed, the whole body is reformed. If it is corrupted, the whole body is corrupted. That piece of flesh is the heart." (Bukhari, Iman 39, Buyu' 2; Muslim, Musakat 107, 108). As in the hadith, the sheikh cleans the matters that spoil the deeds and beliefs of the disciple from his heart.

"They remember the name of *Çalab* (Allah) in every part of that stone."

When the disciple (*murid*) beautifies his life in the city of the heart and performs voluntary death, he has awakened in the land of dead hearts. This state is revealed by remembering Allah a lot. It is said, "They remember Allah while standing, sitting and lying on their sides" (Surah Al Imran 191). Because they know their selves (*nafs*), their hearts are sad and they tolerate the oppression from the people. In the hadith, it is said, "I am with those whose hearts are broken." (Abu Nu'aym, Hilya, II, 364). Hadji Bairam, while talking about the characteristics of the perfected human being (*insan-ı kamil*), in a sense, he imposes a social responsibility on him: To endure the oppression of the people (Sahafi, 2013). Thus, he can reach them and call them to the truth.

"Arrows are shot from that city and they come and hit the spirits."

From the city of the heart, arrows are fired that hit their target and bring relief. Those who shoot that arrow are the friends of Allah who possess the divine knowledge (*al-ilm al-ladunn*). They are also called *rijal* (friends of God). "They are the men/*rijal* whom trade and commerce do not prevent them from the remembrance of Allah." (Surah Nur, 37) (Sahafi, 2013; Akşemseddin 2016). Since they call to the Truth with sincerity and without any expectation of benefit, what they say affects the people.

“The words of the gnostics (*arif*) are sold in the bazaar of that city.”

What makes the *arif* an *arif* is his attainment of annihilation (*fana*) in the sea of *tawhid* with his actions and attributes. By the grace of Allah, His Divine Beauty (*Jamal*) was manifested in them. For this reason, actions that call people to the world, such as trade and shopping, do not prevent them from the remembrance of Allah (*dhikr*) (Sahafi, 2013).

“What I call a city is the heart, neither scholar nor ignorant.”

Just as the Messenger of Allah conquered the city of Mecca, as it is stated in the verse “O Messenger of Allah, you are residing in this land” (Surah Balad 2), the gnostics (*arif*) who followed his way conquered the city of the heart. When moral virtues are realized in an individual sense, discourse and action are harmonized. Not only the word of the *arifs*, but also their silence is a guidance for the people (Sahafi, 2013). Even if he does not speak, his deeds set an example for other people.

“What I call a city is the heart, neither scholar nor ignorant.”

Hadji Bairam explains here that what is meant by the city is the heart. Ignorance and knowledge are mentioned together because the heart can incline toward both. Here Hadji Bairam points out the difference between the scholar (*alim*) and the gnostic (*arif*) (Sahafi, 2013; Akşemseddin, 2016). In general terms, the knowledge of the *alim* is related to the world and that of the *arif* is related to the truth.

“The blood of lovers is fountain on the edge of that city.”

The perfected human being (*insan-ı kamil*) has given up his own life and his loved ones to guide people to the right path. He makes this sacrifice not because he expects something from people, but because of his love.

“The *arif* understand my word, the ignorant do not know and condemn.”

Hadji Bairam, like Mawlana, complains about the lack of customers for what he says. Few people understand and follow his advice. When a person understands the extent of his ability and applies it in his life, he becomes *arif* (Sahafi, 2013; Akşemseddin, 2019). The abundance of knowledge on the surface does not mean that the person is an *arif*.

“Hadji Bairam himself shouts and calls out from the minaret of that city.”

Hadji Bairam compares the minarets in the city to perfect human beings (*insan-ı kamil*). Just as the minaret is a distinctive image that adds identity to the city, so is the perfected human being. People are called to worship Allah from minarets. The perfected human being (*insan-ı kamil*) also calls people to the good and the truth. Such people have been blessed with the phrase “We created

man in the best form” in the 4th verse of Surah Tin. The aspirant (*talib*) who wants to reach the Almighty must attempt to do so (Sahafi, 2013; Akşemseddin, 2019). He should do this under the supervision of a perfect master who invites him to the right path.

Minaret also means love, affection and enthusiasm. The minaret is the place where the verse “This is my way; I and those who follow me deliberately call people to Allah” (Surah Yusuf 108) is fulfilled. Minaret and minbar are public and private invitation authorities. This is also the state of abiding in Allah (*baqa*) after the state of annihilation (*fana*), and the state of separation (*farq*) after the state of gathering (*jam’*). Just as the minaret is distinguished from the other buildings in the city, the gnostic (*arif*) is distinguished from other people as he reaches perfection in unification (*tawhid*). Here the *arif* leaves the house of the heart and enters the garden of the attributes of divinity. He migrates to Allah. The verse “Whoever emigrates in the way of Allah, he will find in the earth plenty of space and breadth. And whoever leaves his home to emigrate to Allah and His Messenger and then death overtakes him, surely his reward is with Allah. Allah is most forgiving, most merciful.” (Surah Nesa, 100) refers to this (Sahafi, 2013).

Conclusion

Morality is a set of basic human values. Because, in addition to hope and fear, feelings and enthusiasm in the inner world, human beings exist with their education system, religious and cultural values, and social and political environment. In other words, religion, culture and political environment are the main factors that constitute his morality. Therefore, the relationship of morality with politics, religion and cultural phenomena is an inevitable reality. Just as moral individuals are the cornerstone of a healthy society and an honest political structure, a strong political and social structure is also an important factor in the upbringing of moral people. For this reason, Islam aims to create a fair society and political structures to raise moral individuals. Because the political, social and cultural environment has an important role in the education/upbringing of moral individuals.

Islam is a religion that aims at the unity of faith and action, morality and governance. The educational system, family values, cultural environment and political environment have a great influence on the moral formation of the individual. Because he has an identity shaped by human weaknesses, socio-

political rules, expectations and concerns. For this reason, the religion of Islam has placed morality, one of the most important factors that give human beings personality and consciousness, at the centre and ultimate point of all structures. This is because moral principles form the basis of the human being's relationship both horizontally with his fellow human beings and vertically with the whole of nature.

For tasawwuf, which advocates morality based on religion, morality is not only a set of rules that must be followed but also a system of values. The harmony between the members of the social system corresponds to a limited extent with outside surveillance. As in the philosophy of the panopticon in its current expression, while external surveillance prevents crime, the motivation to reveal virtue is insufficient. In a value system where voluntary participation is essential, the relations of the individual with the individual and the individual with the society can be maintained regularly.

Tasawwuf has used the term *adab* (propriety, the spiritual courtesy) for moral behaviour patterns involving various areas of life. In sufi thought, for a behaviour to be accepted as moral, it must be done involuntarily or spontaneously. Hence, *adab* includes not only the external aspect of morality towards behaviour but also the internal, conscientious aspect of morality that provides involuntary motivation. With this definition, *adab* covers not only the affairs of this world but also the affairs of the hereafter.

The starting point of tasawwuf in dealing with morality is Islam. In sufi thought, morality is not only the rules to be followed, but also the system of values that brings together human relations, life order, individuals and society. The Prophet demonstrated with his life how to apply the morality of the Quran. In this respect, one of the definitions of tasawwuf is to try to live the Qur'an as the Prophet lived.

According to Hadji Bairam, the education of society, moral structure, commercial understanding, and values symbolized by the minaret stand out in the personalities, lifestyles and works of perfect human beings. Each of them carried out activities to warn not only the people but also the administrators during their period. Akshamsaddin, the caliph (*khalifah*) of Hadji Bairam, is a remarkable name in terms of relations and boundaries with the administrators.

Hadji Bairam Wali states that the *nafs* is the source of bad habits and ugly behaviours. The battle against the *nafs* is the effort of man to reach moral maturity. The *nafs*, which leads people to evil, is a difficult mountain to overcome.

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CHAPTER XIII

UNDERSTANDING OF MORALITY OF KINALIZADE ALİ ÇELEBİ THE AUTHOR OF THE FIRST BOOK OF ETHICS IN TURKISH

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INTRODUCTION

Humankind lives as a society and establishes interactions with each other. In the course of such interactions, intimacies and social distances are formed. Moreover, in the course of such interactions, similarities and differences with other individuals are perceived and the emotional consequences of these similarities and differences are also formed. It is understood that the life of society is perceived and lived within a totality of culture that is formed as a result of the need of individuals for each other. Culture is formed in the process of the emergence of a system of values, norms, and behavioral patterns that are formed within the framework of the understanding of protecting these

values, and their acceptance by the majority of the society. What societies should do constitutes the cultural structure, while what they do constitutes the social structure. Therefore, norms regulate human behavior in every society. These norms are not planned by some people, but developed and formed as a result of the spontaneous unity of understanding that societies have formed by living together for many years. Individuals do not learn these norms in written form, but through their interactions with others or through the oral expression of their elders. In this way, each society passes on its culture from generation to generation, resulting in standard patterns of behavior, i.e. customs and traditions. These customs and traditions constitute the rules that regulate behavior. So when we talk about the relations between individuals in societies, we are talking about the concept of morality, because the concept of morality means being able to assess the possibility of putting cultural norms into the individual, into his or her mind.

Social control in society is exercised through customs and, even if weaker, through traditions. Thus, the survival of a society depends on the existence and prevalence of common behaviors among individuals through customs and traditions. Customs and traditions vary from society to society, from culture to culture, and even within the same society according to different settlements and different geographies. When we see and read these differences, we realize that our own customs and traditions do not reflect the absolute truth. We can also see that when living conditions change, the needs of societies change. For instance, industrialization and urbanization change family relations and weaken the paternal authority and traditional ties between individuals. In short, we understand that the ways of behavior shaped by our different customs and traditions of the past and present are not necessarily right or wrong. Therefore, as the laws, customs, and rules governing social relations change, so do the morals of societies. Changing morality is therefore a reality, and ensuring the immutability of morality is an ideal. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the form of morality and its content. In other words, changes in morality are essentially seen as changes in the form and shape of morality. For example, the behaviors we use to express our respect for each other may appear in different forms in different societies and times, but respect continues to exist as a value. Sometimes there are great changes in the content of morality, but the ideal of society is to prevent this change and to ensure the stability of life. If the forms change but the content remains the same in most cases, this shows that the moral value in question is universal, that is, it is valid in all places and times,

and that societies have more grounds for realizing the ideal of the immutability of morality. When we look at the many examples in human history, we realize that good morality does not necessarily require good intentions, but that the outcome must be good for both parties. It is difficult to find and apply examples of moral behavior that will produce good results for all people and will always be valid. Therefore, we should aim to find universal values in morality (Güngör, 1997: 93-99).

Since individuals cannot live alone, those who live together have to regulate their relations with each other. Morality is already a concept related to interpersonal relations. Therefore, human moral behavior is something that is learned in the process of relating to others in social life. In other words, we learn how to behave. In order to solve the problem of morality, society tries to create equality on the one hand, and on the other hand to raise all individuals in moral discipline. This is an ideal situation, but not every society can reach this ideal. Nor can this problem be easily solved through education. For example, what moral values should be imparted through education? Is the ideal morality traditional morality? Or is it the morality proposed by social reformers? Which stratum of society's moral values should be imparted to children? Although religion is not the only source of moral behavior, we can say that it is the biggest source. This is because we know that religions, especially Islam, have many commands that determine the social life of the Muslim, especially his or her morality. All the moral rules that can be considered valid for all people today are among the commands of religions, especially Islam. In fact, religions find their social basis in the system of morality that originates from the understanding of God (Güngör, 1997: 100-117). In this case, it is necessary to say that what scientists do and write about moral values, which are so important for societies and so necessary for realizing peace and tranquility among all people, is as important as what politicians and people do.

Books on morality written by Muslim scholars have been the source of morality in the Islamic world in terms of interpreting Islamic morality, re-developing, enriching, and systematizing it in the face of changing needs in society over time. These books first deal with the existing situation and then specify the qualities that a Muslim should possess and the behaviors that he should perform. In other words, they evaluate problems in theoretical and practical terms. The books on morality can be divided into three categories: philosophical, mystical, and theological books on morality. Books on philosophical ethics include the works of ancient Greek philosophers,

Indian thinkers, and Islamic philosophers. The works of Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato, and the ethical works of Beydeba, an important representative of Indian thought, such as *Kalīla wa-Dimna*, were translated into Arabic in the early period and were very influential in the Islamic world. Islamic philosophers did not attempt to establish a new system of morality, but rather, based on the moral terms, definitions, and classifications in the aforementioned works, they tried to systematically explain Islamic morality based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and put forward an understanding of morality shaped around the concept of soul and virtue and based on reason. Although many Islamic philosophers wrote works on morality, especially Al-Rāzī's *al-Tibb al-Ruhani*; Alfarabi's *al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyah*, *İhşā' al-'Ulūm* ("On the Introduction of Knowledge"), *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* ("The Virtuous City"); Ibn Miskawayh's *Tahdhib al'Akhlaq* ("Refinement of Morals"); Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's *Akhlaq-i-Nasri*; Ghazali's *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* ("The Revival of the Religious Knowledge") and Kınalızade Ali Efendi's *Ahlak-ı Alai* (*The Morals of 'Ali'*) are important works of ethics written in the field of philosophical ethics and provide direct information about Muslims' understanding of morality and their lives. These works were also influential in the development and systematization of Islamic morality (Karaman, 2013: 53-54). One of the most important works of the moralists of the Islamic world is Kınalızade Ali Çelebi's *Ahlak-ı Alai* (*The Morals of 'Ali'*). In addition to carrying the content and essence of the works written in the Islamic world before him, this work provided material for the ethics books and advice treatises written after him. Nevertheless, it is not likely to find its literary success and richness of content neither in its successors or predecessors. This work has special importance not only in the field of Islamic ethical thought but also in literature, history, and Sharia sciences in general, among the works written in the Ottoman period. In this respect, it has won the favor of literary, historical, and political scientists (Kınalızade, 2016: 9)

KINALIZADE ALİ ÇELEBİ

A. His Life and Works:

Born in 1510, Ali Çelebi was the grandson of Abdülkadir Hamidi, who was nicknamed 'Kınalı' because he dyed his beard, and the son of Emrullah Efendi, who was born in Isparta. His father Emrullah Efendi was a kadi in Damascus and Aleppo and besides Ali Çelebi, he had two sons, Abdurrahim Çelebi and Müslim Çelebi. Ali Çelebi inherited the scholarly tradition of his father and his

father's circle, as his father Emrullah Efendi was a member of the seminary. Kadri Efendi, who had a great influence on Ali Çelebi's scholarly upbringing in Istanbul, was also one of the elders of the family. After completing his primary education in Isparta, Ali Çelebi went to Istanbul and continued his education under the supervision of his relative Kadri Efendi. In the meantime, he took lessons from Malul Emir Efendi, Sinan Efendi, Merhaba Efendi, Kara Salih Efendi, and Çivicizade Mehmet Efendi, the famous scholar of the period, and later became Çivicizade's assistant. Çivicizade was the most important architect of Ali Çelebi's world of thought. However, there was a rivalry between Çivicizade and Ebussuud Efendi, the Sheikh al-Islam of the time. In Sufi sources, Çivicizade is portrayed as the harsh representative of the school that declared Ibn Arabi and Mawlana as 'our of Sharia'. This closeness to Çivicizade prevented Çelebi from being a mudarris (lecturer) for a long time. In 1541, Çelebi presented his works to Ebussuud and criticized this situation. Ebussuud admired Çelebi's courage and appointed him as a mudarris to Hüsameddin Madrasah in Edirne (1543). Çelebi served in various madrasas until 1563 when he became a qadi in Damascus. When came to 1571, he was appointed as Anatolian Kazasker, where he became responsible for all educational and legal proceedings on the Anatolian side (Kınalızade, 2016, 12-14). Ali Çelebi had children named Hasan Çelebi, Mehmet Fehmi Efendi and Hüseyin Fevzi Efendi. He died in Edirne in 1572. Sources mention that Ali Çelebi had extensive knowledge in the sciences of Philosophy, Riyaziyat, Islamic Law, Hadith, Tafsir, and Rhetoric. He was fluent in Arabic and Persian to write poetry (Katip Çelebi, 1980: 17-18).

After and apart from Nasiruddin Tusi's *Ahlak-ı Nasiri*, Jalaluddin Devvani's *Ahlak-ı Jalali*, and Hussein al-Kashifi's *Ahlak-ı Muhsini*, Kınalızade Ali Çelebi was the first thinker in the Islamic world to write a book on ethics in Turkish. Kınalızade wrote *Ahlak-ı Alai (The Morals of 'Ali')* in 1563 in Damascus, where he was appointed as a kadi. He expresses the reason for writing a book on ethics in Turkish as follows:

“What if a book had been written in the Turkish language that completely encompassed hikmet-i ameliy (ethics) and had been placed fourth after these three books? In order to realize this, on the one hand, I made the necessary scientific and scientific research, and on the other hand, I waited for a suitable time to start the work. Finally, I started it in a blessed year when the time and the ground were suitable. As a result, the book (in your hand) came into being” (Kınalızade, nd. a: 28).

In his work, Kinalzade divides morality into three parts, as in the classification applied in classical ethics books. The first one is called *Tahdhib al'Akhlaq*, which deals with the theory of the soul, the treatment of soul diseases, the definition of temperament, whether it can change or not, happiness, virtues, vices, and bad habits. The second section, entitled *Ilm-i Tahdhib al'Menzil*, provides important information on the rules to be followed among family members and home economics. The third chapter is titled *Ilm-i Tahdhib al'Madinah* and covers political philosophy and state administration. The fact that the virtues of love and friendship are discussed in this section shows how much importance is attached to the individuals in the society living happily and in harmony with each other without being subjected to state sanctions. In the concluding section, the testaments of Plato, Aristotle, Gujduvani and Mawlana are given (Kinalzade, 2016: 15).

B. Kinalzade's Understanding of Morality

In order to understand Kinalzade's moral theory, we need to start with the concept of wisdom. Wisdom is the knowledge of external beings as they are in the future. However, some philosophers have tended to define wisdom, or philosophy, in a way that includes not only knowledge but also action. According to this definition, philosophy is the emergence of knowledge and action in the human soul and the perfection of the human being in these two aspects. Thus, according to Kinalzade, philosophy is divided into two:

1. **Theoretical Philosophy:** This part of philosophy deals with external entities that are not affected by our power and will. This knowledge is obtained through thinking and research. The external beings subject to theoretical philosophy are in three parts. The first are beings such as God, the abstract mind, and spirits, which do not need matter outside and in the mind. The discipline that deals with these is called "ilm-i ilahi" or "ilm-i a'la" (the highest science). The second is entities such as circles, triangles, quadrilaterals, etc., which do not need matter in the mind, but do need matter outside. The discipline that deals with such entities is called ilm-i riyazi or ilm-i evsat (middle science). The third is entities that need matter in the mind and outside. The discipline that deals with these is called ilm "al-natural" or "ilm al-asfel" (the lowest science). The benefit of this part of philosophy is to help the individual to recognize beings and realities, to know the nature of things, and to ensure his

perfection in this world and his true happiness in the hereafter. For if the human intellect knows all external beings and the nature of things through correct methods and clear proofs, and if it has an accurate idea and a firm belief about all abstract and concrete beings, it will reach the summit of perfection in this world and the true happiness in the Hereafter that true beliefs provide.

2. Practical Philosophy: This part of philosophy is a science that deals with phenomena that are within the sphere of human power and choice, that is, human behavior. These phenomena are also divided into three. The first is the behavior that affects and concerns only oneself. Kinalızade calls this category the science of ethics. For in this section, he talks about the human temperament, knowing which behavior is acceptable and good for achieving true happiness, and which behavior is unacceptable and bad for the world and the hereafter. In other words, a person should be “self-controlled, generous, and honorable, even in solitude and alone” (Kinalızade, nd. a: 32). Secondly, the science that talks about the behavior of a person in his relations with his household and family members is the science of household management. It is a science that man must learn in order to achieve happiness in his worldly and hereafter life. The third part is the science that talks about the attitudes and behaviors of people in their relations with all the people of the city and country, and this science is called the science of state administration (Kinalızade, 2016: 43). Kinalızade says that man can achieve happiness in the world and the hereafter by adorning his soul with theoretical philosophy and cleansing his soul from bad habits with practical philosophy, which he calls practical wisdom, “The one who makes his soul pure has surely achieved what he hoped for, The one who is ambitious in this way to attain his cleansing and covers his soul (with sin) as much as he can, has surely suffered loss” (Shams, 91/9-10), referring to perfecting deeds and beautifying behaviors (Kinalızade, nd. a: 29-30)

Kinalızade’s classification of theoretical and practical philosophical sciences above is based on the tradition of moral philosophy that preceded him, especially Aristotle. Although he counts ethics among the practical philosophical sciences in this classification, ethics itself has a theoretical and a practical aspect (Maraş, 2013: 302-303).

A. Morality

Kınalızade discusses morality in terms of dispositions. He emphasizes the dispositions (virtues) that a person should acquire (virtues) and the dispositions (vices) that a person should avoid (vices) and the ways of doing so. A disposition is a faculty that enables actions to emerge easily from the human soul without the need for any thought process. A quality that is fixed and rooted in the human soul is called a faculty. Spiritual quality consists of two parts: state and faculty. Those that disappear quickly, such as shame and laughter, are called moods, while those that disappear slowly, such as generosity and courage, are called angels. In order for a quality to be a disposition, it must be both a quality that can easily leave the soul and a quality that is an angelic quality. A disposition leads to behaviors that are either competent or deficient, or to behaviors that are neither competent nor deficient. In the first part, good habits such as generosity and courage are called virtues, in the second part, malign habits such as stinginess and cowardice are called vices, and in the third part, qualities that have nothing to do with virtue and vice, such as tailoring and farming (Kınalızade, 2016: 85-86).

Fundamental Virtues and Vices

The human soul has two basic faculties, one cognitive, which enables it to comprehend intellectual matters, and the other motive, which organizes bodily movements. Both faculties have two parts. In other words, the human soul has four sub-powers: the theoretical and practical part of the cognitive faculty and the sensual and predatory part of the motive faculty. These four powers enable the emergence of human action. The trait that causes human actions to emerge from these powers in a moderate and beautiful way in accordance with the right reason is called virtue, and the trait that causes human actions to emerge in a non-virtuous way and tending towards excess or extremity is called vice. It is understood that the theory of ‘moderation - the middle way’, which is found in all classical Islamic ethicists, is also present in Kınalızade’s understanding of morality. Because both sides of virtues are defined as *ifrat* and *tefrit* (*exaggeration and underestimation*), and the middle is seen as virtue and the two sides as vice (Kınalızade, 2016: 86-87).

Virtue Vice as the Opposite of Virtues

Kınalızade defines the opposite of every virtue as vice, and in this context, for example, he defines ignorance as the opposite of the virtue of wisdom. Because

every virtue is the mu'tedil (*equable*) one and there can be countless levels that go beyond this limit. Thus, the true religion and the true path are one, but the deviations and different desires are countless. It is difficult to remain steadfast in the center of the true mu'tedil. This is the reason why in the language of the Prophethood, the as-Sirat is described as “thinner than a hair and sharper than a sword” and this is the truth that is pointed out in Surah *Al-Fatiha* with the words “guide us to the straight path”. The believer’s mission in this world is to be on the straight path in terms of knowledge and behavior, and in the Hereafter, to pass through the straight path. Those who do not adhere to moderation will pass through the ridge, and even those who go beyond the limit and deviate to the path of excess and extremism will not pass through it and will fall into hellfire, the place of the wicked. Kinalızade uses the ‘middle way’, which he calls ‘mediate’, in two senses. The first is the midpoint of two objects at an equal distance from each other. The center point of a circle is like this. The second is the relative middle point that philosophers think is realized in the temperament. According to him, it is this middle point that is valid in ethics. For this reason, virtue varies according to each person and even differs according to time and situation (Kinalızade, 2016: 98-101). Accordingly, considering the excesses and extremes of each virtue, there are four basic virtues and eight vices, which are their opposites.

1-Hikmet (Hikmah)

If the perceptive power in the human soul produces mu'tedil works caused by good habits, this is called “wisdom”. Kinalızade, who states that there are other virtues under the virtue of wisdom, counts these virtues as intelligence, quick understanding, clarity of mind, easy learning, good thinking, memorization, and recall (Kinalızade, 2016: 87-91).

The excess of the virtue of wisdom is deceit and cunning. It is the mobilization and expenditure of intellectual power for unworthy works and transactions. For example, using the power of reason for cheating, lying, slander, and entertainment leads to such vices. The extreme of wisdom is stupidity. When the power of reason is left idle and not used, there is a deficiency and negligence in the direction of knowledge and deeds. This negligence prevents the comprehension of the truth and subtleties of theoretical and practical philosophy, thus making it difficult to learn information about reality and to distinguish the good (Kinalızade, nd. a: 125).

2- Compassion

The power to move the desires in the human soul and the temperament that is trained with good morals and that will bring about good deeds is called “chivalry”. Kınalızade mentions eleven virtues under the virtue of chivalry. These are dignity and maturity (*kibr-u nefis*), courage (facing the events), high-mindedness (*uluvv-ü himmet*), perseverance and determination (perseverance), mildness (*hilm*), composure, ambition to do good deeds (*şehamet*), patience against difficulties (*tahammül*), modesty (*tevazu*), sacrifice in protecting religious values (*hamiyet*) and empathy, that is, humanity (*riqqah*) (Kınalızade, 2016: 91-93).

According to Kınalızade, who also discusses the vices caused by the dispositions that are inclined to the excesses and extremes of the virtue of bravery, the excess of this virtue is *tehevur* (anger), that is, recklessness in taking risks. It is taking risks in situations that are not deemed worthy of assertiveness by those of sound mind, and unnecessarily endangering and causing harm to the soul and its organs, which are the blessings of the Almighty Creator. The extreme form of the virtue of bravery is cowardice. In other words, it is to have unnecessary fears and anxiety in matters that sound reason does not approve of fear (Kınalızade, 2016: 102).

3-Chastity

We can define the concept of “chastity”, which enables the human soul to stay away from excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures, as a temperament and virtue that suppresses excessive desires in eating, drinking, and sexual desire and brings them under the control of reason and religion. Kınalızade mentions twelve virtues under the virtue of chastity. These virtues are as follows: Having a sense of honor and chastity (*haya*), meekness and docility (*rifq*), good morals (*hedy*), peacefulness (*musalemet*), restraining the ego in the face of attacks of lust (serenity), resisting the desires of the ego and sins, and enduring troubles and calamities (patience), being content with a little and despising mortal pleasures (contentment), maturity and moderation (dignity), determination in righteous deeds (*taqwa*), stability in order and discipline (*intizam*), earning halal and avoiding forbidden ways (freedom), and making it easy for the soul to spend (generosity=*sehavet*) (Arslan, 2014: 54). Kınalızade also mentions eight types of the virtue of generosity. These are: making it easy for the soul to give abundantly, preferring others to oneself, preferring forgiveness over revenge,

exemplary humanity, being proud of the continuity of admired actions, being exemplary in helping one's relatives, being full of peace of mind in giving, and leaving what is one's own for the benefit of others with peace of mind (Kinalızade, 2016: 95-96).

Kinalızade discusses the vices caused by the dispositions inclined to the excesses and extremes of the virtue of chastity. The extremity of this virtue is *fücur* and insatiability, going beyond the point of moderation in tasting sensual and mortal tastes and satisfying the lusts, and turning to tastes and pleasures that are not permissible in religion and reason; the point of *tafrıts* is to completely turn away from the tastes and pleasures that are permissible in religion and reason. This situation either harms the body or causes the generation to be interrupted (Kinalızade, nd. a: 125).

4-Justice

According to Kinalızade, if the practical power adorned with good morals causes *mu'tedil* behavior to occur, this is called "justice". He places the virtue of justice in a different place from other types of virtues. If the three virtues we have mentioned so far come together in a person with divine grace and happiness, that person becomes just. The sum of these three virtues is called justice. The opposite of justice is injustice. Oppression and injustice occur when one of these three virtues is absent. Every virtue found in all human beings is either one of these three virtues or a branch of them. These are the source of pride of people (Kinalızade, 2016: 87-89). Therefore, justice is realized as a result of gathering the other three virtues in one person. In this context, justice is the most important of the virtues because it is based on equality. Kinalızade, who emphasizes the concept of equality together since equality means that one thing is one with another thing in terms of quality and quantity, emphasizes that unity is a high attribute and a competent state, and brings the subject to the relationship and closeness with God, whom he describes as 'true one'. He even states that the 'oneness' that occurs among people is the light and shadow reflected from the oneness of the 'true one'. Again, he says that the virtue of justice is the 'middle' and that what deviates from the 'middle' and tends to any extreme cannot be called justice. According to philosophers, there are three areas where justice can be applied: The first is in the division of goods and honors. The second is in transactions and compensation. The third is in the punishments of *hadd*, politics, retaliation and *ta'zir*. Justice is realized when proportionality and justice are observed in each of these three areas. For example, if a person wrongs another

person, he should be treated in kind in order to ensure proportionality and justice. Therefore, it is necessary to know the level of proportion and justice so that no one is wronged. This level is called “Allah’s scales on earth”. It is not easy to master this level. For this reason, Allah has sent a scale called ‘pure Sharia’ and ‘divine law’ to show mercy to His servants and to protect countries. This is the first balance. The second balance is that the human species helps and develops by establishing relationships with each other in the process of establishing civilization and socialization while earning a living. In other words, the second balance is the need for civilization and socialization (Kinalzade, 2016: 113-115).

Kinalzade mentions twelve virtues under the virtue of justice (Kinalzade, 2016: 96-97). These are:

- a. Pure friendship free from self-interest (Loyalty),
- b. Concord and agreement in religious and worldly matters (Ulfat),
- c. Observing the law by supporting the right through cooperation (Loyalty),
- d. Being moved by the suffering of others and having a high level of empathy to alleviate suffering (Compassion),
- e. High level of care for relatives (Silat ur-Raheem),
- f. Responding to the favors done to him with more than enough (reward),
- g. Making special efforts to institutionalize good mutual relations (Husn-i Sherkah),
- h. Making a high effort to protect the rights of all humanity (Husn-i Qadaa),
- i. Gaining the favor of all virtuous people through their encouragement and support (Tawaddud),
- j. Accepting the commands and words of Allah and the Prophet with the consent of the heart (Surrender),
- k. To do one’s best in religious and worldly affairs and then leave the rest to Allah (Tawakkul);
 “While everyone is taking precautions for the future
 We have consented, saying, ‘What a good deputy!’”
- l. It is the fulfillment of all favors, including obedience to the commandments, salawat to the Prophets, and delivery to the saints, in order to serve Allah (Ibadah). The most developed form of this virtue, the most important quality of the sane believer, is ‘taqwa’.

According to Kinalzade, when one moves away from moderation in the virtue of justice, one sees vices. In this context, the excess of justice is oppression.

Oppression is the violation of someone else's rights, violating their honor, life, and property, even though it is forbidden by the Shari'ah. The extremity of justice is 'inzilam', which is when a person submits to the oppression and injustice inflicted on him, falls into the mire of vice, decreases his effort, and resigns himself to misery (Kinalızade, nd. a: 126).

C. Family Ethics

Kinalızade sees family ethics as an essential science to be learned in order to achieve happiness in this world and the hereafter. According to him, the smallest social unit is the family. Kinalızade, who puts the human species' need for each other in terms of subsistence, clothing and shelter, unlike animals, at the basis of this unity, states that the family consists of a father, mother, children, servants and food for nourishment. He says that there is a need for an administration that ensures the unity of the multitude of family members, and that this need must be met by the father, who is the owner of the house and the family. The father rules the family with good management, with bitter-sweet, promises and threats, harsh and soft behavior. In this way, the household stays away from vices and gathers and acquires virtuous qualities. The head of the family must protect the household from enemies, keep them away from harmful deeds and ensure their maturity. He likens the position of the head of the family to that of a shepherd in front of his flock and a doctor in front of his patient (Kinalızade, 2016: 295-298). Kinalızade, who also considers the house where the family will reside important, evaluates the houses inhabited by city and village people and those of nomads separately from each other. Kinalızade considers the houses inhabited by the inhabitants more acceptable than the houses inhabited by nomads due to their durability and good protection, and considers it necessary for the houses of the former to have high ceilings, wide doors, and for the houses to be at a distance from each other where the shapes of women cannot be seen and their voices cannot be heard. They should be away from high buildings, ceiling ornaments and exaggerated paintings on the walls. Kinalızade, citing a narration that does not conform to the Sunnah, says, "If a person raises his house more than six *dhīrā*¹, the angels in the sky will say: "Where are you going, O angel?" (Kinalızade, 2016: 298-300).

Kinalızade, who opened a separate chapter on food as 'property and money' to ensure nutrition, emphasizes that this is a very important value, that not everyone can obtain it whenever they want, and that it is even an important

¹*Dhīrā* is the name of the unit of length from the fingertips to the elbow. It is between 75-90 cm.

factor in the protection of justice. When talking about the ways of acquiring property, Kinalizade discusses the current ones according to different views in the past and the present, and states that it can be acquired in different ways: through art and trade, through inheritance, through agriculture, and through charity. He says that these are not superior to each other, and that the superiority is only in those that are obtained by not committing cruelty and injustice, cheating and deceit. Kinalizade states that justice can be achieved by avoiding excess and extremism in earning wealth and money, and while he considers it legitimate to earn wealth through halal means, he also states that three conditions must be fulfilled. The first of these conditions is not to cut back in a way that would cause hardship for the family. The second is not to neglect the obligatory zakat and charity without harming religion. The third is not to harm honor and humanity, and not to be stingy. As for the preservation of wealth, the first is not to spend more than one earns, the second is to have the ability to preserve and accumulate wealth, and the third is to preserve the wealth that is always in demand. He also mentions three ways of spending wealth: avoiding stinginess, avoiding spending on forbidden desires, and spending for charity, not for riyā and fame (Kinalizade, 2016: 300-313).

In the section on family education, Kinalizade discusses the formation of a family and the upbringing of children, stating that one must first marry in order to achieve these goals, and that the purpose of marriage is to increase the generation, especially the multiplication of the ummah of Muhammad. One of the benefits of marriage is to stay away from sin and evil. When choosing women to marry, he recommends choosing virtuous women, i.e. those with high chastity and honor, decency and manners, intellect and religion, those who win the consent of their husbands, and those who protect their honor.

Kinalizade, who does not approve of gender discrimination in child upbringing, states that whether it is a boy or a girl, one should be grateful to Allah and see them as a blessing from Allah. Kinalizade does not find it acceptable to worry about sustenance when there are many children, and states that Allah has determined and determined the sustenance of children. According to Kinalizade, children should be given names that will not disturb them for the rest of their lives, and good caregivers should be appointed to ensure that the child's body is sound and free from disease, and that his intellect and morals are high. Because the child becomes moral with the morals of the wet nurse. Kinalizade, who advocates religious education for children from an early age,

recommends taking the Prophets as examples in this regard (Kınalızade, nd. b: 61-64).

D. State Administration and Social Ethics

Since human beings cannot meet all their needs on their own, they have to live together with others. This leads people to socialize with other people in a civilized life. However, this coexistence does not run smoothly. Because people's different desires do not allow all of these desires to be met. This leads to competition and conflicts. These disturbances require fine politics and high administrative skills (Kınalızade, nd. b: 130-133). According to Kınalızade, who states that people have to live in order in society with maturity or fuse together, one of the ways to ensure this is the application of laws with justice in state administration. The second is the way of love. It may not be possible for all people to love each other. In other words, it may be the case for a small part of the society, the elite, and the notables of the society (Kınalızade, nd. b: 141-144). In a civilized society, the state will be free from all kinds of threats and dangers if there is agreement and solidarity in a certain order due to the coexistence of opposite characters, different ethnic and social groups. Discord and ontological conflicts between individuals in society would harm the state and it would collapse. In order to be free from these threats and dangers, the state must be governed with justice (Kınalızade, nd. b: 210). It is not easy to apply justice to all individuals in society. In order to define the state that can do this, Kınalızade divides states into virtuous and non-virtuous. A virtuous state is a state in which the reason for the existence of its communities and civilized life unions is the good and the benefit of the people. In this sense, a virtuous state is a state that is united around the existence of God Almighty, that is, a state that is on the right path. In such a state individuals do good deeds and avoid evil. Therefore, sultans should work for their own states to be virtuous. The politics and administration of statesmen have become virtuous thanks to the respect and justice of the sultanate and the religious elite. States that are not virtuous are of three kinds. The first is the "ignorant state" in which the individuals in society do not use the power of thought. The second one is the "fasiq state" in which the individuals in the society use the power of thought, but other powers are more dominant than those who use the power of thought. The third is the "perverse state" in which the intellectual powers of the people are lacking, widespread superstition and wrong legal practices are in effect (Kınalızade, 2016: 415-416).

This classification of Kınalızade is also taken from the famous philosopher Alfarabius.

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CHAPTER XIV

KANT'S NON-FORMAL ETHICS: SOCIAL LIFE, POLITICS AND EDUCATION

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Introduction

For quite a long time now Kant's ethics has been under the accusations of being too formal, devoid of content or even outright empty. These charges were sometimes voiced by great thinkers such as Hegel and Schiller. This study includes a brief explanation of Kant's moral philosophy, as well as the not widely known ideas of the philosopher about education, politics and even social life, with a view to prove the stereotype wrong.

Kantian ethics is an ethics of duty. Whether an action has moral value or not depends on whether it is based on a duty or not. What determines a duty or duties is the moral law. The moral law is formulated by Kant as a categorical imperative. It is due to this formulation that the Kantian ethics is also called formalist ethics (Wood, 2005, p. 136). According to formalist ethics, the moral value of an action is not based on the content of this value, but on its structure and form. This form is the same for all moral actions. As a matter of fact, according to Kant, it is the moral law that determines this form. Therefore, the only basis for evaluating an action as morally good or bad is the moral law, and it is from this form where the action in question procures its moral value.

(Delius, p. 321) Kant himself draws attention to this formal character of the moral law:

“The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will. But since this is merely formal (that is to say, it requires only that the form of a maxim be universally lawgiving), it abstracts as determining ground from all matter and so from every object of volition.” (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason(CPrR), p. 5:109)

The formal character of the moral law can be thought of as the formal character of the Aristotelian logic. As is known, in Aristotelian logic, syllogisms are evaluated entirely according to form. Even if the results are contrary to our experiences and intuitions in daily life, syllogisms can be valid and true. In this way, it can be said that Kantian ethics is similarly formal and sometimes leads to conclusions contrary to our intuitions and experiences.

The moral law is again formulated by Kant in the form of a categorical imperative. It is possible to express this imperative as follows: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law.” (Kant, CPrR, p. 5:30). Or “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals(GM), p. 4: 421) “A maxim is the subjective principle of willing” (Kant, GM, p. 4:400n) Therefore, when our subjective principles that lead to action can be universalized and made into a law, they become moral law. In this way, the moral law becomes the practical law as the objective principle of the will. (Kant, GM, p. 4:400n) According to Kant, the person who becomes conscious of the moral law always keeps it in mind and uses it as the criterion of his judgements. Just like Socrates when he once put his own principle under the spotlight, the ordinary human mind too, with this compass of the moral law in hand, can understand what is good and what is bad in all situations it encounters. He will know which behaviour conforms with duty and which is contrary to it, and therefore will not need any science or philosophy to be honest, good, or even wise and virtuous. (Kant, GM, p. 4:404)

According to Kant, only and only a will determined by the moral law is good. Such a will is more valuable than anything else. To put it in Kant’s words, “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or

indeed even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a GOOD WILL". (Kant, GM, p. 4:393) Therefore, the good will is good not because of the affects it produces, what it achieves, or its fitness for ends, but only in itself as a will. It is incomparably more valuable than anything that the sum total of all our inclinations can realise at once. The good will may fail to fulfil its purpose in spite of all its endeavours, because of what nature has not bestowed upon us or because of various misfortunes. In spite of all this, the good will, like a jewel, shines by itself as something that carries all its value in itself. Utility or inefficiency can neither add to nor subtract from this value. Usefulness may be a frame for attracting attention in daily exchange for those who do not yet know its value, but it means nothing to those who know its value. (Kant, GM, p. 4:394) Therefore, actions that are not determined by the moral law have no moral value. Even if they are motivated by our good inclinations and lofty sentiments, they are devoid of moral value. Similarly, it does not matter whether the result is good or bad. Because, as stated above, we cannot judge the will by what it achieves or does not achieve. Since it is not in our hands to ensure the results anyway, success or failure is not something that can be predicted in advance.

This strict and formal character of Kant's ethics should be considered as a consequence of his theoretical philosophy. He always sought after the necessary and universal in knowledge. Although he accepted that all our knowledge begins with experiment, he argued that not all elements of knowledge come from experiment. Because experience is never enough to establish the necessary and universal. The element that would give knowledge its necessary and universal character had to be a priori. Kant argued these to be time and space as a priori intuitions in human sensibility. Apart from this, he said that the concepts, i.e. categories, in the human understanding are a priori and that this is what gives necessity and universality to what experience provides. To paraphrase his famous saying, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. B, 75) In other words, knowledge has sensory and a posteriori elements on the one hand, and conceptual and a priori elements on the other.

Kant similarly insisted on searching for the a priori in the field of morality. For him, morality had to be universal and necessary too, as he thought a relative understanding of morality had no value and could not even be called morality. Therefore, the moral law had to be in a necessary and universal form. There

could not be a study of morality based on the goodness and benefits produced in the external world, human emotions and tendencies, or the natural and social environment. Instead, he took human reason as the basis of morality and investigated how free individuals could govern themselves according to rational principles. (Wood, 2005, p. 1)

Kant's ethics has been subjected to many criticisms due to this formal and so-called empty structure. In particular, his emphasis on duty and respect for the moral law rather than inclinations and his belittlement of the moral value of doing good for the sake of inclinations caused reactions. One of these reactions came from Schiller in a sarcastic manner. Schiller says the following:

Scruples of Conscience

I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it by inclination
And so often I am bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous.

Decision

There is no other way but this! You must seek to despise them
And do with repugnance what duty bids you. (Wood, 1999, p. 28)

The implication of Schiller's criticism is that there is an absolute opposition between a sense of duty and inclination, and that duty is to be preferred no matter what. Moreover, it is also stated that the imperatives of duty can be repulsive because it is opposed to inclinations. (Wood, 1999, pp. 28-29) Schiller finds the emphasis on duty too harsh and thinks that it takes all grace away from it. According to him, a weak person can easily be driven to monastic asceticism in the name of moral perfection. (Albayrak, 2022, p. 18) He says that the moral law, which he calls despotic, is frightening and worries that adherence to the law of reason can turn into a glorified slavery under the name of moral freedom. (Delius, 1990, p. 323)

When the formal rigidity of Kant's ethics, to which such criticisms are directed, is combined with some details of Kant's life, one might indeed think that what Kant was offering was an asocial and even an ascetic life. He was denounced as a terrorist of thought by Heinrich Heine, who called him the executioner of God. However, he added that despite the terror he created in thought, his life was pale and boring. According to Heine's description, he lived an abstract bachelor life until the end of his life. He had an infallible routine

in his daily life, which he fulfilled even more soullessly than the clock of the nearby cathedral. He got out of bed, had his coffee, his dinner, his lessons always at the same time. Every day at the same time he went for a walk, dressed in his grey, tight-fitting jacket and, with his Spanish cane in his hand. (Heine, 1882, pp. 108-109) Such a portrayal of Kant seems to have led him to be perceived as sullen, aloof from society, indifferent to social phenomena and events, a person who took walks by himself, and hostile to happiness and joy. However, this is a distorted portrayal, and highly detailed Kant biographies suggest otherwise. Kuehn characterises this and similar accounts as caricatures of caricatures. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 14)

Despite this distorted portrait, Kant was a sociable, amiable, witty and even charming man. His social engagements included playing cards and billiards on a regular basis. He was so good at these games that he earned enough money to supplement his academic income. (Wood, 2005, p. 8) He had as many attractive and repulsive qualities as any human being. He was a hard-working and patient philosopher, academician and scientist, dedicated to his work. He was too calculating and ambitious to jeopardise his wealth and money. From time to time he quarrelled with his friends and some of his friendships ended abruptly. Despite his emphasis on being free and autonomous, he was influenced by some of his friends in his lifestyle and habits. He attached great importance to his own prestige and did not treat particularly well towards students and followers whom he thought had betrayed him. Nor was he always far removed from the intellectual stereotypes or the academic rivalries that always existed in universities. He was in favour of liberal reforms in education and especially in religion. He made no secret of the fact that he favoured a republican form of government. He argued that states should cede part of their sovereignty to a federation of states. He was firmly opposed to colonialism and considered European attempts to “liberate” and “civilise” others as unjust and hypocritical. With regard to women, he accepted and even defended the status quo. In the case of non-European peoples, he put forward ideas that could be described as blatantly racist. According to Wood, he was nevertheless one of the most progressive thinkers of his time on social and political issues. (Wood, 2005, pp. xi-xii)

The formal and non-formal debate regarding Kantian ethics

After this introduction, we can move on to the social or sociological aspect of Kant's ethics. First of all, it must be said that Kantian ethics can never be

presented as a sociological theory of morality. Kant's passion for the a priori, the necessary, the universal and, the rational does not allow room for such an understanding. As mentioned above, Kantian ethics is based on pure practical reason and finds its foundations in Kant's Copernican Revolution. Therefore, it is unacceptable for morality to be based on a posteriori foundation in any way, let alone sociological (Wood, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, it cannot be said that Kant developed a comprehensive social philosophy. However, this is not an obstacle to evaluating his moral philosophy from a social perspective. There are also those who read his moral theory as social philosophy and social ethics as a whole (Rauscher, 2022).

As mentioned above, one of the most important criticisms of Kant's ethics is that it is empty, soulless and emotionless because it is strictly formal. Hegel is at the forefront of these critics. He made these criticisms based on the first principle of the categorical imperative and argued that the principle in question offers us "an empty rhetoric of duty for the duty's sake" and fails to provide an "immanent theory of duties" (Hegel, 2003, pp. 162). According to Hegel, the universality test of the moral law cannot make a real distinction between maxims. In one respect all maxims pass it, in another respect no maxim can pass it. (Wood, Hegel Ethical Thought, 1990, p. 154) The accusation that the moral law is empty had been made by others and did not begin with Hegel. (Wood, 1990, p. 155)

However, contrary to the accusations, Kant did not just define the formal principles of the moral law and leave them without content. He elaborated it as much as possible and analysed its casuistic consequences in detail. Moreover, it is not correct to accuse the law of being empty on the basis of a single principle. The first principle in its simplest form provides us with no more than a framework. It only intends to show us whether a maxim is appropriate or not. If a maxim is desirable as a universal law, it is appropriate to act on the basis of it; if not, then it is not appropriate. Although Kant elaborates this principle with a number of examples, the principle in itself does not provide us with a list of duties. (Wood, 1990, p. 156)

Let us remember the principle again:

Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law. (Kant, GM, p. 4: 421)

He goes on to explain that this is a formula for universality and expresses what he understands by universality as: "So act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature"

Kant then tries to fill in this principle by showing how it can be applied through four examples.

First example: Imagine a person who has lost hope as a result of disasters and misfortunes and wants to end his life. The maxim of this unfortunate person who thinks that the future does not promise much is as follows: If the future life does not promise hope, I should end it out of love. Can this maxim be a general law of nature? A natural law based on the maintenance of life contradicts itself when it aims to destroy it. Therefore, such a principle cannot be recognised as a law of nature and cannot be accepted as a duty. (Kant, GM, p. 4:421-422)

Second example: A person who has to borrow money wants to borrow on the promise that he will repay the debt. However, he knows that he cannot pay the debt. He also knows that he will not be able to borrow if he does not promise to repay the debt. The maxim here is this: Anyone in a difficult situation can promise anything with the intention of breaking his promise. However, it is obviously contradictory to want this to be a law of nature. For after a certain point, no one trusts anyone, and promises made in vain are self-defeating. (Kant, GM, p. 4:422)

Third example: A person has talents that can improve him and be useful for many things. But instead of developing his talents, he gives himself to entertainment. Now the maxim here is this: Natural gifts can be wasted. But can I want this to be a law of nature? If everyone does it this way, nature can continue to live. But it is contradictory to think this for humans as part of nature. Everybody knows that they have to develop the talents they were given, because that is what is really useful. (Kant, GM, p. 4: 423)

Fourth example: Can a well-off person completely ignore someone in a difficult situation instead of helping him? The maxim here is this: It is not necessary to help the person in difficulty. This could certainly be a law of nature, and humanity could survive on the basis of this law. According to Kant, it could even survive in a better way than it does now. However, it is impossible to want this to be a law of nature. Such a wish would contradict itself, because it would remove the hope of helping oneself in a difficult situation. (Kant, GM, p. 4:423)

It is possible to think that Kant could multiply these duties. There are already other examples in his other works. However, human situations are open to infinite possibilities and it is impossible to put a complete list of duties in front of people. This is precisely why Kant insists on an a priori law. According to him, everything empirical is not only useless in terms of morality, but also only casts a shadow on the purity of morality. (Kant, GM, p. 4:426) Nevertheless, when we examine these examples closely, we can say that there will be no room

for the accusations against him as empty, emotionless, asocial and disregarding the consequences. These examples are examples that take into account and evaluate man as a social being and the society in which he lives as a whole. You cannot commit suicide because it is not in accordance with what is natural. You have to keep your word and you should not make promises you cannot keep. Otherwise people will not trust each other. You have to develop your natural talents. Because that is what is useful and what suits your purposes. You should help someone who is in a difficult situation because you want to have the hope that one day someone will help you when you are in a difficult situation.

At this point, despite Kant's insistence that the moral law is and should be formal, one may ask what he aims with these examples. Perhaps it would be appropriate to draw attention to a very important detail that is overlooked at this point. The moral law is formal and must be formal. However, moral theory as a whole does not have to be formal. It is quite possible for a moral theory that takes into account all kinds of human situations and their consequences to be compatible with Kantian morality, so long as the basic principle of morality is derived as an a priori principle. When it comes to the application of that principle to concrete situations, we will inevitably encounter a being living in a society, having emotions and dispositions, and encountering its problems. In this sense, it can readily be agreed that the second and third principles of the moral law are not completely formal and thus are contentful and far from being empty. (Wood, 1990, p. 156)

The second principle of the moral law admonishes: Man, and every rational being in general, exists not merely as a means, but as an end in itself. So the will must always be seen as an end in all its actions, both towards itself and towards other rational beings. Anything other than human beings can be used as an object and a means. However, the human being has value in itself and therefore cannot be used as a means. In elaborating this principle, Kant re-evaluates the above four examples. Accordingly, a person who finds life unbearable and attempts to kill himself is using himself, that is, a human being, as a means. A person who makes promises to another person that he or she will not keep is also using another person as a mere means. Examples such as attacks on the freedom and property of others are analysed in the same way. Those who violate the rights of others are those who intend to use the personal status of others only as a means. A person who does not develop his natural talents is also wasting the talents given to him by nature. Developing our talents is among the purposes of nature in our subjectivity with relation to the humanity. Finally, Kant reminds

us that the natural goal that all human beings have is their own happiness and that we should contribute to this goal. Everyone should strive for the realisation of the goals of others as much as they can. Only in this way can a positive correspondence with humanity, which is itself a goal, be possible. (Kant, GM, p. 4:428-430)

The third principle of the moral law is known as the principle of autonomy. This principle depends on both the first and second principles. Man, as a rational being, must submit only to the laws of his own making. How to derive these laws was shown above. In this way, his own laws will coincide with the laws laid down by other intelligent beings. The principle of autonomy also guarantees the individual-personal freedom of man. (Kant, GM, p. 4:432-433)

Similarly, Schiller's sarcastic criticisms stem from a failure to evaluate Kant's ethics as a whole. They are criticisms based solely on the strict and uncompromising form of the first principle. Of course, Kant is strongly opposed to the derivation of the moral law from inclinations, emotions and anything empirical. However, it cannot be said that he envisages an absolute opposition of duty and inclinations. As Schiller claims, there does not have to be a state of disgust or reluctance when doing what the duty requires. In other words, we will first hate our friends and the favours we will do to them, and then we will carry them out anyway out of a sense of duty and thus try to be virtuous willingly. If this is what Schiller meant, it is a clear distortion. Such an interpretation "would make about as much sense as putting your loved ones in needless danger so as to give yourself the opportunity to display your courage by rescuing them" (Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 1999, p. 29) In such a case, the purity of intention, which should go hand in hand with duty, would be compromised. Kant, however, does not hate inclinations. He says that they are perfectly natural and that we should cultivate tendencies such as love and sympathy. Nurturing and developing such inclinations is also a duty. Because in this way we fulfil our other duties more easily. Kant gives the example of "love your neighbour as yourself" here. According to him, what is meant by this is not that you force yourself to love a neighbour whom you do not normally love. You cannot be forced to love someone anyway. According to him, what is meant here is that you do good to your fellow human being, and this kindness of yours will produce love for human beings in time. (Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 1991, p. 6:401-402)

Kant is not against being happy or striving to be happy. Nor does he say that striving for happiness necessarily conflicts with morality. Neither does he say that a behaviour can only be a duty if it is against

inclinations. Rather, he says that duty cannot be derived from inclinations and that happiness alone cannot be duty. (Çilingir, 2015, p. 80) He also says that everything is related to happiness when it comes to our nature. “The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world”. (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 2015, p. 5:61) Therefore, “to secure one’s own happiness is one’s duty.” This is because, according to Kant, unhappiness or dissatisfaction with one’s own situation, under the pressure of certain anxieties and unsatisfied needs, can easily turn into a temptation to violate one’s duty. (Kant, GM, p. 4:399)

What all this shows is that Kant’s moral theory is not empty at all. To reiterate, the necessity for the moral law to be formal does not require the moral theory to be empty. Even in his fundamental works on ethics, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant says many things about the contents of morality. He himself says that ethics consists of two parts, one rational and the other empirical. The rational part is moral science, while the empirical part is “practical anthropology”. (Kant, GM, p. 4:388) However, he never developed the practical anthropology that he thought was necessary for a complete moral philosophy. Nevertheless, especially in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, he gave ample space to anthropological considerations. (Wood, 2005, pp. 129, 132)

His other works such as *Lectures on Ethics* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* have a richer content. Apart from these, he wrote many articles and books on social, political and religious issues. In this sense, it is especially worth recalling the following: *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment!* (1784), *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking!* (1786), *On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory but It Is of No Use in Practice* (1793), *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1794), *The End of All Things* (1794), *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795), *On A Presumed Right to Lie from Philanthropy* (1797), and *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798).

Kant and social life

As I have already mentioned, Kant, contrary to the negative portrait drawn by Heine, was a person who liked to be in society. He had lost his mother in his childhood and his father in his youth and despite these obvious difficulties, he did not neglect to look after his siblings until his death. Nevertheless, he was always distant towards his brothers and sisters. But yet again, he never neglected

his responsibilities towards them. He was always there for them when they needed him. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 34)

He lived alone, but he was never a hermit. Although he was very selective in his relationships, he went out into society at every opportunity. He accused those who isolate themselves from society and despised physical good of distorting virtue:

The *cynic's purism* and the *anchorite's mortification of the flesh*, without social good living, are distorted forms of virtue which do not make virtue inviting; rather, being forsaken by the graces, they can make no claim to humanity. (Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 2006, p. 282)

He had tried very hard to become a professor at the university. But he did not just want to be appointed to any department. He rejected many chairs offered to him including chairs such as Mathematics and Literature. He especially wanted chairs in fields such as “Logic and Metaphysics” or “Moral Philosophy”. In 1758, he applied for the vacant chair of “Logic and Metaphysics”, but Johann Buck, the only candidate other than himself, was appointed. In 1770 Langhansen, professor of Mathematics at the University of Königsberg, dies. Kant wrote to Berlin to ask that Johann Buck, who was already teaching Logic and Metaphysics, be moved to the chair of Mathematics and that he be appointed to the vacant chair. Kant's request was granted and he was appointed as the professor of “Logic and Metaphysics”. Buck, who was not consulted or even informed about this, was very dissatisfied. However, Kant thought that this chair was his right from the beginning. Kant did not care what Buck thought or felt. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 179-180)

The reason I mention this incident is to point out that Kant was as self-interested as anyone else. He used his fame and relationships to get the position he wanted. After his appointment, his income increased and he had a comfortable life. Whether this conforms with his famous categorical imperative can be the subject of another study.

Kant had a heavy teaching load and his lectures were well attended. Students would arrive an hour in advance to find a seat in the classroom. His longest and most popular course was Practical Anthropology. Although he did not write any work on this subject, he continued to teach

this course until the end of his teaching career.¹ (Wood, 2005, p. 169) He did not resort to notorious means in order to increase the number of student enrollments, which are still common in universities today. He always maintained his seriousness and respected his colleagues.

In the following years he served as dean, member of the senate and was accepted as a member of the Berlin Academy of the Sciences. Finally, he was appointed the rector of the university. Despite those who strongly opposed his appointment to all these positions, Kant overcame these obstacles and he sometimes used his fame and sometimes his relationships to overcome them. Although he had a very heavy teaching load and was very busy with his Critical Philosophy project, he did not avoid such bureaucratic tasks. In fact, he never liked bureaucracy and bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, he was even subjected to accusations that he was incompetent at these tasks and that he did not do the administrative tasks properly. However, as a proponent of enlightenment, he did his best to build the university he longed for. After taking the office, he made many appointments to the vacant positions in line with his own wishes. Although he did not oppose the majority of votes, he usually got his own way. This should be attributed to his very high persuasion skills. In this way, he appointed many names close to him as professors and in time the Faculty of Philosophy acquired a more Kantian outlook. He was also interested in other issues such as; the status of the poor, the university's relationship with the military authorities, and the role of the medical faculty. Administrative matters were obviously of secondary importance to him. But they were by no means unimportant. Even though they took up a great deal of his time, Kant did not refrain from doing them. All this was important from his enlightenment point of view. Kant was therefore not a philosopher who was content to only write. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 314-318) He also wanted to change the world and he knew that just writing was not enough for that.

Kant was undoubtedly a precise man. It is possible to learn from biographies how he spent almost every hour of the day. However, some biographies say that one of the reasons for this punctuality was his close friend, the English businessman Joseph Green (1727-86). Kant always visited Green at the same time and left the meeting at the same time, but the reason for this was Green, not

¹ The notes of this course were published as a book under the title *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.

Kant. It is also told that they often took walks together and sometimes went for a carriage ride. Once, when Kant was a few minutes late, Green did not wait for him but drove past Kant, who insisted that he stop yet with no success. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 154) According to rumours, Kant broke his daily routine twice: One was to acquire (or read) Rousseau's *Emile*. The other was to get news about the French revolution. (Gros, 2017, p. 137) Although we do not know whether these rumours are true or not, we can see them as two important details that reveal his social side. We already know that he was influenced by Rousseau and especially *Emile*. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 132) Again, Kant biographies describe in detail about how the French revolution excited him. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 4, 14, 375) In addition, it should be said that almost all of the biographies that convey his daily life with the emphasis on his punctuality in fact describe the old Kant. There is very little information about his earlier and younger years. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 13)

Additionally, biographies of Kant include many details about his dinner parties as well. He was often invited to dinner parties by rich people, nobles and friends. He was often invited to dinner by the Count of Keyserlingk, who had by this time settled in Königsberg, and Kant accepted these invitations. Thanks to her interest in philosophy, Kant also caught the Countess's special attention. If there was no one with higher priority in the protocol, he would be in the seat of honour of the table, right next to the Countess. Later, when his financial situation improved, he organised dinner parties in his own home and invited his friends. From time to time he invited people who were visiting Königsberg and wanted to see the city's famous philosopher. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 115, 218, 322-323)

According to Kant, sociability is a virtue. However, if it is done with an eye for pleasure and in a wasteful manner, it harms virtue. He gives dinner parties as the right example against this kind of sociability. Because, "the good living that still seems to harmonise best with true humanity is a good meal in good company (and if possible, also alternating company)." But the number of companions should be neither few nor many. When the number of guests is small, an ideal and pluralistic conversation cannot take place. When there are many guests, everyone speaks only to the person next to them and it is difficult to concentrate on a particular topic. According to Kant, the purpose of such dinner parties is to provide not only the physical pleasure of eating and drinking, which can be obtained by eating alone, but also a pleasant and enlightening

conversation. This conversation should serve not only for social pleasure but also for the open exchange of ideas between people. Kant argues that such gatherings accompanied by quality conversation are especially important for philosophers. So much so that “Eating alone is unhealthy for a scholar who philosophises.” Because the thoughts he has to share with others tire him and he loses his vitality over time. However, a table companion with alternative thoughts can contribute to the development of his thoughts by contributing thoughts that he cannot come up with alone. (Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*(AP), 2006, pp. 277-281)

Dinner parties as a means of sociability, we learn, also have a higher purpose. Ideally, the dinner should serve an intellectual purpose. Kant states that at such a dinner party with a sufficient number of guests, the conversation goes through three stages: Narration, arguing and jesting. In the first stage, the news of the day is exchanged. In the second stage, an argumentative discussion is held on certain topics. In the third stage, we sharpen our wit through pleasantries and jokes to relieve the lethargy of the meal. According to Kant, it is necessary to pay attention to some subtleties in order for the conversation to be of high quality. The first is to take care to choose topics that interest everyone for the conversation. Thus, everyone has the chance to say something. Secondly, except for momentary pauses, it is necessary not to allow the deadly silence to fall. Thirdly, one should not change the subject unnecessarily and jump from one topic to another. (Kant, AP, pp. 280-281)

The effects of the strict religious education he received in his childhood are hardly visible in the life of the adult Kant. He himself always spoke negatively of his childhood education. He was not very religious in his everyday life and refused to attend church services on principle. As rector of the University of Königsberg, he always refused to attend religious services, remarking that he was “indisposed”. Refusing to compromise the purity of his moral philosophy, he opposed to the empirical and historical determination of morality. He believed that all historical religions, including Christianity, were destined to be nothing more than a means to a universal moral religion. (Wood, 2005, pp. 19-20)

Kant and Political Philosophy

Kant’s political philosophy is a branch of his practical philosophy. He wrote extensively on politics, especially in his last years. However, he

was always interested in politics. It is not difficult to see traces of this in his social life. We know how excited he was by the French Revolution. He was even subjected to many accusations and reported to the authorities. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 4) He was also interested in the political events taking place in America and these had a significant impact on Kant. His philosophy bears traces of the political events of his time and is in many respects a response to those events. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 20)

Despite his interest in the French and American Revolutions, Kant was docile in his social life. In 1793, he was investigated for his book *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. However, Kant published an expanded second edition of the book the following year. He received a stern warning letter for this rebellious behaviour. The letter expressed the royal discomfort with Kant's views. Kant was accused of misusing his own philosophy and distorting the teachings of the Bible. He was banned from lecturing and writing on religion until he had brought his views in line with traditional Christianity. In his reply Kant defended both his work and his views, but promised to abide by the ban. (Wood, 2005, p. 19)

During this prohibition period, Kant wrote mostly about politics. When combined with his writings before this date, it constitutes a very large corpus on political philosophy. In these works, he discusses many issues related to what the state is, on which foundations it is based, its form of government, the foundations and limits of individual rights and freedoms, the relations of individuals with each other and with the state, the institution of marriage, education policies and ultimately international relations.

Kant's political philosophy is based on the concept of freedom. According to him, the starting point of the rights system is freedom. This is because freedom is the only right that people are born with. Freedom is "independence from being constrained by another's choice. (Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*(MM), 1991, p. 6:237) This is also the *raison d'être* of the state and, according to Kant, the state cannot have a higher priority duty. This duty is the "limitation of the freedom of each to the condition of its harmony with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance with a universal law," and this can only be achieved by "external laws which make such a thoroughgoing harmony possible." What we call a constitution is the subjection of free individuals who respect each other's freedom to laws that limit them. (Kant, *On The*

Common Saying, 1793, p. 8:289-290) This is only possible with a state. The state is the transition from the natural existence to the civilised state. In the state of nature, everyone is at war with everyone else and in fact this is its law. This natural state of affairs can only be overcome by means of a contract. (Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace*, 1795, p. 8:348-349)

At this point, we encounter a consequence of Kant's moral philosophy in the social-political field. The primary task of the state cannot be the welfare and happiness of people, as Hobbes argued. This is also a requirement of "pure reason giving laws a priori, which has no regard for any empirical ends." Because, according to Kant, people have different views on what happiness is and how to achieve it. Therefore, under the name of happiness, it is not possible to bring people's will together under a single common principle in a way that harmonises everyone's freedom. Everyone's understanding of happiness is different, and everyone can achieve happiness in a way they find appropriate. For this reason, no one can force other people to be happy based on their own understanding of happiness, thinking that other people will also be happy in this way. As individuals are not allowed to impose their idea of happiness on other people, neither can the state. Because to do so, according to Kant, is to treat its own citizens in a paternalistic manner as "minor children". This, according to Kant, is the greatest despotism. What the state should do is not to act as a patriarch towards its citizens by telling them what is right and wrong, but to protect and safeguard their freedom. (Kant, 1793, p. 8:290-291)

The state is the civilised existence as a kind of evolution from the natural. In the civilised existence, the state's only duty is not to protect freedom. Freedom is one of the three fundamental rights that the state protects which are namely: (Kant, 1793, p. 8:290)

- 1) The freedom of every member of the society as a human being.
- 2) His equality with every other as a subject.
- 3) The independence of every member of a commonwealth as a citizen.

Kant was inarguably a republican. It is possible to understand this from his enthusiasm about the French Revolution. In fact, the similarity of his three fundamental rights listed above with the motto of the French Revolution, "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity", should not be a coincidence. A

republic must first of all guarantee freedom as mentioned above and for Kant indeed, only a republic can do this. (Kant, 1795, p. 8:349-350)

The second right, equality, is formal. Everyone is equal to everyone else before the law. Each member of the state has the right to use coercion in its relations with others. That is, he can use force to enforce the law on his behalf. Kant exempts the head of state from this. Because the head of state cannot be coerced by anyone else. He is not a member of the state, but its founder. People's income, physical and mental powers are excluded from this equality. By formal, we mean that Kant is actually talking about equality in opportunity. The opportunities of the state are open to everyone. All kinds of offices and positions are open to all subjects without any restriction. (Kant, 1793, p. 8:291-293)

The third right, independence, is the right of everyone as a citizen to participate in the making of the law. This right is the reflection of the third principle of the categorical imperative, the principle of autonomy, on political philosophy. (Rauscher, 2022) Everyone is equal in terms of being free and equal before the law. However, according to Kant, it cannot be considered that everyone has equal rights when it comes to making laws. In fact, only those who have the right to make laws can be called citizens. Since children and women are not citizens, they do not have the right to make laws. The only qualification necessary to be a citizen is to be one's own master. Since such a person is self-sufficient, he does not serve anyone other than the republic. In this sense, artisans, small and large landowners are all equal and have the right to vote. All others, such as servants, wage labourers, peasants working on other people's land and all women, cannot vote. There should be no law preventing the sale or inheritance of land by large landowners. For such a law would be an obstacle to the right of non-landowners to vote as citizens. Moreover, large landowners can only vote in their own name. It should therefore be left to the ability, endeavour and good fortune of each member of the republic to become part of the republic as a citizen. The number of those entitled to vote must be calculated by the number of property owners, not by the amount of their property. (Kant, 1793, p. 8:294-296) At this point Kant distinguishes between active and passive citizens. Those who have the right to vote and participate in the governance and law-making of the country are active citizens, while those who do not are passive citizens. As human beings and subjects, the state guarantees their rights. However,

they cannot participate in decision-making processes. (Kant, MM, 1991, p. 6:314-315)

Kant sees the republic as important not only for organising the internal affairs of the state, but also for international relations. According to him, all countries should have a republican constitution. In this way, he says, a possibility for “eternal peace” will emerge. Because then it would be more difficult for one country to declare war on another country. When making a decision on a matter that concerns everyone, such as war, citizens will take into account all the difficulties that may arise. Countries will be more cautious and hesitant about declaring war due to many issues such as participating in the war personally, paying the costs of the war with their own property, and facing the troubles caused by the destruction in the aftermath of the war. However, in a government without a republican constitution, declaration of war would be much easier. In such a situation, rulers can start a war on very trivial grounds, as if deciding on a hunting party. (Kant, 1795, p. 8:350)

According to Kant, the ruler may make mistakes when making new regulations or applying the law. What citizens should do in this case is first of all to be in good faith. They should seek the cause of the injustice they have suffered not in the ruler’s foul intentions, but in his mistake or failure to see the possible consequences of the laws. For this reason, they have the right to make their opinions public in order to correct the wrong or injustice in question, provided that they obtain the consent of the ruler. Kant calls this right “freedom of the pen” and according to him it is the only guarantee of human rights. However, in exercising this right, the limits of respect and loyalty to the existing constitution must not be exceeded and the spirit of free thinking must be fostered among the citizens. (Kant, 1793, p. 8:304)

Nevertheless, it is possible that the manager persistently continues to commit injustice and ignores complaints and warnings. In this case, does the right to revolt arise? Given his enthusiasm for the French Revolution, you might think that the answer to this question would be “yes”. However, Kant firmly opposes this on the basis that the state represents the civilised status as opposed to the state of nature. In this case, any state is better than no state. (Rauscher, 2022). Therefore, people have no right to cause any disorder, let alone revolt. There is no right to attack the person or target the life of the head of state for misusing his authority. The right

to revolt or to force the ruler to do something conflicts with the nature of sovereignty and this is a clear contradiction. As mentioned above, although individuals have the right to force each other to obey the law, the ruler is exempt from this. Because, according to Kant, there is no judge to resolve the matter in such cases of disagreement between the people and the ruler. (Kant, MM, 1991, p. 6:320)

Kant claims that those who advocate the right to revolution misunderstand the nature of the social contract. (Rauscher, 2022) The social contract is a first contract and is the basis of the republic. However, the proponents of the right to revolution see this contract as a real historical event that took place in the past, in which every will of a people participated. However, this is not the case and, according to Kant, this first contract is only an ideal of reason. When it is not possible for all the people to vote on whether a law is just or not, it is sufficient that a consensus on that law is possible. The ruler, not the people, decides whether the law is just or not. All the people have to do is to obey the ruler even when they think that the law is unfair or will harm their happiness. For what is at stake here is not the happiness of this or that individual, but the law, which is above everything and everyone and which guarantees the security of the people. (Kant, 1793, p. 8: 297-298)

According to Kant, the following conclusion follows: Any resistance to the legislator, any incitement to express dissatisfaction through violence, any resistance that leads to rebellion is the greatest offence that can be committed against a republic. This prohibition is unconditional. Even if the head of state goes so far as to violate the First Contract by empowering the government with violent powers and loses legitimacy in the eyes of the subjects, the people have no right to resist him. Because, as I mentioned above, in such a situation there is no higher authority to judge right and wrong. (Kant, 1793, p. 8: 299-300) The only thing that dissatisfied people can do is to obey, but they have the right to declare and express their dissatisfaction. At this point, all they can do is to try to convince the ruler. Kant probably thought that this was the work of a philosopher.

These thoughts of Kant, who is also known for his enthusiasm for the French revolution, may surprise us. When his own writings on the topic and those quoted from him and criticisms are taken as a whole, it seems difficult to make coherence out of the situation. At this point, it

can be said that Kant's enthusiasm and support was more about the ideas put forward on behalf of the revolution rather than the way the revolution was carried out. It is even dubious whether Kant himself considered this event as a revolution. At one point, he even stated that Louis XVI was not dethroned by force, but voluntarily abdicated. (Kant, 1793, p. 6:341) Yet it can readily be agreed that although he did not approve of the excesses of the revolutionaries, he was excited by the impact the revolution would have on history. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 392)

In Kant's thoughts on the state and its structure, there is no idea of democracy in today's sense. Although he spoke of the separation of powers, he understood it only as the separation of the legislative and the executive branches of government. He considered it a contradiction to have a superior judge to solve the problem where the people and the ruler disagreed. Because in this case, the door was opened to the idea of that judge also having a superior judge. It is inconceivable that Kant was unaware of Montesquieu and the distinction between the three powers. Nevertheless, he does not mention the judicial power as a third independent power. (Westphal, 1993, p. 276)

Kant and Education

Education as a social institution was always on Kant's agenda. I have already mentioned above how much he was influenced by Rousseau's *Emile*, but this book, which he read in the early 60s, was not the only reason for his interest in education. He worked as a private teacher (Hoffmaister) for many years before being accepted to the university. It is possible to say that his reflections on education started in these years. Later, when he had the opportunity to teach at the university as a Magister, he developed these ideas further. Later, between 1776 -1787, he gave lectures on education. One of the issues that influenced his thoughts on education, and perhaps the most important one, was the pietistic religious education he received in his childhood and youth. In his letters and writings Kant always denigrated this style of education and recalled his years with horror and fear. He thought that the discipline at school was very harsh and almost like slavery, and that it was clearly harmful rather than beneficial. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 45, 227)

In 1774 Johann Bernhard Basedow founded a private school called Philanthropinum in Dessau. Kant supported this school with all his heart. On the one hand, he was trying to find students for the school and on the other

hand, he was collecting donations from philanthropists for the school. In 1776 and 1777, he published two articles about the school. Not satisfied with this, he encouraged people to subscribe to the *Philanthropinum* magazine and was personally involved in the subscription process. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 227-229)

The *Philanthropinum*'s educational approach and curriculum were of the kind Kant had longed for. The school was designed in a progressive spirit and was not strictly disciplined. It emphasised practical knowledge rather than purely intellectual education. The weekly programme included school trips to nature, emphasised physical exercise, insisted on frequent breaks and language teaching, and abolished the rigid separation between work and play. The aim was for the pupils to become independent citizens who would be able to take care of themselves in their future lives. Religious education was not among the school's priorities. Basedow even argued that children should not be taught to pray until they were 10 years old. Although his approach is now part of the mainstream of pedagogical thought, it was highly controversial at the time. (Kuehn, 2001, p. 227)

Some people have also criticised the fact that a thinker like Kant was interested in such "small" matters. However, an examination of Kant's philosophy as a whole will show how wrong this objection is. He was deeply committed to the high ideals of the Enlightenment and was doing his best in this regard. He was not interested in being a mere theoretician but actively participated in the Königsberg Enlightenment. He fought relentlessly against those who believed that it was harmful to teach people more than what religion and the state required. It would be no exaggeration to say that Kant devoted himself entirely to this cause. (Kuehn, 2001, pp. 228-229)

In his famous essay "*What is Enlightenment?*" Kant defined enlightenment as follows: "Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority." According to him, this state of immaturity is "inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another." For this reason, he said that the motto of enlightenment was "*Sapere Aude!*", that is, "dare to know". (Kant, 1784, p. 8:35) Indeed, we can say that his definition of enlightenment has become the "motto of enlightenment" over time. Kant was aware that this state of immaturity could not be corrected by itself, and it was not possible to achieve this without the education he dreamed of. For this reason, his thoughts and practices on education are directly related to many issues in his philosophy. The republican form of government, equality of opportunity,

freedom of expression and ultimately a virtuous society he dreamed of could only be realised as a result of a refined educational process.

According to Kant, “The human being is the only creature that must be educated” and “The human being can only become human through education”. (Kant, *Anthropology, History and Education*, 2007, p. 9:441, 443) For this reason, he says that the rulers of the country should invest in education. Contrary to Kant’s expectations, unfortunately, princes and kings do not have such a priority. All they care about is satisfying their personal ambitions, expanding the borders of the country, and increasing the welfare of the country. Kant complains that no ruler has ever had such a concern for education and that they have not contributed a single iota to the advancements of humanity. Where is hope in a world where all countries endeavour to destroy each other and wars never end? For Kant, the only hope is education. Education must be conducted in accordance with all the purposes of nature, civilised society and domestic life. But both home and school education are still very imperfect, not only in terms of discipline, doctrine and the development of skills, but also in terms of the development of character according to moral principles. After all, how can those who are not themselves educated govern the state? (Kant, *Lectures On Ethics(LE)*, 2011, p. 27:471)

Kant despairs of rulers at this point and says that the hope lies in private education. The attainment of these aims by education does not depend on the support of princes and kings, but on private endeavours, as Basedow and his friends think. For experience has shown us that rulers do not think of the welfare of the state as much as of the universal good. The people in charge of the state calculate the burden of education on the state treasury from the beginning and withdraw from this work. According to Kant, even academic institutions have always held back from taking on this task, and there is little hope that they will do so in the future. (Kant, 2007, p. 9: 448-449) Kant concludes that Basedow educational institutions offer a small but warm hope to their students:

Once human nature has attained to its full destiny and highest possible perfection, that will be the kingdom of God on earth, and inner conscience, justice and equity will then hold sway, rather than the power of authority. This is the destined final end, and the highest moral perfection, to which the human race can attain, and for which, after the lapse of many centuries, we may still have hope. (Kant, *LE*, p. 27:471)

Kant insists that education should be based on moral ideals. He strongly opposes education for economic and professional concerns, political and religious-sectarian purposes. One of the points he found praiseworthy in Basedow's school was that religious education was not based on sectarian concerns but on moral lines. He was against punishment and reward in educational processes. He argued that children should be treated as potentially autonomous in order to establish moral autonomy. (van der Linden, 1988, p. 39)

In 1798 Kant published his last major work, *Conflict of the Faculties*. Here he does not mean faculties in the sense of faculties of the mind, such as sensibility and reason, but faculties as the units of university. The work is basically dedicated to academic freedom and deals with the existing and potential conflicts between the faculties of medicine, law, theology and philosophy. According to him, the faculties of theology, medicine and law prepare their students according to the needs of civilised society and as deemed appropriate by the government. However, the faculty of philosophy should investigate the truth independently of the views and concerns of the state. Kant argues that those with the political power have a duty to support such structures regardless of their efforts to criticise them. This is because he thought that such an environment of criticism would make the political authority in fact stronger. Guyer says that a stronger argument for academic freedom has rarely been offered. (Guyer, 2006, p. 39)

Evaluation and Conclusion

Morality is essentially social and Kantian morality is no exception. The statement that Kant's morality is formalistic shifted from an evaluation into an accusation at the very first period. However, such evaluations stem from not reading his philosophy of morality as a whole. He thought that morality should be based on an unshakeable and universal foundation and argued that this foundation should be a priori. This necessitated that the moral law be formal. However, the formal structure of the moral law does not necessitate the moral theory to be formal as a whole. As a matter of fact, when we look into the details of Kant's ethics, we are faced with an intense content. Social life, political philosophy, philosophy of education and philosophy of religion have intense and reciprocal relations with his understanding of morality. When read together with his own life story, it can be seen that Kantian ethics is not at all pale, empty or just plain formal.

Rumours that he was punctual and lived a cold and gloomy life are largely untrue. Such rumours seem to be the fault of biographers, who usually narrate his last few years. He had an extremely active, and lively social life. He was

interested in almost everything in society. But he was especially interested in education.

As an enlightenment philosopher, Kant always wanted to improve society. From time to time he disagreed with the ruling authority and was censored. But he knew that writing alone was not enough for an enlightened society. That is why he did not refuse any of the administrative positions at the university. He used the positions he held to achieve his own goals and ideals. He took part in projects that he thought served the aims of enlightenment and supported them with all his heart.

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CHAPTER XV

JEREMY BENTHAM'S AND JOHN STUART MILL'S ETHICAL THEORY

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Introduction

The freedom to use one's talents is the basic condition of individual life, and the freedom of everyone is also the basic condition of social life. Some philosophers attribute the definition of what morality should be to individual and scientific laws, and even to government. However, several distinctions must be made to zero in on the kind of autonomy that is of greatest interest to moral and political theory. "Moral autonomy" refers to the capacity to impose the (putatively objective) moral law on oneself, and, following Kant, it is claimed as a fundamental organizing principle of all morality (Hill 1989:129).

In times of illiteracy, people do not doubt even when they do the greatest evil, and in times of Enlightenment they tremble even when they do the greatest good. As a result, people have always believed, albeit somewhat vaguely, that evil arose out of ignorance. Therefore, the general conclusion that created controversy - taking advantage of things that harm human life, they accepted that it is not possible for any society to accept it.

The subject we want to cover in this section the basic ways of the objective dimension of the moral and ethical theory of Jeremy Bentham and J. Stuart Mill. First of all, the main guarantee of a person in his real position in society, his life and the position to which he belongs, is not only class, family, profession, etc. not only an independent person, but even the center of social life, it must be directed towards immutable legal and scientific laws.

Francisco J. Ayala wrote in his article “The Difference of Being Human: Morality”: “Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself but as a necessary consequence of man’s eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, the morality evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Moral codes, however, are outcomes of cultural evolution, which accounts for the diversity of cultural norms among populations and for their evolution through time.” (Ayala, 1987: 16). These moral codes can be taken further when they are created with the goals of directing the individual to behavior and freedom. While talking about this issue, it is impossible to talk about the fact that there is an absolute reality. Morality regulates the relations of the society in which individuals live through religion, culture, literature, customs and other sources of moral thought, and stands in a more important place for the more modern development of the society.

Moral Models in Human Nature: Basic and Theoretical Wraps

The objective nature of moral and ethical theory is a doctrine that has an extremely diverse ideological content and at the same time deals with ethical dimensions in itself. The effectiveness in promoting human life and health is in itself a valid ethical standard, and “these alternative formal ethical approaches, as well as everyday ethical intuitions, present their own challenges when applied to real world situations”. (Marseille & Kahn, 2019:3).

Therefore, even if multidimensional moral goals and values are symbolized by global normatives, and sometimes even not contradictory, they at least enrich its ethical values both in terms of subject and science. Even if we discuss this striking and challenging mode of moral-ethical theory or explain it with evidence, we believe that much of this dissonance content stems from the contradictory correspondence in world literature between Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

In this respect, the theoretical definitions, propositions, and logic of the correspondence between Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill ensure that the satisfaction of existence as a value and goal becomes the same for all.

In order to explain these ideas in a certain logical sequence, it is necessary to try to read the mind of Benedict De Spinoza. Spinoza states that “the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing Is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for

example, of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being". (Spinoza, 1954:15).

Objective Aspects of Moral and Ethical Theory - Paradoxical rationality behavior of the individual

When we look at history, the issue of evaluating the word "morality" as an original theory continues today as a subject by the world philosophers. Even, if this theory contradicted the different interests of people for some periods, it later had a structure that supported the interests of philosophers. Murove states that "If human beings are only self-interested, it becomes difficult to argue for the need to have an all-inclusive moral outlook that has a concern for the natural environment." (Murove, 2009:3).

Although the first major moral exponents of utilitarianism are represented in world literature as Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) and David Hume (1711-1776), the most famous exponents of this wisdom are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1808-1873). The philosophers of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, especially in the seventeenth century, went a step further and began to use natural scientific methods to explore the moral and mental world order in order to penetrate the material world.

Nietzsche seeks to develop a genuinely critical approach to morality, in which all kinds of novel, surprising and daring questions are posed. Nietzsche, does not so much inquire into a 'moral sense' or a moral faculty as attempt to uncover the different senses of morality, that is the different "meanings" morality can be credited with in the history of human development: morality as symptom, as mask, as sickness, as stimulant, as poison, and so on. Morality, Nietzsche holds, is a surface phenomenon that requires meta-level interpretation in accordance with a different, superior set of extra-moral values 'beyond good and evil'. (Nietzsche, 2006: XVii).

Utilitarianism and Consumer Culture

Historically, the beginning of the industrial revolution in Great Britain in the late 18th century was the first evidence of a reaction of the British Industrial Revolution to the world global economy of previous centuries. So, all this was the main theme that lasted until the end of the 19th century, when all jobs in British production were actually long gone and everyone was busy in the

factories. It also seemed that a new global source of Enlightenment reformism was rapidly emerging against the backdrop of the expansion of this sector.

This action, which dominated English thought and also brought the highest benefit to individualism, advocated the need for the most utilitarian moral theory of human design in every aspect. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill became famous in this field as the two greatest representatives of the approach that embodied British practicalism perfectly. Stuart Mill often frequently criticized Bentham in his own essays, and therefore his quantitative analyses have always been very different from the tone of Bentham's writings. Bentham writes polemically to attack the current moral thinking that appealed to moral feelings, which he called "caprice." (Henry R. West, 2004:5).

Jhon Stuart Mill was a more modern reformer than Jeremy Bentham. For this reason, Mill rejected all kinds of calls that arise in moral terms and are precedent to each other in the general concept. Mill also rejected any call in a moral sense, bringing a qualitative dimension to his essays and studies, tending to emphasize the divergent similarities in his analyzes of pleasures and pains. He was an advocate of women's rights and of better wages and voting rights for the working classes. In addition to, he opposed aristocratic privileges. John Stuart Mill not only studied logic, but also managed to develop a new idealism of knowledge in the social sphere, politics and morality, formulating all human logic in his work.

Who was Jhon Stuar Mill

John Stuart Mill was known in the world of science and philosophy as a liberal theorist, utilitarian, positivist and logician, and thinker. This means that the critical and most important works of the author have been translated into all world languages. But despite all this, there is still a gap in the analysis and research of Stuart Mill's works.

Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873), English philosopher and economist. He was born on May 20, 1806, in London, in the family of James Mill, a Scottish economist and philosopher. His Calvinist views, Scottish education, and friendship with Jeremiah Bentham and David Ricardo made James Mill a strict and dogmatic follower of utilitarianism. Locke's theory of consciousness was a strict follower of his philosophy. According to James Mill, at a person's birth, consciousness is like a blank sheet of paper on which experience is subsequently recorded.

Also, Mill greatly admired the great English Romantic poet, William Wordsworth (1770 - 1850), who helped usher in the Romantic Age in English

literature, and became very close friends with him, joining the circle of admirers. Furthermore, in the events of 1830, John Stuart Mill met the poet and essayist J. Stirling in Paris, and, inflamed by his Saint-Simonist ideas, participated in all the literary and political debates about these views.

That is, the acquisition of consciousness of a value, purpose in the soul or in the human soul, and the acquisition of thinking and measuring is an act of the mind.

With this option, Mill deliberately sought to meet people whose ideas were significantly different from those of his father, and felt an intolerable disgust for anything narrow and sectarian. On the other hand, the French Revolution, American democracy played a leading role in the formation of Mill's own political theory, his views on people changed dramatically. According to Mill, democracy in itself is not a panacea and can even lead to the tyranny of a society. the ignorant crowd, if it is not accompanied by an intellectual and moral education of the people.

“Moral autonomy”, (objective by default) according to the moral theory of that era, one of the main approaches of its philosophers consisted of describing human beings in the state of nature. Mill stated that, “utilitarianism” was a state in which morality had nothing to do with utility, or in which morality contrasted pleasure with pleasure. In fact, Mill was a staunch supporter of freedom, and in his book “On Liberty” he defines the peritomeum of freedom and its limits as follows: According to Stuart Mill, the concept of freedom is a concept constantly debated by political scientists and theorists, and freedom in its most general form is “to do what you want, or to act as you choose.” The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle,” since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it” (Mill, 1859:15). In other words, freedom can also be seen as an attitude and the right to make all kinds of decisions on issues that directly or indirectly concern yourself, getting rid of any kind of pressure and resisting the obstacles in front of it.

According to Mill's other opinion, the happiness of all people consists in pure, lasting and uninterrupted pleasure; that is, morality is based on pleasure, benefit, and the highest goal of moral deeds is the happiness of all people. But Utilitarianism is a theory directed against selfishness, the view that the good consists in satisfying one's own interest. In Utilitarianism, information is provided not through truth, but through utility. Part of the information in

the information flow is false if it has no practical application. Information is considered correct if it does not contain the truth in its basis, but is useful.

According to this view, correct information can only be obtained by trial and error. Above all, the interest of society is put, which attaches importance to sociality, and not to individualism. Moreover, Mill argues that morality stems from the highest goal, which constitutes the ultimate goal of man, and thus the line of Aristotle's and Epicurus in his moral philosophy. He only distances this morality from the higher goal. According to Mill, this morality is based on the highest goal, in short, this goal is the principle of utility and stands before all the private goals of man.

Moreover, along with the fundamental question of the philosophy of politics and the state, John Stuart Mill, in his work "The Subjection of Women", has always opposed an administration that somehow seizes or usurps these rights in order to prevent restrictions and harm to the women. According to Mill, if people were truly equal, there would really be no need for revolutions. So, what is meant here should be that people should be treated equally, not that they are equal. In this work, John Mill also criticized the social treatment that prevents women from developing their talents and contributing to the well-being of society.

"So true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears unnatural. But how entirely, even in this case, the feeling is dependent on custom, appears by ample experience (Mill, 1869: 23).

In the line with these views, Mill also supported women's suffrage in England. Indeed, since liberal society believed that politics should work for the benefit of all people, they came to the conclusion that the system that supported their interests was democratization. Therefore, people began to form in an effort to develop a philosophy that would contribute positively to the advancement of wisdom and humanism, individual freedom and human happiness.

In other words, Mill defined people's understanding of morality as a philosophy of achieving happiness and making clear the existence of concepts related to God, reason, and other cause-and-effect relationships. Because of Stuart Mill is skeptical of methods that go beyond the limits of the scientific option, despite all the difficulties created by Hume and Kant's empiricism, he also opposes "probability", which expresses imprecise beliefs. This new

transformation, which European idealism brought to philosophy, was able to define the existence of concepts that do not have an empirical origin in terms of the impression of morality by making it understandable.

Indeed, John Stuart Mill, the greatest apostle of nineteenth-century political liberalism, was typical of the liberal wing of social theory represented a century earlier by Locke, Hume, and others. Moreover, Mill managed to take more serious steps as an initiative to combat the negative provisions of the industrial reform, which could be implemented by democratic means in the new century.

Definitions

As a obligation and moral theory, utilitarianism has been supported and evaluated simultaneously by various thinkers and scientists since ancient times. Although the modern world has made some changes to this conflict of different scale and nature, it is known that among the scientific options, the assertion that there is no other logical necessity after all is quite important.

In other words, according to Mill, “enlightenment” should be a matter of freedom in England by minimizing the negative effects of religion, society and human life. In this context, John Stuart Mill, both Saint-Simon and Comte, by accepting the philosophy that “the age of positive science has entered” in terms of the history of sciences, tried to defend in a comparable way that social change is moving towards the right. Derek Robbins stated that “Mill proposes to Comte that they should discuss together their ‘opinions’ on certain points. But Comte does not have ‘opinions’ in Mill’s sense of the word. He has a body of doctrine, a system. He has constructed this system quite specifically to bring to an end the ebb and flow of ‘opinions’ between which the minds of our time float and which prevent the establishment of firm convictions.” (Lévy-Bruhl, ed. 1899b, xiii, my translation). (Derek Robbins, 2011:20).

Although Mill agrees with Bentham on some of his ideas, he has different estimates of the amount of pleasure and happiness in people’s lives: According to Mill, goodness-pleasure-happiness is also not absolute salvation and solution.

When you think about the definition of pleasure and happiness, the most common point of this initiative is that everyone enjoys living and owns the happiness they seek in their opposite relationship. In short, people’s sense of being happy also makes the human mind more motivated and satisfied.

Values

Mill, like his predecessor Bentham, proposes the idea that a person must first and foremost fulfill his professional and social destiny in order to ensure his own private well-being. In his view, he believed that in all enforcement, the transformation of virtue into an end in itself was a path to decline.

Mill also defends the values of pleasures by their attributes: someone who has been acquainted with both lower and higher pleasures: The goal that two people can do without happiness is “if there is no happiness to be truly achieved by people, it cannot be the goal of morality or rational behavior”. According to Mill, the utilitarian theory gives importance to the prevention and reduction of unhappiness as well as increasing happiness. (Cevizci,2009:26).

Jeremy Bentham’s Influence on the Conditions of Time and Space

The first representatives of the main currents of natural utilitarianism can be found in the sources even before the 18th century, when Jeremy Bentham lived. During this period, Bentham managed to reach the scientific laws of movement, demanded on moral and worldly grounds, and he was even considered, to put it mildly, the founder of utilitarian theory. The lasting success of progressive culture, the belief in the attainment of the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”, strengthened, and a solid thinking prioritizing rationalism and empiricism gave society an intellectual impetus.

As Bentham himself said: “Nature has placed humanity under the control of two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure. Therefore, they “simply indicate what we should do and at the same time determine what we should do”.(Абдигалиева,3).

Jeremy Bentham was born in London in 1748. Bentham’s interest in education reform led him to London’s most populous schools. However, Bentham could not be happy in these schools. Bentham always criticizes the awareness of the level of education there, describing his education at Westminster as “a miserable place for education”(1838–43,X,30). (Jeremy Bentham, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021).

Bentham rejected some of the theories of the scientific community in his understanding of science and sought to arrive at laws within the framework that this concept had no definite academic basis. According him, first human basis for utilitarianism is the desire for happiness, which he claims by attaining pleasures. So, the supreme distinguishing principle of Bentham utilitarianism is the theory of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”.

Values and Basics of Different Actions

British philosopher and sociologist Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) As the founder of utilitarianism, his vision of “happiness for all, freedom and harm to no one” originated in 19th century English philosophy. Utilitarianism is one of the most legal and ethical currents of Western moral thought to be trusted, particularly in the British community of the universe. Jeremy Bentham is also recognized as the founder of British philosophical radicalism, who perfectly embodied British utilitarianism in England. Also, utilitarianism is seen as the grassroots motivation behind many of the economic and political practices in action today.

The revolution that arose in England with the development of capitalism began to make itself felt already at the end of the 18th century. In addition, the increase in proletarian mobility began to disturb the industrial bourgeoisie clearly and openly. Bentham's first works began to appear around this time. In his writings, Jeremy Bentham advocated clear and accessible laws and in particular denounced the English legal system as “the capricious and incomprehensible ruler of our destinies”.

J. Bentham's “prejudices” revealed by critical philosophy, culture and legal common sense also attracted the attention of British cultural and political philosophical thought. Bentham refuses to acknowledge the ethical dimension of his metaphysics and thus tries to demonstrate that it is necessary to rely on common sense but not on metaphysical sense. In addition to being a philosopher, J. Bentham, also a reformer and lawyer, saw in people rationally pursuing their interests and maximizing their benefits. As expressed by Perreau-Saussine “just as Benthamite law is fleshed out from within the “parallel lines” of a utilitarian legal code, so a natural lawyer treats positive laws as primarily fleshings out of under-determined general principles.(Saussine,2004:353).

As a result, the main axiom that Bentham was striving for, the theory of natural law, by its very nature, divided it into public and private (the area of action independent of state power). And thereby proving that the integrity of laws had been applicable only under the conditions of law and the realization of the will of the individual.

Benthamism (ˈbɛnθəmɪzəm) / *noun. the philosophy of utilitarianism as first expounded by Jeremy Bentham in terms of an action being good that has a greater tendency to augment the happiness of the community than to diminish it.* (Collins English Dictionary), is a verifiable movement in England as a philosophical act that advocates reform in law and politics and that law

should be derived from ethics, and that brings ethics and politics to quantitative measurement and different valuation. Bentham states that, in this period, the laws that had to be designed to ensure the happiness of the people made their own views absolute and caused subjectivity in the field of law.(Steinbach, 2019:2). An essentially supreme-independent value, in Bentham's terms, the pleasure of practicing goodwill corresponds to the perfect rationality of the individual who extends the limits of his own happiness to the limits of the common good. And apart from that, he stylized that law and politics can gain scientific value only in this way. This is why Bentham, who boasted of the progress of the concrete and practical sciences, persistently applied an empirical and critical method to many concrete issues of law and politics, and was also never dogmatic in his economic philosophy, despite all his individualism. This situation, the anarchy arising from the subjective approach to issues in the field of law and morality could only be eliminated by establishing an objective point of view. According to Bentham, the solution of this anarchy could only be possible by excluding all metaphysical and theological elements from the field of law and morality, and posing the issues on a factual basis.(Bentham, 2017). As a matter of fact, Bentham also declared that a similar situation requires a special state intervention on the basis of pragmatism, that the government is responsible for public health and education, and that human right is above all.

Therefore, he adopted the view that the state should be challenged in terms of social welfare as well as being responsible for other duties:

- it has clearly seen that issues such as the individual's freedom of enterprise and "the limitation of state intervention are not just abstract speculation, but must be decided on the basis of history and environment". (Ahmet,2009:515). This is why utilitarians like Bentham believed more that the solution to anarchy could only be eliminated by establishing an objective point of view.

Bentham's Moral Evaluation Criteria

Bentham's steps emerged as a follow-up of positivist philosophy, which is a strategic work of society in terms of general moral theory. Moreover, Bentham's moral theory made an important contribution to the formation of the foundations of the pragmatic philosophy that developed rapidly after him. A society's perception and evaluation of life also affects educational practices. Bentham

conveys the ethical aspects of behavior only by acknowledging the moral significance of the consequences of actions (in accordance with the criterion of increased happiness).

According to Mill's deductive method, the moral sciences, including economics, must be applied within the framework of the results of theory. But Bentham is not interested in the origin of moral categories, he asserts them on a pragmatic basis in accordance with the needs of legal practice and law-making. Developing ethically important concepts, Bentham also gives more priority to the speculative meanings that can be applied from a practical point of view, reveals a hierarchy of tastes according to the criterion of normative utility. According to Bentham, this transition is the basic pleasure of goodness and the moral perfection. And this good corresponds to the perfect rationality of the individual, in which the limits of his own happiness extend to the limits of the common good.

In his work "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation", Bentham has evaluated the adoption of inherently moral principles at three levels:

- understand the path to happiness as rational behavior for the benefit of society;
- the assumption of the social nature of morality and the exclusion of individual goals (motives) from the field of ethical consideration;
- combining the proper and the desired within the framework of a single concept of benefit.

Bentham's principles and theories of moral thought have caused much controversy. According to Bentham, there is a great need for the highest level of internal unity and hierarchy of the basic ideas underlying the generalized laws of principles. In addition, Bentham mentions the social relations of many people of the modern period and says that the goals of the social nature of morality are "in every human being, self-seeking interest dominates social interest".

Studying both the structure and principles of the system, strengthening and developing the method in the process of creating a new reform and new legislation is one of the most important responsibilities of the state. Thus, this similarity makes it necessary to refer to the basic cultural definitions of principles and modern approaches to their structural features and tasks in the legal environment. In fact, Bentham's core concept not only includes it in

the method of determining morally right action, but makes it the basis of that method. At the same time, Bentham does not give some details to determine the trend, with which all possible pros and cons are compared, but notes that it is necessary to summarize all the merits of all tastes.

Traditional Moral Criticism in the Analytical Philosophy of J. Bentham

The basis of J. Bentham's critical deontology has arose in the context of the relationship between philosophy and culture. Philosophical thought in British culture: no matter how far they leave us behind, all developments in the field of reason and philosophy are based on overcoming the influence of the tradition in anti-metaphysical motives. J. Bentham's commitment to the philosophy of the analytical genre was expressed in the following conditions:

Criticism of traditional moral philosophy. The general meaning of the text "Deontology" suggests that this text is not philosophical, but actually ethical - apparently, the phrase "moral philosophy" by J. Bentham turned out to be the same as "physical philosophy" in its universal form. In this concept, the question facing J. Bentham was related to his practical activities in many legal areas that he had to deal with in public life.

J. Bentham was never satisfied with the theory and practical thinking of ethical Aristotelianism. He always encouraged the study of thought and spirit, and as an argument in favor of this concept, English analytic philosophy became an alternative to it.

Bentham, like Hobbes, he saw the laws, the orders and prohibitions put and approved by the state, as a will of the sovereign. According to Bentham, subjective rights are derivatives of law; and they have no individual rights other than the orders of the sovereign. Bentham has always advocated for a civilized and complete legal system, including clear and accessible laws. Jeremy Bentham accepts only the right established by the state as a real right. According to him, the existing criteria often do not simply correspond to his morality. More often than not, Bentham accuses moralists of debauchery: he categorizes them on various grounds.

There are certain moral duties that, Bentham encourages that it is enough for the individual to fear their consequences himself. According to Benham, since these mistakes can sometimes be made by mistake, the law should regulate them by legal means. In making these adjustments to his mind, Bentham strove with surprising tenacity to deduce from a single emotion that morality and law are always and equally immanent in people. Bentham called this theory moral

arithmetic. This question is only known arithmetically as –Bentham's formula: the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of people: and this is also the measure of right and wrong. According to Jeremy Bentham, the most important concept here is making sure the arithmetic data can be found and clearly displayed for a solution. Moral and ethical norms are results that concentrate only on human actions. All these are the most serious conditions and definitions, which sometimes voluntarily or involuntarily cause pleasure or pain.

Moreover, based on the individualist ethical understanding that underlies Bentham's views, a truth about human nature also reveals a truth about human psychological structure. In other words, psychological hedonism as a fact-reporting doctrine underlies his utilitarian ethical theory. *Nature has placed man under the rule of two ruling masters: pain and pleasure. They rule us in everything we do, in all we say and think.*

Therefore, Bentham expresses the psychological truth that man has certain desires and strives to satisfy these desires, like Epicurus, that human nature is designed to turn to pleasure and avoid pain, which is a psychological necessity make claims.

Conclusion

In the analytical philosophy of J. Bentham and John Stuart Mill, it is impossible not to touch upon almost every detail of the moral element when considering the spiritual description of the moral world of being. As can be seen in their writings, both authors formed many ethical theories of happiness and various pleasures using the concentric method of utilitarianism and morality. In general, both authors argue that the best ways to evaluate moral theory are based on the experience of utilitarianism, empirical theory. Although Mill's argument may seem a little different here from Bentham's, Mill believes that happiness is the only thing we desire for its own sake. Everything we desire, is the one pleasure, one wish, or one factor that leads to happiness. For example, at university, sometimes a few students (especially first-year students) say that they do not like certain subjects during their education. They describe it in this way: "X" lesson in itself is not good for us, this lesson has little to do with our field, this lesson is good insofar as it brings us pleasure or understanding (which in itself is pleasant, that is, for pleasure). The main argument here is:- someone who is good at his job should put enough effort into it by enjoying his job. Seeing how some work brings pleasure and benefit to other it also gives us great satisfaction (S.Abbasova).

Mill, of course, did not accept freedom precisely as independent. According to him, individual freedom must be very broad – within the social framework. Thus, society and the state can intervene in the affairs of the individual only when his actions harm other people. In everything related to personal destiny, social status, well-being, a person should be free to make independent decisions.

But such an explanatory ethic is built by Bentham on a fairly solid foundation. Bentham refuses to recognize the ethical dimension and sees it necessary to distrust the metaphysical with reason and common sense.

Probably, among the analytical and moral philosophers of his time, especially in the West, discussions about Bentham's theoretical legacy will always continue. In particular, these views of the adherents of various versions of utilitarianism, the historical and philosophical debates about Bentham's influence against the spirit of the Enlightenment, about its originality in modernity, are seen as inevitable. In addition, the evaluation of Bentham's theories and works in 19-20 centuries with different views, it has brought a beginning not only in the West but also in the evolution of the social sciences. However, the verdict of Jeremy Bentham's moral intuitionism and political doctrine, revealed many different problems in the social status of that period.

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CHAPTER XVI

RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN DOSTOEVSKY'S MORAL WORLD

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Dostoevsky is a writer, but also a sociologist and moralist.

Andre Gide

Introduction

In the 19th century, various approaches to social dynamics developed in Russian society. There were important events that subsequently led to the revolution; all sorts of social institutions were discussed, from religion to the family, from politics to economics. Morality was one of the most discussed topics in this process. Because morality; It is the basis on which individual action is built and makes sense, which is considered on the basis of God, good-evil, freedom, conscience and relationship with another. These fields are in a necessary relationship with each other, therefore, within this framework, discussions about morality are conducted.

Dostoevsky, one of the active thinkers of his time, he took part in the debates that took place in the Russian thought world; and his works had a great influence on society. He revealed his pain with this topic in his writings and made important analyzes, especially in the area of morality. Many of his works can be considered part of a moral responsibility. The nature of this situation creates a religious ground; his writings emphasize the connection between God, society and morality.

Dostoevsky as a central theme, did not have the concern of producing a theory about the morality he examined, and acted with a guiding attitude. Within this framework, the main goal of our study is to describe the understanding of morality based on the works of Dostoevsky. Since linking his writings to his life will make it possible to see more clearly the moral framework that he revealed in the dialogues, his life will be briefly mentioned in our study. Then, on the basis of his works, his understanding of morality and the necessary relationship between religion and society in this understanding will be evaluated.

1. His Life

The father of Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, Mikhail Andreevich, studied medicine at Moscow University and worked for some time as a military doctor. In 1819 he married the daughter of a Moscow merchant, quit his job and was sent as a doctor to the Mariinsky Hospital. His second child (Carr, 2014: 13-14). Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, was born in Moscow in 1821. He was of medium height, pale brown, thin and sickly appearance (Troyat, 2014: 83). Dostoevsky in the first half of the nineteenth century, was the only one who did not come from a landed noble family, among writers like Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Herzen, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Nekrasov (Frank, 2016: 28-29). Dostoevsky was born in a hospital where poor people were treated for free. During the fifty-six years passed in misery, poverty, illness and troubles never left them. (Zweig, 2011: 13) Thus Dostoevsky lived on the verge of poverty, fearing that his creditors would corner him (Frank, 2016: 493).

Dostoevsky learned the alphabet from his mother at an early age. Evening readings in the family gave him the Bible, but he also introduced with Pushkin's poems and parts of Karamzin's history too. Fyodor was sent to school in 1831. Since Latin was not taught here, this task was taken over by his father. The sharpness of his father during the lessons impressed him very much. In 1834 he was sent to a boarding school with his brother and stayed there for three years. His mother fell ill and died in 1837. His father had had eight children, and Fyodor was only fifteen when he died. The death of his mother, when he was only thirty-seven, shocked the family. After this event, his father has decided to send his two eldest sons to St. Petersburg military school. Fyodor was accepted into the school in 1838, but his brother Michael was eliminated due to health reasons. Fyodor, who did not get along very well with his environment, was very attached to his brother. No one could replace his brother for him. Dostoevsky prohibited any kind of exchange with the outside world, he carried the stamp of this youth,

who lived in a closed box, deprived of friends and freedom, throughout his life (Carr, 2014: 18-19 & Troyat, 2014: 21-40).

In 1839 his father was killed by peasants. Before he received the news of his death, he sent an angry letter to his father asking for money. Dostoevsky felt guilty himself until the end of his life, for the writing this letter to his father. He graduated from the academy in 1843 and was appointed to a position in the engineering department. He resigned because of the possibility of being sent to a provincial civil service. In 1844 he wrote to his brother Michael that he would resign, not wanting to spend his best years outside of Petersburg. Now he had no other source of income than a pen. And so, he began to write his first original prose work. *Poor Folk* a short novel consisting of letters, was renewed and rewritten several times in the winter of 1844-45 (Dostoyevski: 24-25 & Carr, 2014: 27- 29& Troyat, 2014: 52-54). Belinsky, a well-known critic of that time, who read the novel handed to him as “A new Gogol is born!”, could not get over his astonishment for a long time that someone in his twenties had written such a great work. “Do you know what you have written here?” he excitedly asked Dostoevsky again and again and said him would be a great writer (Troyat, 2014: 74-77 & Carr, 2014: 30).

The incident with Petrashevsky is a turning point in Dostoevsky's life. Fyodor, who was participating in meetings of a revolutionary group founded by the officer Petrashevsky, was caught by the police in 1849 with a group of suspects. The suspects are accused of committing illegal acts against the state. It is very difficult to predict the political and social views of Dostoevsky at that time. His being with these suspects should be seen as an intellectual sensibility. Therefore, Dostoevsky cannot be considered an anarchist (Gide, 2005: 73).

Those involved in this incident are brought before a military tribunal and almost all are recommended for execution. But Dostoevsky is sentenced to eight years hard labor in Siberia on charges of distributing Belinsky's letter for illegal purposes. Nicholas I changes this sentence to “four years of hard labor, the rest to serve as privates”, provided that it is kept secret. The military court's proposal for the death penalty was rejected, but the demonstration was decided to have an effect. Prisoners who unaware of the pardon were escorted to the usual place of execution; The death sentence was read out, the priest called for confession. They were placed in front of the soldiers who were going to shoot them. Fyodor, along with nine friends, was tied to a pole, wearing the shirts of those sentenced to death. With his eyes covered with cloth, he listened to the death sentence. It was then that the real decisions were read for the first time,

and the prisoners were returned to their cells. This experience left an indelible mark on Dostoevsky's life (Zweig, 2011: 118 & Troyat, 2014: 129 & Carr, 2014: 55-56).

They tied chains to Dostoyevsky's ankles. On the way to Siberia, a woman gave him a Bible. The Bible, was the only book allowed to be read in prison, Fyodor kept with him throughout his life. The Bible was a major influence on all of his later work. Dostoevsky was released from prison in 1854. To serve the rest of his term, he was sent to the 7th Siberian Rifle Battalion as a private. He was sent to Semipalatinsk, where he spent the next five years of his life (Carr, 2014: 73 & Troyat, 2014: 111-161 & Gide, 2005: 94).

In a letter he wrote to his brother as soon as when he got out of prison, he said: "My whole future depends on them," and asked him to send himself the Quran, along with Kant and Hegel books (Dostoyevski, 1973: 68). Dostoevsky, who married with Maria Dmitrievna Isaeva in Semipatalinsky in 1857, then left the army in 1859 and received permission to live in Russia. However, he was forbidden to live in St. Petersburg or Moscow. He had to live in the small town of Tver. After living for some time in Tver, subject to continued secret surveillance of him, he was allowed to settle in Petersburg (Troyat, 2014: 191-208).

In his writings, written after his release from prison, Dostoevsky connects the prison experience with the moral outcome and argues that these years are necessary to save the soul. Because prison life destroyed all moral values in him. The social categories of virtue and vice no longer seemed to him to be two opposite poles of the moral line. Dostoevsky learned to see the inadequacy of generally accepted the moral values and to seek the truth beyond the accepted definitions of good and evil. It was here that, he caught bursts of the moral question that formed the basis of *Crime and Punishment*. Those four years were a hidden treasure that nurtured his genius (Carr, 2014: 59, 69 & Troyat, 2014: 162).

Dostoyevsky, who lost his wife and brother in 1864, suffered from epilepsy in all his life. This disease, which he suffered before leaving for Siberia, worsened during the days of his imprisonment. Dostoevsky has always been a sick man. In addition, although he was inherited with the death of his father, he led a very disorderly life and was constantly in debt, as he was completely responsible for his younger brother. The money problem appears on every page of his correspondence. This problem played a very important role until the last years of his life, and only in recent years did he really get rid of it (Zweig, 2011: 120 & Carr, 2014: 68 & Gide, 2005: 27-72). His financial problems forced him to

make a deal with a publisher to release the book within a certain period of time. Otherwise, he will lose the right to publish all his works. To complete the book, Dostoevsky met the stenographer Anna Snitkina, who would become his future wife, and in twenty-five days prepared *The Gambler* for publication. The year 1866 is very important in his life. *Crime and Punishment* began publishing in January; in October, he met Anna. *Crime and Punishment* placed Dostoyevsky among Russia's greatest writers. His second marriage strengthened his family life and financial position. By the age of forty-five, he became a devoted husband, a famous writer. His settled life also made him give up his great passion, gambling. In 1871, after losing a lot of money gambling once again, he promised his wife that he would never played gamble again, and the end kept his promise (Troyat, 2014: 255-279 & Carr, 2014: 141 & Girard, 2014: 49).

The fame that Dostoevsky acquired in the last years of his life brought with it new positions and responsibilities. He was often invited to read excerpts from his writings to poor students. The main event that reinforced his fame was the Pushkin speech. The event was the opening of a monument to Pushkin erected in Moscow. At the end of the speech, the crowd listening to him was overwhelmed with enthusiasm and shouted for joy. They hugged each other and vowed that from now on they would be better. The crowd said, "You are the one who reconciled us. You are our saint, our prophet" they shouted (Carr, 2014: 289-296 & Troyat, 2014: 232). Dostoevsky was often reading Pushkin's poem "The Prophet" to the audience and describing universal peace in the name of Jesus. It was no accident that the enthusiastic crowds greeted him like a Prophet. The length of the funeral procession, which consisted of people of all stripes, a mile and a half long, was a testament to his dignity. When he died in 1881, hundreds of thousands attended his funeral. In the last moments of his life, he called his children. His final advice was: "Have absolute trust in God and never despair of His forgiveness. I love you very much, but my love is nothing compared to God's great love for people." (Frank, 2016: 18 & Troyat, 2014: 423 & Zweig, 2011: 124).

2. Dostoevsky's Works

Elements that complement each other as themes in Dostoevsky's work make it possible to consider all his works as a whole, although the Siberian years led to a sharp transformation. Dostoyevsky, who left his profession in his early twenties to become a writer, achieved great success with his first work, *Poor Folk*. The literary authorities of the period spoke highly of the novel consisting

of letters. Dostoevsky has achieved great fame. However, his works such as *A Faint Heart* and *White Nights* did not have the effect Dostoevsky expected. Because the inner turmoil that was revealed in his early works had nothing to do with the revolutionary movements that shook Europe and agitated the Russian intelligentsia. His novel *Netochka Nezvanova* was left unfinished when he was arrested. Two parts were published, but Dostoevsky was unable to complete this novel afterwards (Girard, 2014: 74-75 & Carr, 2014: 45).

After the Siberian years, Dostoevsky, forgotten upon his return to St. Petersburg, was published for the first time only some novels and short stories. Later, when the *Memoirs from the House of the Dead*, in which he told about his prisoner's life, was published, the name of Dostoevsky began to circulate again. He had a greater reputation than before. This book was a huge success for him. In the same year, he published *Humiliated and Insulted*, his most ambitious work to date. But the publication of *Crime and Punishment* in 1866 made Dostoevsky's name permanent in the literary world. In 1863-1865 he concentrated all his energy on the magazine. He spent the last five years of his life working with the magazine. All these articles were later collected under the title of *A Writer's Diary*. The diary has reached a wide readership from the countryside to the palace circle. In this diary written for the people, Dostoevsky attacks the Westerners because they want to make Russia a branch of Europe. He also criticizes the Slavs, whom he claims are slaves to the past. According to him, there is only one way out, and the public will show it (Girard, 2014: 17-18 & Zweig, 2011: 120 & Gide, 2005: 118 & Frank, 2016: 763 & Troyat, 2014: 374-375).

Dostoevsky did not accept the thoughts that influenced the new generation he encountered when he returned from Siberia. The ideas had put forward by Chernyshevsky were a combination of atheism, materialism, rationalism and utilitarianism. Fedor began to write each of his works as an answer with the sensitivity that acquired during the years of exile. For example, he wrote *Notes from the Underground* as a reaction to Chernyshevsky's understanding of the "rational egoism" on which Russian radicalism is based. The morality of the 1860s is especially criticized in the work. *Crime and Punishment* was a response to the ideas of another radical thinker, Pisarev. Pisarev, like Raskolnikov, morally for the sake of humanity defended the right to commit murder. At the time, when he wrote *The Idiot* and the *Demons*, Dostoevsky's religion was nothing more than a violent reaction to Belinsky's influence, a rejection of the intellectual atheism that was wreaking havoc among the Russian

intelligentsia. The *Idiot* was written as an attempt to create a picture of the Christian ideal against the backdrop of the rational selfishness that Dostoevsky so vehemently criticized. But the *Demons* is based on the Nechaev Incident. According to Nechaev, it was permissible to use any means for purposes that benefit society. Also *The Adolescent*, was a response to the problems that had begun in Russian culture under the influence of the Russian Populist movement. While Dostoevsky opposed such ideas, on the other hand, he tried to create a moral image of Christianity that would set a positive example for the new generation. In short, in all his great novels, whatever differences stand out from the ideology of the radical Russian intelligentsia at the time the work was written; resists his moral pressure (Frank, 2016: 16-739 & Troyat, 2014: 328 & Girard, 2014: 52).

Dostoevsky writes his criticisms of Europe in his work the *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*. Throughout the book, the author describes how Europe has morally degraded and loudly voices his objection to European admiration (Dostoyevski, 2010a). In *The Brothers Karamazov*, on the contrary, he defines a theme in which he raises the question of the boundaries of morality with the problem of evil. Dialogically, on the one hand, he expresses questions about the God through Ivan Karamazov, but on the other hand, he answers these questions with the speeches of Alyosha Karamazov and Father Zosima (Dostoyevski, 2001). Socratic dialogues, moral experiences, conversations with oneself and confessions determine the plot and compositional structure of Dostoevsky's novels. In each of his works, events are fertilized by some ideas. The meaning of morality in *Crime and Punishment*, the moral ideal in *The Idiot*, the relationship between morality and politics in *Demons* the foundations of morality and religion in *The Brothers Karamazov* come to the fore.

We cannot see his characters sitting, eating, drinking, sleeping and resting in his twenty thousand pages. All Dostoevsky's characters are constantly thinking and struggling with emotional problems. All these constitute the main material of his novels. The ideological teachings of his age felt in his works; provides the motivation for the eccentric behavior of individuals such as Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment*, Stavrogin and Kirillov in *Demons*, and Smerdyakov in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Thus, he explains that these teachings cannot be the way out for the Russian people. Therefore, in order to understand what Dostoevsky wrote about, it is necessary to place each work in its social context (Bahtin, 2004: 225& Gide, 2005: 126 & Carr, 2014: 241 & Zweig, 2011: 176 & Frank, 2016: 13-14).

3. God and Morality

Dostoevsky is an ardent supporter of the fact that values that are not based on moral thinking built on religious grounds cannot form the basis of social life. The loss of faith is a big problem for him. His struggle with the individual and social consequences of this deficiency can be seen in almost all of his writings. This struggle has a pronounced moral content. Concretizing his religious faith around the profile of Jesus, surrounded by love, Dostoevsky has drawn the only way out of social welfare from this point of view. It is no exaggeration to see in Dostoevsky a lover of Jesus who thinks that in a world that has lost its faith, there will be no useful qualities left; he even wrote in one of his letters: “If anyone can prove to me that Jesus is outside the truth...then I would rather be with Jesus than with the truth.” the decision is up to him. Dostoevsky’s mood in the setting where Belinsky criticizes Jesus shows this very well:

Belinsky suddenly stopped his angry cries and turned to his friend. Pointing to me, he said: “Looking at him, “I’m worried.” “Every time I talk about Jesus, his face changes, he looks like he’s about to cry.” He was always hooking on me. “Believe me, you are very naive! If your Jesus had lived in our time, believe me, he would have been an ordinary person whom no one would have noticed. Science and humanity of our time would be completely destroyed before those who moved them.” (Dostoyevski, 2012a: 12-13).

The Siberian years had a decisive influence on Dostoevsky’s understanding of morality. Dostoevsky, who said he was devoted to the holiness of communist society prior to his years of exile, said that Christianity at the time was against moral values; he says he believes in the corruption of religion. However, in *A Writer’s Diary*, he states that now he considers it an illness and is highly critical of the materialistic approach. In addition, he says that a society that will be built according to the views of the intellectuals of the time will create a picture that humanity will curse. According to him, “in denial of Jesus the human mind can achieve surprising results.” For Dostoevsky, who connected the cynicism and indifference observed in the youth of that period with the “universal” values that they were inspired, it is quite natural that such a result occurs when religion is not taken into account. Because in infancy, “if their nannies were kicked out for reciting prayers from the Virgin Mary bending over their cradle, tell me what can be expected from these children?” (Dostoyevski, 2012a: 170-175).

Dostoevsky was the moralist who waged the war against those who tried to build morality to the exclusion of Christian values. For Dostoevsky, who proposes a Jesus filled with love for humanity as a solution to the problems of the time, the values that Jesus preached are a moral social necessity. Otherwise, it will only lead to disaster for the society. The character that he reveals in *The Idiot* through Prince Myshkin is clearly influenced by Jesus. Myshkin, who treats everyone around him with unconditional love, almost always wears his cross on his back. In *Demons* the character of Kirillov, created by him as the antipode of Jesus, commits suicide for the sake of high values in which he believes. His death is a challenge to the God - against the man, and the man against the God. Thinking that he has an absolute will, completely independent of God, Kirillov sees an illusion in God and therefore takes everything for good. He also rejects morality because he opposes God. This view, which equates all acts of morality, even with the rape of a child, becomes more central in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The idea that Dostoevsky approves of Ivan Karamazov, that everything is permitted without God and immortality, led to the murder of their father, which is the main event of the novel. Smerdyakov, the illegitimate son of Karamazov's father, under the influence of these theses of Ivan, committed this murder. When Ivan learns about this situation, the guilt turns into a mockery of the devil he sees in his dream. The leveling plane of disbelief in God has once again led to disaster. Thus, the main problem of the book is the position of the individual, who derives from the moral equation God and life after death; thus Dostoevsky reveals his approach to the moral necessity of God. In Dostoevsky's vision of religion, the Catholic Church does not have a positive position. He blames Catholicism for changing the teachings of Jesus. The story of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* just illustrates this situation. The story of the reappearance of Jesus on earth and his imprisonment by the Grand Inquisitor.

For the Grand Inquisitor, the teachings of Jesus have always brought pain and tears to humanity. Dostoevsky makes the prince talk about this approach of the Catholic Church right in *The Idiot*. The prince defines Catholicism as a non-Christian religion and considers it worse than atheism: "Atheism at least glorifies absence; On the contrary, Catholicism offers humanity a distorted, humiliated and slandered Antichrist, contrary to the truth!" (Dostoyevski, 2010b: 625).

Dostoevsky wants to take the teaching of Jesus only from the Bible. In fact, Gide says that he did not know another writer who was as Christian and less Catholic as Dostoevsky (Gide, 2005: 169-170). His biblical approach is undoubtedly closely related to his personal experience. Because he was allowed

to read the Bible only during his stay in Siberia. The effect of this experience can be clearly seen towards the end of *Crime and Punishment*. In the novel, Raskolnikov's understanding of his right to kill in the name of a noble cause leads to a moral crisis. Because he cannot reconcile the murder he committed, claiming that he is doing it for humanity, with his moral understanding. Thus, he recovers his moral understanding with the help of the Bible. During his all lifetime of Dostoyevski, one woman gave him the Bible. Therefore, Dostoevsky, through Raskolnikov, emphasizes that a person must sacrifice himself, and not someone else, for the sake of humanity, and reveals the religious basis of his moral understanding.

Dostoevsky argued that socialism was trying to replace the then-lost dominance of religion. According to him, socialism is trying to save humanity without resorting to Jesus. The basic teaching for this is as follows: "Don't believe in God, don't own property, don't have personality!" (Dostoyevski, 2010b: 626). The West is about to die because it has lost Jesus (Troyat, 2014: 331).

Fighting to prevent Russia from falling into the same situation, Dostoevsky opposes individual or social means of salvation where Jesus is not included in the equation. In his opinion, this situation, in which secular morality will arise, leads to a utilitarian understanding at the center of morality. Thus, the individual is prone to arbitrary behavior, to the satisfaction of all kinds of desires, and moral decay occurs. To build life on these arbitrary principles is to open the gates of hell. Dostoevsky is very generous to his self-confident heroes in order to protect their moral principles. This gives them the right to talk in detail about the individual, society and being. But these characters are suicidal for that very reason. Therefore, the main emphasis for Dostoevsky; lies in the fact that a person can find the way of salvation not in himself, but only in God.

4. Theodicy and Freedom

In order to reveal Dostoevsky's understanding of morality, it is necessary to evaluate the concept of theodicy, the theme of which we encounter in almost all of his works. In his works, the suffering and evil experienced by the man in this life underlie the criticism developed against God. Since a loving God is mentioned; how then will all these events on earth be interpreted? For example. How does God allow the terrible vices of a child? The problem of children is often found in the works of Dostoevsky. In *The Idiot*, sixteen-year-old Ipolite is battling tuberculosis. Also in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ivan wants to test his

brother Alyosha, who insists on a loving understanding of God by asking if the general deserves to be shot for having his child mutilated by dogs. Here Ivan rejects the theological meaning attributed to suffering, and hence the meaning of attributed to the world: "If everyone has to suffer in order to earn eternal happiness through the suffering, then why do we confuse children with this, tell me? I do not understand why they should suffer, deserve their eternal happiness with the same pain that they will endure... Let's suppose that you are the one who raised the structure of the destiny of the human being in order to make people happy, to give them peace and tranquility. If you had to make a small creature suffer, such as a boy who punched him in the chest, and build this building on these unavenged tears, would you agree to be the architect of this structure under such conditions? (Dostoyevski, 2001: 272-275). Alyosha confronts Jesus with these questions. Because he shed his blood and sacrificed himself for everything and everyone. Therefore, life can only become meaningful with a love that embraces all of humanity. Dostoevsky decides morally good and evil, taking freedom into an equation with an ontological approach. If good and evil simultaneously exist in a person, this indicates the presence of the will to choose. As he argues in "Notes from the Underground," two times two is not life, gentlemen, it is only the beginning of death (Dostoyevski, 2007: 48). Free will is the variable that takes all kinds of action beyond good and evil. Thus, Dostoevsky characterizes the deterministic approach to morality as death to existence. He says that such a society would be no different from an anthill.

Freedom, how often emphasized in *Notes from the Underground*, takes on a purely religious connotation in *The Brothers Karamazov*: Should the man sacrifice his existence to sow his freedom? Satan; Jesus chose freedom when he tried to tempt him with bread, power, and an easy life. For this reason the Grand Inquisitor criticizes Jesus; he says that this choice brings pain and tears to humanity. In this context, the chief inquisitor who gave a long speech to Jesus while he was in prison; he says that he will return to Earth and interfere with the prosperity they want to build and therefore will burn it down. Because Jesus condemned man to freedom. Freedom has only led to suffering for fifteen centuries. However, the good must be given to man in spite of himself. For the sake of happiness, freedom must be conquered. To do this, absolute obedience must be ensured. Otherwise, all of humanity will continue to live in turmoil and turmoil. Jesus answers these words only by kissing the Grand Inquisitor.

Dostoevsky believes that when a person is given a choice, he will instinctively choose deprivation and suffering in the name of freedom. According

to him, even if science proves that a person is a piano key, he will still begin to experience various pains, creating some kind of confusion and storms in his mind. In this way, he will believe that he is a person, and not a piano key (Dostoyevski, 2007: 45-46). The underground man is looking for an ideal that accepts human freedom, is compatible with his moral nature and is not based on personal interests. According to Dostoyevsky, this ideal can be found in the teachings of Jesus. (Frank, 2016: 456).

Dostoyevsky sees in the inclusion of pain in life divine grace, the possibility of purification. Traces of this thought can be seen in his own life. He is grateful for the epilepsy he suffered all his life, and describes his experience when he was exiled to Siberia as a test that purifies his soul in *The Writer's Diary*. (Dostoyevski, 2012a: 174). In *Crime and Punishment*, Katerina Ivanovna, on her deathbed, does not ask a priest for confession. Its justification includes the thoughts of Dostoyevsky: "I have no sin! However, forgive me Lord. ... Because he knows how much I have suffered in this world." In this context, in a paragraph from the notebook *Crime and Punishment*, Sonya almost speaks of Dostoyevsky's morality: "When you are at ease, in existence, perhaps you have no idea what human happiness is. God's beloved, the man God truly trusts, is the man to whom he suffers the most..." (Frank, 2016: 413, 500). For this reason, Sonya advises Raskolnikov to confess his guilt and that the suffering he will endure will atone for his guilt: "You must suffer to pay for your sins." (Dostoyevski, 2010d: 494).

Emphasizing the purifying side of suffering, Dostoyevsky sees freedom as a distinctive side of human suffering and considers evil an inevitable consequence of this situation. He opposes the profile of man that is put forward as an alternative, who is deprived of his freedom for the sake of his own happiness, and against all ideological approaches that develop moral theory within this framework. He argues that in this way a real catastrophe will occur, and that a person will lose all his human differences. In his writings, he allows characters who have this moral understanding to detail their statement, but these characters are all stumped; they cannot offer a solution of their own life. Since their freedom is not placed in a religious context, good and evil are equalized on the same plane. Thus, as with Raskolnikov, freedom leads to the captivity of the individual's own desires and creates chaos.

5. Conscience as a Judge

When Dostoyevsky reads Karamzin as a child, he encounters two ideas that oppose rational explanations. One of them was the necessity of the other

world for any moral order, and the other was the idea that conscience is an indestructible part of human nature (Frank, 2016: 56). Dostoyevsky's works are fictional with its character types that bring this context to the fore. In his novels, criminal or prostitute, murderer or priest, prince or drunkard; all symbols are nested. What distinguishes one from the other is the degree of truth they have attained, not these qualities. The actions of the individual must be weighed and evaluated on such a scale. Because, according to Dostoevsky, nothing can defile a person. Moreover, before the court of God there is no other court than the court of conscience (Zweig, 2011: 160-161).

Dostoevsky bases his moral theory on the approach that people are valuable because of God. According to him, even the most contemptible person has an absolute value. In addition to the characters that appear in his works, even ordinary types that remain in the background are evaluated in this context. For this reason, no one should suffer in the slightest degree. Murders, often found in the artistic world of Dostoevsky, are seen as a threat to divine existence. A reality arises that the individual has denied both in himself and in others. When you kill someone else, you kill yourself. As Berdyaev states, this dialectic is purely Christian (Berdyaev, 1984: 81).

As we emphasized earlier, in Dostoevsky's understanding of morality, an important place is occupied by the relationship between suffering and sin, for which committed sins are not the cause of suffering. On the contrary, suffering leads to the formation of the psychology necessary for the forgiveness of sins. Here we are talking about the forgiveness of the individual himself, and not about the forgiveness of others. However, it is necessary to be ready to suffer because of this situation, which is possible with conscience (Carr, 2014: 280). Raskolnikov stands out more than all other characters in Dostoevsky by showing the conscientious return of action. Here, Raskolnikov is trying to convince himself that he committed the murder on behalf of all mankind. After all, he killed a moneylender who sucked human blood. This is a very useful action for society. He positions himself in a separate place from other people and believes that he can push the boundaries of morality with good reason. He will calm down if he pleads guilty. But throughout the novel, he seeks different outlets for his soul, torn apart by the act of murder; trying to suppress the inner voice. But he can't find any way out for himself. The guilt never leaves him. Because, as Porfiry Petrovich said to Raskolnikov, even if you deceive another at first sight, you will start to think if I made a mistake somewhere at night. "He can't get rid of this mental state!" (Dostoyevski, 2010d: 403).

Raskolnikov clearly shows the reader the consequences of faith in the power of reason, which replaces conscience (Frank, 2016: 419). Unable to withstand the pressure of conscience, Raskolnikov finally confesses to Sonya in the murder. Sonya tries to help him cope with this mental state. When he found out that he had committed the murder, he told Raskolnikov: “You are the most unfortunate person in the world, you are the most unfortunate person in the world!” she exclaims. He understood very well the guilt he felt. She looks at him with intense pity (Dostoyevski, 2010d: 484). Even when he was sent to Siberia to deal with it, he does not leave her alone. The only healing tool Sonya has is the Bible.

Encouraging Raskolnikov to confess, Sonya reveals the meaning that Dostoevsky attributed to confession. Here it is appropriate to recall the parlor game (pöti-jö) played in *The Idiot*. The people gathered in Nastasya Filippovna’s house decide to play a game of confession; everyone will tell about the worst thing he did (Dostoyevski, 2010b: 188). In a word, Dostoevsky glorifies confession as Christian and singles it out as the only means of deliverance from the pangs of conscience. This understanding, which is repeated in all his works, is the idea of confessing before an ordinary person or everyone, and not in the ear of a priest. Most of the characters, often unexpectedly and untimely, are ignited by the need to confess and apologize (Gide, 2005: 104). In fact, the importance attached to repentance is such that it renders legal punishment meaningless. According to Zosima, the real punishment is the “conscious” punishment. Because the punishment given by the court does not correct anyone. For this reason, crimes are increasing even more. What will protect society and guide the guilty on the right path is the law of Jesus, which makes people listen to the voice of their conscience (Dostoyevski, 2001: 87).

Conscience acts as Dostoevsky’s critical threshold. We see another example of a working conscience in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Although Ivan Karamazov did not kill his father and was not charged before the law, he was distraught with deep guilt because Smerdyakov killed his father under the influence of his views. His understanding that everything seems to be halal led to the death of his father. Dostoevsky also offers clues about how a person who has escaped the influence of conscience turns into someone in his novel *Demons*. The nihilist Verkhovensky, one of the main characters, is fictionalized as a type of failed conscience. Thus, in Dostoevsky, conscience expresses the pressure of individual consciousness upon itself. It should be emphasized that conscience is formed as an element that acquires its significance on the basis of religion.

6. Loving and Being Responsible for Others

In Dostoevsky, one side of morality looks at the inner world of the individual, the other - at society. When morality is not built on the basis of love, it seems impossible for a person to find peace in his inner world. Love centered on the person himself will also bring disaster to society. For this reason one must melt oneself in the cauldron of love and come into existence with this renunciation. The Bible verse in the introduction to *The Brothers Karamazov* summarizes Dostoevsky's idea of sacrifice:

I tell you the truth, the truth: if a grain of wheat does not disappear after it has fallen to the ground, it remains a grain of wheat; and if destroyed, it will give a bountiful harvest (Dostoyevski, 2001: 5).

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Zosima responsibly explains the position of the individual in society. Zosima, who recounts the memory of him in the story "The Mysterious Guest", explains the relationship that a person must establish with society. When all are brothers to each other, the dream of a heavenly life will come true in this world. For this, the era of individualization must end. Therefore, a person must feel responsible for others in order to save his soul from loneliness. In fact, a sense of responsibility should be in relation to the entire universe, and not just to people. A grain of sand, a small leaf, animals, plants...In short, they must feel responsible for everyone and everything. In order to achieve this, there must be a divine love for everyone and everything. After all, hell is "the pain of not being able to love yet" (Dostoyevski, 2001: 333-352).

Dostoevsky in the *Memoirs from the House of the Dead* draws a profile of a man who acts with the desire to gain power over others. These people, "burnt with the desire to lick blood like tigers," made it a habit to inflict pain on others. This passion is a disease, and it turns a person into a monster. Even worse, there is a risk that this disease will spread and infect the entire society. In a society that makes others suffer if it keeps silent about these events, this society is sick and rotten (Dostoyevski, 2010c: 252).

Dmitri who is accused of killing his father among Karamazov Brothers, has a dream at the end of the episode titled "Sorrows of the Soul". Passing by a burnt village, he notices a peasant woman. On the woman's lap is a baby trying to suckle her dry breasts and crying from hunger and cold. Dmitri wants to cry at this sight. At that time, the baby and his mother no longer cried; believes

that in order for all people to be happy, something must be done at any cost (Dostoyevski, 2001: 535-536). A similar incident occurs in one of Dostoevsky's short stories. The hero of the story, as is often emphasized, is the one who doesn't care. There is nothing in the universe that he cares about. So much so that he postpones her decision to commit suicide for a long time with the thought that "I was so indifferent that I wanted to capture a moment when I wasn't so indifferent." One evening, when he is about to commit suicide, he meets an eight-year-old girl on the road. The child grabs his hand and asks for help. He pulls her hand, her clothes are soaked through, she is shivering from the cold. Apparently, she went out to seek help for her mother. But the man does not want to help her. So he pushes the girl away from her insistent begging and yells at her. So the child hopelessly leaves him. Then the hero of the story goes home to put a bullet in his head. He thinks of a little girl sitting on a table with a gun in front of her. At this point, his indifference to everyone and everything begins to break down against his pity for the little girl. He no longer considers himself a zero and refuses to commit suicide. But the little girl saved her life (Dostoyevski, 2011: 115-121). Thus, Dostoevsky tries with a sense of responsibility to connect people with everyone and everything. He thinks that love mixed with compassion will inevitably give this sense of responsibility.

In the work of *Humiliated and Insulted* Dostoevsky describes the character of the prince as a selfish person. A prince is someone who gives all his love to himself and says he can accept whatever is in his best interest. According to him, egoism underlies all kinds of virtuous behavior. Life is also a commerce, and it should be spent on your own pleasure. Therefore, any moral responsibility should be accepted only for the benefit (Dostoyevski (2012b: 269-271). Prince Valkovsky is Dostoevsky's artistic response to the morality of the 1860s. The prince was created to refute Chernyshevsky's assertion of "rational egoism". Thus, the idea that reason and self-interest will be reconciled and that egoism through reason will turn into benevolence, Dostoevsky rejects. Because building morality on selfishness will lead to uncontrollable forces in the human personality (Frank, 2016: 345, 355).

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CHAPTER XVII

SOCIAL ETHICS AT ZİYA GÖKALP

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Introduction

From the past to the present, the concept of social morality has been one of the main topics that almost all thinkers deal with. According to Aristotle, man has two important weapons, intelligence and thought, compared to other living things. If a person does not pass through a moral education filter, he can become one of the most dangerous creatures in the living world (Aytaç, 1980).

Because in the realm of living things, beings do not tend to harm other living things as long as they do not perceive a threat to life and their stomachs are full. On the other hand, as a thinking being, a person may exhibit an attitude other than this motivational behavior. In such a situation, a person can harm both himself and others. That is why moral norms in the social field are extremely important and indispensable. Many thinkers who think about society have definitely mentioned social morality and put forward their ideas. Even in this sense it is also known that there are different schools.

Ibn-i Khaldun (2004) states that the geography in which people live and, accordingly, the way they eat affect their nature. According to him, the scarcity, abundance or types of food affect the morality of nations in different dimensions. Ibn Khaldun establishes a kind of relational link between social morality, geography and food. If the needs of people are not met through legal means, immorality occurs in the society. As a result of this situation, all kinds of evil and illegality situations increase in the society.

In Auguste Comte's classification of the sciences, it is seen that he did not include morality in the early days, but began to include morality in his classification in the following period. Comte does not recognize the state, religion and lineage differences in his moral understanding (Güngör, 1993). Because according to him, religion provides unity and integrity in society by creating a consensus in the society.

Durkheim, on the other hand, says that morality and moral norms, like all other institutions, are determined by society. According to him, the main source of morality and moral norms determined by society is religion, which is also a social output. According to Weber, the principles of Protestantism such as being rational, thrifty and giving religious moral value to worldly work gave birth to modern capitalism. In this context, Protestantism accepts it as its sacred duty to rationalize human life and to do one's work regularly, honorably and diligently (Kızılcelik 1994).

In addition to the world of thought, there are many different field books on the moral understanding of Turkish society. In fact, it is seen that the socialist structure of Turkish social morality is at the forefront. This situation is understood by keeping the social interest ahead of individual interests in all kinds of preferences and interests.

As a matter of fact, it is seen that the military tradition, which has been going on in Turkish communities since history, has become a character that is engraved in the soul of the people in a collective way in terms of protecting and watching over the society. From this point of view, it is known what the military spirit dominates the life of Turkish society. For Turks, dying in war is more preferable than dying in bed (Gökalp, 1989). It is noteworthy that this is the case especially among the Turks, who did not even have the promise of paradise in their belief system before Islam. So, killings for military purposes is a social morality that is considered honor among the Turks. In a sense, it is Mehmet Ziya Gökalp, who examines the morality of Turkish society in detail sociologically.¹

Ziya Gökalp is one of the most important intellectuals of Turkish social science, but especially of Turkish sociology, whose personality and character were well established during the most depressed periods of the Ottoman Empire, and who shaped his academic knowledge and experience in the last years of the empire. Gökalp has the title of founding father of Turkish sociology with his unique style by evaluating the changes and transformations of the period both internally and externally.

Gökalp faced different problems in the society he lived in as of the time he lived. While the nationalist uprisings, economic crisis and management problems in the Balkans have created threats to the survival of the state, Gökalp found the solution to these problems in Durkheim's solidarist approach. For this reason, one of the important foundations of Gökalp's sociology is the solidarity model based on morality (Karakaş, 2008: 11).

For this reason, Gökalp, by assigning serious missions to the science of sociology, saw it as an important tool for awakening and strengthening the "National Conscience" in the rebuilding of Turkish society. It also should be noted that Gökalp's main goal was to analyze the Ottoman social structure, which was on the way of modernization and nationalization on the one hand, and the developments there, and then to analyze the social integration and development of Turkish society in the transition period to the Republic of Turkey. is to seek solutions to their problems (Günay, 2012). In this new construction of Turkish national identity, his approaches to society and social morality will play a guiding role.

In this context, the subject of the study is to discuss the sociological dimensions of Ziya Gökalp's views on social morality. The aim of the study is to reveal what Gökalp's holistic social morality is, to discuss moral Turkism and the role of discipline, solidarity and religion in his system.

What is Understood by Social Ethics in Gökalp?

Gökalp seems to believe in Durkheim's thesis that with the increase in the division of labor, there will be changes in the social order and the role of religion will be differentiated. In the progressive division of labor, both thinkers argue that religion will not be accepted as a force that will keep the society together and provide solidarity on its own (Türkdoğan, 1998).

Aside from the importance of religion, Gökalp, believes that in new times, society needs a more secular and socialist moral understanding instead of a religion based moral system. He defines those responsible for the moral problem

of his time as follows: “Trying to force creeds and rites, family and government styles, moral duties and ideals that are no longer alive in the conscience, is the complete opposite of the desired results” (Baltacıoğlu, 1966: 107).

Therefore, much work falls on intellectuals and political practitioners to understand the new situation correctly. According to Gökcalp, morality consists of some rules that lead individuals to self-sacrifice. Social morality is the recognition of social groups as the goal for these sacrifices.

Social phrases include: *Political group, occupational group, family and civilization group*. Four kinds of morality emerge from these four groups: *Patriotic morality, professional morality, family morality, international morality*.

Apart from these, there is another morality that Gökcalp calls personal morality. The basis of this morality is to sacrifice your individuality to your personality. It is to respect the personality, to love the personality, to help it, to recognize its rights.” (Baltacıoğlu, 1966: 104). At this point, the highest morality for Gökcalp is patriotic morality.

According to Gökcalp, in the 20th century, no one attaches importance to any unprovable fact. Gökcalp, while creating the moral rules demanded to be obeyed for himself, it emphasizes that it is necessary to clearly show the basis on which these rules were created, what their benefits are and the function they perform socially.

Therefore, these rules cannot be presented in the form of scholastic or literary knowledge. According to him, the method used by morality should be the same as the method used by the positive sciences. Because those who attack morality they base their opinions on positive sciences. This is why; If the method used by positive sciences is not used in such cases, it will not be possible for the morality put forward to resist these attacks (Gökcalp, 2012). Here, Gökcalp’s positivist attitude and the source of morality is seen that his view is based on science and society, not religion.

According to Gökcalp, the moral crisis, which is a terrible microbe that gnaws at social life, can only be cured with the prescription of moral sociology, which is the science of social medicine. He states that positive morality, which has the potential to replace the deeply religious morality that is valid in society, can only be “social morality” formed by the method of sociology. While Gökcalp considers it necessary to establish a positive moral science, he also argues that it is not possible to establish such a moral science based on materialism, biology and psychology.

Because although they have tried this many times before, it expresses that a moral discipline that can withstand the attacks of positive sciences has not been established (Gökalp, 2012).

According to Gökalp, who sees the only source of values as the society itself, the collective feeling and knowledge created by the individuals creates the collective consciousness (Becer, 2017, p. 823). He explains the social morality and understanding of the state with the Turkishization of the language and the idea of a non-ethnic nationalism. In addition, emphasizing the importance of the unity of religion and homeland, he revealed a scientific, moral, cultural and philosophical understanding of Turkism. (Gürsoy & Çapcıoğlu, 2006, p. 98).

The main problem that Gökalp seeks to answer about morality is about the source of morality. Since morality means defining something as good or bad, who decides if something is good or bad? Gökalp's answer to this question is very clear. The source of moral feelings is life. Therefore, changes and transformations in social life, influences the perception of good and evil.

As in Durkheim, Gökalp seeks the source of morality in society. Moral rules have to adapt to changing social conscience. Because the perpetuation, of moral rules, can cause some practices that are contrary to the conscience of the society to be presented in moral covers. "The incompatibility between social conscience and moral cover harms the moral values of individuals (Gökalp, 1333, p. 114; Mart, 2018, p. 54).

Gökalp presents different arguments about the sociality of morality. At this point, the point that Gökalp draws attention is that the rules of morality are against individuality in terms of nature. These rules require the person to give up their individual wishes. A person who behaves morally cannot think of his own interests. Therefore, the cause of moral action cannot be another individual. These rules did not exist in the individual from birth, they were taught to the individual by the society in which he was born. The society itself applies the sanctions that arise as a result of obeying or not complying with these rules. In short, the society is the source of morality (Gökalp, 2012; Mart, 2018, p. 55).

While Gökalp emphasized the importance of morality in ensuring social cohesion, he showed the custom as a complementary element of morality. Moreover, in order for a rule to be customary, it must be accepted by the society. In addition, while this acceptance of custom is ensured by individuals, it should not be an element of coercion on individuals. Thus, custom conforms to both social rules and social conscience. Gökalp has placed the morality above all other fields (Zorlu, 2018, p. 104).

The Individuality-Sociality Dichotomy of Morality

Gökalp, who is a society-oriented sociologist, not the individual, argues that the society has dominance over the individual. Because society completely dominates the individual. Therefore, he argues that the individual should sacrifice himself for the collection. According to Gökalp, society is above everything else and society has a sacred dimension. This state of being holy is the due to the moral state of the society that directs the society. Therefore, in Gökalp's thought, society is accepted as the supreme spiritual authority (Zavalsız, 2017, p. 780).

We see the sacred-profan distinction in Durkheim's works as well. This distinction is related to the sociality of religion. According to him, it is the situation that religion, which is considered as one of the purposes of religion, does not come into contact with the society. *Making religious worship away from worldly life and bringing it closer to the holy exemplifies this situation.*

With this understanding, worship is divided into two parts as positive and negative worship:

- The main purpose of negative worship by saving the individual from the individual point of view; It is to keep the individual away from pleasant things such as speaking, eating and drinking and dressing:
- Positive worship is also the worship that socializes the individual in the same way.

Mass prayers in mosques are shown as an example for these positive acts of worship. What Gökalp wants to focus on with these explanations is, that it is difficult to experience holiness in an individual sense. However, even if worship is negative or positive, it helps the person to socialize (Mart, 2018, pp. 29-30).

According to Gökalp (1992: 227 et al.) "A man wants to live with people in language and religion rather than the people he is common. Because our human personality is not in our body, but in our soul. If our material virtues come from our race, our spiritual virtues come from the society from which we were educated." In this approach of Gökalp, it is seen that he also overcomes the conflict between the individual and the society. On the one hand, the personality as an individual and on the other hand, the society in which the personality develops is important for the human being. Individual and society; It builds society like the relationship between body and soul.

Social Ethics and Moral Turkism

Gökalp had an introverted and quiet structure in his social life. However, in the case of their ideals, even in the most difficult situations, he became a determined and struggling identity. All his life, he has struggled for the sake of his dreams and never took an action that compromised his ideas. Because of this determined attitude, he was accused of many crimes, he was exiled and has lived in prison. Even in these difficult days, he did not give up hope that his country would achieve prosperity. What made Gökalp a man of ideas and action on social and moral issues, has been an idealized world of high imagination and thought (Gürsoy & Çapcıoğlu, 2006, pp. 92-93).

The period when Gökalp was born and grew up generally comes to a period when the Ottoman Empire lost its power, experienced significant territorial losses and the current politics was directed by Western powers. For this reason, Gökalp, who had the thought of Ottomanism in his youth, adopted the consciousness of Turkism in the following years and supported the struggle to establish a national state with sociological will. Gökalp, one of the ideologists of the Committee of Union and Progress, influenced many politicians and intellectuals with his sociological analysis (Türkdoğan, 1989).

The French sociologist Emile Durkheim argued that the solidarity approach, which was institutionalized as a solution to the crisis of the French society, could be an alternative to his nation based on these theories. Based on domestic and national sensitivities, he was trying to achieve this institutionalization with a analysis of the traditional codes of the Turkish society. Because the salvation of the new Republic of Turkey from the crisis is in, he believed that this would be achieved it through the social analysis (Tutar, 2014, p. 15).

Gökalp's nationalist understanding is against religious bigotry, defending freedom by reacting to autocratic rule, and his search for a secular society by emphasizing equality between men and women symbolizes a stance close to the Western liberalism. It is also understood that, he adopted the idea that the society should be educated gradually, basing the innovations realized in the Ottoman society on the people until the end of the First World War. After the national struggle, he argued that the state should make social revolutions based on the law and in spite of the people (Tur, 2019, p. 50). He pointed out the importance of the type of morality he defined as patriotic morality in order to make these revolutions gradual. We can summarize this situation better with the following words: "Especially for nations like us that have a lot of political enemies, the greatest pillar should be patriotic morality. If our patriotic morality

is not strong, we can neither protect our independence nor the integrity of our homeland. In that case, first of all, Turkism should value the ideals of the nation and homeland.”(Gökalp, 1968, p. 139).

In Gökalp’s thought; it has been stated that another important element that ensures social solidarity after patriotic morality is professional ethics. According to him, each professional group should create their own professional ethics and serve the Turkish nation in this direction. Successful professional groups in their field will set an example for other occupational groups and a beneficial competitive environment will develop for the society. This developing competitive environment will provide important contributions to the Turkish state and nation by feeding a moral economic structure. Solidarity between professional groups is very important here. He stated that, the development of a solidarity ground like the *Ahilik* that was established in the last period of the Anatolian Seljuks and the Guild Organizations that developed afterwards could only be achieved in this way (Tofer, 2020, p. 120).

According to Gökalp, the moral understanding to be put forward should be a moral understanding called the socialist moral understanding and which can be revealed by researching the culture of the nation. Because the survival of a nation and in order for it to develop itself, that nation must have a unique culture and moral understanding.

This form of morality, which can also be expressed as national morality, developed in parallel with culture should also be beneficial for the development of society. According to Gökalp’s thought, our nation has taken the moral values of other cultures ready for a long time and has not been able to fully form its own national moral culture. If for the solution of this situation; it needs to be done is to go back to the old Turkish sources. Gökalp, in this return, describes it in two ways as researching pre-Islamic Turkish culture and history and examining the culture of today’s people (Karaşahan, 2017, p. 45).

Social Ethics and Discipline

Gökalp expresses the most basic element that directs the moral understanding of the society, with the meaning that the individual attributes to the concept of discipline. He also explains the concept of upbringing by bringing the culture (culture) produced by Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness into the consciousness of individuals. He defines communities with a culture that is compatible with each other in the public sphere as a nation. However, he argues that a new Turkish society can be created with a national upbringing (Gökalp,

1972). Based on his thoughts on this axis it seen that he put forward the two-dimensional form of provision:

Value judgments:

The basis in this form of judgment is not individual consciousness, but social conscience. Therefore, the judgments of value are different in every society. Because of, what is considered right, beautiful, logical and holy in one society may be seen as wrong, bad, unqualified and sinister in another society. Since the provisions of value are perceived differently in every society, they have a national character. However, the sum of these values hars- (culture), is also acquires a national character.

Se'niyet (reality) provisions:

The dominant element in the judgments of reality is individual consciousness. Therefore, the rules of reality are the same in every society. For example, technology, which is one of the reality provisions, has nothing to do with nationality. According to Gökalp, the issue of bringing technological developments and advances in science to the youth should not be perceived as giving up the national consciousness of the youth. In addition to hars (cultur) education in high schools, attention should also be paid to manner (training) education (Şahin, 2011, p. 388).

In Gökalp's system of thought, the source of civilization is not the people. People are the source of culture. The main elements in the emergence of civilization, which he sees as the source of reason, are known as an industry, science and technique. By preserving Turkish culture and Islamic belief, he argues that it should be included in Western civilization. He thinks that in this way, a modern civilization will be created (Tur, 2019, pp. 89-90).

While emphasizing the decline of culture in societies where civilization is overdeveloped, Gökalp stressed the importance of culture. Many societies with a low level of civilization underline that they have defeated most civilized societies because of their strong culture. However, the overdevelopment of civilization destroys social solidarity. This development not only causes individualization, but also brings selfishness and conflict of interest. Societies that keep their cultures alive, may even compromise their personal interests for social existence for the sake of national values. Therefore, according to Gökalp, who gives importance to the development of national culture, culture not only

provides social solidarity, but also makes the society strong in military and political terms (Tur, 2019, p. 92).

Gökalp explained the reflections of the concepts of culture and civilization on the Ottoman Empire with the following words:

“Two languages lived side by side in our country: The first of these had an official value. and he seemed to have monopolized the writing. It was called Ottoman. The Ottoman language was an artificial language that originated from Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Second one is, it seemed like it was only the meant for public performances. It was called to as Turkish, with reference to it. And it was considered that it was a common slang. However, this was our real natural and genuine language. From these two languages, Turkish came into being spontaneously with a natural formation and custom. Therefore, it was the language of our culture. On the other hand, Ottoman language was made by individuals with a method and will. Only some Turkish words and prepositions could be mixed in this language. So, Ottoman Turkish had little share in our culture. Therefore, we can say that it was the language of our civilization.”

As in the concepts of culture and civilization, according to Gökalp, who prefers to make a binary classification in almost every field of social life, the most basic feature that separates the concepts of culture and civilization; culture is based on emotions and civilization is based on knowledge. In addition, Gökalp’s distinction between culture and civilization has been the subject of some criticism:

“In his conceptualization of culture and civilization, Gökalp attributed more subjective features to the concept of culture and objective features to the concept of civilization. As in many of Gökalp’s definitions, his emotional and biased approach is evident here too. In culture, values such as freedom, intimacy, spontaneity, beauty are often although he sees attractive qualities, it exists the opposite of them in civilization. By dealing with the subject in such unscientific ways, Gökalp’s heart and logic reflect his inner conflict regarding the values he loves and loves, accepts or should accept through reason. Another reason why Gökalp attributes such importance to the concepts of culture and civilization is that he believes that culture is developed in Turkish society. Therefore, he preferred to use

these concepts in such a way as to elevate the Turkish nation” (Heid, 1979, pp. 75-76).

One of the important points in which Gökalp expressed his opinion on religion is the issue of discipline. According to him, religion represents a very important place for the development of education. He also says that the national personality cannot exist unless there is an Islamic upbringing. The following statements by Gökalp regarding his understanding of religion are noteworthy: “Religion and perception can change; it also makes progress, it also makes shrinks. As the good understanding rises, the nation also grows. As the perception of religion degrades, the nation also shrinks. The way religion is understood can change” (Olağ Ercan, 2020, p. 77).

To become contemporary in terms of the Turkish nation, it meant that the science and technique of Europe should be taken in terms of both theory and practice. According to Gökalp, to the strengthen of Turkish society it has to make science and technology a part of it. The moral and spiritual needs of society should also be satisfied with religion and culture, and therefore education and training should be organized in such a way as to satisfy these needs (Anar, 1996).

According to the mentality put forward by Gökalp, who has full faith in the national cultural structure, a two-way planning was made in order to carry out the activities of educating and educating the people in the right way. In order for Turkism to be put into practice, the elites will turn to the people first, and then the elites will bring them a Western civilization that does not belong to them.

According to Gökalp, the elite, corresponding to the concept of “notables”, is balanced by the people, which are the source of national culture. The elite are highly educated intellectuals. However, with the intense education and training, it may be inevitable for them to adopt a life disconnected from the public. The education that the elite receives in childhood is not national. The schools they attend are not national or public schools. In this case, the elite needs the people. Because the source of national culture is the people (Gökalp, 1992; Kaya, 2021, p. 260). Gökalp’s understanding of education in his own thought; intertwined with the concepts of culture and civilization. The cultur (hars), which uncorrupted by the other cultures, is expected to be implemented by the whole society.

Gökalp underlines that society needs a sociological enlightenment. Because every society should be aware of its own sociological dynamics and develop an

understanding according to its own cultural codes. If the Turkish child will live in his own country, should be educated with a moral understanding according to the requirements of their own culture. Therefore, the upbringing he received according to that cultural understanding will help him to gain a modern education and moral understanding. According to Gökalp, the emergence of bad results in the understanding of morality and education, stems from not knowing their own cultural life and not being able to fully achieve international integration. At this point, Gökalp has focused more on the culture (*hars*) (Özel, 2020, p. 86).

In addition, he considers the civilization acquired from other nations necessary. One of the important points of Gökalp especially underlined is; it is the absence of one's own culture as a civilized individual. This is one of the most harmful situations for society. For the solution of this problem, Gökalp emphasizes that people should go to the public in order to have cultural values. Gökalp thinks that this is the main reason for the depressions experienced by young people who receive positive science education. Because it is quite normal for a person who has been mentally trained in positive sciences that are grounded to be demonstrable, to begin to reconsider religious or moral values. According to Gökalp, what needs to be done in order to resolve this constant conflict between values and reality; is the development of a method of education based on a positive science of religion and a positive moral science. If a such method is developed, religious and moral values will have the same quality as positive truths. Therefore, these values will no longer be affected by something of their own kind (Gökalp, 2012).

Social Ethics and Solidarity

The individual is expected to continue his or her life as a social being in the society he was born into. However, the individual who starts his/her life as a social being is brought up by the society in which he/she lives. The individual's adaptation to social norms, is necessary for the continuation of the society to continue its life as a social being. The individual, who is the basic element of societies, unless inculcates the language, customs, morals and aesthetics of the society where he lives, there is no any way that individual can live. This socialization effort applied by the society to the individual is called social morality (Gökalp, 1981, p. 99). According to Gökalp, making the individual adopt the cultural values and gaining the consciousness of the society is considered one of the most necessary steps in ensuring social solidarity. To the extent that the individual integrates and socializes with the society, it can contribute to solidarity (Şahin, 2011, p. 388).

According to Gökalp's moral understanding, there is a close relationship between morality and national solidarity. While explaining the source of morality with the actions of society, he underlines morality, which he sees as the highest value after religion, as the most fundamental factor that ensures national solidarity.

When talking of the nature of morality, mentions three basic steps that guide the individual. As it is understood, the highest order in his thought is given to morality. Because science and genius are meaningless without morality. Morality is the most fundamental force that binds the members of society together. And Gökalp (1333, p. 112) divides morality into two basic qualities:

In the first aspect, the limits of morality are determined by the society and these limits must be followed by the individual;

The second is the type of morality that is followed not because the individual feels obligated, but because of the attraction he has. He conceptualizes these types of morality as compulsion and attraction.

While those who follow moral rules are approved, those who do not comply are punished by society. While the cause of moral temptation is necessary, it is the generally defined as the individual's compliance with moral rules not because of this obligation, but because of the attraction he has. The virtuous individual, generally adopts virtue as virtue, regardless of social approval or exclusion. Such an act of thought, is only seen in individuals of socialized society. Socialization reveals a social conscience area in the individual. Therefore, the orientation to moral virtues stems from the social conscience of the individual (Gökalp, 1333, p. 113; Zorlu, 2018, p. 103).

Gökalp thought that the concept of morality invisibly connects people like a language. At this point, we see that the old Turkish states were very developed and that they should be taken as an example in some sentences:

“The first basis of national unity is patriotic morality, and the second foundation is civil morality. Civil morality does not only consist of recognizing the members of our nation as venerable and loving them with sincere affection. In short, civilized morality consists of loving and respecting first of all our fellow citizens, then your coreligionists, and finally all people. All this means not to violate the life, property, freedom

and dignity of individuals, is one of the duties offered by civilized morality” (Gökalp, 1968, pp. 81-83).

In another type of family morality, Gökalp gives examples from the old Turks and emphasizes that they are democratic and egalitarian. He talks about the disappearance of these features over time and the legal backwardness stemming from the Iranian and Greek civilizations. He also states that the most harmful ones were women from this backwardness. In addition, he also stated that what needs to be done to re-establish family law and bring women’s rights to a more egalitarian status would be achieved by reviving old Turkish customs (Gökalp, 1968, pp. 151-152).

Similar to Durkheim, Gökalp also considers moral sanction necessary for a collective integration (Tutar, 2014, p. 61). According to Gökalp, social problems arise from the problem of individuals not complying with social rules and norms. He tries to explain this situation with the concept of not being socialized. It also examines the socialization stages of individuals with the concept of social conscience. Therefore, according to Gökalp, if the individual obeys the rules without feeling the pressures of social institutions, he is considered socialized. If the individual adapts to these existing rules through institutional pressure, he is shown as unsocialized. According to Gökalp, social conscience refers to a solid structure formed with a strong sense of solidarity (Tutar, 2014, p. 54).

Emphasizing sociality, and not individuality, as an additional element of morality, Gökalp sees the need to act in accordance with the goals of the civilization to which the individual belongs, as an element of civilized morality. But on the other hand, international morality should be evaluated on the basis of mutual respect (Tur, 2019, p. 42).

In order to understand which institutional structures in society are useful and which are harmful, one should look at the extent to which they provide solidarity in society. Because institutional structures function as an invisible spiritual bond that connects individuals to society. The individuals with similar religions, feelings, customs and languages are part of each other. It is these institutional structures that hold them together and provide solidarity (Tur, 2019, p. 96).

Gökalp, who explains the personal development of a person in society by his place in the division of labor, points to nationalism as the most important step in the system that implements social solidarity. In addition, he emphasized that structures such as national museums, national libraries and statistical offices

should be established to make national culture more visible in order to strengthen national solidarity (Tutar, 2014, p. 60).

Gökalp tried to create a national state and society by using the *concept of culture*. With these study objectives, the state should be truly national and be based on solid foundations, possible through the cultural unity. Since the concept of culture covers the fields of language, religion and morality, the state will be able to survive with the harmony of these formations (Zorlu, 2018, p. 79).

When considering Gökalp's worldview, it is clear that his philosophical basis is based on positivism. While dealing with social events, he emphasized the determinism and considered it important to understand social laws. The social order that he imagined corresponds to the solidarity model of society (Tutar, 2014, p. 12).

The Role of Religion in the Construction of Morality

Having a religious personality for most of his life, Gökalp drew conclusions about religion, generating ideas to improve the functioning of the state. Although this religious personality appeared to be a secular mentality in the following years, he always stated that he saw religion as a sociological phenomenon. *In Gökalp's sociological conclusions, religion has a functional importance for both the belief-oriented social system, morality and education.* In all his works, which he put forward based on these sensitivities, religion has a special place. For example, while explaining the concept of culture, he showed religion as one of the components that make up this concept. Even, as Erol Güngör stated, Ziya Gökalp explained the sociological function of religion and its place in the Turkish world for the first time (Özel, 2020, p. 74). He does not consider religion only in the context of beliefs and practices. His aims to reveal the effects of religion on social life and interpersonal relations (Uğurlu, 2019, p. 26).

Gökalp's thoughts on religion were broken after the period when he was in Thessaloniki. The nationalist ideas he acquired at the 1909 convention of the Committee of Unity and Progress led him to reformist views on religion. In fact, Gökalp's thoughts gained weight in the new steps on religion that were put into practice during the Atatürk period. Gökalp, by blending some of the practices that he describes as normative in Islam with sociological concepts tried to make it a new social norm. He tried to connect the Muslim faith in terms of the modern nation and the identity of the Turkish society. With this effort, it is seen that

he believes in the importance and functionality of the religion of Islam in the Turkish national culture. In Gökalp's understanding of religion was targeted by a belief system shaped according to society (Özel, 2020, p. 77).

The nationalist ideas he acquired at the 1909 convention of the Committee of Unity and Progress led him to reformist views on the religion. Gökalp's main thoughts about the religion are such questions as religion will take place in the new state with the vision of the nation and what will be the position of Islam. According to him, Islam is not a religion that hinders progress. He argues that the religious view is an element that gives meaning to the life of the individual and enables him to have an ideal. According to him, religion is the most sacred of moral and economic life styles, among the values and emotions of society (Gökalp, 1990; Zorlu, 2018, p. 110).

Gökalp tried to explain social identity in terms of the consciousness of religion and Turkishness. However, despite constantly emphasizing the importance of religion, it sees religion as a part of national identity consciousness. This is evidenced by the fact that the pre-Islamic Turkic states explained their religious adventure exclusively by social factors and gave the reason for the adoption of Islam by the Turks in accordance with their national characteristics. However, the effort to emphasize the importance of religion in Gökalp's works, in general, it was seen that it ended with the effort to deal with religion in the social dimension. Gökalp wants a person to integrate into society and sacrifice himself to the society in which he lives. When considered from this point of view, it is seen that there are traces of a mystical consciousness in Gökalp. He also criticizes the Jabriya school and underlines that this school is contrary to the true Muslim spirit. Because the will of the individual is not accepted in the Jabriye sect. He argues that this situation hinders the freedom of will (Zavalsız, 2017, p. 781).

Many of Gökalp's articles are about society and religion. The importance given to religion "*The source of all perfection in the West is science. But in the East the source of every light is religion (Gökalp, 1976, p. 79).*" evident from such expressions. Gökalp, who emphasized the necessity of making religion functional with a Durkheimian perspective, he also states that the reason for the backwardness of the country is that this functionality is not used properly. He also stated that, corruption in the madrasas had caused religious ignorance and that this ignorance was also beneficial to repressive governments. According to Gökalp, who emphasizes that the destruction of Islamic Civilization is related to such factors, he also emphasized that the previous benefits of the lodges are gone

and that they are the source of corruption and perversions in the society. Also he emphasized the necessity of rehabilitating these lodges on similar foundations (Special, 2020, p. 75).

Even at that time, Gökalp thought that the younger generation was experiencing a religious crisis. As the reason for this, he attributed it to the fact that those who teach religion in schools do not know the real Islam, and that those who teach positive sciences do not know what these sciences really mean, namely philosophy. The younger generation is under these two domains, they were in a state of depression because they thought that there was a conflict between religion and reason, religion and custom. In addition, one of the reasons for this crisis was the presentation of many traditions that do not correspond to reason and logic as a religious order. In addition, many traditions that do not comply with reason and logic, the presentation of religion as an order was also one of the reasons for this crisis. Therefore, many traditions that did not have a religious nature were regarded as contrary to science and philosophy, since they were considered integral elements of religion. Gökalp thought that this confusion could be overcome with a good religious education (Zorlu, 2018, p. 111).

In Gökalp's view, there is no fundamental contradiction between the type of society that Islam proposes and contemporary civilization and modern science. *He makes this justification because of his peculiarity of taking "reason in judgments of reality" and "custom in judgments of value" as the basis in the Islamic tradition.* Gökalp, as a result of the wrong interpretations that were added to the religion of Islam later on, he went on to explain that religion in general seems to be contrary to modern society. According to him, the perception of traditions acquired from different geographies as religion has corrupted the religion of Islam. As a solution to this problem, it is the elimination of customary practices that hinder the modernization of society and seem contrary to both contemporary national traditions and modern science. However, it is necessary to ensure that religion acquires a national identity in a way that is consistent with contemporary needs. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to investigate the real religious values and to interpret the religion in the right way (Özel, 2020, p. 78).

In Gökalp's thought, Turkishness cannot be separated from Islam. However, his understanding of religion is slightly different from the classical understanding of religion. He defines religion as a spiritual foundation. Gökalp, who criticizes the religious information which given in madrasas, is closer to a

more mystical understanding. Because according to him, the social dynamics of each period reveal different needs and emphasizes that it cannot appeal to the period in which ossified religious rules exist. However, he emphasizes that religion must be cleansed of superstition in order for Islam to be attractive to contemporaries. His religious understanding, is about the extent to which religious life is reflected in society. Islam is not exists only for the happiness of the hereafter, but also for the happiness of the world. However, the fact that people completely withdraw from worldly affairs, turning to the afterlife, causes an economic and philosophical regression in society. He also, emphasizes that another reason for this decline is the lack of division of labor and specialization in religious life.

Ascetics Islamic lawyer failed to specialize in their own fields. He stated that since it does not seem possible for every individual to live a devout life, an atmosphere of hypocrisy and hypocrisy about religion is created in the society.

It is clear that the backwardness of society in artistic fields such as music, painting and sculpture has nothing to do with religion, emphasizing that it is related to asceticism, which was added to religion later. According to him, religion is now in our society, it is used as a tool to denigrate worldly life and condemn it to pessimism. He stated that women and children suffered the most from this situation, and that people forgot to laugh. Gökalp, unlike Marx, he talks about a close connection between religion and other social phenomena. The necessity of specialization in the religious field is also due to this situation. According to him, religion can affect the structure of a society. However, at the same level, society can also affect the way religion is perceived and lived. While talking about these effects, Gökalp said, emphasized the necessity of shaping the new modern and national state with this understanding of religion (March, 2018, pp. 29-30).

According to Gökalp's principle of secularism, he proposed the idea of separating state affairs from religious affairs. According to him, Islamization means making Islamic values understandable to the population. Gökalp envisioned a religious understanding freed from Arab and Persian influence and in which Turkish culture and Western civilization would be compatible. In 1916, at the Congress of Union and Progress, he has suggested that the seat of the Sheikhu-Islam authority be limited only to religious matters and that its legal powers be transferred to the secular state (Zorlu, 2018, p. 114).

His views parallel to this thought, evident from the following statements: "Religious Turkism, the separation of religion and state affairs, it also means

that religious books, sermons are in Turkish. If a nation does not read and understand its religious books, of course, he cannot learn the true nature of his religion. Even if the orators (preachers) did not understand what the preachers were saying, they do not enjoy worship, as they say. *The factors that ensured that the Turks lived a religious life from time to time, from religious practices it is the existence of the rites that have been allowed to be performed in the Turkish language since ancient times.*

So, in order to give a greater ecstasy and inspiration to our religious life, both the Quran (with the exception of recitations) and all the prayers, munajats and sermons recited after the prayers and amen should be read in Turkish (Gökalp, 1968, pp. 158-159).

According to Gökalp, religion covers the fields of belief and worship. Therefore, specialization in these areas is essential. From a religious point of view, other public spheres should not be interfered with. Other areas are the areas of political, economic and social life and have different dimensions from religion in terms of their structure. Gökalp put forward the idea of reform in religion. With this assumption, it is understood that he views religion as a social phenomenon (Aydin, 2017, p. 48).

Some criticisms were also brought about Gökalp's views on religion. These criticisms are that he does not give the enough importance to religion. Although Gökalp (1997), stated in his book "Turkification, Islamization, Conversion" that, these three points do not contradict almost in everywhere, and in spite of, he gave detailed explanations on Turkization and Contemporaryization, he also was criticized for not giving detailed enough explanations about Islamization (Gökalp, 1997; Zorlu, 2018, p. 117).

As Parla emphasized, "Turkism was the cultural norm and Islam was the moral norm in Gökalps social model" (Parla, 1993: 56). However, it is clear that he is more interested in the social norms of everyday life than in the theological and legal aspects of Islam. As can be seen, Gökalp, while he had a more traditional religious thought in the early stages, he aimed to return to a national religious identity by referring to the functionality of religion in the society. Even in his second period, it is seen that Gökalp gained a secular point of view with a positivist tendency. Moreover, it is clear that he put forward this point of view with thought in accordance with the conditions required by the period in terms of Turkish culture. He tried to mix religion with the cultural structure of society. According to him, the most basic element is nationalism and religion was seen as a part of this cultural structure.

Conclusion

According to the thoughts of Gökalp, who evaluates the concept of morality as a concept that helps to preserve the integrity of society as a whole, it is clear that he divides morality into such types as patriotic, civil, professional and family morality. The fact that he dwells in detail on almost every genre shows that he tried to extend his understanding of morality to all areas of society in order to ensure social integrity with the concept of morality. While starting with the slogan of a modern nation-state, Gökalp tried to enter the Western civilization with the dominant understanding of the period and used modern elements in his concepts in line with this idea. But when using these modern concepts, he tried to stay away from actions that would contradict the old Turkish customs. In essence, he thinks that in this way it will be possible to become a modern state. He tried to explain the achievement of a strong state by an entity that combined a cumulatively evolving culture with Western civilization since ancient times.

Ziya Gökalp's concern is to produce theoretical solutions to the practical problems of the country. Therefore, he uses all scientific and philosophical tools in this direction. This also affected the scope and systematic nature of his thoughts. According to him, the society of the period in which he lived is faced with a moral crisis. And in order to prevent this moral crisis that society is in, 'morality' and the state of our society; should be studied by scientists. He believed that this was possible with a sociological thought. Sociologists; they must study the social morality of the time and create a new secular morality. Like Durkheim, whom he followed, he too; the way for the society to overcome the depressive period it is in he thinks that a social consciousness that is above individuals and affects individuals and social life after it is formed, will affect individuals. In today's societies, thinks that it can only be possible with the establishment of a secular moral understanding. On the basis of Gökalp's idea of social morality ensuring social solidarity is essential. The central concept in the systematics that he called "Social Ethics" is the highest concept of good patriotism/nationalism. In other words, in order to ensure solidarity, it is necessary to glorify public, family, professional and national morality. Gökalp gave an important place to the concept of solidarity in his system of thought: in order to resolve the crisis of identity and belonging that arose as a result of the war and the political crises of the society in which he lived.

It is clear that Gökalp advocated a social system of ethics without neglecting the individual. According to Gökalp, the target of morality is not

just the individual or the society. According to him, individual morality cannot be abandoned and the individual cannot be sacrificed for the sake of society. Gökalp believes that all individual or social duties are parts of a whole. Again, Gökalp is of the opinion that theology and morality should be separated from each other (Gökalp, 1333). Gökalp comes to the conclusion that a secular and socialist moral system should be established instead of religious morality.

This shows that Gökalp was influenced by Durkheim and it is a very clear idea that moral values emerge from society and that these values change from society to society and through the historical process. In addition to this, it is seen that Gökalp rejects moral nihilism and expresses the idea that morality is shaped according to the unique conditions and realities of society.

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1 Ziya Gökalp was born in Diyarbakir. His grandfather Mustafa Sıtkı was the son of a mufti. He served as a civil servant in Van and Nusaybin. Gökalp's father, Tevfik Efendi, had served in the province of Diyarbakır and worked as an archive and printing press manager. Later, he was brought to the publication of the official newspaper of the province and published a Diyarbakir Yearbook. An important influence of his father on Gökalp is that he was instrumental in understanding both Western values and native/Eastern values together. After primary school, he attended the Military High School in Rushdiye. He was the editor-in-chief of the Diyarbakir newspaper. He studied at the Civil Service High School. Since these years, it is known that he criticized the Sultan.

After 1908, he established a branch of the Committee of Union and Progress [ITC] in Diyarbakir. During this period, he published the newspaper Peyam. He attended the Union and Progress Party Congress held in Thessaloniki in 1909, representing the Eastern provinces. He continued his party and sociology studies, which he started in Thessaloniki, in Istanbul since 1912. During this time he became a member of parliament. In 1914, he founded the Department of Sociology and started to teach "Sociology" at the university. In 1919, after the British occupied Istanbul, Gökalp was captured and exiled to Malta and was able to return to Turkey only in 1921. After staying in Ankara for a while, he returned to Diyarbakır. Here he published Küçük (Mecmua)Magazine. After he was appointed as the chairman of the "Copyright and Translation Committee" in Ankara, the publication activities of the magazine stopped. In 1923 he was elected as a member of deputy of Diyarbakır. Ziya Gökalp, the Founder of Turkish Sociology, died on October 25, 1924 in Istanbul.

CHAPTER XVIII

NURETTİN TOPÇU: A DEDICATED LIFE ON SOCIAL ETHICS

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Introduction

Morality has been dealt with either within the framework of the behaviors exhibited depending on certain norms that have been put forward and adopted by the society, or within the framework of principles formed on a purely intellectual basis, regardless of social structure. With its first definition, there is a value judgment about the behaviors that are valid or expected to occur in interpersonal relations in a society. In the second sense, apart from social norms and oppression, only the emphasis on morality comes to the fore. Moral justification can be based on a real and concrete fact, feelings, possible consequences, moral codes, moral authorities, or conscience. A subjectivist or objectivist point of view is also possible when constructing moral values. Morality also encourages people to act in the face of events. When this action remains in certain group circles, intellectual morality emerges, and when it is considered to be valid for the whole society, universal moral values emerge. Morals can be classified as mystical, rational, emotional, and will ethics according to their content; Stoic, Epicurean, and idealistic regarding the worldview; instrumental, purposeful, and independent regarding the viewpoint; optimistic, pessimistic, and volitional in terms of personal feelings; and fatalistic, utopian, and deterministic regarding on freedom of will (Gündüz, 2016).

One of the main functions of morality is to help regulate social relations. All social values that guide life are based on a moral idea. In this sense, morality

emerges as a basic sociological reality. Society has surrounded the individual in every aspect and is trying to socialize him in his own direction. Morality also directs one's relations with himself, his environment, the universe, and religion. Every society has its moral teachings. These moral values contribute to the social integrity of society. Common elements such as moral values in interpersonal relations in social life are of great importance for the functioning, integrity, and future of society. In this sense, common values transform into a social power and shape history (Akdoğan, 2011: 108).

The coexistence of people necessitates the establishment of an order. In this sense, moral norms contribute to social order and peace. Morality, as a factor that maintains social order, has been in the interest of philosophers since the First Age. Moral philosophers have explained the goals that people should pursue either with the basic components of a good life or with the types of things that are good in themselves (Cevizci, 2017: 735). In this sense, morality has reached idealism on the one hand, and hedonism on the other. While social ideals were glorified, individual tastes and ambitions came to the fore. All these explanations also mean the construction of a society. This inseparable relationship between morality and society, which we have mentioned, makes it necessary to deal with morality at the sociological level.

In this study, the views of Nurettin Topçu, one of the most important moral philosophers of modern Turkey, on social ethics will be elaborated.

Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975)

Nurettin Topçu was born in Istanbul in 1909. His childhood was spent in the turbulent period of World War I. After graduating from high school in 1928, he went to France in the same year by passing the European education exams. There, first, he took some high school courses because of the difference in education programs. Immediately after, he started his undergraduate degree and at the same time began to do his doctorate. In 1934, with his work "Conformisme et Révolte" (the Revolt Ethics), he completed his doctorate at Sorbonne University with outstanding success. Although the Sorbonne University administration awarded him a gold watch and travel grant for his successful work, he did not accept this. Instead, he asked that the Turkish flag be displayed in the entrance and exit towers of the university for 24 hours (Mollaer, 2009: 39). This narration about Topçu shows the strength of his nationalistic feelings.

Topçu's doctoral advisor is the famous contemporary thinker Maurice Blondel (1861-1949). The influences of Maurice Blondel in the philosophy of

action, Henri-Louis Bergson (1859-1941) in intuitionism, and Louis Massignon (1883-1962) in mysticism are clearly seen in Topçu's ideas. Topçu, who had a doctorate in Western philosophical teaching, did not ignore the East either. In the East, the poet of the National Anthem, Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936) and the mystic/sufi Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207-1273) influenced him. In addition, it is seen that Abdülaziz Bekkine (1895-1952), a leader of the Naqshbandi order, had an impact on Nurettin Topçu, as he did on many conservative intellectuals of that time (İrğat, 2017: 124-131; Kara, 2009: 20). In this way, he was able to blend the philosophical power of the West with the mystic power of the East and succeeded in forming a social ethics idea within a unique Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

After his doctorate, Topçu wanted to teach at a Turkish university, but his request was hindered by the political authorities at that time. A few years later, he received the title of associate professor of philosophy with his thesis on Henri Bergson, but still, he was not appointed to a university as a faculty member. Only for a while, he had given lectures on ethics at the Sociology Department at Istanbul University. In the following years, he did not want to return to the university despite the offers he received (Erverdi, 2009: 77). Therefore, he served as a high school teacher until the end of his life. The state, which had an assertive understanding of secularism at that time, always saw Topçu's ideas as dangerous and wanted to keep him under surveillance. Hence, he could not escape from being exiled while he was a teacher.

Compared to his contemporary thinkers, Nurettin Topçu stands out with his intellectual abilities, his emphasis on critical thinking, and his enthusiastic style. He had always been an active man with a cause throughout his life. He founded the journal *Action* in 1939 and with the articles he published in this journal, he tried to spread and nationalize Blondel's action philosophy. With the transition to the multi-party system, the *Action* has become a school in Turkey's intellectual life in the post-1950 liberalized environment (Mollaer, 2009: 61). Topçu produced works in different fields. Since he was a high school teacher, he prepared textbooks for ethics, philosophy, logic, sociology, and psychology courses. His doctoral thesis, the Revolt Ethics, and his associate professorship thesis on Henri Bergson stand out as his academic works. He has translations of the philosophy of action and existence. He has two works in the story category. In addition to these, there are many books and articles on sociological thought.

Topçu retired from high school teaching in 1974 and died of cancer within a year.

Revolt Ethics

Ethics

Our ethics is the morality of love that combines the principles of respect, service, and compassion (Topçu, 2008: 29).

The Reason, Nature, God, and Contract play an active role in grounding the ethics of Western civilization (Solmaz, 2013: 305-307). If we look at the reflections of these four sources in the Western world: 1) The ethics theories put forward by Plato and Aristotle in Ancient Greece were based on reason. Reasonable living was accepted as virtuous. It is thought that being virtuous will provide people with a calm and peaceful life. Descartes and Kant were the representatives of moral teachings based on reason in the modern period. Here, however, being virtuous and being reasonable are not considered identical. Virtues can mislead people when they are not enlightened by reason. 2) Epicureans and Stoics attached great importance to the concept of nature. By nature, the Stoics mean the universe, the cosmos. The Epicureans, on the other hand, mean the supersensible nature, not the physical nature. They also base morality on the pleasures of supra-sensory, particular natures. 3) According to Western Christian theology, when the prophet Adam ate the forbidden apple, evil entered the earth. Every person is a sinner. People should try to get rid of this sinfulness. 4) Acts that comply with the contract are right and fair, while acts that do not comply are unjust and wrong. In the natural state, chaos and confusion prevail. Only a mutual contract can save society from turmoil.

The importance of Nature and God, among the four elements mentioned above, which play a role in the foundation of ethics and morality, has decreased in the modern period. Mankind has now begun to dominate nature. The decisive role of nature on man has decreased. Similarly, the decisive role of God in man has decreased. Moreover, in Nietzsche's famous phrase, "God is dead". In other words, modern man wanted to kill God.

While God is withdrawing from the square in Western morality, religion and morality are not separate things in Nurettin Topçu's thought. Religion itself was sent by Allah to complete good morals. Religion both originates and nourishes moral feelings. Where religion declines, moral collapse begins. Topçu also looks for religious deprivation as the source of social problems such as increased suicide in Western society. According to him, not only suicide but also all immoral situations, from theft to persecution, arise from the weakening of

the spirit. What will strengthen this spirit is religion (Topçu, 2012: 31-35). The basis of morality is Allah, the owner of creatures. Allah, who is the owner and ruler of all human beings, imposes certain obligations on human beings in order to protect human beings and not descend to the level of lower creatures. With these explanations, Topçu does not deny the existence of other types of ethics that base the moral foundation on duty, emotion, or reason (Topçu, 2012: 155-171). However, the principles that are decisive in the moral field are intertwined with religion.

In Topçu's view, separating ethics from religion or religion from ethics means separating a person's inner world from himself. Because ethics is essentially nothing separate from religious maturity. Morality is the transition from animal life to human life. Human will participates in divine life with this movement. The ethical principles should be derived from the revealed principles of religion. The moral history of humanity is the history of religions. Religion for the people is nothing but morality. According to the Islamic moral understanding, morality is the essence of religion. Even, morality is Islam itself. To be a Muslim is to have Islamic moral values, to keep them alive. From the point of view of reason and wisdom, morality occupies the greatest and essential place in the Qur'an (Topçu, 2018: 95-96).

Ethical Order

We are in the wreckage of sinking world order. The necessity of finding a new order, which will serve humanity in morality, law, art, religion, and the state, is shaking the weak shoulders of our generation (Topçu, 2008: 13).

Ethics in Nurettin Topçu represents both revolt and action. He experienced the turmoil of the World Wars, saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, lived under the threat of Communism, and also witnessed the rapid deterioration of moral and religious values. The West was blamed for all this mess and corruption. In the eyes of conservative Turks, Western civilization is "a single-fanged monster" as mentioned in the National Anthem.

The Turkish and Islamic civilizations experienced a rapid decline against Western civilization, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. This situation has created learned helplessness in many Muslims. In the face of this feeling, some people lost their core values and distanced themselves from the Turkish-Islamic identity, and became a relentless Western imitator. Civilization has been sought

in the Western culture and life beyond knowledge and science. The Turkish state was also shaped by oppressive secularism. Nurettin Topçu's contemporary and opinion partner, sociologist Cemil Meriç (1916-1987), describes the Turkish intellectual of that time with the following sentences: "The intellectual is an intellectual to the extent that he breaks away from his own history, i.e., from his own people. He is an intellectual to the extent that he is the representative of the West" (Meriç, 2018a: 27). This intellectual could neither be European nor remain Asian. He could not be French, nor could he stay Turkish (Meriç, 2018b: 156). Like a teenager who is ashamed of his parents, the Turkish intellectual could neither deny nor proudly claim his past.

On the other side, those who preserve their religious identity have turned to a more passive religiousness. They have lost their belief that they can lead the country and the world. "Europe's conquests stun the ulama of the decadent era. The collapse of Islam is a divine wrath whose wisdom they cannot comprehend" (Meriç, 2018b: 131-166). On top of that, the Islamic world was experiencing a moral breakdown.

Nurettin Topçu puts moral collapse at the root of the downfall of the Islamic world. There is a certain relief brought by industrialization and technology in human life, but this is not at a level to heal the wounds of moral collapse. A social structure in which individualization increases, personal interests are prioritized, and trust decreases is getting stronger every day. Society, which can do nothing but cry, is only watching this social dissolution. While people suffer from this situation, they cannot take any action to correct it. Although, those in the executive power wanted to stop the collapse with the reforms they had made over the last century and a half, the result had not changed (Topçu, 2008: 13-14).

According to Topçu, the absence of such a touchstone as morality has increased the social cleavage in society since the beginning of the 20th century. The conflict between conservative and secular sides has deepened (Topçu, 2008: 15). Accordingly, "the confrontation between the center and the periphery has been the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics since the late Ottoman Empire. In this cleavage, the center represents the elite who possess economic and political power, while the periphery represents the rest of the people, who are mostly religious." (Yılmaz, 2014: 42).

Topçu states that to be able to determine on which side the Right resides, we need a method that will lead us to the truth, a path to safety for our thinking, a guide that does not deceive, does not surprise, and does not overwhelm under influence. Topçu prioritizes systematic thinking here. The three main sources of

our problems are that we do not know how to connect the cause with the result, that we cannot distinguish the frauds from the real situations, and that we obey the supreme authority, including the clergy without questioning (Topçu, 2008: 16-17). Although Topçu sees religion as the source of morality and order, what he means by religion is an undistorted understanding of religion. However, when religion becomes a tool for colonialism and bad intentions, on the contrary, it can become the biggest problem. In such a case, religion becomes the enemy of all kinds of enlightenment, culture, civilization, and humanity. The reason why the Islamic world has been crawling on the ground for centuries is also the wrong use of religion. The so-called religious man who ruled in the name of religion stalled the development of Islamic civilization. Development has been hindered by calling knowledge as irreligious, and civilization as infidelity, etc. (Topçu, 2008: 80).

According to Topçu, the last generations, who saw this poor state of the Islamic world, unavoidably bid farewell to religion and turned to the world, since they did not have a philosophical perspective to understand the reasons for this situation. Religious people, on the other hand, turned to formal religiosity. In this form of piety, the soul disappeared, and mathematical calculations came instead, worship and sins began to be measured in numbers. Loyalty to this mathematics was considered as the condition of faith. The whole soul was stripped of religion, and a skeleton that had nothing to do with it was called faith. When the soul disappeared, the shape replaced the soul (Topçu, 2008: 82).

Topçu attributes the emergence of the moral problem to the removal of religion from social life. According to him, the dizzying reforms made in the footsteps of Western civilization damaged the national identity. The old values were wanted to be rejected in a wholesale manner. The spiritual realm was neglected by increasing the emphasis on material well-being. One by one, materialist revolutions took people to the suburbs of communism, which denies the nation, religion, family, and morality. Human life has become worthless. State organs began to despise people. People began to be oppressed more and more in the face of state authority. In addition, those who held power in social life overlooked other people. The idea of a responsible human being has not been created in society. Doing our simplest tasks created an expectation of gratitude. Responsibility has never been adopted as an ideal of free conscience. Instead of responsibility, which is based on faith and ideal, fear dominated our lives. Teachers could not be role models. Sense of altruism and intelligence could not reconcile. More recently, the authority has been combined with autocracy.

The high-ranking ones used their power as an instrument of domination. Misunderstanding of freedom of work, freedom of the press, freedom of women, and freedom of children have actually killed our free will. Freedom of work broke the spirit of the guild organization. Freedom of the press did not leave a national consciousness in the press. The press has turned into a mere business. Women's freedom left women alone. The woman who once ruled a state start to follow an irresponsible life. Child freedom left the child unattended on the street (Topçu, 2008: 113-111).

Regarding the solution to the aforementioned problems, Topçu states that instilling the culture of history comes first among the measures that will prevent the moral education crisis we are facing and develop the moral principles desired in the life of the nation, in the school and in the family. Secondly, students should be given moral education starting from the primary school level. Third, national education should be nationalized in terms of both curriculum and language. Fourth, a university and media structure that does not turn its back on its people is necessary. Fifth, the importance given to fine arts should be increased. Sixth, the emphasis should be placed on feelings of responsibility and sacrifice, and altruistic people should be elevated and praised in the eyes of the younger generation. Seventh, idealistic schools that will give this sense of morality should be established, not technical schools that prioritize material welfare (Topçu, 2008: 117-120).

Ethical Problems

Imitation under the name of westernization has been destroying our national identity for three centuries. The ignorance that points the free personality to the automatism of imitation was due to the fact that those who have shaped our lives in recent centuries are not possessed of philosophy and wisdom, but are unconscious and foolish
(Topçu, 2008: 122).

Nurettin Topçu has gathered the moral problems that the Turkish nation has faced recently under 40 headings (Topçu, 2008: 122-140). 1) *Imitation under the name of westernization*. This problem has been going on for three centuries. Under imitation, the self has been handed over to others and an unconscious action has begun. Creativity has been destroyed. This problem has deepened especially in the 20th century. Anything from Europe and the U.S. is taken without question. Everything, even the bread, wants to be taken from the West. 2) *Rapid*

urbanization. Unplanned and rapid urbanization increases social problems. The rural people, who adhere to their traditions and customs, had problems with articulation when it came to city life and quickly degenerated. The ambition to make easy and fast money spoiled the characters. 3) *Rapid industrialization*. Factorization drove individuals away from the land. The naivety of nature gave way to the brutality of the machine. Success was prioritized, and conscience was pushed into the background. 4) *The collapse of the Ahi organization*. During the Ottoman period, there was an ahi-order institution that took care of the rights of both tradesmen and customers. The capitalist economy, on the other hand, has always taken a stance of protecting the owner and maximizing his profit. 5) *Decreased importance given to spiritual values*. Material things and meaning (religion/morality) were put in the same basket as two equivalent issues and they were weighed to indicate value. While a football player made millions, love and spirituality became worthless.

6) *Indulging in luxury and comfort*. The love for people leaves its place for the love for things. Man becomes enslaved to things. Man constantly creates new needs for himself. 7) *Prioritizing the supremacy of wealth*. The superiority given to science and morality leaves its place for the superiority of wealth. 8) *Transformation of the family*. The transition from the father-dominated family to the democratic family type has created a vacuum of authority over the new generations. Young people who oscillate between family values and outside life harm family happiness. 9) *The inadequacy of the education system*. In the modern era, education was taken from the family and transferred to the state. However, the state could not properly fulfill its disciplinary and upbringing duties. 10) *Decrease in the value given to a human*. People's appreciation of each other strengthens them. In the opposite case, they harm each other.

11) *Time is not valued*. Profit is put before any other value. Those who increase their profits, not those who live their lives in moderation, were commended. 12) *The trivialization of labor*. A diploma's value is squashed under nepotism. Workers have been oppressed by profit-making. 13) *Increasing importance is given to material possessions*. The will of man gave way to the will of money. Money has taken precedence over all relationships. 14) *Increase in unfair gain*. Earning is prioritized, not working. 15) *Deepening of class differentiation*. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Competition for employment has damaged the relationship between people.

16) *The moral authority vacuum weakened the national identity*. Space was opened for communists and anarchists. 17) *The authority vacuum is created*

by the wrong perception of democracy. The slackening of authority left morality uncoupled and uncontrolled. 18) *Sectarian partisanship system.* While the multi-party system should have been the basis of democracy, on the contrary, it turned brother against brother. 19) *Malicious foreign powers.* Western powers are harming the national identity by exploiting the idea of democracy and freedom. On the other hand, communists exploit financial inadequacies. Similar attempts are made by masons as well. 20) *The collapse of the consciousness of history.* The nation is like an individual. He has childhood and youth, adolescence, and maturity. In order to benefit from this development, historical consciousness must be kept alive.

21) *The cultural vacuum created by the simplification of language.* After the proclamation of the Republic, the Arabic alphabet was switched to the Latin alphabet. Words of Arabic and Persian origin were abandoned and words in the Western language were transferred to Turkish. These artificial interventions to the language have corrupted the language. The cultural link with the past has been severed. 22) *The philosophy of education is based on a materialistic understanding.* All metaphysical teachings such as God and spirit have been removed from education. The importance given to moral lessons has decreased. 23) *Foreign schools create an alternative education system.* During the Ottoman period, economic capitulations were given to Europe. Today, this has almost been replaced by educational capitulations. In schools of German and English origin, education is given in languages other than Turkish. Families prefer to enroll their children in these schools. 24) *Not prioritizing academic concerns in universities.* Professors think about financial interests and ponder non-academic issues. 25) *Positivist publications.* The publications of our time are generally destructive of morals and beliefs, and corrosive to values.

26) *Deepening cleavages between the intelligentsia and the rest of the public.* This cleavage has increased the distrust of the education system. On the other hand, the imam was also unable to carry out his former spiritual leadership. He came down to the level of someone who only made the villager perform their religious duties. The teacher has not been able to fill this void yet. In short, the villager was deprived of a guide. 27) *Press became a toy of capitalist entrepreneurs.* The press, which was supposed to be both the translator of the public opinion and the language of the people, and the best public trainer and spreader of morality, could not achieve these goals due to concerns about sales and profit. 28) *Radio became a tool of political currents and a victim of unconscionable morality.* Radio should not be the voice of political power, but the voice of the nation. 29) *Art took a destructive position in family morality.* In

art mediums, inferior emotions are appreciated, not sublime ones. 30) *Morality could not move to prison and hospital*. The criminal does not always carry the criminal spirit. The moral should be able to touch the heart of the criminal when he regrets his crime. Moral values could also give spiritual strength to the patient.

31) *Labor migration to foreign countries*. The national values of these people should be protected. 32) *Wrong employment of female workers*. Why is a woman mostly a typewriter, a small worker? Women should be used in services such as primary school teaching and nursing. 33) *Sports competitions*. Sports, losing their beautiful nature, became a tool for the feeling of competition. It also fueled materialism and ruthlessness. 34) *Gambling*. Gambling became state-sponsored and spread to the entire population. 35) *Alcohol*. It poisons future generations.

36) *Difficulty of having a decent life in metropolises*. The individual is oppressed in the metropolitan cities and is under intolerable pressure. Spiritual forces dwindled. Vagrants, adventurers, and psychopaths proliferated. 37) *The idolization of pleasure*. The Western understanding of menial pleasure has been transferred to us. 38) *Consideration of wrongful examples*. The bad examples that excused our misery fed our moral weaknesses. 39) *The banalization of bad examples*. Bad examples of our recent history have also facilitated moral decline. 40) *Lack of will training*. The religious men, who were supposed to give this discipline, also fell into moral weakness. They prioritize wealth. They recite the Quran for money.

Nurettin Topçu tries to identify the source of the moral problems faced by the Turkish nation with these 40 items, which he expresses as moral wounds. It is seen that the problems brought by industrialization and urbanization, giving priority to material welfare, admiring the West, having a lack of spiritual guidance, having ill intentions and bad habits are at the root of most of these problems.

When all these items are carefully examined, it can be claimed that Topçu puts individual weaknesses rather than social processes on the basis of moral degeneration. Although urbanization and industrialization appeared as a natural reflection of modernization, as we have seen in the example of Germany, industrial opportunities could be distributed to different cities, preventing dense population migration and the problems caused by them. In this sense, it can be claimed that the criticisms for the problems caused by rapid urbanization are not directed at the ordinary people but against the ruling class. A similar denunciation can be made for the education system. Except for a few items like these, the criticisms are directed towards the individuals. In this sense, moral

improvement should be initiated from the bottom up, not from the top down. Placing the individual at the base of the theory of action supports this claim. Then, it's not "A fish rots from the head down." but instead "As you are (as far as your actions are), so will be the rulers."

Agency

*The issue of our time is neither technical, atomic, nor political.
The issue of our time is a matter of will (Topçu, 2018a: 18).*

One of the main debates in sociology is the freedom of human actions. One side argues that society and its structures as composed of the actions of its individual members who are agents of their own actions. Whereas the other side asserts that individual action is a part of a system of relationships that determines the activities of the members of society. The structuralist position argues that human beings are essentially social creatures who by their very nature are made by their social habitat, i.e., society. On this basis, it makes no sense to talk of human beings as individuals. Indeed, the very content and character of the interests, purposes, and values are derived from the social world. Hence, a society has its own autonomous reality; as expressed by Emile Durkheim, *sui generis* (existing in its own right). (Walsh, 1998: 8-30).

Overemphasizing the social structure makes human agency passive. In fact, the issue of agency, which means how free a person is in deciding his behavior, has occupied the minds before functionalist theory. According to sociologists, the agency was previously sought in natural forces apart from human nature and social life. These forces, sometimes in the guise of animistic forms and sometimes personalized gods, controlled and shaped individual and social life. Later, the agency was reduced from supernatural forces to natural forces. Then it was thought that societies are formed and changed depending on physical, biological, climatic, and geographical conditions. Action has become more secular and closer to the human being. But even in this case, it is still located outside of human existence. In the next stage, even if the freedom of human beings regarding their own actions began to be attributed to people, this power did not include all people but only a few important figures such as prophets, heroes, leaders, commanders, explorers, inventors, and geniuses. The rest of the people are still subject to these important personalities and their charisma. Human action is guided by charismatic personalities. Even if the action is

now confined to the individuals, it is not yet attributed to the general society (Sztompka, 1993: 191).

The structural functionalists' view of human agency remained at the above-mentioned stage. According to this understanding, our actions and thus social change are determined by the structure, not by individuals. Although we often think that we, as human beings, decide our own actions, this is actually an illusion, a "false consciousness". As a result of perceiving social demands as our own, we think that our actions are the result of our wishes. However, they are not our real will, but an action created by the thought that society imposes on us. The fact that a person is free in his actions means that his actions do not arise because of tradition or social pressure but as a result of his own free will. According to the structural-functional point of view, this does not seem possible (Yılmaz, 2019: 45-46).

In Nurettin Topçu's early years, it is seen that the structural-functionalist view was still the most influential social paradigm in the world. The most important representative of the functionalist theory in the world is Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) represented Durkheim's views in Turkey. Mentioning the opinions of Durkheim and Gökalp, Topçu criticizes the functionalist view that pacifies people and wants to assign an active role to people regarding their agency.

Durkheim explains social structure in terms of division of labor and solidarity. According to him, specialization and, as a result, the division of labor increased in the modern period. The division of labor is a necessity for the intellectual and material development of societies because it increases the productive power and skills of the workers. In this sense, it is also the source of civilization. Durkheim approaches division of labor through differences. Although we feel an affinity for those who think and feel like us and therefore resemble ourselves, the opposite is often possible. In fact, there is unity over differences. Thus, we complete our deficiencies and form a social unity. In this sense, the division of labor is necessary not for the beautification and improvement of society, but for its existence (Durkheim, 1984: 12-21).

Ziya Gökalp brought similar thoughts to Turkey with the formula "There is no individual but only the society." Gökalp, one of the important representatives of Turkish nationalism, tried to create a nationalist spirit in this way (Topçu, 2020: 40).

Topçu criticizes these ideas that reject human agency. According to him, it is not possible to evaluate society as a personality. If we examine the reasons

for this: 1) In society, there is no self that is always its own and does not change. Society is constantly shaped by external guidance. 2) While the individual soul is creative, the community is imitative. 3) The society that lives by tradition admires docility. The individual, who always bows before morality, is a rebel. 4) Society is materialistic and egoistic. It enjoys legend, fairy tales, and applause. However, as we can see in the examples of scholars, artists, saints, and prophets, the individual may abandon his material desires from time to time. 5) Society admires strength, sanctifies pride, and applauds heroes. The individual is fond of mercy and glorifies love. All of these show us that society is impersonal, fatalistic, imitative, traditional, docile, materialistic, and mythical. However, the individual soul that finds itself has a personality. He is creative, rebellious, idealistic in pursuit of truths, a hero of mercy and love, and lives with moral values (Topçu, 2020: 43-51).

Topçu is a moral practitioner who presents the characteristics of the ideal person. Ideal behavior is ultimately based on action and rebellion. Rebellion requires the existence of freedom in human movement. To be responsible for the action and to establish a better moral order, a person should be the agent of his own action. The existence of individuals who risk suffering (such as social exclusion and imprisonment) by rowing against the current in society is evidence of this freedom (Topçu, 2021: 47).

Topçu not only refuses to define the individual as a passive entity in front of society but also emphasizes the importance of an individual will. According to him, man gains value with his will. Will is a conscious balancing between the inner driving forces of the individual and the restraining forces of society. While selfish feelings lead us to an animal will, altruistic feelings elevate us and make the will valuable. The will to religion is to turn to Allah, the real owner of wills. The ascension of humanity is progress on the path that leads to participation in the divine will. According to Topçu, today's people show a weakness of will. We do not have the power to make our decisions, we follow the decisions of others; we cannot find the power to create an ideal for ourselves, we open our hands to foreign ideals; we cannot claim our own beliefs, we applaud the beliefs of others. The attitude we take against social manipulations like these is our will (2018a: 16-20). Therefore, we must resist against social pressures and manipulations and reveal our existence/self.

Indeed, Topçu is aware that society has certain pressure on an individual. Since man cannot live alone, he must be in certain solidarity with other people. There are two kinds of solidarity. In the first, the man accepts solidarity as a

necessity and falls into a passive state. In such a situation where the will of man disappears, the reason for existence also disappears. In other words, “he does not even exist anymore.” In the second type of solidarity, one creates solidarity for others by creating new foundations with new forces. By creating his action in this way, a person, born as a prisoner in society, gains his freedom afterward (Topçu, 2021: 94).

Ethics in Action

An action can be called a revolt only if it bears the passionate will of a higher order in response to an order in which it rebels
(Topçu, 2021: 236).

It would not be wrong to say that Nurettin Topçu’s entire moral philosophy is based on action and free will. He wrote his thoughts on the philosophy of the action in his doctoral thesis “Conformisme et Révolte”, Revolt Ethics. The philosophy of action is a spiritualist philosophy that sees the salvation of humanity in the rise of ethical values against the materialist-positivist movements that have developed in the West since the 18th century.

Action, which is explained in the interrelationship of the organism and nature, is literally a very central characteristic of the living being. Conscious action, besides, can be expressed as the most fundamental aspect that distinguishes human action from the action of subhuman living forms. Action, which includes nature and living beings, can only be understood by recognizing the dynamic relations between these two components. The action, embodied in nature, the living thing, and the dynamic network of relations between these two, creates a meaning that transcends nature and human in terms of its results. The element that creates this meaning is the state of being purposeful (Kinağ, 2018: 366). This opening to action voices a challenge to deterministic and materialist theories of man and nature. As a matter of fact, the action serves to create the field of values as an instrument in Nurettin Topçu’s thought.

The French philosopher Maurice Blondel, the founder of this philosophy, thinks that human actions pass through the steps of family, society, state, and humanity and progress towards God. Here, the distinction between reason and belief disappears. Nurettin Topçu also formed his ideas in this line. Instead of shedding tears for the past, he focused on the present and thought about how the Turkish-Islamic civilization could be brought back to its former glory. Without getting stuck in the past, he planned “an action for the faith”. “The moral

cause” was placed at the base of this movement, which is compatible with the modern age. But this was not a purely moral case, but a common value case that concerned all humanity. Since the action was the basis of this change, the name of his cause was called “the revolt ethics” (Kök, 2021: 26-28).

Topçu argues that action should be the center of philosophy because it is also the center of life. Here, full responsibility is given to the human being. This is not only for his own actions, moreover, the responsibility of the universe is also placed on man. If the universe was created for human beings, humans are also responsible for protecting the universe and making it beautiful (Topçu, 2006: 45-47). In other words, action is a substance and ontological necessity of human existence. Existence seems to have co-existed with movement and is destined to never separate from it. Action, which is the most important event of life, is also the most essential one:

To exist means to think and act. In fact, animals move too. But their movements are not conscious; it is only an act of traveling from one place to another. Action, which is unique to humans only, means changing oneself and other beings. With this, human actions gain their agency. However, does the freedom of my actions not require the existence of a principle called freedom, which existed before it and prevailed over it? However, there is no other event that will make freedom exist before the action. My freedom exists because of the existence of my action, and it manifests itself with the action. The analysis of the action, on the other hand, confronts the human being with a bigger enigma. Existence seems to have co-existed with the action and is destined to not be separated from it forever (Topçu, 2017: 17).

According to Nurettin Topçu, every action that is the work of a will is a leap towards perfection. The action is not pure spontaneity, but a hindered spontaneous generation. So, morality begins with willful action. In this sense, it can be said that “action itself is good”. A person is obliged to follow the order of society. In that case, the moral act consists of overcoming this captivity and a kind of conversion in order to regain the universal will (Topçu, 2021: 37-39). True action means submitting even our simplest decisions to infinite will. Then, with the strength we receive from infinity and the lesson from the whole world, at the same time, using all the forces of intelligence and will, it is a return to our own individual world and contact with the world from this point. Actions

that are not like this are fruitless attempts. To exist in its true sense means to base one's thoughts on infinity with one's actions and thus to seek one's own existence in infinity (Topçu, 2017: 20-23).

Topçu criticizes rationalist, experimentalist, and sociologist moral philosophies from different aspects. Rationalists equated virtue with knowledge. Ancient philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle thought that the knowledge of goodness would necessarily bring its application. Evil, on the other hand, was seen as ignorance and it was assumed that individuals would not do evil intentionally of their own will. So, mental training will suffice to make man moral. Topçu rejects this idea on the grounds that moral ideal and knowledge of moral events are confused. In empiricist ethics, knowing the good is not enough, its application is essential. For example, it is not enough to know the idea of compassion, it is necessary to experience it in person. According to Topçu, the reason that misled the experimenters was that they all acted from an experiential element. However, moral truths are not truths of fact, but truths of necessity. In the case of the social solidarity doctrines, they recommend solidarity for happiness or utility. Ethics of solidarity do not establish morality but assume it. Solidarity can be made for evil as well as for good. Social solidarity blinds the conscience of the individual and leads him to the morality of conformism in which there is blind obedience (Topçu, 2021: 40-43).

Three different authorities, namely conscience, society, and God, have jurisdiction over the free actions of human beings. Relative to these authorities, people's conscientious, social, and religious responsibilities emerge. These three responsibilities, which are accepted in Islamic moral values, are intertwined with each other. Because every responsibility is also a moral responsibility, provided that it is accepted by the conscience. Moral and social responsibilities also fall within the scope of religious responsibility (Karaman, 2000: 67).

Topçu puts the concept of responsibility at the center of ethics. According to him, other moral doctrines consider responsibility negatively, in the sense that man is responsible for the realization of his actions. In this case, responsibility is not the force that moves the individual. However, in Topçu's ethical philosophy, responsibility is a positive factor. The responsibility forces the person to move. Topçu also separates the sense of responsibility from the conscience. According to him, remorse does not create any active reasoning for the action. In Topçu, responsibility is the element that activates the individual. Responsibility breeds thought and action. This sense of action breaks down all self-limiting patterns by gaining endless movement. So much so that everything other than himself,

outside his movement, is now illusion and delusion. This state is a kind of conversion to attain its unity. Thus, by destroying every obstacle that comes its way, the self that has reached perfection begins to say, “I am the truth: Ene’l Hakk” (Topçu, 2021: 43-44).

As it can be understood from what we have written about Nurettin Topçu’s philosophy of action so far, revolt in his sense is not a rebellion that destroys the social order and creates anarchy. On the contrary, it is that man becomes an integral part of the universal order created by Allah. On the one hand, rebellion is modesty in which one accepts the nothingness of the world and himself. On the other hand, it is praying to Allah and seeking His support. Thus, the individual finds strength in the action that he never dared alone (Topçu, 2021: 245).

The revolt is an action in the sense that it rebels against the conditions of the will and does not conform to them. This action does not appear as a result of a compulsory situation but as a choice. To want or not to rebel/act, it is necessary to choose between these two. Every action that opposes determinism and social conformity in nature is actually a genuine revolt. Thus, the sought and desired creation, the discovery of one’s own life rule, becomes a revolt. In that way, man is in rebellion most of the time and to a certain extent. The consciousness of revolt is to awaken the consciousness of man’s superior duty. Man and also humanity will only progress by rebelling consciously (Topçu, 2021: 247-248).

The last enemy soldier in Anatolia was expelled in 1922. However, according to Topçu, the independence war of Anatolia has not yet been fought on the spirit front. The people of this land were not valued or respected, and it was not known that these people were a trust of Allah. The Anatolian guy is not the owner of his existence, he is a prisoner in the hands of the strong. The Oriental has not yet tasted the love for work. Hence, working is not a form of worship for these Oriental people. Here, service is a demanding burden. This is why you cannot be creative. A person who is afraid to devote all his life forces to the realization of an ideal, that is, to make the body a servant to the spirit, can only obtain work in the measure of the body. For this reason, the work of the Orientals cannot show the power of a body to spread beyond its own shadow. The disease of westernization is all around us. We act under the influence of the West in every field from our school to our legal system. Morality and religion have degenerated. Since the spiritual body is weakened to such a degree, it becomes open to the attack of foreign cultures (Topçu, 2020: 13-15).

If we are responsible and concerned about our destiny, only through revolt, this concern will be eliminated, and this responsibility will be accepted. The

revolt, which is the determinant of our freedom and destiny, is the only thing that can provide us with the salvation of the soul and body (Topçu, 2021: 251). An action can be called a revolt only if it bears the passion for higher order (Topçu, 2021: 236). Therefore, in order for a movement to be considered a revolt, it must establish an order that will bring the society better.

Unity should be at the center of the movement, and personal ambitions and wishes should not be allowed. The individuals who founded the nation should not forget that they are organs of the same body. The breakdown of unity opens the door to non-existence. The being we believe in is the One, the universal and the eternal Being. We are His perfect part. Nurettin Topçu, who has these thoughts, reveals the formula of his philosophy like Descartes: “I act, I think, I love Unity, therefore I exist.” (Topçu, 2017: 23).

Conclusion

In Nurettin Topçu’s thought, ethics is one of the basic elements that make people human. Ethics both motivates and directs people to the right path. Topçu desires ethics for the general well-being of society, not for the personal interests of people. In this sense, he criticizes the reproaches about morality in daily life. Basically, a person who commits many immoral acts himself becomes a moral monument when it comes to the behavior of others. Namely, when it comes to people who oppress others, they beg for justice from the court; people who take bribes talk about moral degradation; the driver who does not obey the traffic rules complains that pedestrians ignore traffic rules. As it is seen, people present their personal interests as ethics. This situation shows us that the mass prioritizes their interests and happiness, not real morality. While applying moral rules, people adapt these rules to their goodness and happiness. People seek compassion, justice, and intercession under the threat of pain and suffering. Indeed, morality should be asked and shaped for a lofty purpose, not for personal interests. This is due to a person’s ignorance. However, a person should know himself and direct his criticisms to himself first. The wisdom in Jesus’ motto “let him who is without sin cast the first stone” advises us to criticize ourselves before criticizing others (Topçu, 2018: 93-94).

The will also bring responsibility. Topçu defines his philosophy as an act of responsibility, saying, “Our cause is not to conform to life, but to adapt our lives to the truth.” It rejects the understanding of “It’s the captain who saves the ship.”, which expresses individual salvation. He does not see “not meddling in anyone’s business” as a moral virtue. He criticizes those who put religion

into figures. According to him, we are surrounded by enemies on all sides. In this siege, there is no living in honor, the ship cannot be saved, knowledge is inaccessible, God is unreachable, and evil does not breed salvation. Hence, we should open our eyes and act (Topçu, 2020: 215-216).

Nurettin Topçu dreams of creating an ideal generation. Contrary to many intellectuals, Topçu does not want to realize this through politics and the state. He thinks that such an effort would be insufficient. The main effort should be made on the side of ideas and spirit, on the side of morality and faith. Since it is not possible to educate all the youth in this direction at once, giving this awareness to even a certain group will be sufficient in the short term. Tomorrow's Turkey will be cultivated by this new generation morally (Topçu, 2020: 16-17).

In Topçu's writings, action, ethics, and belief appear as an inseparable trivet. The individual's movement crosses the family, society, and humanity steps and creates a bridge between individual existence and God. All this emphasis on the act can actually be read as a way of wanting to awaken the numb Turkish generation and the Islamic ummah. Turkish-Islamic thought has been oppressed by the West since the late period of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, under the new Republic, an oppressive secular state structure had been formed. The conservative public became "You are a stranger in your homeland, a pariah in your homeland!" as expressed in the lines of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983). There is a need for a driving force that will awaken this generation from its slumber and reactivate it, restore its self-confidence, and enable it to reclaim its core values. Topçu aims to initiate this action.

Topçu's ideas are valuable in terms of both his stance against the dominant sociological paradigms and the re-motivation of a generation that has lost faith in itself. Worse than falling behind in a football game is thinking you cannot win anymore. A team that thinks this way has no chance of success. Topçu's ideas on the action philosophy can be considered as a motivational speech in this sense. He instills in the younger generation the belief that they can catch up with the Western civilization. He encourages the youth, guides them to the right path, gives hope, and motivates them to act. It must be this self-confidence and dedication that gives Topçu the title of an intellectual man.

For Topçu, the action means existence. A will that cannot direct life is equivalent to nonexistence for him. Man has freedom and will and is the creator of his actions. Man is not trapped in a deterministic flow that follows society without questioning, as structuralists assume. Of course, there are social pressures on humans. But man has the capacity to resist it and has his

agency. In other words, the revolt ethics is against the conservative docility and deterministic approaches. The naming of Topçu's ideas as the "revolt ethics" is also a request to rebel against the existing order. Although he is against blindly submitting to social order, Topçu is not a strict individualist. When it comes to obedience to the divine will, the individual should show this docility. Hence, Topçu wants to establish a new ethical theory rooted in Islam.

In Topçu's thought, revolt is not a rebellion that destroys the social order and creates anarchy. "Revolt" represents moral will. The volitional purpose here should be to establish a superior order to the rebelled one. This revolt action should carry the individual to the social order and then to Allah. The final point to be reached on this path is the point of "I am the truth: Ene'l Hakk".

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CHAPTER XIX

EROL GÜNGÖR'S SOCIAL MORALITY THEORY

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Introduction

One of the concepts that many philosophers, mystics, scientists, thinkers, scholars, intellectuals and social scientists have emphasized and evaluated with sensitivity in the history of thought is undoubtedly morality. When defining morality, thinking people took into account the characteristics of the age they lived in, the structure of society, the model of ideas they followed, their worldview and their lifestyle. Each definition of morality has emphasized a different characteristic of it. In this context, the views on morality were examined by the researchers by dividing them into different categories. Morality, which has an intricate nature due to its content, has not been able to be defined as accepted by almost everyone in the history of thought (Kaymakcan and Meydan, 2014: 15-19).

Morality, which is the whole of the rules that organize the personality structure, actions, behaviors and evaluations of human beings, has both individual and social aspects (Çapcıoğlu, 2020: 291). Since man is a social being and has

the obligation to live together, moral and moral rules come at the top of the spiritual values that will keep them together and ensure their unity. Erol Güngör, a famous thinker, intellectual and cultural bearer who lived in the last periods of Turkish intellectual life and had views in many fields of social sciences, was examined morality by considering it in both psychological and sociological dimensions. According to Güngör, morality is an indispensable system for the welfare and peace of a society. Morality gives an idea of a person's personality and also offers clues about the social structure of a society. In the formation and grounding of morality, the environment and the family have very important roles and functions. Since individuals and societies can change, morality can also change. However, this change is not related to the content of morality, but to its formal feature (Kılıç, 1998: 267-270).

Famous social psychologist Erol Güngör considered morality, one of the oldest problems of philosophy, as a social issue as well as a psychological problem. For this reason, in his written works on morality, he starts by revealing the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Erol Güngör has dealt with the subject of morality in depth especially in his works titled "*Moral Psychology and Social Morality*" and "*Researches on the Psychology of Values*" (Kılıç, 1998: 265-266).

In this study, we will try to discuss and evaluate the views about the importance of morality and morality in the social structure of Erol Güngör, who acts in the line of Ziya Gökalp-Mümtaz Turhan in Turkish sociology, who is considered a follower of the structural-functionalist school, who constitutes one of the cornerstones of Turkish intellectual life and whose sole purpose is to "create a modern Turkish national culture" in Turkey.

Ethics (Morals)

The word 'Ahlâk' (akhlaq) is the plural form of the words "khulq" or "khuluq" (nature/temper) , which comes from the same root as the Arabic "khalq" (creation). Since the word khulq means both creation-creating and character-temperament, 'Ahlak' and 'khulq' are used in the same meaning in sources. Although the word akhlaq is not mentioned independently in the Qur'an, it is mentioned in two verses as "khuluq" (Çağrıç, 2019: 15).

If we look at the definitions of morality made by intellectuals who are competent and model in morality: Morality according to Ibn Miskawayh; "It is the state that enables the self to put forward its own actions without the need to think about it." (Ibn Miskawayh, 2017: 51). Morality according to Al-Ghazali;

“It is the council that has become a rooted in the self and has become a faculty, from which actions and practices arise freely without any compulsion and without thinking.” (Ghazali, 2000: 120). Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi, one of the important moralists of the Ottoman Empire, while seeing science of morality as a part of practical philosophy, defines morality as “a faculty that allows actions to arise easily without the need to think and without being forced from by the self” (Kınalızâde, 2019: 81).

According to Muslihiddin Adil Taylan, one of the late Turkish intellectuals who is a social integrative functionalist and adopts micro approaches rather than macro approaches, morality is an important branch of science that brings social development into being. Morality is closely related to other social sciences. The science of morality is a branch of philosophy. There is a close relationship between morality and law in terms of ensuring the order of society. However, a generation that is deprived of religious upbringing is also deprived of supreme emotions. For man survives with his morality. Without morality, there is no duty. A person who has no duty is no different from an animal. According to the sociologist who gives a serious place to the issue of upbringing/morality, the family, school and the environment are three important factors that affect upbringing/morality (Öztürk, 2017: 99-101).

Considering the definitions made at the sociological analysis level; Morality is a term that serves to explain all the principles and norms that individuals agree with and are obliged to comply with in a society (Köknel, 2006: 111). In another definition, morality; refers to the set of values and goals that have been accepted, bordered and defined in a cultural environment, to the set of principles that reveal how these values will be kept alive and how the goals will be achieved, or to the traditional way of life of a human community over a period of time, designed according to certain kinds of beliefs, prohibitions, commandments, norms and values and modified depending on this design (Cevizci, 2002: 3). However, these definitions and explanations lead us to the fact that there is a relationship between sociology and morality. Although morality is characteristic of individuality in general terms, individuals ultimately live in society. It is highly probable that societies formed by individuals who experience moral collapse in the individual sense will also experience moral collapses. In the sociological sense, since social formation comes after moral formation, both formations are complementary and supportive of each other. From a philosophical point of view, while sociology is a “genus”, morality is a “specie” of it. From this point of view, morality is not outside the spectrum of sociology, on the contrary, it

is a social phenomenon (Öztürk and Fidan, 2019: 276-283). According to Erol Güngör, morality “is a system of precepts that regulate interpersonal relations in a society.” (Güngör, 2020: 9).

Morality from Social Perspective

According to Güngör, wherever there is a human being, morality and moral behaviors can definitely be mentioned. Humanity has been created at a level and with an intelligence to distinguish between negative and positive attitudes in its behaviors. Although morality is linked to the structure and character of the individual himself, as a result, man lives in a structure called society. From this perspective, there is also a social aspect to moral behaviors. Since morality is a set of rules established to regulate relations between individuals, there would be no morality if people did not live together in social life. So there is a social moral reality as well as individual morality can be. In fact, in order to maintain social order, social morality precedes individual morality. In other words, if an individual has negative moral behaviors, his behaviors will directly harm the social order and society in which he lives, and even harm other individuals. The individual who exhibits positive behaviors is both beneficial to other individuals and contributes positively to the establishment of social order. In brief, morality is a notion related to the behaviors required by interpersonal relations, in other words, social life (Güngör, 2020: 5).

According to Güngör, society itself is a school, and every individual in society is both a teacher and a student of this school. When people pass on the moral rules they have learned from others to future generations, they are not content with just teaching them, they change them when necessary, and even put forward new examples of rules according to themselves. The individual is the most important part of society and at the same time it is the changer, transmitter and regulator of moral behaviors in society (Güngör, 2020: 8-9).

Güngör states that the social environment is effective in all aspects of the learning of moral behaviors as well as in the whole educational life of an individual. Since the system of rules that regulate interpersonal relations in a society is called morality, all kinds of social relations and situations that individuals show within the social structure actually show us examples of moral behavior. It is not possible for an individual to learn all the moral codes of behavior of the society in which he lives or to pass them on to later generations.

However, there is a critical age range and close social environment in which an individual will learn moral behaviors that he needs to learn in a positive and desirable direction. People generally learn moral codes more easily and permanently from young ages. The places where a person's moral personality is really formed are his family, school and close friends, who constitute his closest social circle. The influence of this triple structure, which has a great importance in the formation of moral personality, continues not only in childhood but also in adolescence and later ages. The provision of ethics lessons in schools, which are educational institutions but also a valuable social environment, fills an important gap. Because the moral lessons given in these ages fill the psychological and spiritual voids of children and at the same time serve the purpose of being a good person and a good citizen (Güngör, 2020: 9).

According to Güngör, the learning of morality and moral behavior rules is primarily an educational work and the social environment plays the main role in learning these rules. There is also a close bond between personality and morality that is often indistinguishable. That is why the actions of an individual both reveal his personality and give clues about his moral character. The individual who already has a sound personality will exhibit moral behavior in a positive way, while the individual with a negative personality will exhibit moral behavior in a negative way. Individuals who have positive and good morals are appreciated by the society with their good behavior. No matter how much a society has individuals or strata that exhibit negative behaviors, it has always approved the existence of good, beautiful and positive behaviors and attitudes. That is why engaging in appreciative moral behavior also means having an admired personality. It is a known fact that just as there can not be negative morality in an individual with a sound personality, there can not be good personality in an individual with negative moral characteristics too. For this reason, when the term "person with a bad character" is used in a society, it is essentially implied that the moral behavior of that person is corrupted. In the same way, when it is mentioned "a person with a sound character", it means the good moral behaviors he has and the good moral behaviors he has shown in his life. Positive moral qualities such as honor, benevolence, generosity, valor, chastity, honesty, hospitality are also positive personality qualities (Güngör, 2020: 9). Thus, the individual who has a positive and beautiful personality also acquires the virtues that are one of the basic conditions of "being a good person". In Islamic contemplation, moral virtue is the spiritual ability that enables people to bestow and move away from evil. The four basic virtues that are accepted from

a philosophical point of view and should be in humans are; wisdom, justice, courage and chastity (Saruhan, 2016: 341-342).

Social Purpose of Morality

Güngör states that philosophers have been making a great effort on the importance of the concept of morality and the purpose of being moral since ancient times, and that this is a concept that social scientists also importantly try to explain. Any sociologist's answer to the question, "What is the place, importance and purpose of morality in social life?", is hidden in the close relationship between morality and social life. Although theoretically moral and its precepts are well known, the only place where they can be put into practice is the society. One of the important elements that keep people together and ensure the development of the structure called society is morality and moral behavior. Because of the moral precepts established in a society, individuals belonging to that society know how to behave in which situation, and individuals can even predict how other individuals will react in advance to a situation. The existence of such a moral order gives a sense of security to the individuals in that society above all. If it were not known which behaviors were positive or negative, disorder would arise among people as well as irregularities in society. After all, while individuals who exhibit morally positive behaviors receive the appreciation of society, individuals who exhibit morally negative behaviors face the harsh sanctions of society (Güngör, 2020: 9-10).

According to Güngör, even when societies choose leaders for themselves, they prefer people who have a "good morality", in other words, "architect of a good personality". People who have negative moral traits or who don't inspire confidence have no chance of becoming leaders. Leaders are the outward phenomena of a society. If the leader has good morals and a sound character, people will believe in that leader, and even that leader will always keep people together with this solid character and ensure that these people become a society. However, leaders who have negative moral characteristics, who do not have confidence and who do not have sound personalities, far from keeping people together, can even disperse the society they have and cause it to disappear (Güngör, 2020: 10). Al-Farabi, who is known as "The Second Teacher" in the history of Islamic philosophy, states that a virtuous life can only take place in an ideal society, and that good rulers will build a virtuous society. For this reason, the philosopher, who states that leaders have great responsibilities in the establishment of virtuous world cities, says that not every person can be a

good or ideal manager. According to Al-Farabi, the rulers of virtuous societies should be chosen from those who have some basic characteristics (truthfulness-honesty-fairness-not fondness for games and entertainment-not aspirant to makeshift situations such as sexual pleasures, etc.) (Kaya, 1995: 153-154).

According to Güngör, who says that showing moral behavioral maturity is not a situation that belongs only to leaders, showing moral behavior maturity is an important duty that every individual who wants to live in a peaceful, orderly and virtuous society should do. Since an individual can assume different roles in institutions and groups within the social structure, he has an obligation to observe the principles of positive moral behavior, regardless of the role or position he is in. The precepts of positive moral behavior, whether established by the people before us or by us, must develop a common understanding among individuals. Unless a common understanding develops in a society in a positive sense, there will be no peace and cooperation. Because peace and cooperation form the basis of social life (Güngör, 2020: 10).

Morality, which is the output of a system of thought and ideas, has no concrete and physical existence like a piece of clothing that people wear on. Some people who are interested in and attach importance to physical assets have not refrained from criticizing those who deal with spiritual precense from time to time. Those who make this criticism overlook a fact and try to explain their thoughts. The things that sustain a society or the relationship between people by ensuring it are not always physical elements. In the basic sense, the things that ensure the progress of society and the collective integrity are the spiritual elements. Although there is an impression that materialistic social elements are in the foreground in societies, the value of materialistic social elements actually gains meaning with the value that societies assign to them. For example, language, which is the tool by which people speak and agree, is a purely spiritual system. The spoken language has no concrete symbols, such as a physical element. The greatest example of materialistic benefit among people is money. However, the value of money is not due to its own existence, but to the value that people give to it. Even if the state, which is one of our greatest spiritual values, were not interested in money, people would not value money so much (Güngör, 2020: 10-11).

From Güngör's point of view, it is the symbols that distinguish human society from animal societies and express purely spiritual values. While all symbolic things are spiritual, each society has its own spiritual symbols that it considers valuable. Therefore, the most important of the spiritual values is

moral values. Even religions founded on the spiritual order are largely moral systems. The moral system constructed by religions is the system that provides social order by explaining what is good and bad both in terms of the human-God relationship and the human-human relationship. Since religions are the source of moral precepts and experiences, it is normal for religions to have such great effects in societies. For this reason, as long as there is moral order in societies, religion will exist. In other words, since societies cannot be far from morality, they will not be able to live far from religion. Those who say that religion mainly concerns one by one individuals, not societies, and those who deny the supernatural status of religion have not denied the importance and necessity of morals in social life when it comes to morality (Güngör, 2020: 11).

According to Güngör, as long as behaviors within the social structure are called “good or bad”, they will maintain their own existence in morality. One thing that should not be forgotten is the misuse of the phrase “an immoral person”. People who do not do good behaviors that are generally accepted by society are called “immoral.” However, people who behave badly are not “immoral” but people with “bad morals”. Because every individual or society has a moral system in one way or another (Güngör, 2020: 11). According to the famous philosopher Al-Farabi, since virtues and vices are not innate, man is created with equal predisposition to both situations. Hence people can choose evil as they can choose good by their own will. Therefore, the philosopher who says that there can be no talk of an immoral person states that people will be either with good morals or bad morals. However, emphasizing that education and habits are also extremely important in the issue of morality, Al-Farabi underlines that people have different personalities in terms of their predisposition to moral education (Karaman, 2018: 166).

According to Güngör, just as people can distinguish between foods that will be harmful or beneficial to them, they should also have a spiritual moral system that can distinguish between positive behaviors and negative behaviors. If there is life wherever there is air and water, there is morality wherever there is humanity and in whatever situation. Therefore, morality is a kind of law of nature. The duty of people who have a moral structure and character is to live in the most beautiful and best way by succeeding in adapting their morality to the different situations of life. Man must behave according to moral principles not only in his thoughts but also in his practices in social life. If conditions such as respect, love, goodwill, sense of responsibility, benevolence, which are among the indicators of positive and desired morality, prevail in all individuals

in a society, conflict and unrest will never arise in that society. Although it is perhaps sociologically impossible to create such a society, at least when such moral behaviors are instilled in future generations, the chances of people living in peace and prosperity will increase. For this reason, the transfer of moral and spiritual values that emerge and mature in a society to children and young people will constitute the biggest and first step to be taken towards them becoming a respectable and adult individual in society. Especially, if spiritual and moral values are not transferred to later generations, it will not only cause these generations to grow up as selfish individuals who think about themselves, but also cause them to become parasites that harm their society and nation (Güngör, 2020: 11-12).

Güngör emphasizes that people should be taught traditional morality both in order not to break the connection with the past period and in order to live a comfortable life with our own contemporaries. Of course, some of the changes in the morality and moral order that have arisen in a society fall within the research field of sociology as a branch of science that studies societies. Because the nature of the moral standards that have emerged in a society and the changes of these standards will have important consequences for the adaptation of human beings. The most important environment of man is the social environment that he tries to adapt at the same time. As the social environment deteriorates, deterioration will inevitably occur in our personality. The changing needs of man and the disharmony seen between him and the changing external world is one of the main reasons for the disruption seen in the human personality. The precepts of traditional morality should be taught in order to prevent great gaps in terms of moral values between the past period and the present period. Traditional morality serves as a balance between man and society in particular. The share of national-moral values in that society in maintaining peace, security and stability for generations is great (Güngör, 2020: 12).

According to Güngör, if people and technology can change, societies can also change. Societies that do not change at all or are constantly changing are unhealthy societies. Societies that undergo changes in stability are healthy societies. Therefore, it would be a wrong attitude to adhere to the moral traditions in a society, to close the doors to change, or to state that it should be so. Although some philosophers argue that morality will not change or will change, both sociologically and philosophically, morality has unchanging values and these values will remain valid always in all environments. For example; There are unchanging principles of morality accepted by all societies, such as pitying

weak people, helping, being honest, telling the truth, being just. Although these principles have appeared in different societies at different times and in different forms, the principles that are in the background of the precepts have not changed. The point that distinguishes societies from each other arises from the application of these principles in life and whether they take functional form or not. Because the moral rules that exist in society against the changing and transforming world, by taking its share, will undergo changes and transformations in order to become suitable for life. For example, in the old times, rich people built more works such as sanctuaries, fountains, mosques and bridges to do good or to do charity works, but today there are situations such as donations to schools, hospitals and foundations. As a result of the change and development of society, the type of doing good or doing charity works, which is also an indicator of the positive moral structure, has also changed. In short, according to the changing needs and changing organizations of the society, moral rules have started to take new forms (Güngör, 2020: 12-13).

Güngör would like to clarify the relationship between the change of morality and the change of society with these two crucial questions:

- a) Does the moral system automatically change as society changes?
- b) Is the change of social morality an event that takes place beyond the will of individuals? (Güngör, 2020: 13).

Güngör states that although there are mutual relations between social institutions and structures such as politics, economy, education, religion, family, health, law and morality, these institutions do not change at the same speed and to the same extent in any process of social change. In countries that are advanced in terms of technology and industry, human relations may not develop at the same degree, likewise moral life in an economically backward country may have taken place at a very advanced level. Therefore, it is difficult to say that social and technical changes are carried out in a balanced way in every society. It is inevitable that there will be moral crises and conflicts in societies where changes are not harmonious. If there is conflict or disharmony in a place, it means that moral rules are also endangered there (Güngör, 2020: 13). William Fielding Ogburn's concept of "cultural delay", which was mentioned earlier when the subject of culture was explained, and which describes the fact that spiritual cultural values do not change as fast as materialistic cultural values or change late and slowly, explains exactly this issue (Oskay, 1978: 36-47).

According to Güngör, people do not play a passive role in changing moral codes. Even people cannot prevent a change in morality. The stability of morality in societies depends on the stability of everything that exists in societies. However, since such a situation will not be possible in any period and age, moral change will occur, too. Then, since individuals cannot prevent the change of morality, their duty is to be able to keep this change under control. Every social institution basically arranges organizations to keep the changes that occur in itself under control. For this reason, educational institutions in Turkey on the one hand transfer the traditional national moral codes to new generations and on the other hand strive to develop moral behavior patterns in accordance with the general changes in society (Güngör, 2020: 13-14).

Güngör states that due to the very complex and intricate structure of today's society, it is no longer possible for one person to come out and be effective in all segments of society as in the old periods. In the past, a founder of religion, a sociologist or a philosopher could come out and create a new moral system, and even the system he created was adopted by society. However, since human life in today's society is not shaped around a single value system, the examples of moral behavior of a politician, a teacher, a commander, a religious functionary, a philosopher only show their influence in their own environment. Especially in Turkish society, the prevailing moral personality situation takes shape according to the influences coming from different origins and different authorities. Perhaps the most difficult problem of human life is the ability to combine the effects coming from different origins into a harmonious whole (Güngör, 2020: 14).

The Issue of Whether Morality Changes or Not

According to Güngör, morality has three basic dimensions as knowledge, emotion and behavior. These dimensions have important functions in shaping our moral understanding and moral behavior (Güngör, 2020: 26). In particular, the behavioral dimension of morality is closely related to the construction of social structures that show the number and quality of the things that make up a society, their relations with each other, the place and status of each in the big society (Güngör and Işık, 1977: 89). Since the laws, manners, customs, norms and all other rules regulating social relations within social structures have undergone changes, it is an inevitable social reality that the morality that affects the social system and social life will undergo changes with them. For example, the morality of the Turks and the Eskimos are not the same, nor is the morality of today the same as that of a few centuries ago, and the morality of a

few centuries later will not be the same as the morality of today. So, over time, the moral understandings and moral rules of societies undergo changes, but not changing morality should be the goal of societies. Because changing morality is a fact and inevitable, and ensuring the immutability of morality is an ideal (Güngör, 2020: 70).

Güngör says that morality has a form and a content. When we see people we know on the street, saluting, bowing a little, shaking hands and taking off our hats constitute the dimension of the form of morality, while the friendship, loyalty and kindness that are wanted to be expressed in these ways constitute the content of morality. In fact, since the form and content of morality are intertwined, it is often difficult to distinguish. What really matters here is the meaning of the forms. For this reason, while the changes in moral principles occur mainly in the form changes, the content changes are negligible. In other words, although the behaviors we do to respect a person we know vary, the expression of respect we want to show to that person does not change in essence. Although there are moral changes over time, societies should have the ideal to prevent these changes and maintain a balanced life. If the form of morality in a society changes, but its content does not, that society has both solid foundations and universal moral values to realize the ideal of moral immutability (Güngör, 2020: 70).

According to Güngör, the forms of behavior that are seen in different ways in different societies often lead to the accrual of the same moral value in different ways. For example, in a primitive society, the murder of a very old and helpless husband by his wife is not a murder or an evil act. Because by killing her husband, the wife is doing her duty to him, and the husband admits that his wife is helping her. It's just like an Eskimo offering his wife to show his respect to a guest who comes to his house. Or just as the Spaniards burned the Muslims and Jews during the Inquisition to do good because their souls had captured by devil. Although similar principles are at its foundation, it is not possible to see such behavior as an example of good morality. Therefore, for good morality to be formed, not only good intentions are enough, but the result must be good for both parties (Güngör, 2020: 70-71).

Güngör states that it is extremely difficult to find moral behavior precedents and practices that can always be beneficial and valid for all people. Building universal values in morality, both individually and socially, should be one of the primary goals. Peace and tranquility between people and societies is only possible with universal moral values (Güngör, 2020: 71).

The Relationship Between Morality and Value

Value, which is a notion that sociology is especially interested in within the social sciences literature, is the generalized basic principles or beliefs that are approved by the vast majority of its members as healthy and necessary for the existence, unity, functioning and maintenance of a social group or society, and reflect the common feelings, ideas, goals and interests of individuals. (Yazıcı, 2014: 210). Values, one of the basic words used to explain social life, are the work of social systems as well as the work of individuals. However, while individual values are considered within the scope of people's attitudes, behaviors, choices and beliefs, social values are handled within the scope of social norms (Anar, 1983: 9). Since the knowledge of a human element depends on the recognition of its functions, values also have a decisive function in the occurrence of all human events such as political, religious, moral, artistic, economic, technological, social and familial events (Aydın, 2011: 41). The most important function of social values in the social field is to provide social solidarity. Therefore, the function of values comes to light more in times of disintegration and crisis of societies (Yazıcı, 2014: 213). Values are the elements that distinguish the culture of a society from the cultures of other societies and provide them with a national cultural identity and prevent them from dissolving, support national unity and provide social solidarity (Seyyar, 2003: 99-100). Just as the cultural system created by each social mentality is different, the social values created by each cultural system will also be different. The values owned by a society form the normative side of that society's culture (Yazıcı, 2014: 220).

According to Güngör who stated that the domination of a distorted value system that is instrumental in social and economic activities oppressing people or that cannot prevent this oppression is one of the biggest crises of the world today, the basis of the value crisis is the phenomenon that human psychological needs are thrown into the background and material values encircle all life. When spiritual values are replaced by materialistic values, a social crisis is inevitable. For this reason, it is essential to establish and implement national values in accordance with national culture in Turkey (Güngör, 1989: 30).

According to Güngör, expressions which point out that something is good (desirable) or bad (undesirable) are value judgments. People make judgments about other people, other people's actions and intentions, objects and things. While all moral judgments become judgments of value, not all judgments of value may be related to morality. Value, then, is the belief about something is good (desirable) or bad (undesirable). The reason why value is discussed only

as a belief in psychology is that value guides human actions rather than whether it is based on an impartial principle. For example, Mehmet is a good person. Why? Mehmet helps many people as much as he can. Because helping people is a good behavior. For value is a belief, it means a composition of our minds, feelings and knowledge related to a certain part of our world. However, since value is a specific form of belief, it is an activity of the mind that ranks at higher levels than it (Güngör, 1998: 27-30).

Güngör states that learning values is a social learning. Every person has a position in society and a number of roles that society deems appropriate for this position. People have some ideas about what people in that position should do, what they should think, what they should value. While it is a great value for a young girl to stay chaste and decent, for a man being courageous, showing coolness, perseverance and constancy can be great values. As long as there is community support behind the values, the values will find more space, but when the support of the society decreases or disappears, these values will become available to change and degenerate. Therefore, it is of great importance to teach and put into practice values in raising individuals and bringing societies closer to the ideal (Güngör, 1998: 70).

According to Güngör, the value that ranks at the top or first in the value ranking of an individual can be considered the basic value of that individual. Other values are tools to achieve the basic value. For example, if happiness is the most fundamental value for an individual, other values acquire a value characteristic to the extent that they help achieve happiness. However, moral values do not constitute a distinct part of the human value system. Other kinds of values have an organic relationship with moral values, and these values can take on the appearance of moral values. In addition, moral values, which do not constitute a cognitive category in their own right, must be in a dynamic relationship with the values of other fields (Güngör, 1998: 41-42).

Morals of Family as A Social Institution

The family, which is considered as the sine qua non of being a society, is evaluated as the most basic cell of all societies in this respect (Öztürk and Demirdağ, 2020: 210). In terms of social aspects, the first natural religious group and collective group is the family (Yavuz, 2019: 91-92). In this respect, the collective consciousness, which expresses the abstract integrity of the common beliefs, values and norms that make up the society, shapes the family by including it. For this reason, the family is seen as the founder

and patron of personality, values and social criteria (Öztürk and Demirdağ, 2020: 210-211).

The family, which is the smallest social unit of society, is the center of life for the individual. The family constitutes the most important and primary group in which individuals are located. The family, which expresses not only a biological but also a social foundation within society, is of strategic importance for societies. In addition, the family, which is a social foundation in society, is the cornerstone of a society. For this reason, while the sudden changes that take place in the society affect the family, the changes that occur in the family affect the society in the same way. The family, which also undertakes the function of social control mechanism in social life, is the most basic cell of a society. Therefore, the family and society are like parts of a whole. In addition, in order for the unity of society and the state to be sound, the family structure must be solid (Öztürk, 2017: 2-3).

As a social institution, the family is an institution that has the buffer function in social change, shapes against the interruptions caused by structural changes, and fulfills people's public order needs in different ways (Merter, 1990: 3). There are five global characteristics that every family has;

- a) Each family is a small social order.
- b) Each family has its own values and principles.
- c) Each family has its own sociological structure.
- d) Each family also has basic functions available.
- e) Each family moves through the phases in the life cycle (Hallaç and Öz, 2014: 144).

For Güngör, the family, which is the smallest social institution and at the same time the building block or cell of society, has three important functions such as bringing new individuals to society for the continuation of the human generation, regulating the gender instinct and forming some economic organizations. Perhaps the most important place among these functions is the acquisition of new individuals for the continuation of the human generation. From this point of view, bringing children into the world and raising them is the biggest role of the family in order for the human generation to continue. This role also forms the basis for the formation of many functions. At this point, what is really wanted to be explained is to raise decent and legitimate generations. Otherwise, if the aim is only the

continuation of the human generation, the human generation will continue by bringing children into the world in illegitimate ways without the need for couples to marry. Therefore, the survival of human beings is not only an event that consists of the birth of a child. The family has great responsibilities for the continuation of the desired human generation. A child needs the care of his family from the moment of birth until reaching a certain age. The family is a place where an individual gets the initial care and gets trained. The family, which has a physiological role in the birth of children, has an educational and social role after the birth so that they can be good people. In fact, since the beginning of humanity, the first social institution in which a child was first educated and moral values were adopted has always been the family (Güngör, 2020: 154).

Güngör disagrees with Freud and like-minded people who declare that “the character of man develops within five years after birth.” By the fact that the character is not entirely innate, Freud and his friends have bypassed the influence of the social environment. Nevertheless, this view shows us how important the family is in the formation of human character and the acquisition of moral values since the first five years child will be with the family. Although there are many different factors in the formation of the character and moral structure of the human being, it is a known social reality that the most important factor is the family. As a biological, cognitive and sociological reality, every human being observes, learns and internalizes the attitudes and actions that adapt him to daily life at early ages. These internalized valuing behaviors become a skill that cannot be easily dismantled or forgotten. When the good behaviors that have already been learned become a skill, good morality is formed and the person in whom these good behaviors are internalized is called moral. The same situation can take place in the opposite direction. When improper behaviors are established and exhibited in the individual, bad morality takes place, and the individual in whom these bad behaviors are internalized is called the immoral individual. This situation shows us that the family has a much greater role than we think in the upbringing of children and their good morality. In terms of child education, the role of the family is not only to teach children what they do not know, but also to teach them the most favorable things for their later lives (Güngör, 2020: 155).

According to Güngör, for a child, family means the whole of that society. Because the person who opens his eyes to the world first knows the people in his own family, establishes both emotional and social relations with them and learns

the principles of social behavior. It would not be wrong to say that the one who will be considered the first teacher of an individual is the family itself. Not only the customs, traditions, social norms, values and beliefs that form the basis of social life are transferred to child through the family but also the family plays the most prominent role in the acceptance of them. However, such instructive and educational sharing and activities in the family are not in a formal and planned way as in schools. The phenomenon of social teaching that takes place in the family occurs at a level that is more called informal. In the same way, while the child finds right and wrong by experimenting in daily life, he realizes what he has learned from his family in the normal course of his life. People in the role of educator in the family don't offer options about what to do or how, unlike teachers at school, or expect the child to reach some conclusions with their own ideas. For this reason, the information, rules, attitudes and behaviors that the child learns in his family seem to him as unchanging facts and settle in his mind not to be erased. Therefore, scientists who want to investigate the origins of behaviors in adults argue that it is necessary to go down to childhoods of the people (Güngör, 2020: 155).

The following verse of Osman Nevres seems to remind his interlocutor that the basic principle in raising a child should be conscience and compassion:

“Do you remember the moments you were born?

You used to cry, all the world used to laugh

Live such a lifetime that your death will be

Laughter for you, sorrow for them” (<https://1000kitap.com/oyle-bir-omur-sur-ki--247668>)

According to Güngör, the child who grows up in the family, which is the smallest social unit, actually experiences a kind of rehearsal of his future life. A child gets his first life experience as a result of social relations with his elders, minors, mother, father, peers, close and distant relatives, neighbors and even people he does not know around him. Since the elders in the family represent a kind of “authority”, the child learns firsthand how to act against “authority” as a result of the social relationship with the adults. Therefore, the attitudes and behaviors of the elders in the family have a greater impact on the child compared to other family members. In addition, later in life, the child will always encounter a

power of authority, in other words a source of power, in school, military service, business life, the building in which he lives or in any environment. Situations that represent authority or are sources of power may indirectly be some pressures of social life, or they may be directly individuals themselves. Faced with this kind of social authority or power, while the child learns how to act in the face of these things, at the same time learns how to treat the people of which he is in charge when he is in a position of authority one day. Therefore, the child, who is the reflection of a family, should be thought and educated by the family within the framework of the best, most accurate, most beautiful and most decent behaviors (Güngör, 2020: 155).

While saying that the foundation of the formation of personality traits called “temperament” was laid during childhood, Güngör draws attention to the fact that the family continues to have a very important influence in this age. In childhood, a person learns not only to relate to people, but also to relate to things. The child learns the principles of the relationship with objects, again through the family. He learns all situations from his family such as which object he should use and how he should use or which object is dangerous and non-dangerous and even continues these principles he has learned throughout his life. The family is again at the top in acquiring character qualities such as generosity, extravagance, frugality, stinginess, disorganization, discipline, which begin to form from the first ages. Manners, customs, cultural characteristics and traditions are always taught by the family in childhood. In fact, our attitudes such as what we like and dislike, which foods we like and dislike, which behaviors we see right or not, etc. are always cases from childhood. In addition, qualifications such as being a moral person, whether to lie or not, controlling emotions, being clean, growing up socially or unsocially, how plants and animals should be treated depend on the upbringing that the child receives from his family in the early ages. If each child grows up with superior character and good morals, positive things can be said for that society. In fact, the ideal society that should exist can only be realized by raising individuals of high character. Since the structure called society consists of families, the family constitutes the basis of character upbringing in society (Güngör, 2020: 155-156).

According to Güngör, the role of the family in the formation of the moral character of the child is always superior to the role of the school. Claims such as “the school has little or no influence on the formation of moral character” have no basis in fact. Because most people get many of their good behaviors and moral qualities from school and their teachers in the role of instructor. While the

school focuses more on conveying information, it also makes some proposals and suggestions about our moral character. However, morality, which is the most important concept that makes human beings human, is not only based on theoretical knowledge and suggestions, but also on behavior and emotion factors. The family controls moral acts in every aspect. While a person puts his own conscience into action for the purpose of self-control over the rightness and wrongness of his actions, he immediately shapes the state of his behavior by activating his family. Since the first stages of human life are not spent in school but in the family environment, the role of the family as a trainer, teacher and transmitter of moral behavior cannot be denied. Particularly emotional aspect of our moral actions is formed within the family. Because there is a close relationship between our behaviors and our emotional bond towards family members (Güngör, 2020: 156).

Güngör states that the social and moral roles of the family, which is a social structure, today attract the attention of both societies and states that are larger structures. On one side, family structures change according to the conditions of the time (working spouses, the absence of elders at home, etc.), and on the other side, preschool education institutions where children start education at a young age are becoming widespread by the state. This situation causes the child, who spent a lot of time with his family before, to start school at an early age, and unfortunately, when this is the case, the child enrolls in the educational institution without comprehending the values and moral behaviors that should be learned from family. Today, nurseries and kindergartens share the educative and upbringing role of the family. Thus, the importance and influence of the family on the child decreases. However, there are also negative and positive aspects of transferring moral education and teaching to educational institutions in this way. The family members who cannot raise the child morally due to their special situation are replaced by experts in educational institutions. Thus, while the education and moral mission will be left to the experts, the drawbacks that will arise from the family will be prevented. Another positive situation is that a national cultural unity will be achieved in the society thanks to individuals who are graced with national cultural values through education. The negative aspect is that the child is away from the emotional closeness he will receive from his family because he will be separated from his family at a young age and he lives this emotional deprivation for a lifetime. Another negative aspect is that the existence of such educational institutions to take care of children has a facilitating effect in the divorce cases of married couples who

have disagreements between them. As important as the family is for a child, the child is equally important in terms of ensuring family integrity (Güngör, 2020: 156-157).

Güngör states that the duty of the family is not only to educate and feed the child. Although there are situations of inequality between families within society, every society can still stand and survive thanks to the family. It is the responsibility of the family to care for the child, to raise, to educate and to teach moral behaviors until a certain age. Children's identities in society come from their families. The fact that people belong to a certain social group and acquire the character of that group prevents them from being any being in a herd. A person's loyalty to his nation begins with the family, which is a social institution smaller than the nation. Each person is an individual of his state and nation, but the existence of each nation and state depends on the maintenance of the family. In the same way, an individual obtains his social adaptation from his life in the family and transfers these gains to larger societies. In conclusion, being the most effective resource in the upbringing of an individual, the family will continue to be the most important cell of society (Güngör, 2020: 157).

Conclusion

Man, who was created as an honorable and superior being, is tasked with reconstructing both his material and spiritual world in a way worthy of this superiority and honor. While he was endowed with the skills he would need to accomplish this task, he was also shown the ways of good and evil. What is expected of man himself is that not to waste the precious talents and opportunities that has been entrusted to himself to the evils during his life journey, but to protect them immaculately and to be blessed with the happiness of both the world and the hereafter. Values, which are the real standards of behavior shared by most people, and morality which is the determinant of human behavior and the relations between people, guide man in this journey. Values and morality in one aspect determine the well-being, direction and outcome of man in this journey.

According to Erol Güngör, one of Turkey's intellectuals and thinkers who has put forward original approaches in the recent world of thought with his modern analyses and solution prescriptions for the solution of Turkey's settled social problems, morality is a concept related to relationships between individuals. It is impossible to speak of a moral requirement for people like Robinson Crusoe who live alone. In this respect, it can be stated that morality is

a skill acquired through social learning. Therefore, from childhood, we acquire the ability to reason both from our close and distant environment to make “good” or “bad” decisions about our moral behavior. Since people learn moral behaviors by experiencing in the socialization processes they face as a natural result of living in society, it is expected that people’s learning events on the one hand and their moral behavior on the other hand will continue to change and develop throughout their lives.

According to Güngör, the moral personality formed in the social environment has both psychological and sociological aspects. Just as a person behaves morally towards others, he must also behave morally towards his own self. In the formation of morality and moral personality, especially the family and school have a great importance in the social environment. The entire social environment is like a school where moral education is carried out, and society itself is a moral builder in itself. However, enabling people to live together in harmony should be the main goal of moral behavior. Compliance with social moral principles is a prerequisite for living in harmony.

In addition to say that the issue of “moral inconsistency” is one of the most important problems to be overcome in terms of morality, Güngör states that giving people a holistic understanding of human beings which will provide the comprehension of meaning and purpose of life is the first thing that needs to be done to prevent this moral inconsistency. According to Güngör, a holistic and all-encompassing understanding of human beings can also be gained through religion. Güngör believes that religion, of which moral commandments can be summarized with the principles of “one person should not harm another person and that all people in society should be beneficial to each other”, constitutes the source of basic moral values. According to Güngör, social morality, at the source of which social rules and cultural values are found, should be built on basic moral values such as family, religion, law, norms, manners, customs, traditions, unity, justice, love of homeland and nation. Because, societies in which basic moral values are fully applied and in other words there are moral values that find a place in social life in a practical sense can be “virtuous and happy societies”.

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CHAPTER XX

VOLUNTEERISM IN ABAI'S PHILOSOPHY-A MATTER OF MORALITY

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If you work for yourself, you will become one of
the beasts that feed for themselves;
If you work for the debt of humanity -
You will be one of God's beloved servants.
Abai

Volunteerism and Abai in the Kazakh Steppe

Voluntarism in the Kazakh steppe is a process that has been formed and developed for many centuries, combined with national identity and socio-cultural features. It is in the Kazakh steppe defined as a model of socially important service provided to families and individuals in historical periods in the continuity of the traditional society of the people and social tribal assistance. If we turn to the historical context, we can see that the concept of voluntarism in the Kazakh steppe is developing, changing, and reviving based on various social phenomena.

This volunteerism goes on its way in the steppes. Studying the stages of its formation and development horizons, its philosophical-historical development can be divided into three stages:

First, it has developed as part of Islamic culture as a voluntary institution in the Kazakh steppe;

Second, it appeared as a tribal institution in the traditional Kazakh society;

Third, the idea of voluntarism appeared in the views of Kazakh educators.

The Kazakh saying with a wisdom “My cattle are the charity of my soul, my soul is the charity of my dignity” is probably a testimony of the cheerful Kazakh who helped the needy people even if he gave his last cattle. There is no doubt that voluntarism as a phenomenon originates from the historically formed philosophical worldview experience of different peoples from the traditions and culture of that people. Each nation’s help, support, and joint action in favor of each other to preserve itself as a species is the basis of its development as a nation and the source of its boundless love for each other. (Akhmetova, 2022: 71-83)

Among the individuals who influenced the ideological development and revival of volunteerism as an institution in the Kazakh steppe, we mention the great Kazakh poet, philosopher, lyricist, and composer Abai Kunanbayuli, who lived in the second half of the 19th century. In his works, not only the issues of social inequality and assistance to the needy and weak groups were considered, but he influenced the support of the wealthy group of people to the poor and the emergence of generous people, putting his signature.

The article by the President of Kazakhstan, Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, is a work that aims to differentiate and express the thoughts of Abai and the living conditions, and political and social situation of modern Kazakhstan. It is a valuable article that Abai left us with his thoughts, and weighed and analyzed his time and, how we live.

If we say how much we have succeeded in forming a complete person, as Abai mentioned, we can certainly notice that there are still many shortcomings. First of all, we did not eliminate the shortcomings and behaviors of the people that Abai criticized, and secondly, we did not create the society that Abai longed for. It is no secret that today’s current and important issues are corruption, greed, cruelty, envy, jealousy, and dishonor. The main idea in the President’s article is

that we need to fight and correct those mistakes that Abai mentioned. President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kasym-Jomart Tokayev wrote about Abai:

Abai Kunanbayuly left an indelible mark in the history of the country as a scholar, thinker, poet, educator, founder of the new literature of the nation, translator, composer. In his poems and essays, the essence of the nation, peace, life, worldview, character, soul, religion, language, and spirit was reflected, and later it was evaluated as a unique phenomenon called Abai's world. (Тоқаев, 2020)

Kasim-Jomart Kemeluly in his article continues to articulate and commends on Abai's formulation of "perfect man." He says: "When will social responsibility come to its place?" Of course, this is not an easy task. The solution to this complex problem should be sought in Abai's "толық адам/a perfect man" formula. The word "a perfect man" corresponds to the concept of "A man of integrity" in English. This is a characteristic of only people who are very obedient, self-confident, and strive for goodness. "Abai explained this concept, which is spreading now, as far back as the nineteenth century." (Тоқаев, 2020)

In the lights of Tokaev's comment on this idea, there is a need to re-examine Abai's "толық адам/a perfect man" formula. In this direction, Kazakh scientists should undertake new research. Tokaev adds as "I believe that the concept of "a perfect man" should become the main pillar of every sphere of our lives, government and education system, business, and family institutions." (Тоқаев, 2020)

The great Abai's ideological heritage is very large and universal. Abai's teachings are widely known not only in Turkic countries but all over the world. During his period, Abai studied and compared such fields of literature, philosophy, ethics, and psychology as a science. He paid special attention to the issues of morality and humanism, which he considered to be the basis of human happiness.

In this regard, one of the aspects of solving the eternal problem of philosophy, which worries his contemporaries, is the meaning of the life of the great Abai, his ideas are still relevant today.

ABAI'S «Толық адам/A perfect man» Formula

Abai's doctrine of "толық адам/a perfect man" is a work systematically related to the human problem in philosophy and the human problem in the works of

Eastern philosophers. Al-Farabi's "teaching of a reasonable person", Yusup Balasagun's "teaching of bravery" described in the saga "Kutadgu Bilik", Ahmet Yassawi's "kâmil insan/a perfect man", i.e. the teaching of human personality, Shakarim's "science of dignity" are considered according to their time and society.¹

Abai's doctrine of "Толық адам/a perfect man" originates from the founders of ethics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and it can be observed that it is in harmony with the concepts of "Li" and "Jen" of the great thinker Confucius. This testifies to the uniqueness of universal values, and the absence of any national or territorial boundaries. Consistency is observed in the philosophical and ethical views of Abai and Confucius, they promote the establishment of social order in society, struggle with the wear and tear of tradition, and use advanced points.

According to Abai, the concept of "толық адам" is a harmony of common sense, courage, and kindness. The presence of these good values in a person is the absorption of good qualities and abilities.

Abai believed that knowledge of the world is not only a human quality and ability but also a special feature and natural need. According to Abai, a person's need to know the world around him appears from the moment he is born.

If a person does not need to know the world, as Abai said, a person who is interested in the happenings, the past, and the future will not live a full life. Abai pays attention to the special features of human cognition. He tries to theoretically justify the need to know science, world laws, and enlightenment. "After I was named human, let me return to being ignorant", "Love a human, feel God's wisdom, what is interesting in life except that," says the genius.

Abai with a careful concept of a perfect man lives with the needs of the soul and the desires of the body, needing different benefits. On this basis, Aristotle's ethics is a concept related to Abai's thought about the desires of the soul and the body. In his work, Aristotle points out that among the desires of the soul and body, morality and charity are the most important. Abai, on the other hand, clarified that the sacred value of humanity lies in charity and voluntariness, and explains it philosophically, creating the doctrine of "a perfect man" in a doctrinal direction.

¹ <https://massaget.kz/blogs/27763/> (30.08.22)

The concept of “толық адам/a perfect man” can be classified on the following philosophical basis:

- Material and household values (personal desires): money, possessions, etc. - rational-pragmatic beginnings.
- Spiritual and moral values (desires of the soul): goodness, doing good, spiritual things - irrational-emotional origins.

Summarizing Abai's “толық адам/a perfect man” formula, we can classify it in the following graphic form:

Properties in the толық адам/a perfect man formula

«нұрлы ақыл/ enlightened mind»	Танымдық негіздер/ Cognitive bases
«ыстық қайрат/ sincere vigour»	Философиялық және психологиялық саулық/ Philosophical and psychological health
«жылы жүрек/ warm heart»	Әлеуметтік-эмоционалдық негіздер; мораль және этика/ Socio-emotional foundations; morals and ethics

The systematization of the great Abai's thoughts and knowledge will mostly be aimed at mastering philosophical works such as “толық адам/a perfect man”, “иманигүл/pious”, “жәуманмәртлік/ kindness”.

The main components of the “толық адам/a perfect man” formula are intelligence, justice, and kindness. And the most important concepts are conscience and shame.

Human nature and social issues according to Abai

For Abai, the most important issue is the nature, problems, behavior, understanding, thoughts, and attitude of a person. More precisely, the philosophical problem comes from the point of view of a set of human problems, since they have closely related ethical, social, epistemological, and other aspects.

The ethical meaning of Abai's appeal is a high appreciation of a person's duty and role in life. In the poet's view, man is the manifestation and accumulation of intelligence, humanity, hard work and knowledge, friendship, and love. The moon and the sun are the decoration of the sky, the forest and fruits are the

decoration of the mountain, and the beauty of the earth is the man. Abai proudly proclaims: “I have the glory of being a man!” (Абай, 2006)

Abai defined a person not as an individual, but as a society, a whole nation. It is not enough for a certain group of people to get rid of ignorance and become reasonable citizens for a nation to take its rightful place in the world of humanity and develop according to the needs of the times. He is a thinker who left a will to every citizen who claims to be a human being to serve to open his heart to raise the level of the nation. Abai knew the Kazakh past well. He deeply understood the phenomena of his time. He showed the way to the future by expressing the national spirit and customs with the verses of the poem “It comes in from the ear and embraces the whole body...”. He used all his strength and art to open the eyes of his people, depicting the existence and behavior of his native people, and showing them like a sign printed on a young horse.

Abai’s humanist conclusion is that people have the same abilities and qualities as nature from birth: “All human beings are friends of human beings. Why do you say that when you are in this world, your birth, your growth, your satiety, your hunger, your sorrow, your death, your body shape, your place of birth, the last place of yours - everything is the same, your death in the hereafter, your entry into the grave, your decay, and your death from the grave - everything is the same, to the sorrow of both worlds, your danger to the trouble, your pleasure to the good of both worlds - everything is the same.”² But Abai says that being smart or stupid depends on the circumstances that arise after birth. If a person develops and improves his intellectual abilities through the study of science, he can become intelligent. If he does not develop his abilities, he may remain stupid and ignorant. “What I saw, what I heard, what I knew, I have to learn quickly,” says Abai.

If a person aims to become a genius, first of all, it is better to learn science, of course, he should be fair to direct science to the right channel and use it correctly, and the main purpose of using this science is to use it to help his loved ones, the needy, and the weak. Thus, the great Abai considered the idea of the natural equality of people in his works. Abai by asking questions like Who am I? Who will I be? Where will my work take me? is looking for answers from himself through a monologue and thoughts.

According to the poet, every person, regardless of whether he is poor or rich, has a higher status than other living beings given by God. Therefore, the poor should be treated from a human perspective. Their human dignity should not

2 (<https://bilim-all.kz/quote/6102>) (30.08.22)

be insulted. On the one hand, Abai propagates the ideas of love for people, and ideas of humanism. A person's heart may not be indifferent to human suffering, it should motivate people to do noble and good deeds. Abai shows that nature should be inclined to goodness, pity for the poor, and kindness. However, Abai bitterly describes people's greed, corruption, and falsehood. They are criticized as cruel and merciless because they have not kept their hearts pure.

The promotion of ideas of humanism is an appeal that calls the rich to help the weak and the poor and describes Abai as a thinker who wishes for the well-being of the people.

At the same time, Abai glorifies people who are engaged in honest work. Living with honest work, he writes, - is the work of an honest person.

According to Abai, a person who has achieved fame through his own work is a respectable person. In one of the thoughts says Abai:

Бақпен асқан патшадан	From a king who grew up with a luck
Мимен асқан қара артық;	People who grew up with brain are better?
Сақалын сатқан кәріден	From the old man who sold his beard
Еңбегін сатқан бала артық. (Абай, 1986)	A child who sells his labor is better.

It is worth noting here that the poet-thinker is combined with the glorification of work. Only in intelligence and work does he see the highest dignity and glory of man.

According to Abai, wealth accumulated without difficulty cannot be considered real wealth. True wealth is earned by hard work. He hates people's desire to do good through deception, dishonesty, and theft.

In his "essays," Abai pays special attention to the role of three factors in understanding the world: what he considers to be courage, heart, and mind. Thus, the "Seventeenth essay" of Abai is dedicated to determining the role of strength, heart, and mind in the process of worldview.

In Abai's works, courage acts as the main force in understanding the world. The vision of the poet is clear; no one can achieve anything without courage. Only thanks to the courage, people will eliminate laziness and try to learn the laws of the world, which will force people to act, work hard, and protect themselves from easy profit and bad habits.

Talking about the role of the mind in the process of world knowledge, Abai says that the mind allows us to know the essence of life. At the same time, Abai shows that there are flaws in both courage and intelligence. Courage pushes

people to action. Courage can bring people both good and bad. Doing harm instead of benefit. As for the mind, it is indifferent to good and bad. Abai shows that “the mind is the beginning of good and evil” and it leads people to either good or bad.

As for the heart, according to Abai, it is the source of kindness and goodness. Only this motivates them to think about the needy people, and motivates them to do good deeds. “All goodness, kindness, modesty, justice, responsibility” comes from the heart. If the heart is kept clean and perfect, then there will be no resentment among people, and people will stay away from evil, says Abai. In this approach, the leading role should belong to the heart. Abai was taught to find his place in society and to use all his intelligence and talents to help people get rid of injustice and humiliation.

In his twenty-ninth essay, Abai criticizes some concepts that have become customary in the Kazakh people through proverbs. He says, “many of our Kazakh proverbs are practical, and some are not practical, and there are also proverbs that are not suitable for divinity or humanity.” In this way, the poet spoke of the frozen moral values of the Kazakh society at that time he adds:

First of all, they say, ‘Even if you’re poor, just be noble.’ ‘Whoever leaves the sincerity behind, let him dry out.’ If it means that you have to work hard to earn money while you are renting it, it is not something you should give up. Lying quietly, blindfolded, not begging from anyone, trying to keep his soul and look for wealth with honest work that is the work of a noble person. (Абай, 2011: 73)

Isn’t conscience a valuable feature that separates a person from other creatures? If we lose this virtue, instead of working hard, we become obsessed with easy money, aren’t we dehumanized?

“If it gets what desires, snow will burn”, and “If he gets what he asks for, there is nothing that man will not give” are the most popular words of God. One should either ask for cattle from somewhere, or one should ask for one’s sweat before living a life of humiliation, thinking that one will find one’s request and one’s desire. (Абай, 2011: 73) In his mentioned essay, the great Abai calls on the people to beg for alms, and earn money by their labor, and not by dishonest means, but honestly.

In this regard, the eloquent sayings of Esei bi “Don’t complain about being poor, don’t beg to sell your dignity”, Shogan bi “Let’s look for livestock, don’t

sell our dignity, let's save the souls of our ancestors" seem to glorify the same social idea of Abai.

According to Abai's view, respect is a value that appreciates the social activities of a person, on the other hand, encourages a person to do good deeds for the country, and protects him from negative attitudes and actions. In his fifteenth essay, Abai compares a person with a story and a work with a critical attitude. "If you want to be among the smart people," Abai wrote to the readers, "at least a day, if not once a Friday, at least once a month, take account of yourself!" How have you spent your life since you received that previous report? Did you spend it in a manner that was suitable for education, the hereafter, or the world, and you did not regret it? No, otherwise you don't even know what you've been doing?" (Абай, 2011: 73)

Abai looks at life with a critical eye, there is a deep thought for the reader to educate himself, learn from the good, abhor the bad, and look at life calmly. The main idea of the author in his essays is to give advice to his contemporaries and guide them to get rid of bad behavior. "Be a man, change, your mustache fell on your neck without a razor," he criticizes, and once he expresses his regret and comforts himself by saying, "Go ahead and make amends."

In careful work, the main task is to learn from the good and hate the bad. According to Abai, there are two types of people; humanity and kindness. We can see it in the following table:

Адам/Humanity	Пендешілдік/Kindness
Жомарт/generous selfishness	Өзімшілдік/egoism
Жақсылық жасаушы/good doer	Арамдық/dishonesty
Еңбекқор/hard worker	Парақорлық/bribery
Ар-ұжданды, арлы, ұятты/ conscientiously, shameness	Арсыздық, ұятсыздық/ indecency, shamelessness
Әділетті/fairness	Пайдақорлық/profitteering
Мейірімді/Kind	Залым/cruel
Ақылды/intelligent	Надандық/Ignorance
Абыройлы/ Prestigious	Намыссыздық/dishonesty

Good and bad, justice, dignity, and honor are tested and glorified behaviors in Abai's works, which constitute Abai's moral ideal. And a person who is deprived of the ideal of humanity is not only deprived of loving others but also cannot love himself - cannot know the world with deep feeling.

Abai says and explains his conclusions about the three loves. “You too love that God, who is sweeter than your soul” shows inner love in the sense that a created person should love his creator with love.

<p>Махабатпен жаратқан адамзатты, Сен де сүй ол Алланы жаннан тәтті. Адамзатты бәрі сүй бауырым деп, Және хақ жолы осы деп әділетті. Осы үш сүю болады иман гүл, Иманның асылы үш деп сен тақик біл. Ойлан – дағы, үшеуін таратып бақ, Басты байла жолына, малың түгіл, (Абай, 2020: 186-187)</p>	<p>Humanity created with love, You also love God sweetly. Love all mankind, brother, And this is the way of justice. These three kisses will be the flower of faith, Know for sure that faith has three virtues. Think again, distribute three, On the main highway, not even your cattle,</p>
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The second love, or the main line of thought that is continuously distributed in the works of the poet, is in the heading “Love all mankind as a brother.” Abai’s “and this is the way of truth is just” we can see the third love, which is based on the concept of justice, which is presented based on the arguments of нақылия/proverb and ғақылия/mindedness in 38th essay. The main idea in the poem “Әсемпаз болма әрнеге/Don’t be fancy” is also given as an alternative to this third love:

<p>Әсемпаз болма әрнеге, Өнерпаз болсаң, арқалан. Сен де - бір кірпіш, дүниеге Кетігін тап та, бар қалан! (Абай, 2020: 18)</p>	<p>Don’t be fancy, If you are an artist, rely on it. You are a brick in the world Find the cut and go!</p>
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Abai noted that people who set high goals for young people and work hard to achieve them are considered smart. They do not get involved in small matters, do not waste their energy on anything, but work hard and persistently to complete the task. This is what they enjoy and find happiness in.

Abai’s teaching of morality: “жәуәнмәртлік/bravery”, “иманигүл/faithful”

Through his moral teaching, Abai made constructive scientific conclusions to complex eastern concepts such as “жан мен тән/soul and body”, “жан сыры/

secret of the soul”, “жан құштарлығы/desire of the soul”, “жанның жарығы/light of the soul”, “жан қуаты/power of the soul”, “hawas”, “хауас сәлим/full of passion”, “хауаси хамса захири/passion of five visual”, “иманигүл/faithful”, “толық адам/a perfect man,” and “the maturity of the piousness.”

Abai grew up rocking in the cradle of the rich oral and written literature of the Kazakh people, armed with the teachings of the Islamic mind of the East, and Muslim morals; generosity, faithfulness, passion, he turned to the West and accepted it through critical thinking.

The most important issue in Abai's philosophical treatise is the issue of generosity. Generosity is the superiority of human consciousness, the law of growth. The great Abai's concept of “жәуәнмәртлік/generosity” is based on the idea of “жәуәнмәрт/generous”. Жәуәнмәрт (in Kazakh “жомарт/generous”) is used in the sense of “a generous person” according to the folk concept.

Genius Abai calls the generous man a “just person” according to one of his three main characteristics (justice, grace, wisdom). Thus, this fineness is directly related to the knowledge of “three loves”. That is, according to Abai's teaching, a generous man is a person who loves justice.

The main subject of Abai's poems and essays is a man. According to Abai, “the faith of a faithful person” or “the fullness of a person” is called “generosity” (charity). According to Abai, the improvement of the social situation, and the establishment of justice in society depends on the mercy, benevolence, and kindness of people.

First of all, true faith is needed to open one's heart to the country, firstly to “be a guard for the Kazakhs” and secondly to love “all mankind as a brother”. Bringing people the way to perfect faith was the ideal of Abai's “38th essay,” “Ғақлиат-тасдиқаттың/Mind-confirmation.” Abai said: “When a child is motivated by the love of science and education, only then will his name be human.” Only after that, one can hope that they will learn science and knowledge, such as knowing God, knowing oneself, knowing the world, and distinguishing between good deeds (profit, income, good deeds) without destroying one's humanity. (Абай, 2011: 96) Abai's main idea is that any state or person will achieve great success if the three characteristics mentioned by Abai are guided by justice, science and benevolence, each person's rights are respected, science and technology are developed, he/she takes into account the poor, the sick and the disabled, and the needy are cared for wants to live in such country. For Abai, the principles of remaining the most important person were important.

In the general history of philosophical thought, Abai, a Kazakh educator and thinker, focused his ethical and humanistic thoughts on virtue, spirituality, and faith, and raised the Kazakh national consciousness to a new level. By saying “Make an effort, let the benefits reach many” Abai emphasizes the need to direct one’s actions to “good” and to benefit the people. According to Abai, a person who wants to achieve the meaning of life must be a “good person; a perfect person.” Being a perfect person requires the most important mind. It is necessary to subjugate the mind to the heart with diligence. Only then can a person become perfect.

“Do good. “Doing good is the duty of every person” the thinker considers “doing good” to be an important philosophical concept of the principle of “being a person.” “The image of a complete person (heart, mind, courage) and generosity (intellect, justice, grace) in Abai’s works have been systematically and traditionally continued.” (Әліпхан, 2020) These constitute the key to the truth necessary for living the most important life for Abai.

After the research of M. Myrzakhmetuly, many researchers translate “generosity” as a charity, which became known in the Kazakh scientific community. “Generosity” in its literal sense can be said to be on par with the Kazakh concept of “generosity”:

Generosity is an ethical category that represents one of the good qualities of a person and defines a positive moral quality. Helping the needy, the poor, the old, the elderly, the disabled, that is, those who need someone else’s help, without any payment or expectation of profit, is classified as a generous character. (Раев, 2011: 264)

There are many Arabic and Persian words in Abai’s poems and essays. It is impossible to translate them from the dictionary because these concepts are whole currents in Islamic philosophy. And to understand Abai’s concepts, one must know those currents.

Abai’s idea can be combined or compared with the great Russian writer and philosopher F. Dostoyevsky’s thought that “The most important thing in a person is not the mind, but what controls it: character, heart, kind feelings, advanced ideas.” (Джаманбалаева, 2020: 156)

Conclusion

The moral norms set by Abai in the last century, on the one hand, condemn falsehood, dishonesty, and lawlessness, on the other hand, love for work, a

selfless struggle for the interests of the people, honesty, persistence in scientific research, his high ethical ideal “Be a man!” In our time, it has not only increased its importance but has gained new power and requires careful study and mastering of each of them.

Abai Kunanbayev's indelible thoughts can teach many things to a person who thinks about his life and is looking for its meaning and ways of self-realization. Today's world society, especially the youth, should learn the rich spiritual heritage of the great Abai so that it is not wasted. It is necessary to preserve it for future generations without losing it. Future generations should follow Abai's path, we should get the best of his ideas and thoughts. We need to live with the aim of charity and doing good, as Abai said.

The great Abai, whose main goal was to preserve humanity and “remain human” in the Kazakh society, left behind a very valuable and deep-thinking indelible treasure, which raised the issue of morality more and helped to raise social issues. It is clear that it is still necessary to work on a comprehensive and systematic study of the philosophical teachings of our grandfather Abai, “faithfulness”, “generosity”, and “a perfect man.”

Through the legacy that Abai left us, the existence of the Kazakh of his time; peace, behavior, actions, bad behavior - bad habits, intelligence, goal - legacy, personality - morals, worldview - outlook, position, solidarity - blessing, intention - in short, he gives fair value to his intellectual nature. In any case, these are the dimensions of the real face of Kazakhs in the past era.

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CHAPTER XXI

META-POLITICS AND ETHICS

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In this section, the topics of “metaverse and ethics” will be discussed, with a focus on politics in the metaverse, followed by political ethics in the metaverse. The reader will first be informed about the metaverse, as it is thought that the topics cannot be well understood if there is no concrete information about the metaverse in the minds.

When writing about ethics in the metaverse, the issue is addressed in two dimensions. First, there are ethical issues arising from the metaverse itself and its use. Secondly, there are political ethical issues when doing politics in the metaverse, just like in the world we live in. Therefore, the flow of the chapter will be as follows: First, the topic of the metaverse will be covered, then the main problems encountered in the metaverse and the ethical problems that these problems pose will be discussed. Then, the reflection of the ethical problems in the world we live in inside the metaverse and the ethical issues that are thought to arise from doing politics in the metaverse will be put forward. Solutions will also be proposed to many of the problems encountered while these issues are being discussed.

Introduction

Almost every ten years there is a paradigm shift in information and communication technologies. The paradigm of the personal computer in the 1990s, the web in the 2000s and mobile communications in the 2010s has changed dramatically (Young Lee, 2021). The key word for the paradigm of the 2020s is “metaverse”. The metaverse is a concept derived from the novel “Snow Crash” published by Neal Stephenson in 1992. It represents a three-dimensional virtual world where “Meta” means virtual and abstract and “Verse”

means universe (Stephanson, 2000). Köse (2021), expressed his thoughts for this novel in this way: *“In this novel, the internet transforms into a three-dimensional virtual space called the metaverse in the future, and avatars owned by humans live in this space together with avatars managed by software”*. The metaverse, which came to the agenda with the Second Life game, started to be talked about at the top of the agenda again with the statements of Facebook’s CEO Zuckerberg (Zuckerberg, 2021).

One thing that is certain in 2021 is that our children will grow up experiencing the digital worlds we envision and build; they will enter adolescence with an internet we cannot even imagine. Dow (2022)’s describes this new structure as *“phygital” world that merges our physical and digital selves into a virtual world that parallels our real lives”*.

Universe and Metaverse represent two complementary structures. The universe is the world we live in, while the metaverse can be considered as the world outside the universe. In other words, the metaverse is a virtual world in which you can travel freely. In the metaverse, you can interact with millions of people around the world with your avatar as if everyone was in the same place at the same time (Corceviç, 2022). There, users can create and use “digital assets” (Fernandez & Hui, 2022). The Universe is a world in which people live, physically exist, have an identity, act according to the law, have the freedom to vote and be elected where the form of government is democracy, interact with other people, go to the doctor when sick, form parties and come to power. The metaverse is a virtual world outside the lived world. One does not exist there physically but through “avatars” created in the desired form. In the Universe, physical bodies are mortal, but in the Metaverse avatars are immortal. Although physical bodies have a sense of taste and smell, avatars do not yet have the ability to detect taste and smell.

It is not clear how political activities will take place in the Metaverse. The first questions that come to mind are the following: Can a party be formed? Or any non-governmental organization. How will party members be registered in the Metaverse? Can party meetings or rallies be organized? Will parties have fixed locations like in this world? Assuming that each party establishes its own metaverse, what will be the rules of entry to these environments? Will there be a supreme institution that determines these rules? If each party sets its own rules in its metaverse, how ethical rules will they be and how will communication between them take place? Party Headquarters can be in the metaverse, but can a party headquarters be attacked? If so, what will be the police force in the

metaverse? How will there be a response to deviant virtual behavior? Who will the police take instructions from? Is there killing in the metaverse? How will meta-courts work? And can one make a choice whose outcome is accepted in this world? Or is it possible to be a “proxy” in the metaverse? But it is important to underline that there is no “one metaverse” that everyone agrees on.

The “internet” in its current form relies on collecting users’ data in many ways. Based on this data, decision makers can make decisions. Will the Metaverse be different? What data is collected through the Metaverse, where does it go and how is it used? Is our data secure? Where is it collected and how is it shared? How is it secured? Users need to know these things. In the same way, the “transition to a full-fledged metaverse politics” poses many ethical challenges. The virtual world, once imagined as a science fiction concept, is now “in the flesh”. The development of hardware technologies, VR hardware (VR-Virtual Reality), face-voice recognition and 3D scanning open up important horizons in the metaverse called “Immersive Technology” that we have not encountered before (Cramp, 2022). Meanwhile, in addition to the increase in the power of computers (microprocessors and graphics features, increased memory, etc.), the increase in the speed of the internet has also increased the speed of development of this virtual world. It is worth mentioning here that, unlike all these, the phones we own have become very powerful, have multi-featured cameras and screens, and offer augmented reality (AR) features.

Each new technology comes with “cheaper and better” features. This implies that virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) hardware, which form an important infrastructure of the metaverse, are easily accessible to everyone. Other companies that are much more reliable than Meta are known to be working on VR and AR headsets and related technologies, such as Apple and Google. All of these companies, especially Apple and Google, have huge ecosystems. Amazon or Microsoft should not be left out of this. Now all these companies will probably invest more in VR-based hardware as it is the entry point to the metaverse. In other words, it is thought that in the future, when Apple, Google, Microsoft will be able to access the metaverse, the hardware they produce will be used more.

Many problems that we do not face in the real world are faced in the metaverse. The technologies used to create the metaverse face new ethical and identity or privacy issues that are different from this world. Using more immersive and responsive technologies, the metaverse threatens the privacy, safety and security of users (Roesner et al., 2014).

As can be seen, there are many questions that have not yet been clearly answered in the metaverse. When the answers to these questions are sought, many problems are encountered. In other words, many “ethical” and “legal” problems arise. On the other hand, everyone agrees that ethical values should be adhered to. Basic values such as honesty, responsibility, justice, respect, transparency are important for everyone. These core values are especially important when entering the Metaverse, which blurs the real and digital worlds. Other important considerations include bringing technology to the more disadvantaged and opening up educational opportunities for them, transparency, and accountability, and being unbiased in its use.

Every new technology brings ethical and legal issues. However, it is always necessary to keep in mind that by being “aware” of the problems and “solving ethical problems”, individuals can build a virtual world that respects the values of autonomy and freedom of choice.

The existence of ethical concerns does not mean that the metaverse is flawed. On the contrary, ethical issues need to be considered and learned in order to improve our experience of life online and offline. Many of the ethical concerns raised here are problems that exist for non-digital life. That is, they are not emerging issues.

The reality is that, as far as the big picture is concerned, ethical problems have existed for centuries, and it is only recently that humanity has addressed many of them in efforts to solve them. It is thought that the Metaverse can give people a different and new perspective from which to observe these ethical issues that we endure. It is possible to learn from mistakes and co-create the future.

1. What are the ethical considerations when creating the metaverse?

First of all, it is important to underline that the Metaverse has the potential to revolutionize our society to express ourselves and interact with others without any boundaries (place, time, race, gender). But what kind of ethical approach should be taken when creating this structure? Is it possible to create a metaverse that can be managed according to ethical rules? In the following, the issue will be discussed under four headings in order to answer the question “how can the metaverse be created in a way that solves “ethical” problems while creating it?”.

Firstly, “establishing ethical principles by intervening in codes”, and secondly, the role of “smart contracts” in establishing ethical principles. Thirdly, the protection of ethical principles by paying attention to accessibility, diversity,

equality, trust and mosaic structure will be explained. Finally, the philosophy of “human-centered design” developed by Don Norman for the metaverse will be discussed.

1.1. Controlling the Metaverse with codes

It should be remembered that before the management of the Metaverse, there was always talk about misbehavior, spam, harassment and users’ attitudes towards each other on social media as an online platform (Schneider et al., 2021). For example, Facebook and Tweeter can easily check for misspelled text. But how this will work in the metaverse has yet to be worked out.

One way to do this is to control the “code” we use to create the metaverse and to set rules in the process. The code not only shapes the metaverse, but it can also control the behavior of the users and ensure that they act in accordance with the rules (Humphreys, 2008). In this approach, platform builders or companies should decide from the beginning which features will be included in the metaverse. If “open-source software” is used, it can be more transparent which “social decisions” developers will implement in their platform. The code allows the user to create their own private space and set the rules for accessing this space. In this way, the avatars that will enter this private space can also have the chance to enter this space by accepting the rules.

1.2. Taking control of the Metaverse with smart contracts

Another way to manage the metaverse is the use of “blockchain” through smart contracts (Ølnes et al., 2017). Smart contracts can be used through “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations”. DAO stands for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. A DAO can be defined as a business structure where control is distributed among team members rather than concentrated around a single authority (DAO, 2022). The DAO has a business structure determined by pre-written “smart contracts”. Once the DAO is operational, decisions are decided *unanimously*. Anyone who has a stake in the DAO can make proposals for its future. Shareholders then vote on the proposal. In order to take any action, the majority must agree. The percentage required to reach a majority may vary between DAOs, as it can be written in the code. The goal here is to eliminate manipulation by delegating decision-making power in the system to an automated system, not to any authority. The popularity of NFTs has also led to the proliferation of such DAOs. Online platforms such as Decentraland and Sandbox are real-world examples of DAOs.

1.3. Accessibility, diversity, equity, trust, and mosaic structure in the Metaverse

Paying attention to accessibility, diversity, equality, trust and mosaic structure in the Metaverse can have a positive impact on social good and the formation of ethical codes (Duan et al., 2021). **Accessibility** means that the metaverse can enable global collaboration despite geographical distances. This digital world can also provide accessibility for social events such as concerts. The metaverse can enable many social events that are not physically possible. For example, it is possible to perform concerts with millions of people around the world. An example of such social events is the UC Berkeley graduation ceremony in Minecraft in 2020. **With Diversity, the** limitations of the physical world are removed when using the metaverse. The metaverse can have unlimited spaces and virtual worlds, and there are no limits to our activities in the metaverse. The metaverse can be imagined as a place where users can showcase their artwork, socialize, play, learn and more. **Equality** means that the metaverse is an equalizer where gender, race, disability and social status are eliminated. Users can customize their avatars where their imagination is limited (for example, they can be a cat). This feature could be interpreted as allowing the metaverse to build a just and more sustainable society in the virtual world. The **mosaic structure is meant to convey that** the metaverse is open for cultural communication and preservation. The metaverse could be a platform for preserving and restoring artworks. However, how this platform preserves different cultural and artistic forms can be a challenge in itself. The metaverse can help everyone become part of the metaverse by creating unlimited communities of different beliefs and opinions. By **trust**, we understand the anonymity of online communities, putting concerns about how we transmit information in the metaverse on a sound footing. There is growing concern about fake news and the repercussions that a “bad” internet can have on the transmission of information and therefore knowledge. In the physical world, people have traditionally been able to obtain information through rule-based analysis. Misinformation (e.g., fake news) still exists despite good intentions (e.g., to inform, to warn). In the Metaverse, testimonies and trust play an even more critical role, in many cases it is not a real person who gives the testimony, but their avatar. A few experts explore additional response principles (e.g., punishment) to show why denying the truth is worse than false belief. There are incentive systems for sharing trust between avatars and organisations working to reduce the sharing of false information. Organisations

such as the XR Safety Initiative (XRSI)¹¹ and the XR Association¹² encourage responsible design and adoption of XR solutions (including the metaverse). These organisations monitor whether companies and organisations are following ethical design in their metaverse practices.

1.4. Human Centred Design

Human Centred Design (HCD) is a philosophy developed by Don Norman (Norman, 2005). This design approach for the metaverse can be considered an ethical approach, as it requires the active participation of users in the design process and decision-making. Since the metaverse has a significant impact on society and life, this design model aims to involve every member of the metaverse (developers, editors, users, content creators) in the design and implementation of the metaverse. In HCD, it is considered that decision algorithms should be transparent to every member of the metaverse. Changes to the metaverse also involve code and hardware implementations as they may affect the privacy and security of users. In this design, as with the current Internet, some default privacy protection rules are also implemented to protect users' information and reduce the possibility of data monopolies. These decisions are followed (if necessary) by local government regulations and are intended to adapt to future changes. It is envisaged to use machine learning or artificial intelligence tools to automate processes in the Metaverse, but it is considered necessary to follow existing GDPR policies for “explainability” and “transparency”. In addition, it is emphasized that human rights, privacy rules, human effort and experience should be valued.

From a human rights perspective, the metaverse should be accessible, diverse, welcoming and inclusive. ***Privacy*** is an inherent right that users can protect using existing tools (avatar creation). Existing technologies such as Blockchain and DAOs can be used to manage any decision made in the metaverse. All active parts of the Metaverse (including code) should be transparent and understandable for any platform member. This can reduce complexity during voting (using DAOs) in decision-making processes.

Smart contracts are part of this model. Metaverse includes a reputation-based system that will be naturally attached to users and managed by Blockchain and DAOs. This system allows users to use DAOs to report misbehavior and malpractices of malicious users when voting. Metaverse users, developers, content creators and regulators should be involved in the decision-making process of the metaverse.

The human experience is important in this model. In this design model, the Metaverse is envisioned as an immersive experience that will enable new ways of creating social interaction content beyond our current real-world boundaries (e.g. regulations, geographical location). The Metaverse is conceived as an accessible and inclusive virtual world due to the possibility of creating countless avatars and communities.

2. Ethical issues in the management of the Metaverse

Below, we set out how the problems encountered in the management of the metaverse may pose ethical issues.

2.1. Inequality and decentralization versus monopoly

It can be argued that technology has served as a fundamental accelerator for economic development. However, it is important to underline that it also brings with it a new socio-economic inequality. It is important to remember that for the Metaverse to be truly inclusive, it must reduce existing inequalities, create digital environments where everyone can belong, and reduce the digital divide, the gap between those who have access to modern information technology and those who do not. According to a survey conducted by Heidrick & Struggles in the US and Europe, nearly 80 percent of data analytics and AI executives are male and 65 percent are white (Abouelkheir, 2022). The same study states that “by 2021, less than 25 percent of technology jobs worldwide will be held by women”. Closing these gaps requires a shift in collective thinking and behavior. The underrepresented need to be encouraged to come forward and spaces need to be built that cater to all needs (Abouelkheir, 2022). But while new information technologies are supposed to bridge and overcome this gap, it should not be overlooked that in practice they are likely to exacerbate this inequality. In January 2022, the world more than 30% of the population does not have access to the internet (Datareportal, 2022) . Here we see an unequal distribution of the online world population. This situation is expected to continue in the Metaverse. Therefore, due to the lack of access experienced by a large part of the world’s population, the metaverse is likely to further deepen the inequality gap around the world.

However, the metaverse is imagined as a world of “social egalitarianism”. At the same time, the metaverse is conceived as a state of nature in which people can supposedly escape the obligations of the material world and the social pressures of real life. The idea of escaping from the real world is a method of

relief that contemporary people use to escape the neo-liberal, capitalist world and its materially-driven driving force. However, whether the metaverse is suitable for this method raises a question mark in minds.

Today, industry giants see the Metaverse as an opportunity to expand their symbolic dominance and increase their profits from digital resources. Some see it as an attempt to monopolize the Metaverse and turn the digital world into just another commodity for the hungry market. They do this by gradually extending the visibility of their brands into virtual worlds, almost to “colonize” the digital world for their own financial benefit. Do industrial giants have the right to claim virtual worlds (metaverse) as their playground? The answer lies in the formulation. Because the idea of decentralisation is the fundamental pillar of the Metaverse. Digital technologies and virtual worlds belong to people as much as to industries, and people should have the right to be free and protected from the harms of centralisation in digital spaces.

The kind of Web-based internet that Meta (Facebook, formerly owned by Zuckerberg) and its other platforms are working on appears to be outdated. Once they have developed their metaverse and probably got tens of millions or hundreds of millions of people using it, they want to move their billion-user base to a new virtual world, a metaverse. So they think that one of them will become the standard. And that will put them in control of the market.

The years 2010-2020 saw the emergence of blockchain technology and digital assets, mostly aimed at decentralising communities, democratizing access to investment and enabling people to invest in the future. However, it is important to remember that the metaverse emerged with the promise of facilitating accessibility from the comfort of home, breaking down borders and democratising access to basic goods, services, and experiences. In practice, however, this is what is happening: The Metaverse is managed and owned by tech giants. The same old issues of data privacy, transparency, etc. still persist here. It is clear that if a Meta or an Amazon controls what and how things happen in a metaverse, it will lead to monopolization and will not benefit the people.

First of all, the platform must be democratized. The best solution seems to be to have a decentralized environment, not governed by a single mega-entity, but by transparent, secure algorithms.

One of the most important aspects of Metaverse is that they should be accessible to everyone, without discrimination. Currently, however, companies like Meta and Microsoft are pushing for “*corporate ownership*” of their virtual worlds.

The biggest problem with this centralisation of the Metaverse is censorship. When companies decide how their platform will be used, this hinders freedom of expression. Because then the company can suddenly change the way the metaverse works without any consensus from the user base.

In addition, the company owns all digital assets in such a centralized meta-database. The companies that would own the metaverse can then arbitrarily ban your account and remove access to all your valuable digital assets. You can imagine how bad it would be if you invested significantly in digital real estate only to suddenly lose access to your account or assets.

2.2. Metaverse and law (Metaverse universal, law local!)

First, it is important to remember that the internet is universal and globally decentralised. But law is often local in nature. This makes it difficult to govern technologies on a global basis, and because the metaverse is decentralised, it seems even more difficult to govern the metaverse. Unless some terms and conditions are put in place, users will be at the mercy of the owners of the metaverse.

It is also worth remembering that Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has had a real impact in toughening up on privacy issues and is influencing other parts of the world with its privacy laws (GDPR, 2022).

2.3. "Regulatory frameworks" in the Metaverse, violation of "personal space"

If one is uncomfortable with someone invading "people's personal space" in the metaverse, there is a need for options that exist on the traditional Internet, such as privacy controls, blocking, etc. As with all disruptive technologies, the metaverse needs to recognize the anomalies of its ecosystem and identify what challenges it presents. It is clear that there is a need for regulations and mechanisms. There is a need for standard setting bodies.

If we think of the Metaverse as a virtual state of the society we live in, it is clear that regulating the behavior of users in the management of such virtual worlds is not as easy as it seems (Lee et al., 2021; Ølnes et al., 2017). This is why there is definitely a need for regulation and policy to govern the metaverse platform and its users. For example, entering Decentraland with an avatar can lead to the aforementioned situations. What should be done if another avatar misbehaves with your avatar in any way? What sanction should be applied? If

it is an avatar from other platforms and from far away, will the local laws of the country you live in apply? These are all questions that need to be answered.

Also, one of the main reasons why ethical issues are slow is that technology is always moving faster. Legal and ethical rules cannot be created quickly to match that speed. There are institutions working on this issue.

As with all mass communication technologies, from printing to messaging, widespread adoption of the metaverse requires common technological standards. International organisations such as the Open Metaverse Interoperability Group define these standards (Köse, 2021).

With the current privacy and security measures in place in the Metaverse, it seems very difficult to collect and protect data (Uberti, 2022). Privacy and data security are the first two things we should think about. The metaverse must respect our privacy. GDPR, one of the institutions working on this issue, is one pillar of online data privacy. As new technologies emerge and spread, these regulations will need to be implemented.

2.4. Identity, mental and biological privacy

The first important point to consider when it comes to privacy and identity is biometric information (Biometric information contains biological characteristics. Biometric identity is a person's fingerprint, palm print, face, iris, retina, ear, hand vein, body odour or DNA information or behavioral characteristics such as voice, gait, signature, keyboard keystrokes). The user's gaze, gait and heartbeat give us important information about their mood (Renaud et al., 2002).

If we don't have mental privacy and biological privacy, some of the new technologies can essentially read our minds, they can model our identities, they can modulate our behavior to the point where they undermine our deliberate actions. This has a negative impact on our ability to make decisions.

Even more personal data can be recorded in the Metaverse, such as your brainwaves, body movements and physiological responses. And with so much personal information at their disposal, companies can accurately predict your reactions. This allows them to manipulate consumer behavior and steer users in the direction that benefits them most.

Furthermore, the fact that VR headsets transmit biometric data poses a whole new privacy issue. All the data collected is stored on a server, which can greatly increase security risks. If hackers manage to get hold of this information, they will be able to effortlessly steal your identity and access every part of your virtual and physical life.

Social media platforms have different approaches to online identity. Platforms like LinkedIn and Facebook require some personal data, while others like Twitter or Reddit allow you to hide behind a pseudonym. How should identity be handled in the Metaverse?

When we are born, our geographical situation, economic background and social status are known. Will the Metaverse allow us to reconsider our character and become someone completely different? Or should we be forced to be the mirror image of our physical selves?

Either way, current technology poses a clear danger to our digital identity. Even with advanced biometrics, hackers can impersonate you in the meta database and damage your online image.

Any person can use an avatar of their choice to create their identity in the metaverse. In the metaverse, people can always be whoever they want to be. However, it should be remembered that this freedom comes with some ethical concerns. If you are a man in this world, in the metaverse it is possible to make your avatar a woman. This begs the question, “will people in the metaverse have to represent themselves in human form, or are all appearances acceptable? “ This raises the question. In this case, what would be the perception of other people encountered in the metaverse towards an avatar whose nature remains ambiguous? However, the following question immediately follows. Will there be negative consequences of choosing an avatar outside of your ethnic, sexual or any other identity? (Gurmen, 2022). Who will police this and how? While in this world you can “be what you appear to be”, in the metaverse you can “be what you want to be” (Uberti, 2022).

Although people can choose the avatar they want regardless of their background, not all avatars are in the same demand. According to research, dark-skinned and female avatars are less demanded by users (Nifty, 2022). This raises concerns about race and gender representation in the metaverse. Discrimination based on race and gender is unfortunately not new to our vocabulary. They compromise representation in the metaverse in an environment where individuals are free to choose how their avatars look. Yet people can only hire certain types of images in the metaverse. This undermines “balanced representation” in the metaverse and contradicts their own values. In a second, more dangerous situation, people can use the metaverse to hide their true intentions of not adhering to the politics of equality in the world we live in.

Consumers tend to accept privacy policies and standards or agreements (such as EULAs) without reading them, and this trend is likely to continue in the

metaverse. Currently, companies already track the vast majority of our actions with our consent. They know where we click, what we like and what we talk about.

2.5. Eye Tracking

One of the most important risks when using virtual worlds such as the Metaverse is eye tracking. Increasingly, systems are able to read eye movements and therefore infer the conscious and unconscious thoughts of the user. This fact raises the possibility of a world where we are “forced” to perform actions in our minds through targeted inputs.

If there are no limits to eye surveillance, the risk of violating our privacy is very high. However, there is a chance to take some countermeasures to neutralize this possibility. For example, chips are being developed that “protect” human thoughts when wearing VR glasses. This solution ensures that brain waves and people’s neuronal activity are not read.

Unlike before, in the metaverse, a person’s gait (the way they move), eye movements (pupil dilation, constriction), emotions can be observed and recorded (Renaud et al., 2002). All this provides important information to application developers. At the same time, capturing these behaviors gives both companies and political parties important information to understand the characteristics of users. In particular, the information obtained from users’ mobile phones can then be used to predict changes in both the universe and the metaverse, as well as to control them based on this data. Gustave Flaubert’s “There is no such thing as “Reality”, there is only “Perception” (Karaağaç, 2013). From this sentence, “perception” is the reality itself.

The Metaverse can be accessed through a computer, but it can also be accessed through advanced glasses that we wear on our heads. These advanced glasses (XR-Extended reality devices) can receive and collect important information from the wearer through sensors (Roesner et al., 2014) and transfer it to the “spatial environment” or the “virtual environment”. This is where XR technologies pose very different privacy and security issues for users (Guzman et al., 2019). The breach of privacy and loss of trust should be highlighted here. It may seem fascinating that technology knows so much about us as individuals. It can even help us provide a good experience to help us navigate maps, get customized offers and more. But recording body language as something that can be mapped and recognize your movement can be dangerous. 87% of consumers who feel a company doesn’t handle their data responsibly go elsewhere (Canavan,

2022). In such a situation, it's not good for a business to lose a customer because they decided not to be completely transparent about their data.

The information that XR devices collect from users that might make sense includes eye movements, head movements, and current mood. Advertisers are also known to use eye tracking to see how people read and react to the words they read.

Research has found that in a twenty-minute session in virtual reality (VR), a headset can generate two million data points and unique body language recordings. This body mapping can then create a digital twin of an individual for metadata storage (Canavan, 2022). This kind of technology could create lucrative opportunities for businesses but would raise a wide range of privacy and reputational issues for users. Eye tracking is really a map of someone's mind and intentions (Takahashi, 2022). Also, the way you think about how you move the mouse in a web browser can be used to identify you. So, these things can be used to read intentions, even subconscious intentions. Eye or mouse movements should be controlled by the owner, should not be something that becomes an advertising clue and should not be used for tracking. Ultimately, all this information needs to be protected and the user's right to privacy needs to be respected.

In short, there should be a rule for collecting this information and it should be followed. These information collection technologies should be further developed, and the collected information should be transferred to other environments (cloud, metaverse, etc.) within certain rules. One approach that could be suggested here is that XR devices could light up some LEDs to warn the user if there is an unwanted transfer of information while collecting this information. Privacy rules and practices should be clear and transparent to the user. Organizations that want to maintain trust with the user should declare that they comply with these rules. In the meantime, it is useful to know that blockchain applications also have the ability to record everything in the metaverse.

2.6. Mood

In the metaverse, which is a reflection of our physical world, our avatars interact with other avatars. This is also the communication between the assets we have in the metaverse and the assets that other avatars have (digital assets, e.g. NFT). This social interaction affects habits, actions and choices between avatars, i.e. between people. Just like biometric data, this kind of information also provides information about a person's state of mind. Our avatar's attitude in a

conversation or reaction to an event is also information. Those who want to use this information can manipulate the user's behavior very easily. The question to be asked at this point is: Who will keep all this information and how will they control it? What is the regulatory rule for this? These are questions that need to be answered.

2.7. Using a second avatar in the Metaverse

Here, users can overcome the aforementioned problems by creating a second avatar that does not reflect their real situation. If the second avatar contains economically, culturally, or demographically inauthentic information, the information collected will also be inauthentic.

Another solution for this situation is to create private areas in the metaverse. Other avatars will need your permission to enter your space.

2.8. Children and the metaverse

What happens in the metaverse does not stay in the metaverse. What people experience in VR is known to affect their memory, desensitize them or make them feel as if they have done an action before, even if they have never done it in reality. Marketing to adults in the metaverse is one thing, but for children it is another. Theoretically, anyone can be anything in the meta database, but it is still important to know some important information, such as a "person's age". So even if someone looks like an adult, companies should still be aware that they are not and should act accordingly.

2.9. Brain Waves from Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI)

Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) will soon be a way to access the metaverse. BCIs can be worn on the head like a headset, on the wrist or work with glasses. BCI technology monitors brainwave patterns and extracts thought processes through machine learning. A direct connection to someone's brain can provide a convenient view of all the types of intelligence to be collected and analyzed.

Brain-computer interface companies like Neurosity design their headsets with security in mind. With Neurosity's device, Notion, "brainwaves are automatically converted into metadata encrypted by the N1 Chipset." In the metadata base, marketers can tell how someone accessed it through VR headsets, AR glasses or BCIs, while hiding personal thought data.

If you subconsciously understand what someone is thinking and doing, you provide some kind of advertising in the metaverse and that can trigger them

to buy something. And that is not a good thing. One should never use any of this data or use it only for medical applications. From an entertainment point of view, this data may be needed to improve entertainment. We are heading towards a world where technology will be able to decode the information in our brains and use it to manipulate existing knowledge.

Artificial intelligence is making inferences about us, using our data constantly. We already have problems with bias, transparency, efficiency, and it seems that these will continue with these new technologies.

How to claim data ownership and personal sovereignty and how to model our identity in a digital space remain problems to be solved. The question then is: What level of ethical responsibility will companies, NGOs, platforms have to allow this personal sovereignty?

If there will be no limits to eye-tracking, the risk of our private dimension being violated will be very high. However, we can already imagine some countermeasures to neutralize this possibility. For example, companies have started developing chips that protect our thoughts when users wear a visor. This solution ensures that third parties cannot read brainwaves and people's neuronal activity. Also, the idea of providing different levels of privacy depending on the user we are communicating with seems to protect our thoughts.

2.10. Ethics of interoperability

We need to clarify whether we have an ethical responsibility to ensure interoperability. Because if not, how do we communicate between different metaverse? Just as there is a communication protocol on the internet that does not concern the user, so there should be one in the metaverse. It should be easy to go from one metaverse to another. If we can't, we are stuck in a garden. And that's not good either. Metaverse creators should work with each other to create a standard and be responsible for this collaboration. Big companies like Apple and Google should support this collaborative approach. If they don't, and each of them creates their own metaverse, it will be another step towards monopolization. But we still need to remember that we need to bring many different technologies together.

One of the key promises of the Metaverse is true ownership of digital assets. You won't be able to get it from one meta database to another or have the same functionalities; this other layer of regulation, intellectual property and licensing, contracts and service premises will prevent you from doing so. One of the big debates still going on is how to apply the first sale principle to digital

products. If you buy a T-shirt in the analogue world, you can take it and wear it anywhere. But that may not be true for a cosmetic item in the metaverse. Once an e-book is purchased in the Metaverse, it cannot be moved from one platform to another. At least at the moment.

2.11. Fair access

Accessing the metaverse is very similar to accessing the internet. Mobile phones have made it possible to access the internet worldwide. As mobile phones are built with more powerful hardware and internet bandwidth increases, access will improve. Access to the Metaverse through cloud services that can provide equal access to information over the decentralised and open web will also increase access possibilities.

Today, the metaverse has become more accessible through VR. Because there are many who argue that the Meta subsidizes the cost of headsets through a “surveillance capitalism model” (Takahashi, 2022). It should be noted that more accessibility also means more invasions of privacy. The challenge is that there is no clear path on how to achieve both an accessible technology and a technology that guarantees many of the rights that we would otherwise surrender to surveillance capitalism. This can be achieved through good privacy law.

2.12. Metaverse and a dystopian future

Dystopian is the opposite of utopian. A dystopian future is an important warning for humanity. With the Metaverse, it is expressed that a dystopian future awaits us (Dijitalmosaik, 2022).

It is assumed that people will spend most of their time in the metaverse as the physical world loses relevance. However, it should be remembered that metaverse are platforms where people interact and engage in collective activities. Social networks and online games are no exception. All this still does not completely erase the physical world from our lives. It is just that experiences in the metaverse are more “immersive” and this is not enough to conclude that people will forget the physical world and human relationships.

Therefore, it is likely that addiction will increase as the metaverse becomes more present in our lives. However, this should be seen as a serious problem. In the gaming world, steps are being taken to address this. For example, World of Warcraft changed a part of the game to prevent people from sticking with it for too long, reducing the risk of addictive disease.

2.13. Cyberbullying in the Metaverse

To better understand this issue, it is useful to take a look at previous social media platforms. Facebook brings people together, but by design it can be addictive. Twitter leads the conversation, but there is a lot of hate speech and racist rhetoric there too (Immersive Learning News, 2021). 44% of Americans have been harassed online, 15% physically threatened, 12% sexually harassed and 12% stalked. These numbers are also increasing every day. It remains to be seen how the metaverse will respond to all these problems.

Social media can sometimes be a toxic, harmful place. Keyboard warriors, safe behind their screens, spread hate speech and bully others for their appearance, nationality, or views. Sexual harassment is also rampant on social media and sadly seems to be a trend that will continue to happen in the metaverse. To combat this trend, the metaverse needs to agree on a global, ethical framework. Unfortunately, governments are slow to catch up with new technologies. Law enforcement agencies need to take swift and serious steps to police and punish such malpractices.

2.14. How will digital twins and inheritance work in the Metaverse?

The inheritance of digital assets will become increasingly important with NFTs. How will inheritances be transferred to heirs? Will they be included in the inheritance tax calculation? Will taxes need to be paid in case of capital gains on NFTs?

It is not only people that will be virtualized in the Metaverse, but also everything that is physically accessible. Buildings, objects in the home, items in a store will all be digitally represented in the meta database through a virtual twin. Many people may choose to represent themselves as “digital pairs”. Who is to say which of these objects is acceptable to recreate digitally? For example, if a house with all its personal belongings is in the metaverse, can anyone get in, or only the real-life owners?

Digital twins can be defined as virtual objects created to mirror physical objects, including their appearance and physical behavior. Due to their physical-virtual synchronization, digital twins can enable metaverse users to see themselves not only in the realms of virtual worlds in VR, but also in other paradigms where the virtual and physical merge, such as mixed reality (MR). It can also be envisaged that users’ actions in the physical world, such as travelling and taking photographs, will feed into the metaverse and the avatars within it

(e.g. viewing the photograph in the virtual world). The metaverse then has the potential to become an evolving world that synchronizes with the physical world. There are still some challenges around the ownership of digital twins. The simplest approach to preserving the authenticity and provenance of digital twins is to use a digital ledger such as a blockchain.

2.15. NFTs, digital assets and ethics in the Metaverse

NFTs, or non-fungible tokens, can allow us to record “anything of value” on the blockchain. Thanks to the power of smart contracts, they can identify each “digital asset” in the metaverse as an NFT and provide digital ownership to the owner of the private key. In a nutshell, the owner of the NFT is the only one with access to its assets. No entity can decide to revoke ownership of these assets, as they are tied directly to the user’s private crypto wallet.

In the Metaverse, NFTs can be used to represent the user’s avatar and clothing. These NFTs can be artworks, vehicles, virtual versions of their homes, or much more valuable assets such as digital real estate, private parcels of NFT land they own. Moreover, one of the key features of NFTs is that they can be easily transferred “from one user to another”. Digital clothes, artworks or land can be listed and sold on NFT marketplaces such as OpenSea.

This transferability can also give these digital assets real-world value. Following simple laws of “supply and demand”, the value of NFT assets can increase or decrease, just like in the real world. This allows both NFT creators and speculators to access a new revenue opportunity, creating a viable economy for the metaverse. Some digital land parcels in blockchain metaverses such as Decentraland and The Sandbox can already generate passive income for landowners. It won’t be long before banks, insurance companies, pension funds and many other sectors of the real-world economy adapt to these new systems to stay relevant.

As we have already seen with the existing metaverse platforms Decentraland and Sandbox, the creation of digital assets has opened up a new market for innovation, monetary income and jobs. NFT is one of them. Non-fungible tokens, called NFTs, are unique digital tokens (using Blockchain technologies) that represent ownership of a specific asset, such as digital artworks and collectibles. NFTs are a one-to-one mapping between a wallet owner (represented by a crypto wallet address) and the asset referring to the NFT (usually a uniform resource identifier). NFTs are unique and only the owner has the original (Sharma et al., 2022). For example, Decentraland uses NFTs to manage game sandboxes

and other digital assets such as clothing accessories for avatars. As well as marketplaces that trade NFTs, they can sell their monsters developed on online platforms such as play-to-win games, where games powered by NFTs, such as Axie Infinite10 (a Pokemon-style monster battle), allow players to earn money while playing the game. Other models that virtual worlds incorporate into their platforms (e.g. Sandbox) are win-win, where platform users can contribute to the creation of their digital assets while selling them. The absence of central authorities empowers NFTs as a means of democratising content creation and commercialization. However, these democratization tools to reduce barriers to content creation and sharing also allow fraudsters and malicious creators to exploit the system to sell copies or low-quality NFTs. Various trading platforms of NFTs use “invitation-only” policies to allow only a select group of creators on their platforms. Such a policy reduces the advantages of NFTs as an open-access content creation tool. Using DAOs and platform users to implement a reputation-based system where everyone can vote and enforce norms to maintain the quality of NFTs and reduce scams can be seen as a possible solution.

NFTs still have some serious drawbacks, such as their environmental impact. NFTs currently consume as much electricity annually as a small country. While we are slowly shifting towards greener and more sustainable blockchain models, it should at least be underlined that making NFTs carbon neutral is still a long way off. Displaying Metaverse wealth in the form of expensive NFT art, tools or real estate can be a recipe for disaster. Users can then become more vulnerable to \$5 attacks (a \$5 wrench attack is when someone finds out you have a lot of crypto and physically attacks or threatens you for your private keys) and can be attractive to criminals who want to harm them to gain access to their private keys. Furthermore, with digital ownership, users are “fully responsible for their assets. In the event of a user error, there is not yet a tool that can help recover valuable digital assets.

3. Metaverse and politics

Metaverse and politics is not a common topic in the literature. Again, as in the previous chapters, there are many question marks in minds. How will political parties, which are indispensable elements of democracy, be established and operate in the metaverse? How will they conduct dinner meetings, rallies, signature campaigns, conferences, seminars, marches, forums, commemorations, anniversaries, information meetings, concerts, festivals, spot visits, sporting

activities, trips, award ceremonies and openings? How will parties form their organizations? Will they have buildings where they will carry out their activities as in the world we live in? Will the meetings take place in these buildings? Will there be protocol rules for political meetings? How will they hold main and sub-tier meetings? How will the youth and women's branches, which are sub-levels, be formed and how will they hold their meetings? How will parties carry out their political activities? How will parties register their members and where will these records be kept? How will party congresses be held?

On the other hand, can local or general elections be held in the metaverse? If so, how can they be held? Who will control the elections? Who will certify the results?

3.1. Party congresses or party events in the Metaverse

First of all, the peculiarity of party congresses is that party members who will elect the party leadership must be “delegates”. This delegate status has to be approved by the party authorities during the avatar creation phase. In order for the party to do this, it must have completed its organization in the metaverse. As we know, in the world we live in, the functioning of each party is governed first by the law on political parties and then by the party's bylaws. This means that parties have a clear definition of who the participants are in their activities. For example, when a provincial advisory council is held, it is clear who or, in other words, which officials will participate in this event. This poses the following problems in the metaverse. In the metaverse, the duties of those who will attend a congress or an executive or board meeting should be clear. In other words, this task should be defined when someone creates an avatar. The chairman of a district should be identified as the district chairman at the avatar creation stage. Hence, a party organizing in the metaverse must “confirm” that the person is the county chair. Only after this confirmation will that person be able to enter the meeting to be held in the metaverse without “area violation”. Another important point to be emphasized here is that the “powers” and “actions” of the party organized in the metaverse must be recognized by the authorities in the world we live in. Because every party has to hold a congress every three years according to the law on political parties. If this congress is to be held in the metaverse, the authorities approving the congress must all be in the metaverse.

Almost all of the above-mentioned difficulties also apply to political parties. It is thought that it will be difficult to do politics without addressing these problems.

3.2. *Meta-politics and ethics*

In the case of doing politics in the metaverse, there are many problems arising from politics itself. When we evaluate these situations, we have to find answers to the following questions.

How will gift giving and receiving work in the Metaverse? Is it ethical for one avatar to gift an NFT to another avatar? What would be the measure? If the company that owns Metaverse provides various free trainings to users, how would we evaluate this situation? How will we deal with those avatars who abuse their duties and powers in the provision of Metaverse goods and services to obtain NFTs and other forms of benefits by giving preferential treatment to avatars they deal with? How will we deal with a situation where an avatar working in the Metaverse takes advantage of the difficult situation of another avatar who comes to do work and obtains benefits by force or persuasion? What will be done if the same avatar converts or spends a public resource (NFT in the Metaverse) for personal use? What will be done if the avatar's political views and degree of closeness are the primary determinants of appointments in the Metaverse? In this case, political views, relatives, friendship, friendship, fellow countrymen, graduating from the same school, etc. come to the fore rather than the qualifications required for the job. Nepotism can also be referred to as nepotism, cronyism, political cronyism. How will lobbying activities work? In the political decision-making process, interest and pressure groups prevent the best decision by lobbying. If the party they support wins power after the elections, these interest and pressure groups try to influence the government in order to gain benefits and rents. In the Metaverse, leaking company or institutional secrets is another issue that needs to be addressed. This is when some ministers, senior bureaucrats and some ruling party MPs present a decision to be taken in advance to interest and pressure groups and opportunistic speculators in exchange for benefits. For example, it can also occur in the form of profiteering by informing these interest groups in advance of the increases to be made. This is also profiteering. Political Manipulation is another important issue. What should be done when politicians use political manipulation to mislead voters and thereby maximize their votes? Political manipulation includes over-promising, lying, over-information, secrecy, cover-ups. Conflict of interest is another major problem. What is our position if someone working for an organization in the Metaverse leaves and starts doing business with the same business? The speech, debate and private life of politicians are also important in the metaverse. How will we decide when politicians speak and act in a way that crosses the line of morality, both on the

floor of parliament and in other speeches? What sanctions will be imposed when slang expressions are used in the metaverse? What happens when their private lives are exposed in the media?

The answers to all these questions will tell us a lot about how to do politics in the metaverse.

First of all, it is important to remember that there is no single metaverse platform. In other words, there is not yet a metaverse where everyone agrees, where standards are set, ethical rules are defined, and legal regulations are made. So the basic communication architecture of the metaverse is not yet clear. While today's Internet is structured around individual servers that "talk" to each other when needed, there is no consensus on exactly how the metaverse will work. There is also disagreement about "how much interoperability is required" for the metaverse to be truly "metaverse", rather than just an evolution of today's internet. It is also debated whether a true metaverse can have a single operator. There are "thoughts" that there could be standards and protocols as well as an "open source" metaverse operating system or platform. Countless new technologies, protocols, companies, innovations and discoveries are required to make the Metaverse work. There will be no "Before Metaverse" and no "After Metaverse", but rather a gradual emergence over time as different products, services and capabilities integrate and fuse. The technology for millions of people to participate in a shared, "simultaneous experience" does not yet exist. The Metaverse requires infrastructure that does not currently exist. On the Internet we use, files can be shared from one computer to another. Most of the basic systems of the Internet are geared towards one server talking to another server or an end-user device. For example, there are billions of people on Facebook today. But each user shares an individual connection to the Facebook server, not to another user. Accordingly, when you access another user's content, you really only get the latest information that "Facebook gives you". Furthermore, the internet is not designed for "*continuous*" communication. To make the Metaverse work, something very similar to video conferencing is required. These experiences work as real-time persistent connections. But they all tend to have a "high level of concurrency". Although some of the most highly concurrent games, such as Second Life or Warcraft, have been around for more than two decades, they have essentially misled users by "fragmenting" and dividing them into different "worlds" and servers. Eve Online, for example, can technically have more than 100,000 players in the "same game", but they are split across different servers. As a result, a player only really sees or interacts with a small handful of players

at any given moment. So concurrency is a problem, and it must be solved in order to truly create the metaverse.

The internet as we live it today works thanks to standards and protocols for visual presentation, file uploading, communication, graphics, data, etc. The metaverse requires an even larger, more complex and flexible data set. Moreover, the importance of “interoperability” and “live concurrent experiences” means that we will need to prune some existing standards. For example, today there are many images file formats: .GIF, .JPEG, .PNG, .BMP, .TIFF, etc. And while the web today is built on open standards, most are closed and proprietary. Amazon, Facebook and Google use similar technologies, but they are not designed to migrate to each other. Furthermore, these companies are incredibly “resistant” to cross-integrating their systems or sharing their data. Such moves weaken network effects and make it harder for a user to move their digital lives elsewhere. It is also clear that the metaverse will need entirely new rules for censorship, communications control, regulatory sanctions and many more challenges that we are still struggling with today. The more valuable and interoperable the metaverse is, the harder it will be to build industry-wide consensus on issues such as data security, data persistence, forward-compatible code development and operations. To use a meta-analogy for the metaverse, consider SimCity. In ideal circumstances, the “Mayor” (i.e. the player) would first design his or her own mega-metropolis, then build it from day one to its final form. But in the game, as in real life, you cannot immediately “build” a city of ten million people. You start with a small town and first optimize it (for example, where there are roads, schools, etc.). As time goes on, sometimes you demolish and replace the “old” parts, sometimes you rebuild the town when a disaster (fire) strikes. But in the metaverse, unlike SimCity, there will be not one but many mayors, and their desires and incentives will often conflict. It is not known exactly what the Metaverse will need, let alone which existing standards will be transferred, how, to what effects, when or through which applications and groups. As a result, it is as if it is more important to think about how the Metaverse emerges, not just around which technological standard.

Meanwhile, users’ digital experiences are also important. And these need to be created first. Facebook, the world’s largest social network, worked not because it announced that it was going to be a “social network”, but because it started out small, then evolved into a digital yearbook that became a photo-sharing and messaging service. As with Facebook, the Metaverse needs to be

“populated” rather than just “popular” and this population must then populate this digital world with things to do and content to consume.

4. Who can create the Metaverse?

While the Metaverse has the potential to surpass the internet as a computing platform, the underlying development process has little in common with the internet. The internet came from public research universities and US government programs. This was partly because few in the private sector understood the commercial potential of the World Wide Web, but it was also true that these groups were the only entities with the computing talent, resources and ambitions to build it. None of this is the case when it comes to the Metaverse. The private sector is not only fully aware of the Metaverse’s potential, but also has the most aggressive faith in its future. The private sector has the ability to fund Metaverse R&D, the engineering talent and the desire to make it work. Large technology companies not only want to lead the Metaverse, but they also want to own it and define it. Who are these companies today?

4.1. Microsoft and Metaverse

The first of these is Microsoft. The company has hundreds of millions of user identities. It is the second largest cloud vendor in the world. It has a comprehensive software suite covering all systems. To this end, metaverse is thought to offer Microsoft the opportunity to reclaim the operating system leadership it lost during the transition from PC to mobile devices.

4.2. Meta and Metaverse

Another company is the new name Meta. While Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has not explicitly declared his intention to develop and own the metaverse, his interest in it is clear. Meta, more than any other company, is making a concerted effort to build a larger and more capable social platform that represents both a new computing platform and a new engagement platform. Not forgetting that Meta has invested heavily in the Oculus glasses used to enter the metaverse. Meanwhile, Meta remains the only FAAMG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Google) company stuck solely at the application/service layer. Nonetheless, Meta’s metaverse advantages are enormous. It has more users than any other platform in the world. It has daily usage and user-generated content created every day. It has the second largest share of digital ad spend in the world.

It has billions in cash and thousands of world-class engineers. Its metaverse-focused assets are also growing rapidly. It now holds patents for semiconductor and brain-to-machine computing interfaces.

4.3. Amazon and the Metaverse

Amazon is interesting in several ways. Amazon is more memorable as the primary place to buy “products”. It has the largest share of e-commerce worldwide (excluding China). It is the world’s largest “cloud” vendor. The company provides hosting services to many organisations, including the Pentagon. It has joint ventures (e.g. Fulfilled by Amazon, Amazon Channels) with many different media companies (video, music, e-books, audiobooks, video games). It is working on AR glasses. Building the first major gaming/rendering engine designed for the cloud computing era. Builds and sells home/office digital assistants. More importantly, Founder/CEO Jeff Bezos feels very strongly about infrastructure gaming. For example, AWS (Amazon Web Services - Amazon’s best business) is one of its best services. 80% of its revenue comes from “Fulfilled by Amazon”, where the company sells, packages and delivers products sold by other businesses, rather than buying inventory directly and selling it outright (like most retailers). While the goal of Elon Musk’s private aerospace company SpaceX is to colonize Mars, it is speculated that Bezos’ goal with Blue Origin is to facilitate the creation of a space infrastructure similar to his early web protocols and AWS. This way, he thinks, “we can build huge chip factories in space and only ship small parts”. To this end, Amazon’s truly “open” metaverse will be open to all other FAAMG (FAAMG is an acronym referring to five companies: Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Google) than any other company.

4.4. Google and Metaverse

Another important company is Google. If the internet is considered a data mine, the metaverse is predicted to have both more data and more returns than today’s web. And it could be argued that no one can monetize this data better than Google on a global scale. In addition, the company is not only the market leader in indexing both the digital and physical world, but also the most successful digital software and services company outside China. It also runs the most widely used mobile operating system in the world (Android) and the most open of the major consumer computing platforms. Although unsuccessful, Google was also one of the first to work in wearable computing through Google Glass. Google is

making aggressive moves to digitize the home through Google Assistant, the Nest suite of products and FitBit.

4.5. Apple and Metaverse

Apple has the second largest computing platform of the modern era. It operates the largest game stores on the planet (which means it pays developers more than anyone else in the world). In addition, the company is investing heavily in AR devices and ‘connective tissue’ (e.g. beacons, Apple Watch, Apple AirPods) to help the metaverse. It also goes against Apple’s values and business strategy to “build an open platform” where anyone can access all user data and device APIs. All this means that Apple is more likely to be the dominant way the western world interacts with the metaverse, rather than the operator/driver.

As can be seen from all the above assessments, there seems to be little to no effort by large IT companies to work together and create a common metaverse. In this case, it is thought that each of the political parties will take part in one of these platforms.

Conclusion

The Metaverse is the next stage of the internet. With the technology giving us access to a more realistic virtual world than ever before, it is expected that everyone will gradually switch to this method of communication in the future. Metaverse offers some tangible advantages over traditional internet communication. They can also allow for higher participation and better collaboration between users. However, there are some ethical challenges in metaverse. Companies can easily abuse their control over users and exploit privacy loopholes. By controlling the metaverse economy, they have a chance to control our real-world economy.

These ethical issues can be listed as inequality and monopolization against decentralization, violation of personal space, identity-mental and biological privacy, eye tracking, mood, using a second avatar, ethical issues arising from brain-computer interfaces, interoperability ethics, fair access, dystopian future, cyberbullying, ethical issues arising from digital twins, digital assets. All these ethical problems are ethical problems arising from the metadata itself. It is thought that each of these will also be present in the metaverse, which is called meta-politics, in the policy-making phase.

In the case of politics in the metaverse, it is thought that the ethical problems that existed in the world we lived in before will continue here.

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CHAPTER XXII

A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON THE VALUES OF GOOD AND EVIL: THE EXAMPLE OF MAWLANA'S MASNAVI

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Introduction

Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, one of the great Islamic thinkers, is also known as Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī and Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Balkhi. It is known that Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī was born in Balkh in 1207 and died in Konya in 1273 (Can, 2011:31). One of the 13th century scholars, Mawlānā was born as the son of Bahā ud-Dīn Walad (Can, 2011:32). Bahā ud-Dīn Walad was one of the most respected scholars among the statesmen and people of the period. However, due to the intellectual conflicts in Balkh, he migrated from Balkh with his family between 609-610. During the migration, Bahā ud-Dīn Walad, who wanted to perform the pilgrimage, first visited Nishābur, then Baghdad, and then Mecca with his family. It is said that when they went to Baghdad, they met with the famous Sufi poet Attar and that Attar presented Jalal al-Din Muhammad with his work *Esrār-nāme*. After staying here for three days, they set off for Hijaz. After completing their pilgrimage, they traveled to Anatolia via Damascus and settled in Akşehir. Mawlānā had two sons from his first marriage. Upon the death of his wife, he married for the second time and had a daughter from this marriage (Örs & Kırılancı, 2015:15-16).

Bahā ud-Dīn Walad, who became a mudarris (professor), continued his teaching and guidance classes in Larende. Bahā ud-Dīn Walad attracted the attention of the Sultan of Anatolian Seljukis Alā ad-Dīn Kayqubād because of his lectures. Thereupon, he was summoned to Konya by Alā ad-Dīn Kayqubād for teaching and guidance. After teaching here for a while, he died. After his father's death, Mawlana took over his father's position of preaching, teaching and fatwa upon the request of his father's disciples. After the death of Bahā ud-Dīn Walad, his disciple in Balkh, Sayyed Burhan ud-Din Muhaqqiq Termazi came to Konya. After coming to Konya, he became interested in Mawlānā's education. With Sayyed Burhan ud-Din's guidance, Mawlānā decided to go to Aleppo to improve himself in the fields of literature and religion. He and Sayyed Burhan ud-Din set off for Aleppo. They traveled together to Kayseri, but upon the request of the ruler of Kayseri, Sāhib-i Isfehānī, Sayyid Burhāneddin stayed in Kayseri. Mawlānā continued his journey alone and arrived in Aleppo. Mawlānā studied in different madrasas in Aleppo, and after staying there for about three years, he went to Damascus for further education. After completing his education on Arabic language and literature, fiqh, tafsir, hadith and other sciences in Damascus in about four years, he returned to Kayseri to Sayyed Burhan ud-Din. In Kayseri, he continued his spiritual education under the guidance of Sayyed Burhan ud-Din. Mawlānā completed his spiritual education after three ordeals by confining himself to a place. After his spiritual education, Mawlānā returned to Konya with Sayyed Burhan ud-Din and received an *ijazat* (ratification) from Sayyed Burhan ud-Din in Konya. Sayyed Burhan ud-Din turned back to Kayseri after giving his *ijazat* and died in Kayseri in 1244. After the death of Sayyed Burhan ud-Din, Mawlānā continued his teaching, preaching and teaching activities in Konya (Can, 2011:38-40).

Mawlānā, who gained a great reputation in Konya, had many students and disciples. After a certain period of time, he met Shams-i Tabrīzī, known as Shams-i Perrān or Perende, whom he called his companion. Shams al-Tabrīzī met and was inspired by many Sufis, but compared to others, Mevlānā's answers left a great impression on him. The first influence begins when Shams al-Tabrīzī asks Mevlānā a question comparing Bāyezīd al-Bistāmī with the Prophet and the answer he receives. Mawlānā, whose friendship with Shams al-Tabrīzī had progressed considerably, was criticized by his disciples and the public for not spending enough time with them. Realizing this, Shams al-Tabrīzī leaves Konya to avoid any mischief. Mawlānā, who was very upset by Shams al-Tabrīzī's departure, made an effort to bring him back. His conversations with his close

friend Shams al-Tabrīzī have a special importance for Mawlānā. After Shams al-Tabrīzī came back from Damascus and stayed in Konya for a while, rumors started again. There is a belief that Shams al-Tabrīzī was murdered due to the sedition that broke out. Mawlānā made many attempts to find Shams al-Tabrīzī again, but his attempts were fruitless (Can, 2011:47-48).

In the post-Shams period, Mawlānā increased his friendship with Salaḥ ud-Din, a goldsmith from the people of Konya. Before meeting Mawlānā, Salaḥ ud-Din had been initiated into Burhan al-Dīn Muhaqqiq al-Tirmidhī. Having established a friendship with Mawlānā, Salaḥ ud-Din occasionally participated in his conversations with Shams. After Shams, Mawlānā often met and conversed with Salaḥ ud-Din, but this was not welcomed by some of his disciples. As in the Shams period, sedition was again raised. Thereupon, Mawlana married his son Sultan Veled to Salaḥ ud-Din's daughter Fatma. Thus, the friendship of conversation was reinforced by the bond of kinship. Mawlānā's love for Salaḥ ud-Din is so strong that he is the person mentioned the most after Shams in *Dīwān-e Kabīr* (Can, 2011:60-65). Salaḥ ud-Din died due to illness and after Salaḥ ud-Din, Mawlānā made a young friend named Husam al-Din Chalabi. Mawlānā introduces this friend as his caliph after Salaḥ ud-Din. Husam al-Din Chalabi contributed greatly to the writing of the *Masnavi* (Can, 2011:70-72).

The *Masnavi*, which means "book" and consists of six volumes, is Mawlānā's last work. This work was written in Persian in the last fifteen years of Mawlānā's life. The *Masnavi* consists of couplets, but the number of couplets is different in different printed publications. The oldest copy is now on display in the Mawlānā Museum in Konya. The *Masnavi* was translated into many different languages over time, as it was commented in the Ottoman period after Mawlānā's death. Mawlānā expressed his feelings and thoughts, which he formed by feeding on the Qur'an, in poems and stories in his work *Masnavi*. He included some prophets, the devil, domestic or wild animals in the stories. Within the framework of Sufi thought, he dealt with the idea of *wahdat al-wujud*, prophethood, sainthood, predestination, perfect human being, will and the nature of worship (Çelik, 2002; Örs & Kırancı, 2015:22-23).

In *Masnavi*, it is aimed that people become moral people by raising awareness. In this sense, the things that should be and are expected from the individual are characterized by the concept of good and the things that should be avoided and not desired to be are characterized by the concept of bad. In this research, it is possible to reveal how the concepts of good and bad, which

are moral values, create a relationship model together. For this purpose, what meaning is attributed to the concepts of good and evil in the Masnavi work and with which concepts these concepts are associated will be examined. The work will be studied in terms of the questions such as “How can the concepts of good and evil be defined according to Mevlânâ based on his work Masnavi? Which concepts of good and bad are used together in the couplets in? Which concepts are characterized by the concepts of good and bad in the couplets? Is it possible to create a good-evil value model?”

Hypotheses

(H₁) In the Masnavi, the concepts of good and evil are associated with similar concepts and phenomena.

(H₂) The concepts of good and evil generally characterize the concepts of human, temperament/character, thought and behavior.

(H₃) The concepts of good and evil are discussed within the framework of Islamic sources.

Method

The fact that quantitative research on research topics is limited in understanding and explaining the subject and cannot bring a holistic perspective leads researchers to use qualitative research methods (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2000, p.14). In this study, since it was aimed to evaluate the Masnavi work in terms of the concepts of good and evil, document analysis method, one of the qualitative research designs, was used. Document analysis involves the evaluation of written materials containing information about the events or phenomena that are the subject of the research (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2018, p.189).

Data Collection and Analysis

Masnavi-i Ma’nevî, translated by Örs & Kırılancı and published by the Turkish Manuscript Society, was chosen as the source for the research. The research data were obtained by scanning the work of Masnavi. During the scanning, the couplets containing the concepts of good and evil were identified. After the scanning, other concepts related to the concepts of good and evil in the couplets were identified. The couplets related to the concepts of good and evil were transformed into documents and made ready for analysis.

It is scientifically more appropriate to consider the information, findings and results revealed by the documents within the framework of the content analysis approach (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2018, p.138). The main purpose of content analysis is to identify concepts and relationships that can explain the collected data (Selçuk et al. 2014, 433). In this research, since it is aimed to determine the concepts of good and evil in the Masnavi work and the relationship between these concepts, this research was analyzed according to the content analysis approach.

Results

In the research, 2 main themes and 86 codes related to the concepts of good and evil in the Masnavi work were obtained and the codes under the two main themes were analyzed in MAXQDA 2022 Standard program. Due to the subject of the research, two main themes, good and bad, were created. There were 45 codes under the good theme and 41 codes under the bad theme. The relationship status between the defined codes and the frequency values of the codes were obtained by using different analyses in the Code Matrix/MaxMap section of the MAXQDA 2022 Standard program.

Value Model Formed by Good and Bad Codes

In order to determine whether there is overlap between good and bad codes and other codes, code overlap analysis was used in MAXQDA program. For this purpose, good and bad codes were analyzed one by one and their overlap with sub-codes was examined. The relationship line of the codes that overlapped with only one of the good and bad codes was highlighted in bold color. The relationship between good and bad codes and subcodes is shown in Figure 1 below.

stinginess cannot exist where there is goodness. Where there is less favor and help, there is only stinginess.

When an impersonal individual obtains wealth and authority, he has become the subject of his own disgrace. Such a person] is either stingy and reduces favors and help, or shows untimely and unwarranted generosity... (Mawlānā, 2015:526)

Only codes that overlap with the bad code: Bad behavior, bad condition/ event, bad name, low road, bad intention, black hearth, bad thought, bad character, bad word, hell, calamity, sedition, hypochondria, disloyalty, lust, unbeliever, denial, robber, shame, damage, lie, punishment, ignorant, persecution, fairness, emotion. It can be said that the association of justice and emotion with evil is remarkable.

Since the phenomenon of justice is usually centered on the good, it is expected to coincide with the code of good, but it is seen to coincide with the code of evil. Justice exists to punish the oppressor. When the oppressor who does evil is rewarded for what he has done, evil disappears. When evil is destroyed, goodness takes its place. The goal of justice is to make goodness prevail on earth.

Whoever is more cruel, his well is more terrible. Justice has said that [the punishment] of the evil one is also evil... (Mawlana, 2015:80)

Take the weapon from the hand of the madman, so that justice and goodness may be pleased with you. If he has a weapon but no mind, bind his hand. Otherwise he will cause a hundred kinds of harm... (Mawlānā, 2015:526)

Feeling is related to reason, and a person who has a bad suspicion is like a sophist. He doubts everything, which deprives him of reason and emotion. A person who is deprived of reason and emotion is deprived of non-existence. *That sophist was already deprived of the leaven, the essence of reason; he was also deprived of emotion and was dismissed from existence* (Mawlānā, 2015:852).

In order to be a mature person, one must stay away from the bad people around them. Bad friends play games with people's emotions and use them for their own purposes, so they are not trustworthy people. The only being who is good, who commands goodness and who inspires trust is God. This is confirmed by the code of trust in God because it coincides only with the code of good. *Do not be fooled by the wiles of the evil friend, see the trap, do not walk on earth with a sense of trust* (Mawlānā, 2015:187). *Anything other than trust and complete surrender [to God] in adversity and in prosperity is a deception, a trap* (Mawlānā, 2015:49).

Codes that overlap with both good and bad codes: Goodness, malignancy, high road, good person, good temper/character, good job, friend, liking, hearth, Allah, closest friend, beauty, spirit, mind, backing, generous, hope/less, action for God, pray, religion, patience, reliance, bode ill, bad person, bad temper, defective work, devil, bad friend, bad eye, fear, body, jealousy, antagonist, nafs, cheat, meanness, long suffering, atrociousness, ambition.

The fact that good and evil are intertwined with the codes of good and evil implies that there is an evil in every good and a good in every evil. In the verse Al Baqarah 216, we are informed that there is evil in what we see as good and good in what we see as evil. This is confirmed by the fact that life is between good and evil. *What is the soul? The one who is aware of good and evil; the one who rejoices at the good and weeps at the harm* (Mawlānā, 2015:779).

The association of good and bad codes with similar codes confirms hypothesis 1.

Concepts and Phenomena Frequently Used with Good and Bad Values

The entire work was analyzed in order to identify the concepts frequently used with the codes of good and evil. After coding the concepts of good and bad in Masnavi, the concepts related to the concepts of good and bad were coded. Although all codes were taken as input in the MAXQDA program, codes that were related to each other and frequently used together were processed as output. The model that emerged based on the frequency of codes' association with each other is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2 Model Formed by Good and Bad Codes and Other Frequently Used Codes

According to Figure 2, the codes associated with good and bad codes and their frequency values are as follows: Evil (547), Good (537), Goodness (206), Malignancy (149), High road (50), Allah (44), Bad thought (40), Bad temper (33), Spirit (30), Trueness (26), Closest friend (25), Mind (23), Good person (22), Bad eye (22), Generous (22), Antagonist (22), Bode ill (19), Think a great deal of someone (18), Friend (16), Antroiciousness (15).

It is seen that the codes for good and evil are close to each other, but good and evil are mentioned more than good and evil. The right path, God, bad thought and bad spirit are among the most frequently used codes along with good and bad codes. Companion and friend were used in two different ways Among the codes of companion, friend and enemy in the relationship between good and evil, the companion code was used more frequently.

Concepts and Phenomena Frequently Used with the Value of Good

In order to determine how often the concepts coded as sub-codes of the good code were used with the good code, code - sub-code analysis was used in the MAXQDA program. In the analysis, it was examined which codes were frequently used with the code good. As a result of the analysis, it was determined that 18 codes were frequently used. The relationship model between the good code and sub-codes is shown in Figure 3 below.




Figure 3 The Model of the Good Code with its Subcodes

According to Figure 3, frequently used codes together with the code good: Goodness, high road, Allah, spirit, truness, closest friend, mind, generous, good person, think great deal of someone, friend, good temper/character, backing, beauty, reliance, guide.

It is good to ignore the desires of the body. The body is active in the upbringing of man, but there is no enemy that harms man more than it. When it is sick, it controls every way to get medicine, and when it is well, it turns into an entity that distracts man from the path of Allah. The body is actually a bad friend for man. This bad friend teaches one to be patient with what it puts one through. *A bad friend is good for patience because patience opens and expands the chest* (Mawlānā, 2015:824).

The body moves for the purpose of pleasure. When the body fails to enjoy what it possesses or gives up its desires and wishes for the sake of self-discipline, it begins to suffer. This pain of the body is better than the pain of being away from Allah. *Undoubtedly, abandoning this desire and whim is painful, but it is better than the pain of being away from the Truth* (Mawlānā, 2015:838).

The one who belongs to the world seeks only sustenance, for which he seeks prey and sustenance. The person on the path of Allah seeks freedom and death. Death reminds man of the purpose of his existence and enables him to become a mature human being. That is why the righteous have the desire for death. *Just as it is better to have a desire for profit, it is better to have a desire for death* (Mawlānā, 2015:173)

It is very beautiful for people to speak from the heart or to speak in a literary language. But it is more beautiful for a person to have the ability to speak less than others. *O Sultan! Let me tell you about one of my smallest skills. It is better to speak short*, he said (Mawlānā, 2015:76). Here Mawlānā includes the story of the birds that showed Solomon their skills.

When a person does whatever another person wishes and wants without question, that person is worse than falling into the fire. When one gives up on oneself for another self, one destroys one's own value. However, these two selves, which have the same value, have no superiority over each other and both are impermanent. There is only one being that one can give up oneself for, and that is the absolute being. *It is better to fall into a thousand fires than for the master to worship the servant* (Mawlānā, 2015:568).

Scoundrels are those who are enslaved to their ego, who live to fulfill the needs of the body, who are overconfident and hurtful to life. So it is better to stay away from them and be alone than to be fooled by their affectionate behavior.

Equate the friendship of scoundrels with that of servants. Loneliness is better than the smiling face of scoundrels (Mawlānā, 2015:187).

There is no sadness in the souls of the wise and they radiate beauty around them. And when they are a source of light, the wind cannot harm them. For this reason, the cruelty from the wise is better than the loyalty from the ignorant. *The Prophet says that enmity from the wise is better than friendship from the ignorant* (Mawlana, 240).

The darkness at the bottom of the well is better than man being in the dark. When a person is in darkness, it means that he is ignorant and uninformed. It is difficult to bring an ignorant person to the light, and even the one who acts with him will be in trouble. *The darkness of the well is better than the darkness of the people. He who holds the foot of the people cannot save his head.*

Not all help is good, but it is good to help the truly needy in the way of Allah. Help should be given in accordance with Allah's commands. Otherwise, stinginess is better. *[But] there is much stinginess that is better than giving; do not give Allah's property unless Allah commands it* (Mawlana, 112).

A human being is a person with knowledge. He makes choices based on his knowledge and will and takes part in life events in line with these choices. Being in a Fatanist understanding leads one to inaction. Not taking action or refraining from taking action is against the human nature and this is bad. Even though man acts on his own will, he remains silent in the face of Allah's will and trusts in Allah. *There is disorganization and evil in abstaining; it is better to go ahead and rely on Allah, it is better to rely on Allah.*

Concepts and Phenomena Frequently Used with the Value of Bad

In order to determine how frequently the concepts coded as subcodes of the bad code were used with the bad code, code-subcode analysis was used in the MAXQDA program. In the analysis, it was examined which codes were frequently used with the code bad. As a result of the analysis, it was determined that 18 codes were frequently used. The relationship model between the code bad and subcodes is shown in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4. Model of the Bad Code with its Subcodes

Figure 4 shows the codes that are frequently used together with the bad code: Malignancy, bad thought, bad temper, antagonist, bad eye, bode ill, atrociousness, bad person, nafs, fear, devil, defective work, bad word, bad friend, sedition, cheat, black hearted, lust.

When we question what evil is, it is seen that evil does not have any value in making sense of human life. Evil is like a worthless mine. No matter how much the worthless metal interacts with the precious metal, it does not become a precious metal. Similarly, a person with evil in his/her soul is not a valuable person no matter how much he/she interacts with a good person. And a good person does not become worthless because he interacts with evil. *What is evil? Worthless needy copper. Who is the sheikh? The endless elixir. Even if the copper is affected by the elixir and does not become gold, the elixir is affected by the copper and never becomes copper* (Mawlānā, 2015:290).

A person sees others as he is. A person in whom evil has settled sees the other person as evil. In fact, this evil is not because the other person is evil, but because the person himself is evil. *O you who see the reflection of evil in your uncle's face, it is not your uncle who is evil, it is you, do not be afraid of yourself* (Mawlānā, 2015:80). These evil people are not afraid of themselves but of others. He fears everyone, good or bad, but not himself. Because the nafs has turned him back to himself and prevented him from seeing himself. *All of them fear the good and the bad; no fearful person fears himself* (Mawlānā, 2015:853).

The self-oriented person aims only to fulfill his or her own needs, the relationship with others is very weak. The nafs only directs people towards the worldly and erodes their spirituality. For this reason, it is necessary to stay away from the desires and wishes of the nafs in order not to become its slave. The nafs desires what is bad, not what is good, so it is necessary to ignore the lustful desires of the nafs. *Even if your nafs says, "This place is bad," don't listen to it. For the work of the nafs is the opposite.* (Mawlānā, 2015:253). Even if the people who are caught up in their lustful feelings and do deeds are good, their name is now bad. Lust defiles a person's name and turns a wise person into a fool. *It [lust] has defamed hundreds of thousands of good names and turned hundreds of thousands of wise people into fools* (Mawlānā, 2015:663). *Therefore, those who follow their nafs and approach what is evil should fear themselves. For Allah will repay them for their evil deeds. Fear if you have done bad deeds. Do not think yourself safe. If you have sown a seed, Allah will make it grow* (Mawlānā, 2015:482).

People who do good and evil will be rewarded by Allah both while they are alive and after they die. The evil people determine their own punishment according to the degree of evil they have done. *Whoever is more cruel, his well is more terrible. Justice has said that [the punishment] of the evil is also evil* (Mawlana, 79). At the same time, people who do good and evil are known among the people by their deeds. People who do good are called good and people who do evil are called evil. *Those who do good are dead, their goodness remains. Blessed are those who ride the mount of goodness. The oppressors are dead, their oppression remains. Woe to the soul that cheats and deceives* (Mawlānā, 2015:518).

One should make friends with the good, not the bad. Because people who do evil are immoral. People without decency harm the people around them as well as themselves. *The immoral person does not only harm himself, but also sets fire to all around him* (Mawlānā, 2015:35). Likewise, people who do not use their intellect should be avoided. Since these people cannot distinguish between good and evil, they may do more evil than good. He may do more harm to the other person while trying to do good in a friendly way. *The friendship of a fool is worse than enmity. It is necessary to find a way to get rid of such a person* (Mawlānā, 2015:245). In fact, man's closest friend is Allah. Allah is benevolent and merciful. Since He has the knowledge of what is real, the relationship with Him brings goodness to man. When a person knows that good will always come from Allah, he is in eternal trust and hope. *The prophets said that despair is evil. But Allah's bounty and mercy are infinite.* (Mawlānā, 2015:407)

The Relationship of Codes in which Good is Used as an Adjective with Other Codes

The concepts for which the code good was used as an adjective were defined as separate codes in the coding system. In order to determine how these codes form a model together with other codes, these codes were defined in the center. In order to show the relationship between the codes in the center and other codes, Code Co-occurrence Model analysis was performed in MAXQDA program. The model that emerged after the analysis is shown in Figure 5 below.




Figure 5 Relationship Model Formed by the Codes Using Good as an Adjective and Other Codes

According to Figure 5, the codes good person, good friend, good job, high road, think a great deal of someone, good faith, being good, getting on with, good opinion, warm heart, good name, good temper/character constitute the central codes. Good job is related to goodness and malignancy codes; think a great of someone is related to Allah and bad eye codes; good temper/character is related to being calm and bad temper codes.

The code high road is related to the codes Allah, guide, spirit, mind, fear, malignancy and evil. Man gets rid of fear and enters the right path (Mawlānā, 2015:405). Allah guides the soul (Mawlānā, 2015:306; 855) and the soul, in union with another intellect, turns away from evil (Mawlānā, 2015:179) and perseveres on the right path.

The good friend code is related to both good and bad codes. A person can be a good friend when he or she matures (Mawlānā, 2015:302). A good friend does not think badly of you (Mawlānā, 2015: 711) and does not do cruelty and

evil to you (Mawlānā, 2015:251). A good friend elevates a person, while a bad friend brings a person down (Mawlānā, 2015:319).

Good-naturedness is virtuousness and beautiful competence, and it is worthy of praise (Mawlānā, 2015:205; 241; 628). Good-naturedness is not found in the ill-tempered (Mawlānā, 2015:93), but even if the good-tempered is calm, he will try to kill you when he can, that is, the good-tempered can be evil at times (Mawlānā, 2015:236). Many a learned and good-natured judge has been shamed by bribery (Mawlānā, 2015:365).

Good deeds are difficult; blessed is he who takes this difficulty in his stride and leaves behind good deeds after his death (Mawlana, 2015:78; 518). Whoever wants to reach Allah, let him do good deeds (Mawlānā, 2015:610). A person who is engaged in evil deeds fills his book of deeds with evil deeds, and the only good that this person can do is to do good deeds (Mawlānā, 2015:679).

The Relationship of Codes in which Evil is Used as an Adjective with Other Codes

The concepts for which the code bad was used as an adjective were defined as separate codes in the coding system. In order to determine how these codes form a model together with other codes, these codes were defined in the center. In order to show the relationship between the codes in the center and other codes, Code Co-occurrence Model analysis was performed in MAXQDA program. The model that emerged after the analysis is shown in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6 Relationship Model Formed by the Codes Using Evil as an Adjective and Other Codes

According to Figure 6, bad thought, bad character, bad temper, defective work, bad word, low road, bad eye, bad intention, bad name, bad friend, bad person, bode ill, black hearted, bad condition/event, bad behavior codes constitute the central codes. Bode ill, bad friend, bad person, defective work, bad temper and bad eye codes are related to both good and evil codes.

The code of bad thought is related to the codes of atrociousness, devil, hypochondria, hypocrisy and bad temper. Satan tries to distract people from the right path by bringing bad thoughts into their minds (Mawlānā, 2015:597). Even if the right path is shown to people with bad thoughts, they do not want to see it, their hearts are full of delusions (Mawlānā, 2015:268). The deeds of people with evil thoughts are also ugly because they always think of themselves (Mawlānā, 2015:685). Evil thoughts gain a place in evil spirits.

There is a relationship between the code bad temper and the codes sedition, nafs, spirit, good temper/character, hypocrisy and heart. Bad temper is nourished by the nafs (Mawlānā, 2015:945) and sedition and mischief is also a bad temper, and no one should have it (Mawlānā, 2015:204; 444). Bad habits blind the soul's intellect and the heart's eye (Mawlānā, 2015:526; 567). Tolerance takes place in hearts where bad habits have no place (Mawlānā, 2015:294).

The code of hypocrisy is associated with evil spirit and evil thinking. Hypocrisy is a bad habit. Bad-tempered people think for themselves, that is, they treat everyone differently in order to gain benefits. When a person acts only in their own self-interest, it is because they have self-centered thinking (bad thinking).

Bad eye is related to jealousy, sadness and think a great deal of someone. The cure for the evil eye is to think a great deal of someone (to look with the good eye). The good eye comes from being compassionate and forgiving, and the evil eye comes from sadness (Mawlānā, 2015:630). A person is jealous of someone else because he does not have what he has. Underlying this jealousy is the sadness of not having (Mawlānā, 2015:449; 630).

The code of evil is related to the code of evil person and evil deed. Two things are needed for evil to emerge; firstly, a bad person and secondly, a bad deed. Evil occurs as a result of bad deeds done by bad people. Evil does not come from God but from the bad deed. Allah has informed us that He does not approve of evil deeds, that He does not like people who do evil deeds, and that the person who does evil deeds will be rewarded. *Allah does not love those who do evil deeds and wrongdoing* (Al-Imran 57).

Bad hearts are found in people without faith (Mawlānā, 2015:456). People with evil hearts are like enemies (Mawlānā, 2015:274). Therefore, they get along well with enemies and mistreat the innocent (Mawlānā, 2015:542). Their hearts are darkened because of their ignorance, evil thoughts and greed (Mawlānā, 2015:173).

The fact that good and bad codes are taken within the contrasts of good person - bad person, good thought - bad thought, good temperament - bad temperament, good friend - bad friend, good eye - evil eye, being good - being bad, good name - bad name, good intention - bad intention, good hearted - bad hearted confirms hypothesis 2.

The fact that the values of good and evil are associated with God and discussed in a way that is supported by Qur'anic verses confirms hypothesis 3.

Conclusion

The values of good and evil are the basic values of moral life and are the values that shape the psychosocial and spiritual life of human beings. Good and evil as moral values are formed on opposites. Good is a value that defines actions and events that are desired by both the Almighty Creator and human beings, and bad is a value that defines actions and events that are not desired. When good functions as an adjective, it explains to human beings what the right path is, which personality traits they should have and in which triad of emotions, thoughts and behaviors they should take part. When bad acts as an adjective, it shows what things (thoughts, behaviors, personality traits, etc.) are not in accordance with human nature.

In this study, good and bad values were found to be associated with 86 different concepts and phenomena. The good value is only associated with concepts and phenomena such as tranquility, tender-mindedness, benefit, trust in God, guide, dervish lodge, mercy, good name, think a great deal of someone, getting on with, warm hearth, good opinion, being good, good faith. It can be said that these concepts and phenomena are generally the thoughts, feelings and behaviors that are expected from human beings and are in accordance with their nature. On the other hand, bad value is only related to concepts and phenomena such as bad behavior, bad condition/event, bad name, low road, bad intention, black hearth, bad thought, bad character, bad word, hell, calamity, sedition, hypochondria, disloyalty, lust, unbeliever, denial, robber, shame, damage,

lie, punishment, ignorant, persecution, fairness, emotion. These concepts and phenomena include emotions, thoughts and behaviors that are not expected from human beings. It is seen that goodness and malignancy are the most commonly used phenomena in the model formed by the values of good and evil together. The phenomenon of goodness corresponds to concepts and phenomena such as serving in the way of Allah, helping, being generous, being virtuous, having a beautiful heart, being loyal, being well-intentioned, being honest, and being forgiving. The phenomenon of evil, on the other hand, corresponds to concepts and phenomena such as being immoral, being in turmoil, being angry, being jealous, being in doubt, being stingy, cheating, sinning, acting out of greed and hatred. It is also seen that the phenomena of goodness and evil consist of opposites (Durak, 2007:14). A similar situation is seen in the use of good and evil as adjectives: Good person - bad person, good thought - bad thought, good temper - bad temper, good friend - bad friend, good eye - evil eye, being good - being bad, good name - bad name, good intention - bad intention, good hearted - bad hearted.

The good is what the rational will finds valuable and desires to be and do (Cevizci, 1999:278). This thing is good because of its intrinsic quality, the benefit it provides, and because it enables the attainment of another good (Cevizci, 1999:479). According to Mawlānā, what is good? It is to ignore the desires of the body, to have the desire for death, to speak short, not to be a servant to the servant, not to make the ignorant and lowly a friend, to stay away from the darkness of the people, not to define every help as help, and to have trust.

People who put good into action are good people, and they are also good friends. Good friends are people who are mature and try to guide their friends in the right direction. They usually do not do evil, do not think badly of people and are good-natured. Being good-natured requires being virtuous. However, sometimes good-natured people can also do bad things. This is because it is difficult to do good deeds and it is not always possible to take the risk. People who aim to be on the right path and always do good deeds are the ones who can reach Allah.

Bad is that which is not fit for purpose, is incomplete and defective, causes fear and anxiety, and has a damaging effect (Cevizci, 1999:524). According to Mawlānā, evil is that which does not have the value of the good and is not affected by the good even though it interacts with the good. The bad comes from the ego of the human being because the ego directs the human

being towards the worldly, that is, the transitory. The spirituality of a person who is oriented towards the world is also damaged. Evil resides in people whose spirituality is damaged and they are ready to do anything for their own benefit.

The person in whose heart evil has settled is a cruel person whose heart is blackened by greed. Because of their blackened hearts, they see everyone else as bad. Since he is the evil one, he sees everyone else as he is. But they fear others, thinking that harm will come from them and not from themselves. At the same time, since these people cannot distinguish between good and evil, they often do evil to those around them when they want to do good to them. Evil is also revealed in the bad deeds of the bad person.

An evil person is a person who has strayed from the right path because of his evil thoughts and whose heart is full of mischief. They think a lot about themselves and are bad-tempered. This is because they are driven by their nafs. By dulling the mind and heart, the nafs leads to bad habits such as sedition, mischief, jealousy and hypocrisy. Bad habits, in turn, eliminate tolerance and force people to act only in their own interests. When they see that others have what they don't have, they become jealous. And jealousy sometimes leads to the evil eye. The cure for the evil eye is to look with the good eye. The one who looks well sees the beautiful, and the one who sees the beautiful reaches the flavor and meaning of life. The evil eye is ruled by the ego, and the one who is ruled by the ego dulls his mind and heart.

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CHAPTER XXIII

AWAKENING OF THE ISLAMIC UMMAH: CRITICAL THINKING OF MUHAMMAD IQBAL

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Introduction

The development line of civilizations has always been a subject of discussion from the ancient philosophers to the present day. Social change theories try to explain the changes in societies. In general, these theories can be grouped under three headings: I. *Cyclic change* (organismic models); II. *One-directional change* (evolutionary models); III. *Versatile change* (neo-modernist and post-modernist models). Since the change will exist in time, it is better to explain this classification by choosing a starting point for change. According to the cyclic change, societies begin to change by going through certain processes from the starting point we choose. But there is an endpoint to which this change will reach. After arriving there, the reverse change begins and society will return to the starting point. Social changes continue cyclically in this way. In the linear change, societies always continue to develop to the better. The ultimate point here is to reach modern society and there will be no going back. The change processes of all societies run on a single linear line. Versatile change, like linear change, adopts a progressive approach. However, societies do not have to carry out change along the same lines. According to this approach, different paths can be followed (Yılmaz, 2019: 21-22).

Western civilization generally wishes to explain its development line within the framework of evolutionary theories. Accordingly, there is only one right way to progress on the path of modernization, and that is the path followed

by the West. Other civilizations should also follow this path. This paradigm had been a dominant way of thinking, especially during the 19th century and until the middle of the 20th century. Of course, some dared to stand up to this dominant paradigm. For instance, Danilevskii (2013) (1822-1885), in his seminal work in Russian intellectual history, mentions that each civilization has its own line of development. He, by comparing cultures and nations to biological species, claims that every nation is united by language and culture that cannot be transferred to other nations. The outstanding work of British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1987) (1889-1975), in which he examines the formation, rise, and fall of 26 civilizations, can also be mentioned here. Toynbee argues that civilizations develop by responding to the challenges that come from other civilizations and environmental factors.

In fact, it is possible to read world history as the power struggle of civilizations. The West has wanted to carry the power it gained through technology and colonization to the field of civilization. In this context, the West has imposed its civilization line on other civilizations. On the other hand, Islamic civilization has lost its power, which was at its peak during the Ottoman's strong times. Muslim intelligentsia was in great psychological destruction on the eve of and after the World War I. But tough times also have the capacity to bring out strong men/ideas.

Every era has its great people. What makes them great is that they either oppose the established order or speak ahead of their time. One of the thinkers revealed by these difficult times is Pakistani Allama Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. Within the scope of this article, his thoughts on self-formation, reconstruction of Islamic thought, and his determination to stand against imperialist powers will be examined.

The Life and Works of Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) is one of the distinguished writers of the Indian subcontinent. He is a famous philosopher and poet. He studied philosophy and law at the Government College in Lahore. During his education, Thomas Arnold noticed Iqbal's talent and helped him go to Cambridge University for undergraduate education. Later, he completed his doctorate at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich in 1907 with his thesis *the Development of Metaphysics in Persia*.

Iqbal wrote poetry in Urdu and Persian. *Asrar-ı Khudi*, which he published in Persian in 1915, was translated into English by Professor Reynold Nicholson

from Cambridge University, under the title *the Secrets of the Self* (1920). This work helped Iqbal be recognized in the West. His greatest masterpiece *the Javid Nama* (1932), or *Book of Eternity* is a spiritual odyssey across the universe under the guidance of Mevlana Jalaluddin al-Rumi. Rumi guides Iqbal just as Virgil guides Dante in *the Divine Comedy*. *Bang-i-Dara (the Caravan Bell)* (1924) and *Baal-i-Gabriel (the Wing of Gabriel)* (1936) are among his Urdu anthologies. He made an exceptional contribution to the literary forms of Urdu poetry. Some poems in these collections are expressed as the greatest poems in that language. In his conferences, he addressed the socio-religious problems of his time. These talks were later published in the book *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1930).

Iqbal was actively involved in politics too. While in England in 1908, he was elected as a member of the executive council of the newly formed British branch of the Indian Muslim League. In 1931 and 1932, along with names such as Aga Khan III, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Fazlul Huq, he represented Indian Muslims at the British Round Table Conferences where the future of India was discussed. In his 1930 Presidential Address at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, Iqbal articulated the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Although his life was not enough to see its establishment, Iqbal continued to strive for the creation of an independent Pakistan. After its establishment in 1947, Pakistan officially honored Iqbal by counting him among the founding fathers. *Iqbal Academy Pakistan* was declared an Executing Agency and became a statutory body of the Government of Pakistan. The Academy aims to promote and disseminate Iqbal's thoughts. Iqbal Academy also uses its webpage extensively in memory of Iqbal and shares Iqbal's works as well as studies about him (Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2022). Meanwhile, the year 2002, coinciding with Iqbal's 125th birthday, was declared the "Year of Iqbal" by the Pakistani Government. Iqbal's birthday, November 9, had been celebrated as a national holiday from 1975 to 2015 until the Pakistani government decided to reduce the number of national holidays.

A Brief Political History of Pakistan

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the fifth most populous country in the world with a population of over 220 million and has the second-largest Muslim residents. Although it is possible to trace the existence of Islam in the Indian subcontinent back to the seventh century, it would be correct to say that the main influence in the region—where is Pakistan now— began in the 11th century.

Islamic dynasties such as the Ghaznavids (963-1186), the Ghurids (1175-1206), and the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) dominated the region for five centuries in succession (Wynbrandt, 2009: 41).

It is not possible to evaluate the recent history of Pakistan independently of world colonial history. Since the 16th century, imperialist powers have been trying to seize the regional underground sources and world trade routes. In the middle of the 18th century, this domination passed into the hands of the British. Over the next century, the English East India Company (EIC), under the patronage of Britain, gained control over the subcontinent mainly through military force. The dominance that Britain sought to establish in the Indo-sub-continent, as well as over the world, was based on political and commercial concerns. British dominance in this region gave them a significant advantage in the competition of Britain with other Western imperialist powers. In 1857, due to the discontent of colonialism, Hindus and Muslims initiated the Great Indian Revolt against the English East India Company. In its aftermath, Britain dissolved the EIC and began direct control of Indian territory (Wynbrandt, 2009: 114).

As a matter of fact, when a state seizes a region, it tries to revive and develop this new land since it becomes a part of the country. However, the aim of colonialism is not to connect the new land to the mainland, but only to transfer the resources of that region to the mainland. As such, the imperialist powers have seen every means permissible to keep the colonies in their hands. Sometimes artificial migration movements were created to increase dominance over the colony, and sometimes regional conflicts were incited. Christian missionary works were also frequently used to ensure dominance in the religious and cultural field and to strengthen obedience. Of course, there has always been discontent with the colonial states among local population, but these voices were often weak due to the military superiority of the colonialists. One of the arguments used against colonialism is Islamic jihad. Religion has given Muslims a sense of unity, strength to resist, and honored them with martyrdom in death. For this reason, imperialist powers have always considered religion dangerous for their domination. Based on the negative perception created against Islamic movements, it can be argued that the imperialist powers see religion as a threat to their domination and want to suppress it. Many Islamic movements, whose reflections we still see today, are actually the product of the resistance against the colonial powers. Returning to Pakistan, it is seen that the desire to create an independent Islamic state against the British colony lies at the root of the Islamic movements in Pakistan.

At the end of the 19th century, it is seen that the first steps toward independence began to be taken. At the beginning of the 20th century, the desire for independence increased and the Muslims succeeded in forming a new unity, albeit by forming a party. Mohammed Iqbal also expressed this desire more loudly in his speech at the All-India Muslim League in 1930 and stated that he wanted to see the western provinces of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan gathered under an independent Islamic state (Iqbal, 1970: 159).

In the political environment after World War II, the colonies had begun to declare their independence one by one. The independence struggle of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent for years has paid off and Pakistan was established in 1947 as a bi-zonal state (East and West Pakistan) covering the east and west of India. After the establishment, there have been conflicts with India about the dominance of some regions. By 1956, the Islamic Republic was constitutionalized. In the following years, the management problems of East Pakistan, which has no land connection to the West, emerged and East Pakistan gained its independence in 1971 under the name of Bangladesh.

Islamic Modernism

In order to understand the mental world of the Muslim intellectual who lived in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, it is necessary to know the relationship between the West and Islam in those years. We touched upon colonialism above; however, the colonialism of the West was not only limited to the material world but also created a hegemony in the cultural area. Orientalism studies are also a part of this hegemony. According to Edward Said, Western imperial powers (Occident) have dominated the Orient by managing the entire information system about the Orient. Even more, this information is reprocessed by the Orient and gained legitimacy in the minds. Under the influence of orientalism, the Orient has also read itself from a Western perspective and contributed negatively to this legitimacy. The vision of the Orient in need of development legitimizes all the colonial steps of the West. All the mistakes made by the West are covered under the guise of civilization and modernization (Said, 2003).

The West, strengthened by industrialization and colonialism, has become the center of both science and civilization. While the West was building a conception of the universe in its own line of development, the non-Western world such as Muslim countries, India, and Africa was marginalized by being pushed

out of this system. Eventually, the East has been de facto occupied and exploited. While the West established freedom, democracy, and prosperity in its mainland, it operated the opposite in the East. In this course, the Orient sometimes engaged in resistance and conflict to protect its values, and sometimes this process led to reconciliation and assimilation under a sense of surrender. For this reason, for the non-Western 19th-century ordinary person, the West represents not reason, science, and freedom, but an invading imperialism (Kalin, 2008: 109).

Contrary to the negative conception of the West in the minds of ordinary people, an incurable admiration for the West has emerged among most of the Eastern intellectuals. The regression that has been going on for the last two centuries against the West has pushed the Eastern intellectual to learned helplessness. Most of the time, the science and culture of the West were seen as an inseparable part of each other, and the western culture has been aimed to be transferred to the Islamic world in the same way. For instance, in the newly established Republic of Turkey with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, modernization has been implemented as a strict western imitation. Under the idea of modernization, Islamic education was banned, western-style clothing was adopted, and the state applied an oppressive secular structure.

Indeed, in this picture, it is not correct to portray the last few centuries of the history of Islamic civilization in a completely dichotomous manner, as anti-western and pro-western supporters. The number of thinkers who want to prepare the Islamic civilization for the new century by considering the Industrial Revolution of the West and the new lifestyle brought by modern life in an Islamic perspective is substantial. According to İbrahim Kalın, the travelogue literature created by Muslim ambassadors and travelers shows that the approach to Europe is beyond simple admiration or imitation. In any case, the Muslim observer oscillates between two European and two Islamic worlds: on the one hand, a Europe that has achieved great success in the fields of science, economy, military, and technology, and on the other hand, a Europe whose imperialist ideals have gained a transcontinental dimension; an Islamic world with a glorious past on the one hand, and a defeated and weakened Islamic world on the other. This bilateral dilemma has dominated the worlds of almost all pro-western, anti-western, traditionalist, and modernist intellectuals and political actors for a long time (Kalin, 2008: 109).

Here, conservative Muslim intellectuals did not equalize modernization to Western modernism. They considered the technological and military development and cultural change of the West as independent structures. The technological and military development of the West was sought to be transferred

by considering Islamic values. The Islamic understanding was also re-evaluated and the needs and conditions of the modern age were taken into account. Meanwhile, there was resistance to Western cultural imperialism. In short, while one side was skeptical of everything coming from the West and rejected all of them, the other side wanted to transfer everything to the Islamic world without question. The conservative Muslim intellectual, who showed that a third way could exist, tried to create a consciousness against the moral corruption of the West while embracing the science of the West, based on Islam and its moral values. Muhammad Iqbal is one of the Muslim intellectuals who showed us that a third way can exist. This perspective, which represents the third and original stance against the West in Iqbal's thought, requires the Muslim identity to have some fundamental concepts.

Self

The self is one of the most central as well as critically discussed concepts in philosophy. As a matter of fact, the self, as a philosophical problem, is discussed by modern self theorists, sometimes objectively or subjectively, and sometimes by integrating both its subjective and objective dimensions. In this sense, the contribution of the self as a whole to the temporal coherence of individual identity is determined by the object-self. However, the developmental, progressive, and unpredictable characters of the self are determined by the subject-self. In other words, while the object-self represents the traditionality and established rules, the subject-self represents the novelty and the unknowable (Kınağ, 2017: 96).

The self-concept, which is the dynamic center of human desires, pursuits, ambitions, efforts, decisions, actions, and personality development, also has a central position in Iqbal's thought. In general, the fact that Iqbal includes couplets about people first and then society in his poetry shows that he established his system of thought based on the human being. For social transformation, people must first be prepared (Albayrak, 1998: 241). Iqbal, who examines the basic problems related to man and the universe in his philosophy of self, seeks answers from Islamic teachings. The purpose of man's creation and the ways to reach this goal are also a part of these basic questions. In doing so, the human being is placed at the focal point. In other words, his aim is to find an answer to the question "What is a human being?" (Soydan, 2016: 95-96).

Iqbal sees every person's existence as unique, just as every person's fingerprint is unique. Even, Allah himself is an individual. He is the most unique individual. The universe is an association of individuals. But this association is not fixed. Each individual contributes to this unity. Thus, the universe is

not a completed act: it is still in the course of formation. The creation process continues, and man gets his share of it. Even if a man is spiritually and physically self-sufficient, he is not yet a complete individual. As a man gets to know God, he completes his self. In the opposite case, the greater his distance from God, the less his individuality. Eventually, man absorbs God into himself. In this way, the self becomes free by overcoming all obstacles in its path. In the words of Iqbal, “life is an endeavor for freedom” (Iqbal, *Collected Poetical Works of Iqbal*: 3-4).

According to Iqbal, the self in its movement toward uniqueness must pass through three phases. First, the self has to obey the divine law:

*Endeavor to obey, O heedless one!
Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.
By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy;
By disobedience, his fire is turned to ashes.
Whoso would master the sun and stars,
Let him make himself a prisoner of Law! ...
The star moves towards its goal
With head bowed in surrender to a law.
The grass springs up in obedience to the law of growth:
When it abandons that, it is trodden underfoot. ...
Drops of water become a sea by the law of union,
And grains of sand become a Sahara.
Since Law makes everything strong within,
Why dost thou neglect this source of strength? ...
Do not complain of the hardness of the Law,
Do not transgress the statutes of Muhammad!*

(Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self*)

Obedience here is not insubordination that causes people to lose their faculties. On the contrary, man here gains value in obedience to God. Forcing the soul to submit to divine rules means disciplining the self. The soul that learns to obey can improve its entity. The second phase is self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness:

*Thy soul cares only for itself, like the camel:
It is self-conceited, self-governed, and self-willed.
Be a man, get its halter into thine hand,
That thou mayst become a pearl albeit thou art a potter's vessel. ...*

*All this is a means of strengthening thee:
Thou art impregnable, if thy Islam be strong.*

(Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self*)

Our soul constantly wants to act in the direction of its desires. It is necessary to restrain it. The way to do this is by fulfilling the requirements of Islam. Prayer kills sins and wrongs like a dagger; fasting controls sensuality through hunger; the pilgrimage feeds the soul and binds Muslims; and almsgiving makes equality familiar and reduces craving for wealth. All of these empower people. In other words, the stronger the religion of the person, the stronger the self. The last phase is the divine vicegerency:

*It is sweet to be God's vicegerent in the world
And exercise sway over the elements.
God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe,
Man's being is the shadow of the Greatest Name.*

(Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self*)

This divine vicegerency is the final phase of human development. The vicegerent is Allah's vicegerent on world. Both for mind and body, reaching this point is the pinnacle of life. This is the purpose of man's creation. The essence of the self lies in absorbing the meaning of the word "there is no god but Allah."

*The secret of the self is hid,
In words "No god but He alone."
The self is just a dull-edged sword,
"No god but He," the grinding stone.*

(Iqbal, *The Rod of Moses*)

Believing that there is no god but Allah gives man the power to break all idols like how the prophet Abraham did. As stated by the Quran "This worldly life is no more than play and amusement." (Al-Ankabut, 64). Worldly wealth is deceit. A strong belief in the oneness of God can fall all idols headlong. Led by religion, the depths of ourselves will guide us here again.

*A thousand founts shall spring on path that you have trod,
Go deep in self and cleave the sea with Moses' Rod.*

(Iqbal, *The Rod of Moses*)

Monotheism frees man from all his fears. In this way, the value given to the world is declining. The self emerges and the will of God, not worldly desires and fears, begins to dominate it.

*My Saki made me drink the wine / Of There is no god but He:
From the illusive world of sense, / This cup divine has set me free.*

(Iqbal, *Gabriel's Wing*, 9)

Every area of life should serve religion or create an awareness of faith. Art, insight, intellect, and science not inspired by religion do more harm than good. At best, they are stillborn.

*What good is art that does not have
The impact of the rod of Moses?*

(Iqbal, *The Rod of Moses*)

Iqbal links existence to self-knowledge. The existence of man is also a reflection of the existence of Allah. The person who denies Allah is actually denying himself. In other words, man's self-knowledge is equivalent to knowing Allah.

*To your mind God's existence seems unproved:
Your own existence seems not proved to mine.
He whose self shines like a gem, alone exists;
Take heed of it! I do not see yours shine.*

(Iqbal, *The Rod of Moses*)

According to Sufi understanding, the reason for creation is the "manifestation" of Allah and His desire to be "recognized". A narration that is assumed to be a hadith is cited as a basis for this justification: "I was a hidden treasure, and I wished to be known, so I created mankind." According to Iqbal, existent wants to appear, it wants to show its existence. Just as God wants to make himself known, man also should make himself known.

*I asked him [Rumi], 'What is the existent, the non existent?
What is the meaning of praiseworthy and unpraiseworthy?'*

*He said, 'The existent is that which wills to appear:
manifestation is all the impulse of Being.*

*Life means to adorn oneself in one's self,
to desire to bear witness to one's own being.*

(Iqbal, *Javid Name*, 231)

According to Iqbal, the first purpose of existence is self-knowledge. However, self-knowledge is not a purely intellectual act. There are also obligations that existence brings to man. Action and dynamism are also parts of the process that completes our selves. In the next sections, Iqbal's dynamic character and his theory of action will be discussed.

Dynamism

Iqbal sees creation as an ongoing process. The man also contributes to this process. For this reason, Iqbal also opposes the thoughts that make the self lose its dynamism. Passive Sufi understanding of Islam is also at the center of this criticism. Iqbal claims that Plato has deeply influenced the mysticism and literature of Islam.

*Plato, the prime ascetic and sage
Was one of that ancient flock of sheep.
His Pegasus went astray in the darkness of idealism
And dropped its shoe amidst the rocks of actuality.
He was so fascinated by the invisible
That he made hand, eye, and ear of no account.
"To die," said he, "is the secret of Life:
The candle is glorified by being put out."
He dominates our thinking,
His cup sends us to sleep and takes the sensible world away from us.
He is a sheep in man's clothing,
The soul of the Sufi bows to his authority.
He soared with his intellect to the highest heaven
And called the world of phenomena a myth.*

(Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self*)

Plato's theory of ideas is among the most debated topics in the history of philosophy. Ideas are immutable, immaterial, eternal essences or patterns of visible objects that are pale copies or reflections (Cevizci, 2014: 93). Although

it can be claimed that Plato's doctrine of ideas deepens the distinction between appearance and reality, that is, it devalues the world, it should be noted that it does not abolish the relationship between them. Indeed, the aim is not to discredit the phenomenon, but to provide a philosophical explanation that can explain the existing differences. The difficulty of grasping these kinds of concepts causes different and even contradictory interpretations from time to time. Therefore, the criticism here can go to Plato's teaching as well as to a misunderstanding of his concepts.

Iqbal states that "My criticism of Plato is directed against those philosophical systems which hold up death rather than life as their ideal—systems which ignore the greatest obstruction to life, namely, matter, and teach us to run away from it instead of absorbing it" (Iqbal, 1920: XXII). Iqbal argues that by shaping Islamic mysticism, Neoplatonism played a role in the decline of Islamic civilization. Neoplatonism has evaluated this world, including human beings as mere metaphors for the real. Under the influence of this thought, Sufis adopted the idea of the annihilation of the self in God (*fanaa fi Allah*). Considering that Iqbal put the idea of self at the foundation of his entire philosophy, the notion of killing the self collapses the whole system (Majeed, 2013: XV).

Iqbal desires a revival in all aspects of life, especially in religious thought. He writes odes with a musical appeal to activate the Islamic youth. In this way, he fills the pessimistic, hopeless Muslim, who has fallen from leadership and dominance, with sweet tunes and warns him (Albayrak, 1998: 247).

*See, the ocean is at rest, Slumbrous as a desert waste;
Yea, no waxing or increase; Ever disturbs the ocean's peace.
Never the ocean knows storm; Or Leviathan's dread swarm:
Rend its breast and, billow-wise; Swelling into tumult, rise!
Out of leaden sleep, Out of slumber deep, Arise!*

(Iqbal, *Persian Psalms*, II:19)

Iqbal seeks to arouse the Muslim world from a long and deep slumber. Iqbal is not trying to build a thought system from scratch. He wants to bring dynamism to the already existing Islamic thought. The likeness of Muslims to an ocean points to their knowledge of depth. What is desired is the realization and re-activation of this power. Just as the waves on the sea are unique, Islamic thought is also unique. It has the capacity to make new formations every time. However, today's

Islamic world seems to have forgotten this capacity. It is necessary for them to remember this power.

Iqbal illuminates the principle of movement in the structure of Islam through *Ijtihâd*. This term refers to the process of Muslim jurists making a legal decision by implying an independent or original interpretation to problems that are not precisely or directly covered by the Quran or Hadith. The completion of Islam refers to a 23-year process. Throughout this process, the Quran was gradually revealed, and the Prophet's conversations were shaped within the framework of daily needs. The Quran verses had not yet been collected and turned into a *mushaf*, and the hadiths had not been compiled yet. The companions presented the problems they faced to the Prophet and arranged their lives according to his answers. As the Islamic geography expanded, the possibility of asking questions about religion directly to the Prophet began to decrease, and after the death of the Prophet, this opportunity disappeared.

After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the companions tried to solve the religious issues and problems in the light of the Quran and the Sunnah. However, as time passed, issues such as the meaning of the verses and the authenticity of the hadiths began to challenge Muslims. New religious thoughts, customs, and traditions encountered in the new regions where Islam spread have also begun to affect Islamic understanding. All this progressed in a natural process and Islamic scholars tried to find religious provisions by thinking about these newly emerged issues. In the following years, sect formations occurred with the schooling of Islamic scholars. The formation of sects started to put pressure on religious thought over time. Acceptance of the sects led the next generations to imitate. The idea that "all has been said about religious principles" has blocked new interpretations. While there was no restriction on *ijtihad* until the middle of the 9th century, since then, the understanding that only the previous *mujtahids* had *ijtihad* competence has begun to prevail. By the 10th century, this idea turned into general acceptance, and after this period, all the functions of the jurists were limited to interpreting the doctrines of the previous scholars. This doctrine is expressed in the literature with the term "closing the door of *ijtihad*" (Apaydın, 2000: 443).

According to Iqbal, the most important reason for the loss of dynamism in the Islamic world is the closing of the door of *ijtihad*. Iqbal, recalling the famous hadith of Mu'adh, traces the foundations of *ijtihad* to the time of the Prophet. When Mu'adh ibn Jabal was appointed as the ruler of Yemen, the Prophet asked him how he would decide matters coming up before him. Mu'adh replied I will

judge matters according to the Book of Allah; if I could not find the evidence I was looking for in the Quran, I would take into account the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah; and if I could not find what I was looking for there, then I would exert to form my judgment. The Prophet was pleased with these answers (Sunan Abi Dawud, Kitab Al-Aqdiyah).

What Iqbal wants to show us by quoting this hadith is that the *ijtihad* was approved by the Prophet even in his lifetime. Iqbal attributes the reasons for the closing of the door of *ijtihad* to three processes. 1) Discussions about the createdness of the Quran and the *mihna* incident where Islamic scholars were persecuted for not following the Mu'tazila doctrine during the Abbasid period. In those years, doors were closed to different ideas in order to protect the social integrity of Islam. 2) The rise and growth of ascetic Sufism not shaped by an Islamic character. The spirit of total other-worldliness dulled the worldly aspect of religion. This situation caused the Islamic world to be deprived of well-trained statesmen. Leaderless people found their security only in blindly following the schools. 3) Foreign invasion of Islamic lands such as Baghdad by Mongols in the 13th century. Fear of further fragmentation led conservative Islamic thinkers to a protectionist approach. That caused the door to be closed for all kinds of new interpretations. Although there were Islamic scholars who wanted to reopen the door of *ijtihad* in the coming centuries, their efforts were not sufficient (Iqbal, 2013: 117-120). As can be seen above, intellectual stagnation in the Islamic world started long before the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Iqbal does not agree with the views of writers seeking Turkish influence in the stagnation of Islamic law. In fact, only Turkey among Islamic countries shows signs of revival in religious thought and deserves praise;

The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the ideal to the real – a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle. To her, the growing complexities of a mobile and broadening life are sure to bring new situations suggesting new points of view and necessitating fresh interpretations of principles which are only of academic interest to people who have never experienced the joy of spiritual expansion. It is, I think, the English thinker Hobbes who makes this acute observation that to have a succession of identical thoughts and feelings is to have no thoughts and feelings at all. Such is the lot of most Muslim countries today. They are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk is on the way to creating new values (Iqbal, 2013: 128).

Iqbal predicts that in the near future other Islamic countries will also face the problems encountered by Turks regarding Islamic law. In this sense, it can be said that the greatest benefit brought by modernization to religion is to re-examine religious thought. Iqbal states that Indian Muslims are not yet ready for a critical discussion of Islamic law, and states that such issues can disturb many conservatives and even lead to sectarian conflicts. Still, Iqbal does not hesitate to express what he thinks is right. He reminds us that practically up to the rise of the Abbasids, there was no written law of Islam apart from the Quran. Secondly, Until the 11th century, at least 19 different schools of law had emerged. This is a proof that how the early Islamic scholars were active. Thirdly, when we study the most famous four schools, the controversies between them evaporates the supposed rigidity of the schools (Iqbal, 2013: 131). All this effort of Iqbal is to reconstruct the Islamic thought.

Indeed, following “reason” alone will not lead humanity to salvation. According to Iqbal, “humanity needs three things today – a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis.” The capitalist idealism and soulless mind of Europe are far from presenting these to man. Islam, on the other hand, gives us this spirit with its revelation-based foundation. Today’s Muslims should appreciate their position and rebuild their social life in the light of religion (Iqbal, 2013: 142).

Action

This paper implies that Iqbal is a great thinker. However, Iqbal did not speak purely based on thought, but also made efforts to bring his ideas to life. He begins the preface to his book *the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* with these sentences: “The Qur’an is a book which emphasizes ‘deed’ rather than ‘idea’” (Iqbal, 2013: XLV). So, ideas alone are not enough. They need to be implemented in life.

While Iqbal was famous in the western world for his philosophical thoughts and poems, it was his attitude towards western imperialism and colonialism that made him famous in the eyes of ordinary Muslims in the Islamic world. Iqbal appreciates the scientific development of the West but reminds us of the damage it has done to humanity while achieving the power it has reached. In the New Year’s message broadcast on the radio in 1938, he articulated the damage done to humanity by imperialism under the mask of Democracy, Nationalism,

Communism, and Fascism. From Abyssinia to Palestine, from Spain to China all humanity is being oppressed under capitalist barbarism. The Spanish Civil War, which continued during Iqbal's speech, shows that greed for power and economic success caused the death of tens of thousands of people, even if they have the same race, nationality, language, and religion. Unless people show by their actions that the whole world is a part of Allah's creation, they will not be able to live in peace. To reach this contented life, it is necessary to remember the source of the problem:

The tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face under the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism, and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way to which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. The so-called statesmen to whom government and leadership of men was entrusted have proved demons of bloodshed, tyranny, and oppression. The rulers whose duty it was to protect and cherish those ideals which go to form a higher humanity, to prevent man's oppression of man and to elevate the moral and intellectual level of mankind, have in their hunger for dominion and imperial possessions, shed the blood of millions and reduced millions to servitude simply in order to pander to the greed and avarice of their own particular groups. After subjugating and establishing their dominion over weaker peoples, they have robbed them of their possessions, of their religions, their morals, of their cultural traditions and their literatures. Then they sowed divisions among them that they should shed one another's blood and go to sleep under the opiate of serfdom, so that the leech of imperialism might go on sucking their blood without interruption.

(Iqbal, 1938 New Year's Message broadcast on All-India Radio, 1995: 298)

At a time when the cultural dominance of the West over the Islamic world was so intense, hearing these ideas from a thinker who received his education in Europe instilled self-confidence in the Islamic world. Ali Shariati, one of the pioneers of the Iranian Islamic revolution, likens Iqbal to a flower that blooms in rotteness. Iqbal succeeded in nurturing his roots with the Islamic spirit. Iqbal's presence brings hope to the colonized Muslims of the world. He shows us that, despite ignorance, inner stagnation, and imprisonment under military entanglements, Islam still has the ability to create great geniuses, deep, and powerful spirits. For many Muslim intellectuals, who want to establish the rules of religion in political life, it is important to take action for the realization of

religious ideas. In this sense, Ali Shariati describes Iqbal as an anti-colonial fighter, a responsible intellectual, a mujahid, and a man who acts in his own age for the benefit of his people. Shariati, by quoting the lines of Iqbal, explains a mujahid's characteristics:

*In the Sufi spiritual path / there is only the state of intoxication.
In the mullah's Divine Law / only words intoxicate.
I see not the intoxication of deeds /
in the song of a dead, dejected, foolish poet / who is neither asleep nor awake.
I do not see that mujahid / in whose veins there is only /
the intoxication of deeds.*

Shariati elucidates that these are the states of intoxication, words of intoxication, intoxication of thoughts, and, finally, intoxication of deeds characterizing four distinct types of intellectuals with four different world views: Sufi, jurisprudent, poet, and mujahid, respectively (Shariati, 2011).

Iqbal tries to create awareness of self, Islam, and ummah through poetry. Just as Israfil revives the dead, Iqbal tries to revive Muslims with his poems (Schimmel, 2007: 148).

*In my song there is no charming and romantic grace,
for the blast of the trumpet of Israfil is not meant to please the heart.*
(Iqbal, *Gabriel's Wing*, 15)

Iqbal's poetic period is generally divided into three phases. In the first period, until the age of 20, Iqbal presented his poems in a more traditional style by using the accepted symbols and terminology of the period. In these years, besides religion and mysticism, subjects such as the beloved, the beauty of the beloved, nature, homeland, and nation were also in his field of interest. The turbulent political conjuncture of the Indian subcontinent led him to become a national poet in the following years. In those years, Pan-Islamist movements started under the leadership of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani against Western imperialism were gaining popularity. Beyond being purely religious, these movements carried political and reformist characters. Similarly, patriotic and nationalist views began to gain prevalence. Iqbal also sanctified the homeland in this period. Iqbal proposes to meet on the common ground of the homeland, without discriminating between nation, race, language, or religion. Accordingly,

these differences create color rather than conflict in the cultural unity of the country, and this contributes to the unity of the homeland. Iqbal, who is constantly evolving intellectually, withdraws his support from the patriotic movement in time. In the following years, he even opposes patriotic ideas by stating that the bond between homeland and geographical borders does not comply with Islamic teachings and principles. In his speech at the Muslim League in 1930, he stated that the most important factor shaping the society in the history of Indian Muslims was Islam. He pinpointed that as an ethical ideal and a political system, Islamic laws and institutions are the most important factor in uniting dispersed individuals and groups. After his youth, Islamic teaching manifests itself in every field of Iqbal's thought. Although Iqbal included religion in his early poems, religion and politics were handled as separate subjects. In his Islamic poetry period, religion and politics became inseparable parts of each other. The aim of the poems of this period is to create a completely Islamic way of thinking, warn humanity, and take action (Soydan, 2016: 67-93).

Iqbal wants to throw away the dead soil laid on Muslims. His poem *Prayer* is remarkable in this regard. In this work, Iqbal prays to Allah for the Muslims to regain their old will to action. The fact that this prayer is put into verses shows that the purpose is not prayer, but the desire to move Muslims:

*Lord, fill the Muslim's heart with a desire so fervent
That it will set his heart aflame and stir his soul.
Light up again every speck of dust in the Valley of Faran.
Make us long again for beautiful sights, and create in us the urge to make demands.
Give piercing vision to those deprived of sight,
And show to others what I have seen.
Lead the stray gazelle back to the Sanctuary.
It has grown used to the city - give it back the vastness of the desert.
Stir up again the ruins of the heart with a commotion like judgment Day.
Let this empty litter once again seat a sweetheart - a Layla!
In the darkness of this age give to every troubled heart
Scars of love that would shame the moon.
Let the goals be as high as the Pleiades.
Give us the calm and poise of the shore, but the freedom of the sea.
Let love be selfless and truth fearless;
Let our breasts be flooded with light- make our hearts clear as crystal.
Enable us to foresee the calamity that is coming;*

*In the midst of today's upheaval give us a vision of tomorrow.
I am a nightingale making my lament, I am from a garden which has been ravaged.
I wish that my prayer would have effect— give to a beggar, bounteous Lord!
(Iqbal, *The Call of the Caravan Bell*, Prayer)*

Conclusion

Muhammad Iqbal's moral, philosophical, and religious thoughts are based on three basic elements. These are self-construction, reinterpretation of Islam, and unity of Muslims. For all these elements to be fulfilled, a constant determination of struggle must be shown.

Iqbal puts the human self at the foundation of everything. A strong self-construction should be the basis of all struggles. No obstacle can stand in the way of a person who knows himself and therefore his self-worth. Self-knowing, self-believing, and having self-esteem represent Iqbal's ideal human being. A person who can build a strong self will be able to overcome all worldly problems. Iqbal's emphasis on self-concept reminds us of the comparison of Muslims and unbelievers on the battlefield in verses 65 and 66 of Surat al-Anfal. In verse 65, it is stated that a true believer will overcome ten unbelievers. However, in the next verse, it is stated that this ratio could be one to two due to the weakness of believers. A strong self shaped by Islam will protect the individual, and therefore the society, against dangers much stronger than himself. Therefore, the primary goal is to create a strong self-consciousness. Iqbal sees self-construction as a necessity of being human beyond a religious basis. Man only acquires existence by his being. There is a fine line here, though. Over-emphasis on the self can lead a person to dangerous pride, just as the devil sees himself as superior. For this reason, Iqbal restrains the self with obedience to Allah. The self gains value through obedience to Allah. Obedience develops the self by disciplining it.

The second point that comes to the fore in Iqbal's thought is the rebuilding of Islamic thought. Iqbal opposes the confinement of a timeless religion to time. Closing the door of ijtiḥād comes at the beginning of the practices that cause the weakening of Islamic thought. He states that the ijtiḥād provisions created in a certain time and place should be reconsidered. He states that the most important factor that adds dynamism to Islamic thought is the capacity for ijtiḥād. By examining the socio-political historical past that caused the closing of the door of ijtiḥād, he wants to show that the door of ijtiḥād is not closed as a religious necessity. He tries to blend Islam with the spirit of the time. In fact, in this way, he

speaks beyond his time. Iqbal predicts that with the spread of modernization, the entire Islamic world will encounter similar problems over time, and states that an intellectual ground must be established against these problems in advance. Iqbal rejects Sufi understandings that preach passive acceptance. He opposes Sufis who reject the self and worldly life. According to him, the issue of destiny has been misunderstood both in and outside the world of Islam. He separates destiny from fatalism. Destiny is actually the time when possibilities will yet appear. Time is free here from the net of causal sequence –the diagrammatic character that the logical understanding imposes on it. Hence, destiny is not a misfortune that man cannot change, but a force that offers him an opportunity. It is up to us to shape our actions using the power that destiny gives us. The continuation of Allah’s creation is hidden in this sense. This is the essence of Allah’s being “in a state of creation at every moment.” Man and society, whose destiny is in their hands, will have the capacity to change the existing established order.

The third point that stands out in Iqbal’s thought is the establishment of Islamic unity against imperialist and colonial powers. He opposes nationalist movements because it harms unity. Although he saw the caliphate as a unifying force for the Islamic Ummah, he predicted that it would be useless to try to re-establish this institution in the vacuum created by the abolition of the caliphate by Turkey. While he deems the caliphate necessary, he did not remain stuck there when the caliphate was abolished. According to him, the caliphate was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the Islamic world has been divided into independent political units, it has no longer been operative. In fact, far from serving any useful purpose, today, it has stood in the way of a reunion of independent Muslim States. In other words, Iqbal did not stick to the names of authorities such as the caliphate but advised that new ways should be sought to bring Muslims together according to the conditions of the time.

Finally, Iqbal suggested a constant love of struggle for the realization of all these factors. He did not consider the idea that was not put into practice sufficient. Let’s end with his other poem;

*May I tell thee the secret of my existence?
I constantly struggle, therefore I exist,
Like a restless wave on the surface of an ocean,
I have no identity unless I turn and twist.*

(Iqbal, *A Message from the East*)

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CHAPTER XXIV

ON ABAI'S DIVINE 'BEATITUDES'

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Introduction

The main objective of the comparative philosophical historiography study proposed in this research is to establish the existence of a series of significant and fundamental nuclei in Abai's theory. Through Dante's perspective it was in fact possible to initiate the recognition of common paradigms, shared by Asian and European culture, in the structuring of a "common mental dictionary". On the basis of this methodology, it is therefore possible to derive the historical-philosophical "universalia" of Abai, through the "a priori" categories of Dante's medieval "beatitudes." In the construction of a linguistic-textual corpus of the culture of the 13th-14th centuries, I have recomposed, with the aim of isolating them, those key terms, essential for a basic glossary, and fundamental for the understanding and reading of Abai's texts. To this end, I concentrated on a discursive dimension, around the constellation of at least five fourteenth-century paradigmatic terms: COGNITIO, AMOR, PIETAS, RELIGIO, LUX.

1. Historical-philosophical perspectives on Abai.
2. Dante's contextualization of Abai.

“As above, so below”

The great interest that the Kazakh philosopher Abai expressed for Dante's theoretical corpus inevitably leads us to the philosophical and theological correspondence, between microcosm and macrocosm between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, making the saying of the esoteric tradition of the Western Middle Ages our own: “As above, so below”. This would show how the study of the three different monotheistic religious forms, Judaism-Christianity-Islam, is able to bring about an increase in a consciousness of a primordial unity, of an ever-greater tolerance in Abai's Eurasian Weltanschauung and of a of the World and the Universe. Regarding the historical relationships, between the Jewish (Kabbalah)-Christian-Islamic (Tasāwwuf) esoteric triad, we can refer, in a first phase, from the period of the Crusades and to their conclusion, towards the end of the 13th century, in which Islamic esotericism, while, at a later stage, up to the consolidation of the Renaissance, one draws, rather, on Jewish esotericism. An example of Islamic mediation, according to the studies of N. Goodrick-Clarke, has been identified with Ramon Llull, whom many Islamologists have defined as a “Christian Sufi”, especially for his main work “The book of the friend and the beloved”, clearly imitating Sufi poetry. While, in the second phase, for the whole of the sixteenth century, Moshe Idel underlined how decisive the influence of Jewish esotericism on Christian intellectuals and mystics was, which seems to go back, in Italy, to the syncretistic work of Pico della Mirandola and the decision to publish some works of Kabbalah, both in Italy and in central and northern Europe, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Meditating on some Dante's eschatological lemmas, well highlighted by Abai, it is possible to grasp and learn, referring to Pliny and other encyclopedists of classicism, “as an encyclopedic dimension, entirely transcendent and immanent, for a complete education, which in tradition Greek was defined as *enkýklios paideia*, able to collect knowledge of every mystery age, in a *concordantia philosophorum*.”

In particular in the Dante tradition for the exemplarity of the lemmas, which I have chosen, in the construction of a brief Abaisian glossary, I would like to emphasize the connection of Man with the divine Being, in the same way of the connection of Man with the Other, together with the regulation of processes and roles in the social structure, precisely to focus that creative link, which proceeds, even from top to bottom, right into the most immediate and concrete processes and configurations of Life itself.

- COGNITIO, as the capacity for human knowledge, without evading its ultimate teleological function, as “*pulcherrima quaestio*”;

- AMOR, as human tension in its questioning about the Truth and the Good;
- PIETAS, as the point of arrival of the interreligious journey, of the “via perficiendi hominis”;
- RELIGIO, as a social exercise for the revelation of the Supreme Good;
- LUX, as divine help towards cosmic infinity.

1. Historical-philosophical perspectives on Abai.

Abai was the bearer of all the new, like Dante, he was far above the environment that had given birth to him. In poetic works created since 1882-1886 he addresses the social, social and moral problems of the Kazakh people, inviting the Kazakhs to follow the “right path” of civil development (“eight verses”). For the first time in Kazakh literature, he created poetic works with the purpose of the poet and poetry (“Poetry is the queen of the language”). He combined elements of landscape, love letters with philosophical generalizations and educational and humanistic ideas, like Dante’s “dolce stil novo”. Abai’s artistic innovation has indeed manifested itself in the renewal of the theme of the poem’s content, as many poems are written in the form of lyrical monologues (“Aittym salem, Kalamkas” - “I send you my greetings, beautiful Kalamkas”).

Like Dante, Abai sang the woman-angel. In the poem “Kozimnin Karasy” (“You are the apple of my eye”), “Kyzaryp, syrlyny” (“And blush and turn pale”), “Kashykyk tili - tilsiz til” (“The language of love is a language without words”) shows the strength of Love, through the song of the beauty of an angelic woman.

In 1887 he wrote the poems “Iskander”, “Magsud”, “The Legend of Azim”; basing his plots on the reinterpreted motifs of classical oriental and esoteric literature.

Abai’s significant contribution to the development of artistic prose and social thought were the “Words of Edification” - “Gaklia” (1890 - 1898). The content of the book consists of 45 “Words of Edification” on various topics, playing an important role in introducing young people to the spiritual sources of popular wisdom. The central idea of “Words of Edification” is the belief in the triumph of humanistic ideals, in the limitless possibilities of ethical and traditional values. Many experts believe that Abai Kunanbayev’s main legacy is the words of edification, widely known in Kazakhstan, in the original language, “Kara soz” (“Essays”).

The poet wrote them at a very mature age, having lived most of his life, meeting people and his own people. There was nothing new in “Words of Edification”, just a more common set of rules, which mainly concerned morality

and norms of behavior. However, for their time, they caused a sensation: established in a simple and understandable form, they spread among the common people of Kazakhstan, forming a higher morality, enlightening local residents.

These poems by Abai Kunanbayev were translated into Russian and published at least three times: in 1945, 1954 and 1979. Attempts were also made to translate into German; however, the work was never completed.

Abai's literary and aesthetic legacy is the national pride of the Kazakh people. The traditions of Abai in his literary work were developed by Sh. Kudaiberdyev (1858 - 1931), S. Toraigyrov (1894 - 1921), M. Zhumabaev (1893 - 1938), S. Donentaev (1894 - 1933). The classics of Kazakh literature of the 20th century grew in the legacy of Abai: M. Auezov, S. Seifullin, G. Musrepov, S. Mukanov, G. Mustafin, A. Tazhibayev, K. Amanzholov, T. Zharokov.

The image of the outstanding poet-educator is embodied in works of literature, music and fine arts. His life and work inspired M. Auezov to create an admirable epic novel in two books: *Abai* and *Abai Zholy* (The Way of Abai) (Lenin Prize, 1959).

2. Dante's contextualization of Abai.

Abai Kunanbayev was an innovator of Kazakh poetry like Dante for the history of the Italian language and literature: he introduced new dimensions, rhymes and poetic forms into Kazakh versification. His poems dedicated to the seasons are also innovative, such as "Spring", "Summer", "Autumn", "Winter", poems on the purpose of poetry (to teach good and condemn evil). The plots of the poems "Magsud" and "The Tale of Azim" are based on motifs from classical oriental literature. The poem "Iskander" contrasts reason in the person of Aristotle and the greed of the conqueror in the person of Alexander the Great.

In a difficult time of colonization and disputes between clans, Abai boldly and proudly raised the banner of the struggle for progress and enlightenment, leading the nomadic Kazakh people along the path of knowledge and light.

Abai dreamed and worked tirelessly to make his native Kazakh people free and united:

“When the people become unanimous, -
It will be an inexhaustible lake
And the fatty herbs will cover its banks.

Then, playing, the foliage will whisper,
 And, thunderous, the fleeting rush
 Slide.
 And the herds on those shores
 It will multiply and grow.”

Abay has created about 170 poems and 56 translations, poems and “Words of Edification” (“kara sözder”) have been written. He was also a musician and composer, creating about two dozen melodies, which are currently popular, like some of his poems that Abay Kunanbayev personally set to music, for example “Közimnin Karasy”.

3. Keywords: COGNITIO, AMOR, PIETAS, RELIGIO, LUX.

COGNITIO

“Ipsa verba cogitamus” Agostino, De Magistro I, 2

In Dante’s thought, as in that of Abai, “cognitio” is presented as the capacity for human knowledge, without evading its ultimate teleological function, the aim of which is “to lead men into science and truth”.

Dante drew on a long-developed patrimony, dating back first to Aristotle, who in *De anima et vita* had theorized the role of faculties, functions, as well as the passions of the soul. Dante focused on the dynamism of the facultates, with an in-depth study of memory and ingenium, in their privileged function of transmitting knowledge, in the methods of deepening the disciplines.

On the part of Western philosophers, in fact, the theme of signs and language has always been the subject of in-depth study, in order to investigate the origin of the construction of human ideas and opinions. Naturally, the common starting point was the Aristotelian tradition, which established words as signs of thoughts, asking, however, whether linguistic signs were capable of carrying out a cognitive function.

At the dawn of the early modern age the question, for every theory of knowledge, arose as one of the priority questions, that is: whether from every classic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was possible to deduce a particular gnoseology, regarding the nature of language and to its relationship with thought.

In the Middle Ages a real theory of mental language had been launched: it was, that is, a doctrine that was both psychological and semantic, a conception of thought which, on the one hand affirmed the priority and autonomy, with respect to conventional linguistics, on the other hand it highlighted its semiotic and discursive nature.

Less explored by scholars was, however, an apparently secondary implication of this theory, namely the hypothesis relating to the existence of a completely parallel mental language, to spoken and written verbal speech, a sort of conventional “double” of that Language natural mind that united all men, regardless of the linguistic community to which they belong.

In the Latin West, the reflection on language has been based on the distinction between spoken terms, written terms and mental terms. A subdivision that, as is well known, derived from Aristotle, through the linguistic mediation and transmission of Boethius’ knowledge.

But in the late medieval treatises of logic, on the basis of Augustinian, Anselmian and Occamist suggestions, a fourth type of linguistic signs was added to this triad, called “improper mental terms”, “unfinished concepts” or “average concepts”.

These were given an important role in the explanation of the cognitive processes involved in the use and understanding of verbal language: their function would have been, in fact, to mediate between the exteriority of the sign and the interiority of the concept, which of that sign held the meaning.

The term “knowledge” specified by the indication of the Truth, as its object, seemed to have wanted to be a propaedeutic to logical-epistemological questions, rather than psychological ones: in other words, what was passed over in silence was the study of *Cognitio* itself, that is, the reflection of cognitive processes, consisting in the formation of the mental representations themselves. Using the *Logos*, according to a structure articulated on the three planes of the *phônê*, the *grámmata* and the *pathémata tes psyches*, and, subordinating the former to the last, in a relation of symbolic expression, Aristotle traced the reference coordinates for the entire speculation western, precisely on the relationship between thought and language.

Thus, through the Boezian mediation, the Aristotelian tripartition was transmitted to the Christian Middle Ages: it was, in fact, at the origin, among other things, of the Occamist theory of Mental Language, conceived as an interior discourse, composed of concepts and not of words, which preceded and gave meaning to every verbal, spoken or written production.

Taking directly from Boethius's comment, *De interpretatione*, the conception was expressed according to which "triplax est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta". Ockham identified the mental proposition, and the "conceived terms" that were its parts, with those "verba mentalia", of which Augustine had affirmed that they did not belong to any language: they remained, in fact, confined to the interior of the mind, and only acoustic symbols could be pronounced externally and transmitted to other minds.

The work to which Ockham was referring was the *De Trinitate* XV, in which Augustine had interpreted the "affections of the soul" of the Aristotelian text, in the sense of a word pronounced internally, but radically different, compared to the acoustic and graphic productions, which were the outward signs. Finally, at the origin of this conception of the *cogitatio* as *locutio cordis* we can include a series of scriptural suggestions, with respect to the trunk of Aristotelian semiotics, which highlighted and well represented typically Christian development.

And, in fact, Augustine made use of it, in order to trace in human thought, a precious resemblance to the divine Word: whoever came to perceive in his own heart, "in secretario mentis", the existence of a verb that was pure thought, not yet incarnated in the voice, only then could he see some faint reflection of that Word of God, which was in the beginning, and understand that it would become flesh to manifest itself to men.

The *locutio cordis* was common to all men: a universal language, which everyone could experience within himself. Still, his presence didn't seem to be that obvious. Augustine, in order to gain a dimension in which the analogy between the inner verb and the divine Word was recognized, had, in a certain sense, to focus that *locutio*, which coincided with the pure *cogitatio*, isolating it from the other languages, which distinguished thinking and human action proper. It was therefore a question of conceiving that verb "non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione volvantur".

The warning was clear: in the search for the verb "quod intus lucet", one should not stop at the acoustic images, which reflected, in the thought, the external utterances, and which therefore still belonged to the language, which resonated to the external. We should not focus on the "verbum nostrum quod sonat in auribus, nec when voce profertur, nec when silentio cogitatur".

The signs emitted by the body filled the mind with their incorporeal images, forming speeches, rhythms and melodies, which thought recited in silence. Besides the verb, there was another word that competed with the verb of the heart:

Augustine defined this mental verb, yet, to some extent still corporeal, as “*cogitativum in similitudine soni*”, and added that it, unlike thought, which preceded all the signs, which meant it, was necessarily formulated in a particular language.

The importance of these observations, at least in terms of a history of influences, is easily documented in Dante, who took care of Augustine’s production with extreme interest and meticulous wealth. The passage in this glossary also deserves a mention, in which it was prayer that posed the problem of the relationship between thought and linguistic signs: since the prayers taught by God were nothing more than sequences of words: how the precept to pray in the interior of the heart?

Augustine’s answer was that the words uttered, silently, in thought, offered only a mnemonic trace: retracing the verbal signs, the mind could recall the things meant, and it was to these that the praying soul turned. “You will have realized”, said Augustine to his son, of the fact that: “*etiamsi quisquam contendat, quamvis nullum edamus sonum, tamen quia ipsa verba cogitamus, non intus apud animum loqui, sic quoque locutione, nihil aliud agere quam commonere cum memoria cui verba inhaerent, ea revolvendo, facit come in mentem res ipsas quarum signa sunt verba*”.

Taking a leap of over six centuries, we find very similar observations in Anselmo: reflecting on the form, which preceded the existence of the created thing, the Monologion compared this form, the eternal ratio, which governed creation, to a saying that had place “*in ipsa ratione*”. Anselmo, however, felt the need to specify:

... *Mentis autem sive rationis locutionem hic intelligo, non cum voces rerum ificoe cogitantur, sed cum res ipsae vel futurae vel iam existentes acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur.*

There were, in fact, three ways to describe and tell a res: using sensitive signs, that is, perceptible through the bodily senses; or thinking insensibly, “*insensibiliter cogiando*”, those same signs that, on the outside, were sensitive; or without using these signs “*nec sensibiliter nec insensibiliter*”.

The same trichotomy would also seem to be present in Albert the Great and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio 571, and in Thomas Aquinas, especially regarding the reception and evolution of the problem, during the thirteenth century. Thomas, in the *Summa theologiae*, argued, for example, that there were three ways of

using the verbum, in the proper sense, that is, to indicate either an “interior mentis conceptus”, or, “ipsa vox interior conceptus significant”, or, again, “Ipsa imaginatio vocis”. Thomas quoted, in addition to the Augustinian *De trinitate*, the *De fide orthodoxa*, by Giovanni Damasceno, although this second reference, for most of the historiographical survey, would seem not very critical.

It is interesting that Thomas justified the presence of the third level, that of imagining the sound, by observing that the vox proceeded from the imagination: the image of the sound would seem to be constituted by the model of the word, uttered externally. The third way consisted in the thought of the res itself, of which one represented with the intuition or, with the imagination, the corporeal figure, or, with the intellect one reached the universal essence.

The intuition coincided, therefore, with an exercise of the *acies mentis*, which took the form of a thinking, totally purified from the sensibility, from the bodily residue, which still remained in the thought: “cum idem nomen tacens cogito”.

Intuitive thinking centered on the res itself, and did not use sensible signs, nor utter them externally, nor thought them silently. It is with this *locutio*, Anselm added, taking up, in turn, the speculation on the Johannine verb, that God had made the res be and, therefore, he knew them, after having created them.

In addition to this juxtaposition of intuitive, non-sign, thought with the divine inspection of ideas, there was another element in the Anselmian text: the verba, which had composed the phrases of the third species, were natural, that is, they had exhibited the res, by virtue of their similarity to it, and not, it could have been added, by virtue of an arbitrary institution.

In Occamism, this qualification of naturalness will constitute a prominent feature of that particular class of signs, the concepts, which will be the basis of mental language. Ockham, however, if on the one hand he took up this semiotic conception of thought and developed it considerably, on the other he structured the different levels of Language, following the Aristotelian tripartite division.

The intermediate level, between the external sign and the internal verb, consisting of the images of sounds, the thought of words, seemed, however, to be of little interest to the English Franciscan theologian.

While, the concern to distinguish the *oratio mentalis*, true and proper of the mental representations of sounds, and the scriptures was felt by all medieval hermeneutics, which, as Eco affirms from the “scriptural labyrinth”, was continually fascinated by a dilemma: if “the book was written *digito Dei* is the very principle of identity, the book cannot generate contradictory meanings”.

Its sources are not in the documents and are not based on Tradition, because it is the Kingdom of Heaven itself: there the spiritual forces must be sought and understood, as well as mathematics is understood, trying to develop the forces of one's own intellectuality. Our intellect, when we need it to understand the laws of the sensible world, is aided by only one organ, the brain.

While, for the understanding of the laws of the spiritual worlds we need, equally, the suitable organs, those given by the supreme unifying principle, of the Word expressing the hidden Father, of which he is manifestation: of Christ, in the Vital Spirit, in the unifying principle of eternity, the initiation of all Humanity was historically accomplished, on the level of sentiment and heart. Vives had reiterated this, perhaps, inspired by the contemplative *cognitio* of Bonaventura di Bagnoregio, in his *De tradendis*, combining *cognitio* with *Amor* of God: "(...) Deus nos, antequam nobis nasceremur, jam diligebat quia jam noverat, jam illi geniti eramus; nos nati, et cognoscendi vim atque usum adepti, amamus (...) ". And, again, to anticipate the terms that I analyze, below in the fourteenth-century educational-philosophical lexicographic mapping:

(...) quae autem amanda sint fides monstrabit, traditis unicuique primis et simplicissimis elementis pietatis de Deo patre omnium, et filio ejus Jesu Christo, here ad redemptionem nostrae carnis peccati, carnem eandem nostram induit, sed sine sino.

Dante had indicated what the requirements were for the mystical ascent, first of all with the knowledge of the same reality, which always precedes the act of love: "amorem vero est necesse cognitio antecedit".

God loves us, therefore, because we have always known him, before birth, and our condition of existence is guaranteed, precisely because he knows and loves us, in every moment, in eternity. Our finitude, on the contrary, is inscribed in our sapiential and initiatory evolution, in that a certain knowledge of God is reached only after having achieved a certain level of maturity, after having received the necessary and gradual teachings, to adore and love him, in his infinite goodness.

AMOR

"The love that turns and the virtue that rains". Dante, *Paradiso* XXVII, III.

"The love that calms this sky". Dante, *Paradiso* XXX, 52

Dante intended AMOR as a human tension in his questioning about the Truth and the Good, creating a real mystical "summa", and, although it is difficult to investigate the written sources available to the Florentine, it would seem allowed to advance hypotheses of classical authors, like Plato, from whom he certainly drew inspiration.

The theme of love reminds us not only of Neoplatonic speculations, but, above all, of medieval reminiscent "literature and love travelers" and the pilgrimage of love and the initiatory dream of Polifilo, written by Francesco Colonna. Like the eternal pilgrims who, moving between the two Venuses, or three, as suggested by Pico della Mirandola, went in search of the eternal Beauty.

Dante's journey began with the Fathers of the Church, especially St. Augustine, who were another important source of inspiration for developing the Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas on love. It is considered probable that Dante was initiated into the reading of troubadour lyric, medieval novels and medieval doctrinal formulations, such as, for example, the *Tractatus Amoris et de Amoris Remedio*, by Andreas Capellanus.

Hence the interreligious principle of charity, as a manifestation of human love, present in all the poetic productions of Petrarch, Cavalcanti and Dante. The mystical experience of the Christian tradition did not express the experience of God's presence. The direct experience of God's silence expressed something ineffable, which went beyond human words and therefore, obviously, it was not easy to talk about and was not satisfactory. The same term to indicate it. The essence of medieval Christian mysticism consisted in the intense and perfect communion of the person, in the community in Christ. This type of mysticism characterized the whole monastic tradition, which in the late Middle Ages and in modern times took on an increasingly intimate and individual dimension.

Spirituality was manifested in prayer, which became love, above all because it materialized in the choice to live a life infused in AMOR, complying with one's humanity and seeking one's naturalness in the love of God and in the universe, as open sentient beings, dynamic and free.

The spiritual life thus confronted man with something inaccessible, which constituted the universe, although it was beyond it, inexhaustible and unknowable. The spiritual tradition adopted that apophatic theological approach, according to which man, in silence, could therefore welcome God with love, more than with the intellect.

Welcoming God meant transcending and transforming both one's own intellectual and affective dimensions, intuitively and suddenly, in a connection

of reciprocal interpenetration, like a fire that, flickering from below and from above, in a single movement, merged the person. who loved with the beloved, in a passionate and lasting union, in respect of mutual identity.

The reference concerned the so-called “*incendium amoris*”, the fire of love, which could be expressed by the contemplation of natural beauty, by music, by pure beauty, or simply by our secret interiority. Isaac the Syrian in the seventh century had defined it as the twig, which set fire to all of Creation itself, through the ardor and ecstasy of devout prayer, which overwhelmed and absorbed everything. In it they learned to know Nature, the harmony of the spheres and humanity in its panic meaning, of fusion with God.

In that way a tree was a tree, a pine or an olive tree, but at the same time they express a theophany. For contemplatives everything was what it was, in its specific particular, and, at the same time, something more, in the pantheistic sense of the divine.

Thus, that nucleus of metaphorical ontology was outlined, capable of expressing the manifest sense of phenomenal reality, in order to reach that knowledge of the greatest truth, in its most intimate and secret sense. being divine and human, they were identical to the metaphors used to describe the sky in the Arts.

Peace, serenity, freedom from worldly concerns, together with the stupendously paradoxical metaphor of the “*negotiosissimum otium*”, a total stillness, which were both intense activity and a magnificent representation of the spiritual life and the life of the spiritual hierarchies.

The Christian spiritual tradition had had two prominent exponents in Dionysius and Augustine. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the most eminent examples were: Bernardo di Chiaravalle and Francesco d’Assisi. Bernard and the Cistercian tradition, after him, united together: intellect and will, discipline and joy, love of the soul and love of the body.

The Cistercians were often able to abstract themselves from the mystical openness, so much so that they could write about it, even knowing, that the conceptualization and verbal expression retreated precisely in front of the experience of that openness, which could not be described, except in the metaphor.

Francis of Assisi himself seemed to have been involved so often that he could not talk about it, although the Franciscans who followed him, like Bonaventure, did. Dante’s words on Amor could almost literally trace both St. Augustine and St. Thomas. St. Augustine wrote: “When one yearns for love for

dear things, it is desire; when one possesses and enjoys it, it is joy” (De civitate Dei, XIV, 7). And St. Thomas argued, in the *Summa Theologica*, that love “is the first of affective emotions”, (IaIIae 25.2.), The cause of all emotions, even that of hate, (IaIIae 29.2.), “One can be hated because you only act against something beautiful “: *contrariatur convenient*.

The language and definitions developed by Dante have well represented the starting point of the philosophical system of St. Thomas and all those scholastics who had experienced, in a completely mystical form, the ecstasy of desire and emotion, conformed to an empty, negating, absent pleasure, specifically distinct both from love, which precedes desire, and from pleasure, what happens, and from the lasting effect of *Amor*. (IaIIae. 30.2)

PIETAS

“*Sunt lacrimae rerum (...)*”. Virgil, *Aeneid*, 1, 462.

The ancient term of *pietas* has had a very long success since the 14th Century, thus making it possible to elaborate a “history of piety”, with a simple common denominator in Dante: the relationship between individuals with God. *pietas*, in the historical context, therefore led to the reconstruction of the “*pietatis via*”, that is an initiatory path, which Christianity had inherited in a complex and articulated process of assimilation the values, mediated by the notion of the Sacred of the classical world. A political, historical-cultural operation, characterized by an exceptional religious syncretism, which also entailed the semantic transformation of the same term: from the public to the private, from the heroic-sacral notion to the civic duty of assistance to the needy, from the cult of ancestors of the gens to the social responsibility of the state, from the devotional testimony of the individual to the war action of the “knight of Christ” in the world.

The theme of mendacity is strongly felt by Dante.

The word *pietas* was used in the language of those who had received a humanistic education and expressed itself with the refined vocabulary of classical authors, assimilating, for example, with a certain ease, the Virgilian religiosity of the “*pius Aeneas*” to that of Christian Europe, on the eve of the Reformation.

“(…) According to the Homeric hymn to Aphrodite (198 ff.), The son of Anchises and the goddess was given the name *Aineias* because the relationship with a mortal had caused Aphrodite an” *ainon ... achos*”, a terrible pain Virgilio

seems aware of this legacy: his protagonist enters the scene while he stretches his hands to the sky and shouts his agony and his desire to die. (1.92 ff.) And the ‘terrible’ inscribed in his name reveals himself to be capable. to suffer but also to make people suffer: the last image we have of Aeneas projects outwards the potential for ‘terrible pain’ that is inscribed in his name: *saevi monumenta doloris ... furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (12,947- 48). Even his mute traveling companion and attendant, Achates, could bear traces of this temper of pain (cf. Servius, to Aen, 1,312: again, we think of the Greek *achos*).

Aeneas, Odysseus and Achilles are memorable for their ability to suffer and also for the pain they inflict. This human complexity is one with the epos. But this literary tradition, it must also be said, does not speak to us of being human. A famous ancient definition, ‘the epic is said to be an intertwining of divine and human stories’ (Diomedes, *Gramm.* 1,483.27), can serve as a guide. The epic, substantiated by pain, is also a literature that lives on the coexistence, distinction and interaction of men, gods and heroes. We will see in what sense the presence of pain unites and divides the actors of the epic, this community of unequal people who must continually know and separate: men and gods, friends and enemies. (...) Virgil here assumes the role of replacing the authority of Homer: his new epic enunciates, in a certain sense perfect, the cosmic laws that assign different positions to men and gods (...) Jupiter who does not cry (...) the effort of self-control exerted by Hercules shows that we are in a divine world where pain is more severely regulated.

(...) The particular context - (also here) “*Sunt lacrimae ...*”: Aeneas discovers in Carthage a temple decorated with the events of the Trojan war and his comment is that there he will find respect and compassion for the sufferings of Trojans - is continually transcended: each new reading is charged with previous interpretations ..., with its universal enunciation force ... the “tears of things”, in the sense of universal history, the myth of the foundation of the West. Our starting point is, again, the representation in pain. This time we are dealing not with the painful separation between men and gods, but with the possibility of a unification between men: pain represented in the figures of the temple is an opportunity for mutual recognition - Aeneas sees himself known by Dido and recognizes his humanity (...)

And, again Barchiesi on the Virgilian inheritance: “(...) This is therefore the starting point of my reasoning. For those who feel they have been overwhelmed by impetuous historical and cultural changes, the permanence of the classic may seem an irritating challenge, or an empty nostalgia: but there are also ways

to put the acquired experiences to good use. We often conceive of modernity as a process of inexorable distancing from the classical past, according to a progressive loss of meaning: but on closer inspection, it is likely that no era ever has a privileged and objective point of view from which to interpret the past. It is more likely that every era and every historical context offers its opportunities, which it is up to the interpreters to know how to value. That is why I want to introduce from this relatively new point of view the case of Virgil's *Aeneid* and its divergent interpretations.

The *Aeneid* is one of the few ancient texts that have always shared, (with some fluctuations, without ever completely fading) the story of what we can call European Classicism. From our historical position we can try to summarize the story in two words. The emergence of the great nation-states of modern Europe, in different political forms, but with growing hegemonic and imperial ambitions, has fueled a work of reinvention of the Greco-Roman, pre-Christian past, and has given stability, above all through scholastic institutions and the diffusion of teaching, to a conception of the Greco-Roman past as 'classicism'. The stable form of this conception, which has only recently begun to enter into crisis, seems to be this: European culture has the privilege of having 'two' types of past, one religious, national, developed through the Middle Ages and linked to a 'state or ethnic identity; and a 'classic', potentially broader, alternative to the Christian and ethnic heritage: this second type of past has functions of authority and beauty that are felt to be generalizable, and that allow a sort of 'traffic' between elites and educational institutions of the European world.

I would like to state that the *Aeneid* had a considerable influence and importance because it was attributed a mediating function, almost a hinge between the areas I have outlined. On a religious level: a 'polytheistic' poem to which, however, values and contents were assigned in some way compatible with Christian culture. At the level of national identity ('Romanity' is imagined as more national and state than the political fragmentation of the Greek world) as well as an evident imperial ambition. On the ethical level: a story that teaches us to establish a link between the individual and the community, just when the almost threatening growth of the idea of the 'modern individual' threatens to upset old equilibriums. These strategic functions of the *Aeneid* in the European imagination emerge very well from Virgilian imitations, even in very different contexts, such as in the Eurasian one of Abai.

Thus, the *pietas* of Aeneas, in facing the painful and dangerous trials of Life, became a true allegory of the long journey of the man of Dante and Abai,

the same one they undertook, in the confluence of their respective biographies, to penetrate the secrets of Scripture, with their own Enchiridion, in facing their vices and demons, proclaiming, on the basis of the Augustinian lesson the *pietas litterata*.

For Dante the *pietas* was the point of arrival of the Christian journey, like the “*via perficiendi hominis*”.

Abai, too, the history of man was a description of the process of perfection.

Man, as “*perfectus homo Deo*”, had expressed, in the conditions of social coexistence, the need to purify Culture, the artes, in the theater of the World, as a work of God, to reach perfection, the purpose for which it was possible to reveal the purpose for which he was created: God made man capable of knowing and loving, in the consciousness of the “*perfectus vero sibi*”.

Pietas therefore linked the two “perfections”: the “*perfectus homo Deo*” and the “*perfectus homo sibi*”, in the bosom of the human historical process. In both, the first as the work of God the creator, the second as a result of the existential path: Man was forged in love and obedience, for all of his existence and up to the achievement of his final end of his finitude, with fullness and bliss, in union with God, through Love.

The only path that led to God, that is, the path of perfection, through the *pietas* of the “*perficiendi hominis*”, was none other than the actual carrying out of an incessant process of love. Love was for Dante, in fact, the main source, the path of perfection and the end of man.

The love of God, which we have received from birth, has been the cause of our being: through love, expressed by Creation, and with our mission on Earth we have fulfilled the divine plan to be Children of God, in the union with him out of love, sharing his joy and happiness, as there was no greater test, in his name.

This was why God created us and this will be the purpose for which He will welcome us back into the Kingdom of Heaven.

The perfection of Man, however, was not limited, as an act, to the perfection of Nature. The will, as “*physis*”, as Nature, was not represented by intrinsic force alone, because it did not reach its maximum perfection in the mere act of desiring or loving, but rather the teleology of the act itself was to be considered, so that he could reach his super-sensitive “*ad quem*”. Man was therefore unable to achieve his mission in the simple act of Nature, because only in union with God, the “*Supreme Good*”, God had generated himself. Because the same God

as the end of man was the motive and the reason for everything that determined the same "beingness", Dante, again, underlined the triple condition for all sentient men: the rational, the social and the historical.

Man, as the fruit of God's work, was the desire of God himself, in union with the beloved, in the exhortation to advance the path of humanity towards perfection and eternal happiness.

RELIGIO

Abai as Dante not only demonstrated in all his production, to be an ethical philosopher and a pedagogue, but also an apologist and an ascetic of the I AM, YHWH, the God of the Book, foundation of Creation, principle of life.

Dante intended to understand the origins of Man, crossing the religious mystery and living the prophetic poetics of Virgil's IV Egloga, to find his own divine identity in union with God. Even if in his pedagogical or even linguistic approaches, strongly theological and esoteric implications cannot be found, precisely because in his will as a viator he intended to seek a concrete answer to his "Who am I?" in a *Philosophia perennis*, which went beyond what was called, over the centuries, as *hokmah nisteret-chen*.

A famous midrash is reported, from the Hermetic Tradition, which could allow us, at least, to guess precisely that anti-mystical mentality, which did not wear the *arba'kanfoth* or the sign of Zion, under or over the garment:

Four sages entered the *Pardes* (Garden of Divine Knowledge) to study Kabbalah: the first, Ben Azai, died shortly after, the second, Ben Zuma, went mad, the third, Elisha ben Avuia, broke the plants and lost faith, the fourth only, Rabbi aqiva went out in peace.

Therefore, it would not be out of place to underline how, even his Comedy can constitute a real reading of high spiritual rank, thanks to its high educational content, about the logical, concrete and universal idea of every life on Earth. Which, in critical terms, led Dante into a truly avant-garde religious anthropologism, aimed at the knowledge of God, with respect to the egoic Self, through the idea of the Mystical Body, which comes to incarnate every day. His mysticism has, above all, highlighted a pragmatic solution, with the proposal of a participatory communion of the faithful, together with prayer and ethical life.

In this context of religious practice, Dante in his texts, in fact, demonstrated only mystical and ascetic expressions against false prejudices on other religions,

for example Hebrew and Islamic, urging to pursue, together with the sacraments, prayer and supplication, as an essential moment of communion with God, through universal brotherhood.

In the Kazakh language we invite you to have a welcoming disposition; the verb “to love” literally means “to look good at someone”. But even the traditional culture of these Eurasian regions affirms the same spiritual longing thing through a beautiful popular proverb: “If you meet someone, try to make them happy, it may be the last time you see them”.

If the cult of steppe hospitality recalls the inalienable religious value of every human being, Abai affirms this by saying that “man must be a friend of man” and that this friendship is based on a universal exchange, because the important realities of life and after life is common. And, therefore: “All are guests of each other”; and “the same man is a guest in this life” (Abai: Word 34).

LUX

The scholastics explicitly denied the intuition or direct vision of God, even opposed the Platonic and Averroistic doctrines, which reduced or even annulled the active power of the intellect, which made it dependent on an external action of an acting intellect, unique for all, like a spiritual sun.

Against them, the Scholastics affirmed that the acting intellect and its “lumen” are proper to the soul, “aliquid animae proprium a creatione inditum”, and that the intellect can be called “quoddam lumen creatum” for each rational soul.

St. Thomas categorically argued that the intellect produces the “intelligibles” by applying the uncreated lumen, in which the eternal reasons for things would be contained.

St. Bonaventure, in turn, suggested that we see in some way, “obscure et immediate”, those eternal reasons, because God is the reason for our own intellectual acts:

“Inasmuch as the created light cannot pass into its operation without some operation of the uncreated light by which every man is illuminated” (Lib. II Sent., Dist. 28, a.2, q.3). Therefore, God would not be directly the total cause, “tota causa”, of the intellectual act, even if without Him no created power is able to operate.

Our human mind, all too changeable, could not know the true immutables except through the immutable Truth, it cannot see the light of thought:

“incommutabiliter relucens nisi per aliquam aliam lucem incommutabiliter radiantem”.

This light, therefore, is not human, it is the Word with God, indeed, it is the Word God, who allows mediation with the same eternal Truth (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c.3).

St. Thomas was very precise on this point: light is not God himself (I, q.84, a.5).

What is this light for Dante?

The Word communicates itself to the intellect, as a finite power, as a ray that starts from God, as knowledge of God. The ideas of finite things, changeable and contingent, thus pervade themselves with universality, immutability and necessity, in the one act of God, as ontological illumination. Likewise, the term of *Lux*, is to be understood as divine help towards the infinite.

In fact, in this case we can speak of a metaphysics of light, identifiable with the intelligible and the divine. In the Christian Middle Ages, both patristics and scholastics had already found, through biblical exegesis, valid expressions that represented God as eternal light or his wisdom as splendor, using the same Plotinian metaphor, which had identified in the light the term that more than any other it could express the emanative processing from the One to the multiple and to illustrate the generation of the Word from the Father.

Augustine and Dionysius, for example, had defined God and the Word as *Lux*, not only, in a metaphorical sense, but, in the proper sense, starting that reflection, which will culminate in Grossatesta, Bonaventura and, even, in Dante.

Dante's guide, Virgil, in Purgatory (IV, 103), spoke of the “*lumera*” of the most noble castle, which would win the “*emisperium of darkness*” (IV, 69), excelling in its dazzling brilliance, through the darkness of the night of the underworld.

It was a light, albeit reflected, which came from afar, but which would have helped precisely those “*great spirits*”, and who, like Homer, Horace, Ovid, Lucan and many others, did not know the Christian faith and as blind, they could just live in the limbo of the shining castle (*Purg.* VII, 28-36).

Already in Hell (IV, 199), in the meeting with Sordello, Virgil had explained the suspended condition of glorious souls, who in life had been *exempla*, but who had not known the Faith and the theological virtues, while distinguishing themselves from the “*spirits thick*”, (IV, 66).

Balducci explains that the “lumera” assumes in the Comedy:

(...) a central importance, especially as regards the depth of Dante’s ‘classicism’ which, while denying pagan religiosity a positive value, recognizes all its historical importance, sensing in it (in its myths, that is, as well as in the results of the arts, law and philosophy of the ancients a basic archetypal repertoire for the future of the Western spirit. of Christianity, of a patrimony of values that continues to express its ethical and aesthetic substance even after the collapse of the ancient idols. (...) It should also be mentioned how metaphysical-theological problems were very much alive in these authors and physical-cosmological, coming from the Arab and Jewish debate, such as al-Kindi, Avicenna and Avicbron, who debated the fifth essence or ether as a luminous and heat-bearing, subtle and incorruptible matter that it formed the sky and the stars.

From this luminous substance, the light as *forma corporeitatis* radiated and descended into the lower world as an active force and virtue. Thus, resuming, Bonaventure, in his *Breviloquium* (II, 3), described *Lux* in its mixing with all the elements, to reconcile the opposite properties, create compounds, develop plant life and, in Man, keep the soul steady in the body, even in the terminal stages of the disease.

This going “beyond” and this expression of man’s dissatisfaction represented those symptoms which, neo-platonically, anticipated beauty as the revelation of the divine essence, but which, at the same time, matured the idea that death it was not the end of consciousness and that the solution was simply to overcome the limits dictated by the Nature of the physical body, offering an ultimate, eternal meaning to the existence of Man.

Perhaps this was the meaning of all Dante’s production for Abai: to take care, as a teacher, of the whole life of man, from his childhood, with his educational mediation.

A *renovatio* or a rebirth of culture and education, which opened new cultural horizons, above all, for Man, on the threshold of contemporaneity, starting a profound and unanimous process of change.

The return to the classical world would have meant finding new ideological models and cultural, which worthy of *homo novus*, on the basis of the common criteria of a neo-humanism, to which Abai himself belongs, could have said something useful, and given ever wider and more adequate answers to the

nascent individual consciences, obtaining, thus, the possibility of escaping from *obscuritas* and chaos, to attain *claritas* and elegance.

A cathartic program so that the light would return after darkness, post *tenebras Lux*, and that, as in any cosmic order, was able to illuminate the life of each man. This encounter with the classical world, a real *Arcadia felix*, had as a result, not so much the boundless number of volumes to read, but a new mentality which, thanks to the intellectuals, put in place a high quality of critical reception of the sources historical and bibliographic, for a philological and translation hermeneutics, also as a key to reading and critical learning for the new generations.

Abai, with his passion for classical studies, knew well, in the *Divine Comedy*, the correlation between sin, virtue, grace and 'beatitudines.' "Like Dante himself, who, in turn, had assimilated the theological ideas of Thomas Aquinas and of Bonaventure, and who, like them, expressed a teleological concern for the achievement of happiness, the ultimate universal goal of human existence. In fact, the "beatitudines" already prelude, albeit in a rudimentary form, to the participation in heavenly things by the human individual, belonging to any religious belief of any age.

Abai, as it is popularly known, has left us writings steeped in religiosity, in which the best of the spirit of the Kazakh people is reflected, a harmonious wisdom, which desires peace and seeks it by questioning itself with humility, yearning for a wisdom worthy of man, never confined to limited and narrow visions, but ready to be inspired by multiple experiences. Abai provokes us with the eternal question: "What is the beauty of life if you don't go deep?"; (Poetry, 1898). The need for religion reminds us that we human beings do not exist to satisfy earthly interests and to establish relationships of a purely economic nature, but to walk together, like pilgrims with their eyes turned to heaven. We need to find meaning in the ultimate questions, cultivate spirituality; we need, said Abai, to keep "the soul awake and the mind clear." (Word 6).

The search for transcendence and the sacred value of fraternity leads us, in fact, to the universal response of world peace and the infinite, it has made us understand that, as Abai said, "we are not demiurges, but mortals" (Word 45). Abai recalls that "he who permits evil and does not oppose evil cannot be considered a true believer, but, in the best of cases, a lukewarm believer" (cf. Word 38). In fact, a purification from evil is necessary, through the "beatitudines" dictated by: *COGNITIO, AMOR, PIETAS, RELIGIO, LUX*.

The great Kazakh poet insisted on this point, writing that those who “abandon knowledge deprive themselves of the blessing” and “whoever is not strict with himself and is not capable of compassion cannot be considered a believer” (Abai: Word 12).

Abai, in this sense, encouraged to broaden knowledge, to cross the border of one’s own culture, to embrace the knowledge, history and literature of others in universal brotherhood, to the praise of the Creator. Abai wrote: “What a wonderful world he gave us the Creator! He gave us his light with magnanimity and generosity. When mother earth welcomed us into its bosom, our heavenly Father bent over us with a question.” (From the poem “Spring”)

Conclusion

The traditional Greco-Thomistic philosophers, with their processes of abstraction, had almost always tried to escape the representation of the “tragedy of the world”, isolating Man from the roots, which linked him to his history, due to the progressive rise of soul to God.

For medieval mysticism, from Sant’ Agostino and Pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita, then used by Dante, this “upward trend” was represented in the symbology of the “steps” of the Divine Comedy, precisely to express the progress of the soul, created in the image and likeness of God, with in himself a divine principle, the starting point for bridging the gap between Man and God.

In this sense, the dangerous omission of imaginative language and knowledge rich in creative ingenuity was based, in late-scholastic culture, on the one hand on the rejection of the perception of historical relationships between individual objects, and on the other on the rejection of expression. and the translation of those meanings which Man had to continually discover through “contemplatio”.

Dante had profoundly intuited the cathartic need of the “beatitudines” as the necessary hinge between God and Man, to reach Paradise “Beati which alluma so much grace” (1Pg. 24, 151-152), as well as Abai has masterfully confirmed that “the source of humanity is love and justice, [...] they are the crowns of divine creation.” (Abai: Word 45)

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APPENDIX

APERTURA DELLA SESSIONE PLENARIA DEL VII CONGRESSO
DEI LEADER DELLE RELIGIONI MONDIALI E TRADIZIONALI

DISCORSO DEL SANTO PADRE

Palazzo dell'Indipendenza (Nur-Sultan), mercoledì 14 settembre 2022.

